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– the economics of hope. 
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 PREFACE 
 This book brings together 12 papers written over a period of  30 years (1985– 
2015). I have added an introduction ( Chapter 1 ) where I indicate the context 
of  the papers and their relationship to each other and an essayistic Postscript 
( Chapter 14 ) where I refl ect upon normative implications. 
 Anyone who reads the book as a whole will experience some repetition. 
This refl ects ‘self- citation’ and that the papers appear in their original form. 
This means, however, that each chapter can be read separately. I  am most 
grateful to Shagufta Haneef  who helped me with preparing the manuscript 
and the editing. 
 Several of  the papers have been co- authored, and I am grateful to Anthony 
Arundel, Antoine Valeyre, Björn Johnson, Edward Lorenz, Morten Berg 
Jensen, Rasmus Lema and Shulin Gu for their collaboration and for permis-
sions to republish those papers in this volume. 
 I am in intellectual debt to many other scholars who have given inspiration 
to my work. Thanks fi rst to colleagues in the research group on Innovation, 
Knowledge and Economic Dynamics (IKE group) at Aalborg University, par-
ticularly Asger Brændgaard, Bent Dalum, Birgitte Gregersen, Björn Johnson, 
Esben Sloth Andersen, Gert Villumsen, Jan Fagerberg, Jesper Lindgaard 
Christensen and many others. 
 Since 1984, I have become increasingly involved in collaboration with schol-
ars from outside Denmark. I have benefi ted from cooperation in European 
projects with Alice Lam, Daniele Archibugi, Edward Lorenz, Giovanni Dosi, 
Luc Soete, Maria Jao Rodrigues, Mark Tomlinson, Susana Borras and many 
others. 
 In the new millennium, I learnt a lot on how to link innovation to devel-
opment from Globelics colleagues Jose Cassiolato, Judith Sutz, Gabriela 
Dutrrenit, K. J. Joseph, Keun Lee, Rajah Rasiah, Shulin Gu, Anna Kingiri, 
Bitrina Diaymett, Mammo Muchie and many others. 
 One of  the messages in this book is that apprenticeship learning is impor-
tant in all domains of  knowledge, including research. I have had three ‘masters’ 
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who have inspired my work: Lars Herlitz, Richard R. Nelson and Christopher 
Freeman. 
 For the title of  this book, I have borrowed the concept ‘the economics of  
hope’ from Freeman’s 1993 book. Christopher Freeman was an intellectual 
giant who not only called for a better world but also, as a scholar and a world 
citizen, made contributions to make it a reality. 
 Thanks are due also to my life companion, Birte Siim, who gave ideas for 
how to wrap up the work so that it could reach the publisher on time. Our 
numerous and often heated discussions on nation states, global citizenship and 
politics have served as antidotes against technology determinism and econo-
mistic perspectives. 
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 Part I 
 INTRODUCTION 
2
   3
 Chapter 1 
 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LEARNING 
ECONOMY: OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 This book is about the economics of  innovation and knowledge. One of  the 
major conclusions drawn is that the perspectives standard economics imposes 
on society are biased, incomplete and inadequate. The focus on rational choice, 
allocation of  scarce resources and equilibrium only captures some dimensions 
of  the modern economy, notably short- term and static ones. Alternative per-
spectives, in which the focus is on learning as an interactive process and on 
processes of  innovation, give visibility and direct attention to other, at least 
equally important and more dynamic, dimensions. 
 Social science is about human action and interaction, and it diff ers from 
natural science in several respects. It does not have access to laboratories where 
it is possible to organize controlled experiments. In spite of  this, standard 
economics has gone far in adopting criteria and ideals from natural science, 
more precisely ideals that originate from Newtonian physics. This is refl ected 
in standard economists’ conception of  equilibrium as an ideal reference state 
and their tendency to focus exclusively on quantitative relations, also paired 
with in its excessive use of  mathematics. 
 In this book, I insist that economics should remain a social science while 
also taking into account the complexity of  the strivings and hopes of  human 
beings. People cannot be reduced to algorithms or automatons. The basic 
assumption about rational behaviour in economic models (in which individu-
als and fi rms act as if  they know everything about the future) is absurd and 
leads to equally absurd conclusions and to dubious policy recommendations. 
 Taking a departure from more realistic assumptions about how and why 
people act as they do in society has implications for what constitutes a theory 
in social science. In social science, a theory should be regarded as a focusing 
device – no more and no less. This book presents two sets of  theories or focus-
ing devices – the innovation system and the learning economy – that diff er 
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from those used in standard economics. These alternative focusing devices 
help us to see the core institutions in the economy (such as the market, the 
competition regime, the fi rm, the law, etc.) in a diff erent light than that cast by 
mainstream economic theory. 
 What is currently presented as the only and necessary pathway for the 
economy and for economic policy aiming at competitiveness and growth at 
the national level actually undermines both. The only certain outcome of  cur-
rent national strategies with focus on fi scal balance and cost competitiveness is 
that the rich get richer and the poor stay poor. Using an alternative analytical 
perspective, where the focus is on processes of  innovation and learning, points 
in other possible directions for institutional design and economic policy, where 
the focus is on collective entrepreneurship, knowledge sharing and interna-
tional collaboration. 
 1.1  The Structure of  the Book 
 Twelve articles have been selected for this volume; some of  these are 
co- authored. I have chosen the papers that I regard as my main contributions 
to the understanding of  the learning economy. The work is presented here in 
the order that it was published, and it spans a period of  30 years (1985– 2015). 
 The twelve chapters are presented in fi ve parts.  Part I gives the introduc-
tion to this book and an overview of  the content.  Part II includes four chap-
ters from the period 1985– 95 about innovation as an interactive process and 
innovation systems.  Part III includes four chapters from the period 2000– 2010 
about knowledge creation and the characteristics of  the learning economy. 
 Part IV includes three chapters that use the learning economy and the innova-
tion system as focusing devices in an analysis of  China’s innovation system and 
policy, Europe’s fi nancial crisis and Africa’s growth and structural problems 
and a chapter on how globalization changes the role of  national innovation 
systems.  Part V closes the book with a chapter on the learning economy and 
the economics of  hope. In essayistic form, it regards major global challenges 
through the lens of  the learning economy and spells out wider normative 
implications for public policy as well as for a research agenda. 
 The rest of  this introduction briefl y discusses the context for the original 
papers and presents the central ideas in each chapter. A summary of  the main 
points of  criticism of  standard economics appears at the end of  the chapter. 
 1.1.1  Part II: Innovation as an interactive process 
 The fi rst chapter of  this part ( chapter  2 ) is about product innovation and 
user– producer interaction (Lundvall  1985 ). It is a think piece that was worked 
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out as an analytical follow- up to a major empirical project on the impact of  
‘microelectronics’ on the Danish economy, and it draws on the analysis of  
how technology was shaped in four distinct industrial complexes. It was pre-
sented in draft form at a seminar at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
in the spring of  1984 and at the Stanford Seminar on Economics of  Science 
and Technology in the fall of  1984. It was published as a booklet by Aalborg 
University Press in 1985. It is, to the best of  my knowledge, the fi rst publica-
tion that refers to the concept of  ‘innovation system’ relating it to university– 
industry linkages and to the micro- phenomenon of  user– producer interaction. 
 The chapter draws together the wider theoretical implications of  what 
other innovation scholars have documented in empirical and historical stud-
ies. The Sappho study at SPRU (Rothwell  1972 ,  1977 ) and the historical work 
on the textile industry by Nathan Rosenberg at Stanford ( 1976 ) are just two 
examples of  contributions that document that innovation is an interactive pro-
cess and that users play an important role in the development of  new products 
and processes. 
 As demonstrated in the very  last chapter of  this book, the uptake in the 
academic community of  the ideas developed in  chapter 2 has been selective. 
Experts in economic geography were among the fi rst to link the analysis to 
the location of  economic activities; marketing experts and software develop-
ers have used the ideas for developing management strategies and innovation 
policy experts were inspired to give more attention to the demand side. Other 
elements of  the analysis never received much attention however. The criticism 
of  the basic assumptions in economics has been largely neglected, and the 
same is true for the analysis of  ‘unsatisfactory innovations’. 
 The chapter looks diff erent from the standard scientifi c journal article, and 
the somewhat pedestrian language refl ects that it was one of  my fi rst attempts 
to write a paper in English. The terse style was inspired by Janos Kornai’s 
book  Anti- equilibrium ( 1971 ). I hope that the reader will be able to overcome 
these barriers. Some typos have been corrected, but for the rest, the original 
has been left unchanged. 
 Chapter 3 presents user– producer interaction and relationships as a micro- 
foundation for the national innovation system. The chapter was written in the 
context of  a major collective project on technology and economic theory that 
brought together economists working on innovation. The fact that the result-
ing publication (Dosi et al.  1988 ) ended with a structure where there was a 
separate section on innovation systems with contributions from, respectively, 
Freeman, Nelson, Pelikan and Lundvall contributed to the wider introduction 
and spread of  the concept in innovation studies. 
 Most of  the ideas developed in  chapter  2 are presented in a somewhat 
diff erent form in the fi rst part of   chapter 3 . One major diff erence is that in 
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the new chapter, the interaction process is described as a process of  learning 
rather than as a process of  information exchange. A second is that there is 
more emphasis on the risks for lock- in in connection with establishing durable 
user– producer relationships. Nevertheless, the most important new contribu-
tion in the chapter is the discussion of  ‘national systems of  innovation’. 
 In many respects, this fi rst conceptualization of  the national innovation 
system is tentative ( chapters 4 and  5 introduce a more developed understand-
ing of  the concept). However, there are some nontrivial statements in this 
chapter that point ahead to issues that I have returned to later in my career. 
One of  these issues is to see the innovation process as rooted in the produc-
tion process. In the chapter, this is refl ected in the sequence of  analysis that 
starts from the concept of  a national system of  production as used by French 
Marxist economists. 
 Another issue relates to the potential role of  ‘fi nal users’ as including work-
ers and consumers. In the third part of  this book, those two ideas are devel-
oped in the context of  the learning economy.  Chapter  8 in  Part III shows 
specifi cally that international diff erences in the participation of  workers in 
processes of  learning are as important for the explanation of  diff erences in 
innovation performance as diff erences in national science systems. 
 Chapter  4 is the introduction to  National Systems of  Innovation:  Towards a 
Theory of  Innovation and Interactive Learning (Lundvall  1992 ). It gives a more com-
plete picture of  the innovation system concept and is based on two major 
assumptions. The fi rst is that learning is the most important process and 
knowledge the most important resource in the modern economy. The second 
is that learning is a social and interactive process, and therefore, it is necessary 
to take into account the role of  institutions and organizations when analysing 
economic processes. 
 The chapter discusses at some length if  it is meaningful to analyse national 
innovation systems in an era of  globalization. It argues that the globalization 
process makes it even more important to understand both the historical and 
the current role of  the nation state for innovation. It is crucial in order to cope 
with the contradictions and institutional mismatch that refl ect the transforma-
tion toward a more globalized economy. 
 One central point in the chapter is the distinction between a narrow 
and a wide defi nition of  the innovation system. The fi rst refers mainly to 
the linkages between research institutions and business, while the second 
includes and gives special attention to learning that takes place in con-
nection with the normal operation of  the production and marketing. This 
discussion leads to a pragmatic and broad defi nition of  the national inno-
vation system opening up for diff erent defi nitions depending on historical 
and local context. 
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 These three chapters (2– 4) were written during the period 1984– 92. They 
were inspired by empirical work as well as by interaction with many schol-
ars. The ideas behind them were infl uenced by interaction with colleagues 
in the Aalborg University research group on Innovation, Knowledge and 
Economic Dynamics (the IKE- group), including Esben Sloth Andersen, Asger 
Brændgaard, Bent Dalum, Birgitte Gregersen, Björn Johnson, Gert Villumsen, 
Jan Fagerberg and several others. Of  special importance was the interaction 
and discussions with Christopher Freeman who joined our research group as 
guest professor in the fi rst half  of  the 1980s. 
 One characteristic of  these contributions on innovation systems is that 
they increasingly refer to the role of  knowledge and learning in relation to 
the innovation process and innovation systems. Actually the fi nal chapter in 
 National Systems of  Innovation (Lundvall  1992 ) was presented under the heading 
‘Innovation Policy in a Learning Society’. The  last chapter in  Part II goes 
further in defi ning the characteristics of  ‘the learning economy’. This chap-
ter was co- authored with Björn Johnson and was actually my fi rst scientifi c 
journal article published in English. It appeared in 1994 in the  Journal of  
Industry Studies (later under the name  Journal of  Industry and Innovation ). This 
chapter takes further steps toward analysing the economics of  knowledge 
and learning. It introduces a taxonomy of  knowledge distinguishing between 
know- what, know- why, know- how and know- who and discusses how learning 
takes place. 
 1.1.2  Part III: Economics of  knowledge and learning 
 In  Innovation as an Interactive Process  – from User– Producer Interaction to National 
Systems of  Innovation (Lundvall  1988 ), I proposed to bring dimensions of  work 
organization and labour market institutions into the analytical framework 
of  innovation systems.  Part III of  this book presents four contributions that 
expand on these ideas. The economics of  knowledge and learning is analysed, 
empirical studies of  diff erent modes of  learning are presented and it is shown 
that the performance of  national innovation systems refl ects the degree and 
form of  workers’ inclusion in organizational learning. Finally the concept of  a 
national system of  innovation is revisited on this basis. All four of  these chap-
ters build on papers published during the period 2000– 2010. 
 Chapter 6 was published in its current form in Christensen and Lundvall 
( 2004 ). The chapter is about the production, diff usion and use of  knowledge 
seen from an economic perspective. Fundamental distinctions between tacit 
and explicit knowledge and between know- how, know- why, know- what and 
know- who are related to distinctions between public/ private and local/ global 
knowledge. It is argued that the idea of  the economy as being knowledge 
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based in its current stage is misleading and that it is more enlightening to 
assume that we have moved into a learning economy where interactive learn-
ing is a key to the economic performance of  fi rms, regions and nations. 
 This is one reason why a narrow economics perspective is insuffi  cient. The 
most serious weakness of  standard economics is that it abstracts from the fact 
that agents are more or less competent and that learning processes enhanc-
ing competence are fundamental for the economic performance of  organiza-
tions and regions. When it comes to understanding industrial dynamics in the 
learning economy, it is necessary to bring in disciplines other than economics 
in the analysis. 
 Chapter 7 was fi rst published in  Research Policy in 2007 and co- authored with 
three colleagues, Morten Berg Jensen, Björn Johnson and Edward Lorenz. It 
introduces empirical analysis of  two modes of  learning – an experience- based 
mode that involves learning by doing, using and interacting (the DUI- mode) 
and a science- based mode that makes use of  scientifi c knowledge through 
research and development (R&D) and interaction with research institutions 
refl ecting a mode of  innovation linking Science and Technology to Innovation 
(STI- mode). The paper is a follow- up on an earlier paper on the role of  tacit 
knowledge in relation to innovation (Johnson et al.  2002 ). 
 The empirical analysis is based on survey data from around 700 Danish 
fi rms. It shows that fi rms using mixed strategies, that is, fi rms that combine a 
strong version of  the STI- mode with a strong version of  the DUI- mode, are 
the most successful in introducing product innovations. The distinctions made 
and the results obtained have important implications for innovation policy and 
for the analysis of  innovation systems. They help to avoid biased approaches 
exaggerating the role of  science- based innovation, while also indicating lim-
its for experience- based innovation strategies. The basic idea that innovation 
requires a combination of  experience- based and science- based knowledge is 
widely shared among experts on innovation management and is a common 
observation in case studies. What is unique about this chapter is that it pres-
ents econometric evidence that support this idea. 
 Chapter 8 was co- authored with Anthony Arundel, Edward Lorenz and 
Antoine Valeyre and published in  Industrial and Corporate Change in 2007. The 
chapter explores the link between the organization of  work and innovation 
through an analysis of  national aggregate indicators for the EU member 
states of  respectively organizational forms and innovation modes (how fi rms 
innovate). The analysis shows that in nations where work is organized to sup-
port high levels of  discretion in solving complex problems, fi rms tend to be 
more active in terms of  innovations developed through their in- house creative 
eff orts. In countries where learning and problem solving on the job are more 
constrained and little discretion is left to the employee, fi rms tend to engage 
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in a supplier- dominated innovation strategy. Their technological renewal 
depends more on the absorption of  innovations developed elsewhere. 
 The results suggest that in order to understand national systems of  innova-
tion, it is necessary to bring the predominant mode of  work into the analysis. 
Early conceptions of  national innovation systems were built on an analysis 
of  interactive learning between producers and users. Now we show that the 
analysis needs to be founded also on an understanding of  how people interact 
and learn at the workplace in diff erent national economies. The results also 
suggest that European policy eff orts to improve innovation performance as 
part of  the revised Lisbon strategy would benefi t from a stronger focus on the 
diff usion of  innovative forms of  work organization. A step in this direction 
would be to develop indicators of  work organization that could be directly 
linked to innovation performance. 
 The chapter is one in a series of  papers using data from the European 
Survey on Working and Living Conditions showing that there are dramatic 
diff erences within Europe when it comes to how work is organized and how 
workers learn. The fi rst paper developing the taxonomy used was a contribu-
tion by Lorenz and Valeyre to the edited volume  How Europe’s Economies Learn 
(Lorenz and Lundvall  2006 ). This dimension of  national innovation systems 
which is crucial for innovation performance has been largely neglected both 
in research and in the design of  innovation policy. 
 Chapter 9 was written as a postscript for the new 2010 edition of  the book 
on national systems of  innovation originally published in 1992. It presents 
the research that constituted the background for the concept of  national sys-
tems of  innovation. It also discusses the diff usion of  the concept and diff erent 
recent interpretations of  the concept. It draws the implications from research 
on economics of  knowledge and learning presented above. 
 In this chapter, it is argued that during the process of  diff usion there has 
been a  distortion of  the concept as compared to the original versions developed 
by Christopher Freeman and the IKE group in Aalborg. Often policymak-
ers and scholars have applied a narrow understanding of  the concept, giv-
ing rise to so- called innovation paradoxes, which leave signifi cant elements of  
innovation- based economic performance unexplained. Such a bias is refl ected 
in studies of  innovation that focus on science- based innovation and on the 
 formal technological infrastructure and in policies aiming almost exclusively at 
stimulating R&D eff orts in high- tech sectors. 
 Without a broad defi nition of  the national innovation system encompass-
ing individual, organizational and interorganizational learning, it is impos-
sible to establish the link from innovation to economic growth. A double focus 
is needed where attention is given not only to the science infrastructure but 
also to institutions/ organizations that support competence building in labour 
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markets, education and working life. This is especially important in the cur-
rent era of  the globalizing learning economy (Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ; 
Lundvall and Borràs  1997 ; Archibugi and Lundvall  2001 ). 
 One major reason for this distortion is the uncomfortable coexistence in 
international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Commission of  the innovation 
system approach and the much more narrow understanding of  innovation 
emanating from standard economics (Eparvier  2005 ). Evolutionary processes 
of  learning where agents are transformed and become more diverse in terms 
of  what they know and what they know how to do are not reconcilable with 
the rational ‘representative agents’ that populate the neoclassical world (Dosi 
 1999 ). 
 1.1.3  Part IV: Continental transformations and 
global challenges 
 The fourth part of  the book contains four chapters based upon recently pub-
lished papers. Three of  those apply the basic concepts to diff erent continents 
and to major global challenges.  Chapter 13 goes back to the two very fi rst 
contributions that introduced the concept of  a national innovation system 
(Freeman  1982 / 2004 ; Lundvall  1985 ) and shows how they can be used to 
span the more recent literature on the tension between national and global 
perspectives on innovation. 
 Chapter 10 relates innovation systems and the learning economy to China’s 
ambition to develop its national innovation system so that innovation becomes 
less dependent on foreign sources and more oriented toward social and envi-
ronmental objectives.  Chapter  11 presents a critical view of  the European 
integration project. Specifi cally it argues that the opportunities off ered by the 
Lisbon Strategy to bridge the gap between Southern and Northern Europe 
were not exploited.  Chapter 12 discusses the implications of  a learning econ-
omy perspective for Africa’s economic transformation. One main conclusion 
is that the current economic structure with extreme dependence on produc-
tion and exports of  natural resource– based commodities calls for eff orts to 
diversify the economy through active industrial and innovation policies. 
 Chapter 10 was published in 2006 and co- authored with Shulin Gu who 
pioneered the study of  China’s innovation system in her book on China’s 
industrial technology (Gu  1999 ). The chapter makes an attempt to explain the 
evolution of  China’s growth pattern and of  Chinese policies aimed at promot-
ing innovation. It refers to domestic debates in China that point to the need 
for a shift in the growth trajectory with stronger emphasis on ‘endogenous 
innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’. 
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 This chapter makes an attempt to capture the current characteristics of  
China’s production and innovation system – how they were shaped by recent 
history and what major challenges they raise for the future. It presents data 
on China’s postwar growth experience. It shows how the shift in policy toward 
decentralization, privatization and openness around 1980 established an insti-
tutional setting that, together with other factors such as the presence of  a wide 
‘Chinese Diaspora’, has resulted in extremely high rates of  capital accumula-
tion especially in manufacturing. 
 It also takes a closer look at how the policy shift in the 1980s aff ected the 
institutional framework shaping R&D activities, in particular, and learning 
and innovation, in general. The attempt to break down the barriers between 
the science and technology infrastructure, on the one hand, and the produc-
tion sphere, on the other, was highly successful as compared to the develop-
ment in the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the original intentions were 
not fully realized. Rather than establishing markets for science and technol-
ogy, the reforms led knowledge producers to engage in mergers or forward 
vertical integration, and they became to a large extent involved in production 
activities. 
 It discusses the decision by China’s government to promote endogenous 
innovation and harmonious development. Applying the innovation system 
perspective, it argues that these broadly defi ned objectives can be realized 
only through a strategic adjustment toward ‘innovation- driven growth and 
learning- based development’, and we discuss what important policy elements 
such a strategic adjustment needs to encompass. 
 The chapter concludes that imperfections in the division of  labour and in 
the interaction between users and producers of  knowledge and innovation 
that motivated the reforms of  the 1980s remain of  central concerns. In order 
to raise the long- term effi  ciency of  the massive accumulation of  production 
capital, it is necessary to promote the formation of  social capital and to be 
more considerate when exploiting natural capital. 
 Chapter  11 is a critical assessment of  the European integration project. 
The project is of  great importance since it is the most ambitious attempt in 
the world to build transnational governance in a period when the limits of  
national strategies become increasingly obvious. Therefore it is important to 
understand why the project now is in crisis and what changes in the strategy 
are required to get it back on track. 
 While the Eurozone was originally designed to protect member countries 
from economic instability, it has now turned into a major source of  instability 
for the world as a whole. When the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was established, there were warning voices that a monetary union without a 
common fi scal policy would be vulnerable to external shocks. The total budget 
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of  the EU is only a few per cent of  GNP and cannot play the same role as the 
federal budget in the United States as an automatic stabilizer. This is especially 
problematic for a currency union bringing together countries at very diff erent 
levels of  economic development. There were elements in the Lisbon Strategy 
that could have reduced the gaps between Northern and Southern Europe. 
But the turn toward a more neoliberal strategy that took place around 2005 
undermined its capacity to function as a scaff old for the Eurozone (Lundvall 
and Lorenz  2011 ). 
 The chapter shows that the countries in the Eurozone now most exposed 
to fi nancial speculation are the ones that have the weakest industrial structure 
with the biggest proportion of  workplaces directly exposed to competition from 
emerging economies. On this background, it is argued that there is a need to 
design Keynesian policies coordinated at the European level in such a way that 
they promote deep institutional change in education, labour market and indus-
trial policy in Southern Europe. Public expenditure needs to be allocated to 
stimulate the learning capacity where it is weakest – this is why the solution may 
be referred to as a ‘new new deal’. It is about redistributing learning capacities. 
 Chapter 12 is co- authored with Rasmus Lema and published in 2015 in 
the  African Journal of  Science, Technology, Innovation and Development . It takes as its 
starting point the discrepancy between the reporting of  record growth rates 
for African economies and the reality of  how people’s living conditions have 
evolved over the last decade in African high growth economies. It is argued 
that the economic upswing as measured by high rates of  registered growth in 
GNP in African countries needs to be used to support structural and institu-
tional change across the economic, social and political spheres bringing them 
closer to what we refer to as ‘learning economies’. 
 The widening of  the gap between reality on the ground and perceptions 
based on growth rates refl ects partly that the increasing global demand for 
natural resources – especially for commodities such as oil and minerals – has 
led to advantageous change in terms of  trade and to increased export volumes 
and raised the rates of  GNP growth while the impact on domestic employ-
ment has often been limited and sometimes negative. The expansion of  the 
commodity sector does not automatically create new employment directly, 
and so far it has rarely resulted in a substantial increase in job creation in 
upstream and downstream manufacturing and in knowledge based services. 
 This is taken as a starting point for an analysis of  opportunities and policy 
options for African countries. What kind of  policies and institutions are nec-
essary in order to transform the current increase in rents from commodities 
exports into industrial investment and upgrading of  agriculture and agro-
industrial development? Recommendations of  neoclassical economists are 
contrasted with those derived from the classical development economics that 
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includes scholars such as Dobb, Hirschman and Sen. The theoretical per-
spective proposed on this basis takes into account that we have entered a 
phase – the learning economy – where it is useful to take as a starting point 
that ‘learning’ is at the core of  any process of  development. 
 Chapter 13 on innovation systems and globalization goes back to the two 
very fi rst publications that referred to ‘innovation systems’ and discusses how 
they have spanned diff erent research trajectories on innovation. It also indi-
cates a new research agenda on how innovation systems are changed through 
increased openness. Factors such as deregulation of  fi nancial markets, new 
communication and transport technologies and liberalization of  trade have 
given rise to global networks of  production and global value chains. Innovation 
and learning increasingly take place through transnational interactive learn-
ing or through the spread of  codifi ed knowledge across national borders. 
 This chapter compares and confronts two distinct approaches to economic 
development. Global value chain analysis tends to see participation of  fi rms 
from low- income countries in global value chains as a prerequisite for eco-
nomic upgrading and as an important element in moving countries out of  
poverty. The national innovation system approach gives more attention to 
building national infrastructure and innovation capabilities. It is argued that 
it is necessary to combine participation in global trade with building national 
capabilities and that it is important to combine the two perspectives both in 
theory and as the basis for economic development strategies. New neoliberal 
recipes presenting participation in global value chains as a simple and direct 
road to development are misleading. 
 1.1.4  Part V: Economics of  hope or despair –  what next? 
 Part V concludes the earlier discussions in  chapter 14 and addresses global 
issues regarded through the focusing device ‘the learning economy’. The form 
is brief  and essayistic. The chapter begins with refl ections on the basic con-
cepts and their roots. With reference to the three chapters on China, Europe 
and Africa ( Chapter 10 ,  11 and  12 respectively), it is shown that while prob-
lems and opportunities are context specifi c, they often originate from develop-
ments in another region. On this basis, the essay points to the need for new 
forms of  global governance that can promote learning worldwide. It ends with 
ideas for a research agenda. 
 1.2  What Is Wrong with Economics? 
 In this book, the focus is on the creation of  new kinds of  resources (new use 
values) rather than on allocation of  a given set of  scarce resources. Further, 
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the focus is upon how individuals and organizations learn rather than on how 
they make rational decisions on the basis of  a given set of  preferences. This 
double change of  focus has both theoretical and practical implications. As the 
focus moves to innovation and learning, the need to revise the understanding 
of  basic concepts in economic theory becomes obvious. Below I have listed 10 
points where my research as it is presented in this book indicates a need for a 
diff erent understanding from the one off ered by neoclassical economics. 
 1.  The concept of  scarcity is at the very core of  neoclassical economic 
theory, but it does not apply to knowledge. 
 2.  The assumption of  rationality and rational expectations cannot be 
applied to innovation processes. 
 3.  Markets for innovations are not arm’s length markets with prices as the 
major decision criterion. 
 4.  More intense competition often goes hand in hand with more intense 
cooperation and in combination they tend to stimulate technical and 
organizational change. 
 5.  Firms and individuals are diff erent in terms of  both skills and eff orts. To 
assume a representative agent misses the most important dynamics. 
 6.  Learning is a social process and hence there is a need for a socioeconomic 
approach to understand the economy. 
 7.  Growing inequality has economic costs as well as social costs since it 
undermines the processes of  learning. 
 8.  At the core of  international competitiveness are dynamic capabilities, 
including the capability to learn, rather than relative costs. 
 9.  Any assessments of  impact of  expanding international trade should take 
into account how it aff ects the national knowledge base in the countries 
involved. 
 10.  Governments have an important role to play in giving direction to new 
technological trajectories and in fostering economic development. 
 Joseph A.  Schumpeter has stated that the general equilibrium approach is 
applicable to a circular fl ow economy where everything repeats itself  period 
after period and not to a real capitalist economy (Nelson and Winter  1982 ). 
The very repetition could explain that individual agents might start to behave 
as if  they were fully informed and made rational decisions. The following chap-
ters support Schumpeter’s view and they show that the neoclassical economic 
perspective is best suited for an economy without innovation. Moreover, they 
bring the analysis a step further by demonstrating that in order to understand 
economic dynamics the focus must be on processes of  interactive learning tak-
ing place in all parts of  the economy. 
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 Such a shift in perspective also opens up for positive sum games where com-
petition is combined with global cooperation and where new ways to solve 
major global problems creates a basis for new patterns of  sustainable and equi-
table development. For instance, the absolute scarcity of  certain crucial natural 
resources can be overcome when knowledge abundance is exploited through 
global sharing of  technological and organizational knowledge. In the  last chap-
ter , I will spell out why – in spite of  several deep world crises – there is hope for 
the future. One fundamental reason for optimism is that all people, including 
economists and policymakers, do have the potential to learn from experience. 
 References 
 Archibugi ,  D. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å. (eds.).  2001 .  Europe in the Globalising Learning Economy . 
 Oxford :  Oxford University Press . 
 Arundel  A. ,  Lorenz  E. ,  Lundvall ,  B.- Å. and  Valeyre  A.  2007 . ‘ How Europe’s Economies 
Learn: A Comparison of  Work Organization and Innovation Mode for the EU- 15 ’. 
 Industrial and Corporate Change  16 , no.  6 : 1175– 210. 
 Christensen ,  J. L. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å. (eds.).  2004 .  Product Innovation, Interactive Learning and 
Economic Performance .  Amsterdam :  North Holland . 
 Dosi ,  G.  1999 . ‘ Some Notes on National Systems of  Innovation and Production and Their 
Implication for Economic Analysis ’. In  Innovation Policy in a Global Economy , edited by 
 Archibugi ,  D. ,  Howells ,  J. and  Michie ,  J.  Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press . 
 Dosi ,  G. ,  Freeman ,  C. ,  Nelson ,  R. R. ,  Silverberg ,  G. and  Soete ,  L. (eds.).  1988 .  Technology 
and Economic Theory .  London :  Pinter Publishers . 
 Eparvier ,  P.  2005 . ‘ Methods of  Evolutionism and Rivalry with Neoclassical Analysis. The 
Example of  the National System of  Innovation Concept ’.  Journal of  Economic Methodology 
 12 , no.  4 :  563 – 79 . 
 Freeman ,  C.  1982 / 2004. ‘ Technological Infrastructure and International Competitiveness ’, 
 Industrial and Corporate Change  13 , no.  3 :  540 – 52 . 
 Gu ,  S.  1999 .  China’s Industrial Technology, Market Reform and Organizational Change .  Routledge in 
association with the UNU Press ,  London and New York . 
 Gu ,  S. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  2006 . ‘ China’s Innovation System and the Move toward 
Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation’ ,  Innovation:  Management, Policy & 
Practice  8 , no.  1– 2 :  1 – 26 . 
 Jensen ,  M.B. ,  Johnson ,  B. ,  Lorenz ,  E. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  2007 . ‘ Forms of  Knowledge and 
Modes of  Innovation ’,  Research Policy  36 , no.  5: 680– 93 . 
 Johnson ,  B. ,  Lorenz ,  E. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  2002 . ‘ Why All This Fuss about Codifi ed and 
Tacit Knowledge? ’,  Industrial and Corporate Change 11:  245 – 62 . 
 Kornai ,  Janos.  1971 .  Anti- Equilibrium: On Economic Systems Theory and the Tasks of  Research . 
 Amsterdam: North Holland . Reprinted in New York:  Augustus Kelley (1991). 
 Lorenz ,  E. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å. (eds.).  2006 .  How Europe’s Economies Learn .  Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press . 
 Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  1985 .  Product Innovation and User- Producer Interaction .  Aalborg :   Aalborg 
University Press . 
 — — — .  1988 . ‘ Innovation as an Interactive Process – from User- Producer Interaction to 
National Systems of  Innovation ’. In  Technology and Economic Theory , edited by  Dosi ,  G. 
(eds.).  London :  Pinter Publishers . 
16
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE16
 — — — .  1992 . ‘ Introduction ’. In  National Systems of  Innovation: Towards a Theory of  Innovation 
and Interactive Learning , edited by  Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  London :  Pinter Publishers . 
 — — — .  2004 . ‘ The Economics of  Knowledge and Learning ’. In  Product innovation, Interactive 
Learning and Economic Performance , edited by  Christensen ,  J. L. and  Lundvall ,  B.- Å . 
 Amsterdam :  JAI Press Ltd . 
 — — — .  2010 . ‘ Post Script: Innovation System Research –  Where It Came from and Where 
It Might Go ’. In  National Systems of  Innovation: Towards a Theory of  Innovation and Interactive 
Learning ,  317 – 349 , edited by  Lundvall ,  B.- Å.  London :  Anthem . 
 — — — .  2013 . ‘ The ‘New New Deal’ as a Response to the Euro- crisis ’. In  Before and Beyond 
the Global Economic Crises ,  151 – 172 , edited by  Benner ,  M.  Cheltenham :  Elgar . 
 — — — .  2016 . ‘ Innovation Systems and Value Chains in the Globalizing Learning 
Economy ’. In  The Elgar Companion to Innovation and Knowledge Creation , edited by  Bathelt , 
 H. ,  Cohendet ,  P. ,  Henn ,  S. and  Simon ,  L.  Cheltenham:  Elgar . 
 Lundvall ,  B.- Å. and  Borràs ,  S.  1997 .  The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications for Innovation 
Policy .  Brussels :  DG XII . 
 Lundvall ,  B.- Å. and  Johnson ,  B.  1994 . ‘ The Learning Economy ’.  Journal of  Industry Studies 
 1 , no.  2 :  23 – 42 . 
 Lundvall ,  B.- Å. and  Lema ,  R.  2015 . ‘ Growth and Structural Change in Africa: Development 
Strategies for the Learning Economy ’.  African Journal for Science, Technology, Innovation and 
Development . 6, no. 5: 455– 66. 
 Lundvall ,  B.- Å. and  Lorenz ,  E.  2011 . ‘ From the Lisbon Strategy to EUROPE 2020 ’. In 
 Towards a Social Investment Welfare State: Ideas, Policies and Challenges ,  333 – 35 , edited by  Morel , 
 N., Palier ,  B. and  Palme ,  J.  Bristol :  Policy Press . 
 Nelson ,  R. R. and  S. G.  Winter .  1982 .  An Evolutionary Theory of  Economic Change .  Cambridge, 
Mass. and London :  Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press . 
 Rosenberg ,  N.  1976 .  Perspectives on Technology .  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press . 
 Rothwell ,  R.  1972 . ‘ Factors for Success in Industrial Innovations:  Project SAPPHO  – 
A Comparative Study of  Success and Failure in Industrial Innovation ’,  Science Policy 
Research Unit ,  University of  Sussex ,  Brighton . 
 — — — .  1977 . ‘ The Characteristics of  Successful Innovators and Technically Progressive 
Firms ’.  R&D Management  7 , no.  3 :  191 – 206 . 
   17
 Part II 
 INNOVATION AS 
INTERACTIVE PROCESS 
18
   19
 Chapter 2 
 PRODUCT INNOVATION AND 
USER– PRODUCER INTERACTION 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 2.1  Introduction 
 The purpose of  this chapter is to demonstrate the usefulness of  applying a 
user– producer perspective to innovation. A set of  analytical and normative 
propositions – which are neither trivial nor conventional – is developed by 
focusing on the relationships and the interaction between users and producers 
of  innovations. 
 The ideas presented here refl ect a collective eff ort. Since 1977, the research 
program on Innovation, Knowledge and Economic dynamics (the IKE group), 
consisting mainly of  economists but also attracting other social scientists and 
engineers, at the Department of  Industrial Production, Aalborg University, 
has been working on problems relating to industrial development, interna-
tional competitiveness and technical change. The approach has been heretic 
rather than mainstream and eclectic rather than dogmatic. It was developed 
partially by importing and borrowing from some diff erent new schools with 
quite disparate origins. 
 One of  the main imports came from France, where Francois Perroux and 
his followers have put great emphasis on the analysis of  vertically organized 
systems of  production. Another came from the United Kingdom, where 
Christopher Freeman and others at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
have focused on industrial innovations. In Aalborg, a new combination has 
been tried. Innovative activities within vertically organized units, as verticals 
of  production, industrial complexes and national systems of  production, have 
been analysed. 
 The empirical work pursued so far should be regarded as exploratory. 
The hypotheses tested have been crude, refl ecting a certain vagueness in the 
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theoretical framework. This chapter represents a modest attempt towards a 
clarifi cation. Empirical work from the IKE group will be referred to occasion-
ally, but no comprehensive presentation will be attempted. 
 In developing the argument, I have leaned heavily on some central works 
by Nathan Rosenberg and Kenneth Arrow. Rosenberg’s analysis ( 1972 , 
1976, 1982)  of  how users interact with producers in specifi c parts of  the 
economy and under specifi c historical circumstances has helped to clarify 
many of  the problems involved. Arrow’s works ( 1962 , 1969, 1973) on uncer-
tainty and organization theory have inspired essential parts of  the conceptual 
framework. 
 This chapter is divided into seven sections.  Section 2.2 introduces funda-
mental concepts and postulates.  Section 2.3 is a discussion of  the relation-
ship between market structure, innovation and transaction modes.  Section 
2.4 presents empirical illustrations of  unsatisfactory innovations originating 
from specifi c user– producer relationships.  Sections 2.5 and  2.6 apply the 
user– producer perspective to, respectively, locational problems and the sci-
ence technology nexus.  Section 2.7 relates a number of  propositions to units 
of  analysis at diff erent levels of  aggregation. In  Section 2.8 some concluding 
remarks are presented. 
 The user– producer perspective has thus been applied to a broad and 
diverse range of  phenomena. This is refl ected in the presentation, which also 
has brought me into subdisciplines of  economics, where my expertise is lim-
ited. There is ample room for users to take part in the debugging of  this semi- 
fi nished product. 
 2.2  The Framework 
 In this section we shall present the central concepts used and the related prop-
ositions. Limitations regarding the validity and scope of  the analysis will also 
be pointed out. 
 2.2.1  Innovation and innovative activity 
 It is common to regard an innovation as a distinct event, which can be dated in 
time. Empirical work trying to explain innovation has often taken its departure 
in a list of  such dated events. 
 In this chapter we shall focus on the ongoing process of  innovative activi-
ties, as well as on singular events. The outcome of  this process includes both 
gradual technical change and discrete leaps in technical opportunities. But, 
the process is cumulative, and even the most conspicuous single innovation has 
its roots in accumulated knowledge and experience. 
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 2.2.2  Technical opportunity and user needs 
 We shall regard innovations as the result of  collisions between technical oppor-
tunity and user needs. We acknowledge that single innovations might result 
from pure accidents, but we do not see this as a normal pattern. 
 This implies that the innovating unit needs access not only to informa-
tion about technical opportunities but also to information about user needs. 
We shall assume that information about user needs is diff ering in complexity 
and appropriability in the economy but that some costs and eff orts always 
are involved in obtaining the information. The assumption that information 
about user needs is not a public good is of  central importance for the results 
presented. In the fi rst part of  the next section we shall specify the need for 
information gathering on the part of  innovating units. 
 2.2.3  The separation of  the user from the innovating unit 
 Our analysis relates to the interaction between units innovating and other 
units, which are potential users of  the innovations. This perspective is only 
relevant if  the innovating and the using unit have been separated from each 
other. In the extreme case, when for example, a scientist as an integrated part 
of  a research project, develops new methods and scientifi c instruments in 
order to solve a problem, no informational problems will be involved. 
 If  we disregard such extreme cases, there will always be a separation 
between the innovating unit and the user. This will also be the case within 
organizations where diff erent individuals or departments will have to interact 
and exchange information. It will obviously be the case, when there is a verti-
cal division of  labour between diff erent organizations. In  Section 2.3 we shall 
treat the special case where users and producers are separated by a market. 
 2.2.4  Innovation and production 
 Relating technical opportunities  to user needs involves a logical problem. 
There is an immense amount of  user needs in the economy, and all users 
might in principle be regarded as potential users of  an innovation. Is it pos-
sible to defi ne a set of  users, ex ante, before the new product has been devel-
oped and procured by the users? 
 To overcome this diffi  culty, we assume that innovational activities take 
place in units engaged in production. We shall also assume that this produc-
tion addresses a defi nite set of  users and that the innovations are oriented 
towards the needs of  a subset within this set. The product might be tangible – 
a machine tool – or intangible – a software package. 
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 Production is a routine process resulting in a regular fl ow of  products 
from producers to users. Innovation is a search process characterized by less 
regularity in its outcome. Production and innovations are interdependent. 
Information obtained in relation to production and in relation to the regular 
fl ow of  products feeds the innovational process. Innovations, then in turn, 
reshape production and the regular fl ows. 
 This distinction between innovation and production might be diffi  cult to 
apply to units designed specifi cally to promote innovation  – R&D depart-
ments and research institutes – but even in such cases we believe that certain 
routine activities addressed towards a specifi c set of  users can be identifi ed. 
 The fact that innovational activities are addressed towards a specifi c set 
of  users does not exclude the possibility that the result of  those activities – a 
product innovation – might be diff used to new categories of  users whose needs 
were not taken into account when the innovation was developed. Innovations 
might result in an extension of  the set of  users related to the innovating unit. 
 2.2.5  Consumers and professional users 
 The concept of  needs is in itself  a fuzzy one. Should it represent the actual 
behaviour in terms of  eff ective demand and revealed preferences, or should 
it relate to the wants of  the potential users? Actual behaviour can only give 
limited relevant information to the innovation process. A  product innova-
tion will typically address needs that cannot be fulfi lled by existing products. 
Nevertheless, it also seems to be an impossible task for the producer to lay 
bare the indiff erence curves and translate them into user needs, which can be 
addressed by new products. 
 This problem will, however, take diff erent forms depending on the nature 
of  the user. A distinction between professional users and consumers proves to 
be useful. The goal function of  the consumer is broad and can only be defi ned 
in very general terms such as utility maximization, satisfaction and happiness, 
etc. The professional user, however, is a user acting within the formal part of  
the economy and has a more restricted goal for his activities. In the former 
category, it is dubious to ascribe needs to the user and to separate needs from 
wants. This is less so, when the user is a professional one. If  the goal function 
is properly defi ned, bottlenecks can be pointed out and new and better ways 
to produce goods and services could be identifi ed or developed. An external 
observer might be able to discover needs that the user has not yet been able to 
put on to his agenda as wants. 
 This diff erence between consumer and professional user is also refl ected in 
their respective behaviours in relation to innovations. On the one hand, the 
professional user is expected to be active in his search for new ways to solve his 
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problems. He will also be expected to adapt his behaviour and qualifi cations 
when new technical opportunities come forward. This might include formal 
training as well as learning- by- doing. The consumer, on the other hand is 
expected to be more passive. He will not engage in systematic search for new 
products, and he will not be prone to adopt products, which involve extensive 
training and changes in behaviour. 
 This diff erence in (expected) behaviour is reinforced by the producer 
addressing the respective category of  users. The producers of  consumer goods 
will use market research to uncover the needs of  the consumers, and they 
will use advertising both to make new products known to consumers and to 
infl uence the needs involved. They will also be conservative in their product 
innovations in order to minimize the change in user behaviour imposed by the 
new product. Product innovations in this area might be radical in terms of  the 
technology built into the product. In terms of  the interface between user and 
product, however, they will tend to be conservative. 
 In this chapter we shall mainly be concerned with user– producer relation-
ships where the user is a professional one. This limitation makes it possible to 
operate with a concept of  needs that is reasonably clear. Still, we can include 
a part of  innovative activities, which has had a great impact on the over-
all process of  technical change. Some revolutionary innovations such as the 
automobiles and television, etc., have, however, developed at the interface 
between producers and consumers, and those fall outside our framework of  
analysis. 1 
 The distinction made above refl ects the characteristic institutional arrange-
ments for modern industrial societies. This is to not to say that those arrange-
ments are in any sense ‘optimal’. New institutions involving consumers directly 
or indirectly in innovative activities, might liberate new social forces stimulat-
ing the process of  technical change. This is, however, a subject that will not be 
addressed in this chapter. 
 In certain areas the distinction between consumer and professional user is 
less clear- cut. Consumers acting as amateurs involved in hobbies might dis-
play a behaviour that is close to the one displayed by professional users. The 
user- clubs related to specifi c brands of  home computers are just one example 
demonstrating that the amateurs might be as advanced as professionals in 
terms of  both use and innovativeness. 2 
 2.2.6  Behavioural assumptions 
 Our analysis will not be based on very specifi c behavioural assumptions. It 
can be applied to units optimizing under conditions of  limited rationality and 
uncertainty as well as to satisfi cing units. We disregard the possibility of  full 
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information and unlimited rationality, however, and we also discard the pos-
sibility of  totally erratic behaviour. 
 The units studied here are assumed to have certain (possibly vague) goals; 
we assume that they will make some eff orts to reach those goals in a reason-
ably economic way. This implies, for example, that they will be infl uenced 
by changes in relative prices and by cost- reducing innovations. The infl uence 
might take a long time to take eff ect in actual behaviour and might be weak 
compared to other forces at work. 
 We believe that those rather loose assumptions are suffi  cient for our pur-
pose. A more precise analysis of  the impact of  user– producer relationships, 
however, would require more strict assumptions. 
 2.2.7  Information 
 We shall make frequent use of  concepts developed within information theory. 
We shall assume that information is fl owing between units, passing through 
information channels and transformed into specifi c codes. We shall also 
assume that each unit has a memory consisting of  accumulated information, 
as well as an agenda consisting of  items that are scrutinized by the unit. 
 In a dynamic perspective, the establishment of  information channels and 
codes can be regarded as investments. It is time consuming as well as costly to 
develop new channels of  information and new codes. The memory is growing 
in volume as new information enters it, either as a result of  internal experi-
ence from learning- by- doing or learning- by- using, or as a result of  informa-
tion brought into the organization from external units. As new information is 
obtained, new items might enter the agenda of  the organization and old ones 
might be excluded. 
 In  Section 2.5 we shall add ‘distance’ to this framework, a concept relating 
to diff erences in location and cultural background of  the parties involved in 
the exchange of  information. We shall also discuss the impact of  instability 
and complexity in messages communicated between the parties. 
 2.2.8  Linkages and channels of  information 
 The linkages between a user and a producer describe the regular fl ows of  
tangible or intangible products from the producer to the user. Such linkages 
can be described by an extended input/ output table where capital goods are 
treated not as fi nal demand, but as intermediate goods. 
 The channels of  information between user and producer describe a 
fl ow of  signals that are not embodied in the regular fl ow of  products. We 
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shall assume that the network of  linkages and the network of  information 
channels will be overlapping to a substantial degree. The linkages relate 
to production while the information channels relate to innovation. An 
important aspect of  the innovation process is the exchange of  disembodied 
information between the producer and the user via information channels. 
This is another way to state the close relationship between innovation and 
production. 
 The relationship between user and producer involves both linkages and 
channels of  information. They also involve the content of  the products and 
the information exchanged, here defi ned in relation to the technology involved 
as well as the characteristics of  the user and the producer. 
 The interaction  between user and producer takes three diff erent 
forms: exchange of  products, exchange of  information and cooperation. 
 We shall regard situations where the user and the producer engage in a 
common project, as a situation where cooperation takes place. Cooperation 
can take place between diff erent organizations as well as between separate 
units within an organization. 
 2.2.9  The stability of  relationships 
 There are severa l factors reinforcing relationships once they have been estab-
lished. The channels of  information and the codes used within a given channel 
are costly to establish. As the channel and the code are established, learn-
ing takes place and the eff ectiveness of  the exchange of  information grows. 
Alternative channels and codes become relatively less attractive. Only when 
alternatives off er substantial returns will it be rational to change channels and 
codes. Even in such situations, inertia might prevail as long as the old channels 
can be operated under satisfactory conditions. 
 This general observation deriving from information theory is reinforced 
by the characteristics of  technology and innovations. When the information 
relates to technology, the code will be complex and specifi c, making the change 
of  channels and codes extra expensive. 
 One of  the most general propositions emanating from our analysis is that 
the stability of  user– producer relationships reinforces the innovative process in 
certain directions but hampers it in other directions. The interaction between 
innovation and user– producer relationships is far from harmonious and states 
of  disequilibrium, refl ected in unsatisfactory innovations, prevail. This subject 
will be illustrated in  Section 2.4 by empirical examples. Before that, a classical 
issue in economic theory, the relation between market and organization shall 
be addressed in  Section 2.3. 
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 2.3  Product Innovation and the Organized Market 
 In this  section we shall relate the interaction between user and producer to 
the market. We shall try to demonstrate that both the pure market and the 
pure hierarchy have narrow limits to their ability to promote product innova-
tions. In this section, we defi ne product innovations as innovations addressed 
towards the needs of  users separated from the innovating unit by a market. 
Process innovations are innovations addressing the internal needs of  the 
innovating unit. On this background we shall propose that the actual rate of  
product innovations can be explained only by the fact that most markets are 
organized involving elements of  hierarchy as well as elements of  cooperation 
and mutual trust. 
 2.3.1  Producer dependence – information about user needs as 
an input to the innovative process 
 The product innovating produce r unit has strong incentives to monitor what 
is going on within user units. As we shall see, it is not primarily a question of  
getting an isolated signal about a new need among the users. It is a continuous 
process of  information gathering that might involve considerable costs and 
resources. First, the producer will monitor process innovations within the user 
units. If  the process innovations are successful, the producer might appropri-
ate them and present them to other users as a product innovation. 
 Product innovations within user units will often imply changes in the pro-
cess technology. The producer will therefore monitor the product innovations 
within user units. If  a certain product innovation becomes successful, it might 
open up a new rapidly widening market for new process equipment. 
 Technological bottlenecks and technological interdependencies observed in 
user units off er potential markets for the innovating producer. Such problems 
might be complex and in some cases, the producer must have direct access 
to specifi c information about the production process of  the user in order to 
contribute to a solution. 
 Users of  complex and changing technologies will be involved in a process 
of  learning- by- using. Access to experience and know- how accumulated in this 
process will be crucial for the producer. When developing a specifi c innova-
tion, the producer must consider the competence and learning capacity of  the 
users. Very advanced solutions that demand too much in relation to the users’ 
know- how will not be diff used. 
 Finally, when a product innovation has been developed by the producer 
and adopted by some users, a more specifi c monitoring process takes place. 
In order to debug the innovation, the producer must monitor its usage, the 
learning- by- using taking place and the new bottlenecks, etc. 
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 2.3.2  User dependence – information necessary to adopt and 
adapt product innovations 
 The users will also be engaged in a (more or less intensive) search for informa-
tion about new technical opportunities that can result in a better performance. 
They will have incentives to monitor innovative activities among producers 
and also to monitor the competence of  diff erent producers. 
 To be aware of  a specifi c product innovation is only a fi rst step. The users 
have to gather information, making it possible to assess the potential impact 
on their own performance and the compatibility with their competence and 
learning capacity. Especially, if  the product innovation is at an early stage of  
diff usion, such information will be extremely diffi  cult to obtain and a consider-
able amount of  uncertainty will be involved. 
 The users will experience specifi c bottlenecks in the regular production 
process. When developing new products, they will discover that the process 
technology used must be changed. To solve those problems, they might involve 
an independent producer in the analysis and solution. In order to do that, 
they must know which producer to approach. This gives them an incentive to 
monitor the competence of  producers. 
 2.3.3  Incentives to exchange information 
 In order to get an eff ective solution to his problems, the user must give the pro-
ducer a certain minimum amount of  information about his needs. The more 
free access the producer gets to such information, the greater the chance for a 
successful solution. If  the user unit is competing with other users, it might be 
problematic to give a producer free access to its technology and to its needs. 
There will be a risk that the producer might appropriate information and 
distribute it to other users. This places the user in a dilemma to which we shall 
return in the following sections. 
 The producers are interested in diff using information to users about their 
respective competence and about their product innovations. If  a producer 
unit is involved in competition, however, it will also face a dilemma. On one 
hand, it needs to convince users about the superiority of  its competence, reli-
ability and product innovations. This might demand an extensive disclosure 
of  the product innovations involved. On the other hand, it does not want 
competitors to get access to its technology. 
 2.3.4  The need for cooperation between user and producer 
 Certain new products can be ordered by catalogue or bought off  the shelf  
by the user. This will be the case for low- priced standard components. Other 
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types of  products, typically specialized and expensive capital goods, can only 
be adopted in a process of  cooperation between the user and the producer. 
 The cooperation might take place in diff erent steps.  The user might pres-
ent the producer with specifi c needs that the new product should fulfi l. When 
the product innovation has been developed, the producer might install it and 
start it up in cooperation with the user. In this phase, the producer might off er 
training in the use of  the new product. After the product has been adopted, 
the producer might have a responsibility for updating the product as well as 
for repair and service. 
 The extent of  the cooperation necessary might vary with the type of  prod-
uct innovation. But we shall assume that most important product innovations 
involve at least some elements of  cooperation. This increases the uncertainty 
on behalf  of  the user. The user unit does not only procure a product with 
uncertain properties, it also becomes dependent on the future behaviour of  
the producer. This reinforces the user’s eff orts to monitor competence and 
reliability. The choice of  a specifi c producer might be as decisive as the choice 
of  a specifi c product innovation. 
 We, thus fi nd that the users and producers of  product innovations are 
mutually interdependent in a complex way. We shall now discuss how such 
an interdependence will be infl uenced by diff erent institutional frameworks 
connecting users to producers. To which degree can the market mechanism 
intermediate this interdependence? 
 2.3.5  Perfect competition and product innovations 
 If  a great number of  producers are competing and if  the users are anony-
mous and numerous, the only information directed to producers will be price 
signals. It is less clear how the users will get acquainted with new products in 
such a market. Let us assume that they can observe new products at the mar-
ketplace by inspection. 
 It should be obvious that perfect competition does not induce product inno-
vations. The producer does not get any information about user needs that are 
not already served by the market (the fact that we operate with professional 
users excludes the possibility of  introspection and own use, as a substitute 
for such information). The user can only observe superfi cial characteristics of  
new products. The uncertainty in assessing the impact on performance will be 
enormous if  the product is complex. 
 Perfect competition, thus, will imply a weak innovative capability on the 
part of  producers and a weak incentive to develop product innovations with 
complex properties. Such new products will typically diff use very slowly or not 
diff use at all. 
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 Perfect competition does not, however, aff ect process innovations to the 
same negative degree. Here the information about user needs is available 
within the producing unit, and the user can get full and immediate access to 
information about the properties of  the new process. The most important lim-
itation to process innovations will be the small scale of  the operation involved. 
There will be no external market for the new process, and the appropria-
tion of  benefi ts will be related exclusively to cost reductions within the pro-
ducer unit. This will put strict and narrow limits on the amount of  resources 
allocated towards innovative activities. Process innovations will mainly result 
from learning- by- doing and learning- by- using (i.e. from activities that do not 
impose any extra costs on the producer). 
 It might be interesting to relate this result to the fact that product innova-
tions are neglected within neoclassical theory. It seems as if  this is quite logical 
as far as the basic models operate on the basis of  an assumption about perfect 
competition. 
 Arrow ( 1962 ) has demonstrated that the externalities involved in relation 
to R&D activities will tend to result in a suboptimal allocation of  invest-
ment funds to such activities. The result obtained earlier points to another 
mechanism that works in the same direction. It also points to the fact that 
a market form, assumed to be the only one guaranteeing optimal allocation 
of  resources in a static framework, might be the one least suited to promote 
technical change. Only if  we assume that producers have immediate access to 
information, not only about ‘revealed preferences’ but also about needs and 
wants in relation to  products that do not exist, can this problem be overcome. 
But such omniscience on behalf  of  the producer would be in confl ict with the 
assumption about anonymity in the relationship between user and producer. 
 In markets that come close to the ideal of  perfect competition, we should 
expect that product innovations are developed by accident rather than as a 
result of  purposeful innovative activities. Trivial changes in product design 
might be more easily introduced than complex product innovations. Process 
innovations, mainly based on learning, might take place simultaneously within 
all producer units, but the rate of  innovation will be limited by the scale of  
operation involved. 
 Do markets characterized by perfect competition exist in the real world? Do 
they infl uence technical change in the way predicted? In markets where profes-
sional users operate, it is not so easy to fi nd examples. Markets for vegetables 
and fruit, where numerous restaurant owners come and inspect the products 
of  numerous producers, might be one example. Product innovations are not 
frequent in this area, and process innovations are mainly refl ecting learning. 3 
 This fact, however, also refl ects a combination of  conservative users and 
natural limits to product innovation. We shall argue that the potential for 
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product innovations, in terms of  the rate of  change in user needs and new 
technical opportunities, infl uences the form of  the market. Perfect compe-
tition can only survive where this potential is small. In the case mentioned 
above, a future application of  biotechnology to product development might 
undermine the anonymous relationships between user and producer. To which 
extent this will become the case, will depend on the willingness to adopt new 
products in restaurants. 4 
 Let us see why a growing potential for product development undermines 
perfect competition. If  this potential refl ects new technical opportunities, the 
producer unit can benefi t from vertical integration with one or more user 
units. It will get access to information about the needs of  the users, and the 
producer will be able to monitor the application of  the new technical oppor-
tunities to those needs. On this basis, it can develop products that are superior 
to those of  competing producers and extend the market share. 
 If  the new potential refl ects new user needs, a user can gain from vertical 
integration. By integrating a producer, the user unit will get immediate access to 
the technical competences within the producer unit, and it can gear it towards 
the new needs experienced. If  the user unit is involved in competition with other 
users, it will be able to reduce costs and obtain a growing share of  the market. 
 Vertical integration undermines perfect competition in three diff erent 
ways. Directly, it diminishes the fl ow of  goods transmitted by an anonymous 
market. Indirectly, it gives rise to concentration both on the producer and the 
user side of  the market. If  we assume that learning by producing and learning 
by using are important in relation to the new products involved, the process of  
concentration will be reinforced. 
 In the treatment of  vertical integration by Oliver Williamson ( 1975 ), the 
main explanation for this phenomenon is said to be that transaction costs are 
high when ‘small numbers’ are involved. We shall suggest that vertical inte-
gration motivated by information problems will take place also when ‘large 
numbers’ are present. Furthermore, Williamson argues that technological fac-
tors do not play any decisive role in determining vertical integration. We shall 
disagree and suggest that new technical opportunities will induce vertical inte-
gration when large numbers are involved. 
 Our conclusion is thus: perfect competition forms an environment hostile 
to product innovations, and a growing potential for product innovations will 
undermine perfect competition. 
 2.3.6  Small numbers and product innovations 
 Within the category of  nonperfect competition, several diff erent constellations 
might occur: 
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 a.  One producer might relate to one user, a few users, or to numerous users. 
 b.  A few producers might relate to one user, a few or numerous users. 
 c.  Finally, many producers might relate to one or a few users. 
 Thus, we have at least eight diff erent constellations involving ‘small numbers’ 
either on the producer or on the user side of  the market. It will, of  course, 
not be possible to go into details regarding all those constellations. Here we 
shall only present some general implications of  small numbers in relation 
to product innovations. In doing so, we shall refer to the ideas developed by 
Williamson and use his conceptual framework as far as it applies to the prob-
lems treated. Thus, we shall accept that the actors involved are characterized 
by bounded rationality and that the environment is characterized by uncer-
tainty and complexity. 
 Bringing in product innovations within such a framework gives interest-
ing results. In  sections 2.2 and  2.3 , we specifi ed the information needs of  the 
producer and the user in relation to product innovations. If  we take a closer 
look at the distribution of  information in relation to those needs, we fi nd that 
information asymmetry and ‘information impactedness’ prevail; the producer 
has access to information about technical opportunities, which the user does 
not have, and the user has access to information about user needs, which the 
producer does not have. 
 We also fi nd that ‘uncertainty and complexity’ is involved not only in the 
environment but also in the product itself. The user units will, especially in the 
early stage of  diff usion, have very limited possibilities to assess how the new 
product will aff ect their performance. The users will also have diffi  culties in 
assessing the future services that shall be delivered by the producer. If  the pro-
ducer is opportunistic, there will be ample room for ‘cheating’ the user. The 
producers might exaggerate their own competence and the capacity of  the 
new product in order to attract users. The producers may knowingly promise 
to solve problems that cannot be solved and to deliver a package of  services 
that cannot be delivered. 
 The room for cheating is more limited on behalf  of  the user. The user can-
not misinform the producer without risking that it aff ects the eff ectiveness of  the 
solution. The users can, of  course, misinform the producer in relation to factors 
not directly related to their technical needs. The user unit can overstate its own 
capability to develop a substitute for the product, for example. Finally, the pro-
ducer as well as the user might ‘spill information’ to competitors of  the respec-
tive counterpart. Or they might use information obtained to invade the market 
of  the other party. It should be observed that those specifi c problems, having 
their origin in the fact that a product innovation is involved, should be added to 
the general problems concerning an uncertain and complex environment. 
32
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE32
 Can a contract be written that eliminates the possibility of  cheating in such 
a situation? I think that it is obvious that opportunistic behaviour on behalf  of  
both parties would normally result in haggling and in tremendous transaction 
costs when complex product innovations are involved. This has two important 
implications. First, if  opportunistic behaviour prevails, small- number markets 
might be as ineffi  cient as perfect competition in promoting product innova-
tions. We should expect that all, or almost all, complex innovations were pro-
cess innovations (i.e., developed within presumptive user units). Second, this 
kind of  market failure should result in a movement towards vertical integration 
where users and producers become joined within the same organization. We 
should expect that most important innovations were located within vertically 
organized fi rms. Also, we should expect a correlation in the opposite direction. 
The greater the potential for product innovations in a user– producer relation-
ship, the more this relationship should be mediated by a hierarchy rather than 
by a market. 
 At this point, we do not have any systematic evidence relating to all those 
implications. We do know, however, that empirical studies of  great numbers 
of  important innovations indicate that the majority of  those innovations are 
product innovations (Pavitt  1984 ) (i.e. innovations developed for external users 
separated from the innovating unit by a market rather than process innova-
tions). This is not easily reconciled with the implications of  an organizational 
failure framework. Later on we shall question some fundamental concepts 
within this framework, but fi rst we shall take into account some factors coun-
teracting vertical integration. 
 2.3.7  The limits of  vertical integration 
 The informational problems related to product innovations can explain why 
vertical integration might be ineff ective under certain circumstances when 
small numbers are involved. 
 If  there is only one user involved and several producers, the user will be 
able to control the producers by playing one out against another. The room 
for cheating is diminished, and the incentives towards vertical integration are 
weak. 
 If  there is only one producer addressing several users, an integration of  
one of  those users will equate an invasion of  the market of  the users. This will 
increase the producer’s incentives to cheat, and the risks for getting cheated 
will grow among the rest of  the users. The rest of  the users might, therefore, 
be expected to react either by developing their own capability in the fi eld 
controlled by the producer or by stimulating the entrance of  new producers. 
Only, if  the invasion of  the market of  users can be expected to result in a very 
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radical expansion of  the market share of  the user unit integrated, and if  the 
rest of  the users have a very limited ability to develop alternative sources for 
their process technology, will such a strategy be attractive for the producer. 
This might be the case where a radical product innovation induces a very 
dramatic increase in the eff ectiveness in user units and also involves steeply 
increasing returns to scale. 
 If  there are several producers and several users, the vertical integration 
might be either upstream or downstream. If  a user integrates a producer, the 
user will get access to the technical competence(s) of  the producer, and uncer-
tainty can be reduced. At the same time it is to be expected that the other users 
will restrict their procurements from and interaction with the integrated pro-
ducer. They will be less prone to give the producer access to information about 
their own process technology. They will fear that the producer transfers critical 
information to the vertically integrated user and that the producer delivers 
less effi  cient technology than he delivers in- house As a result the producer 
unit will get its information input regarding user needs restricted to what can 
be obtained within the new organization, and this might gradually erode its 
technological competence(s). This means also that the user, by integrating ver-
tically with one producer, in the long run, might get stuck with more limited 
technical opportunities than the other users. 5 
 If  a producer takes over a user unit, the same type of  problems will occur. 
The producer unit’s access to the rest of  the users will become limited because 
it has become a competitor to the other users. 
 If  there is only one user and only one producer involved, vertical integra-
tion might be eff ective in overcoming contractual and informational problems. 
However other limits, relating to large size, might be operating. 
 Our conclusion is that markets characterized by small numbers and by fre-
quent and complex product innovations will not easily be transformed into 
hierarchies. Vertical integration might have detrimental eff ects on users as well 
as producers by reducing market shares and fl ows of  information to the pro-
ducer level. Only in the limiting case where there is one user and one producer 
operating in the market can no such negative eff ects be expected. 
 This is another way of  stating that product innovations will be ‘superior’ to 
process innovations as long as the user is not a monopoly. Product innovations 
use a broader set of  user experiences as input into the innovative process than 
process innovations, which only can use the experiences and needs of  one sin-
gle user. Here we reach a conclusion opposite to the one presented in the last 
section: Innovations will be stimulated by a vertical division of  labour between 
producers and user belonging to diff erent organizations. How to solve this 
apparent contradiction? We believe that the answer lies in the existence of  
organized markets. This concept will be treated in the next section. 
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 2.3.8  The organized market and product innovations 
 In the organization failure framework, a clear- cut distinction is made between 
the market and the organization. Also, the coordination mechanism meant to 
play the most important role within the organization is hierarchy. All parties 
are presumed to act opportunistically, presenting false information and cheat-
ing, whenever it pays off  to do so. We shall question all those assumptions and 
distinctions. 
 If  a producer is going to supply to a specifi c set of  users on a regular basis, 
it would be unwise to become known as an opportunistic cheater. Especially 
if  we allow for information exchange among the users, it seems as if  opportu-
nistic behaviour will be less rewarding from the point of  view of  the producer. 
Such an information exchange will take place between professional users. 
Professional users often have their own organizations, which, as one important 
purpose, have to supply their members with such information (when the users 
are consumers, the room for cheating is bigger, but in this case the room for 
vertical integration is also more limited). 
 Especially when complex product innovations are exchanged, the trust-
worthiness of  the producer becomes a decisive competitive factor. The costs 
infl icted on the user by a cheating producer will be considerable, and the user 
will often have to accept the word of  the producer as the only guarantee that 
the innovation will perform according to specifi cations. Producers regarded as 
trustworthy will attract users, whereas producers regarded as unreliable may 
be off ering advanced technical solutions without attracting users. This will 
counteract any tendency towards cheating. An important aspect of  a producer 
strategy will be to build a relationship characterized by mutual trust with users. 
 This will be reinforced by the fact that producers depend on information 
about user needs as an input to their innovative activities. A producer who acts 
opportunistically risks being excluded from access to such information. That 
would put him into a serious disadvantage in relation to markets where there 
is a big potential for product innovations. 
 In such areas, we believe that ‘codes of  conduct’ are imposed on users as 
well as producers. Such codes might be tacit and vague, but still they will make 
distinctions between what is acceptable and what is not. They will impose 
responsibility and restraint on the producers, defi ning limits for what is seri-
ous misinformation. They will also defi ne limits for spilling information to 
the competitors of  the other party. We also believe that relatively stable user– 
producer relationships will develop. Every single user will establish special and 
long- lasting relations with a subset of  all producers and vice versa. This makes 
it easier to establish mutual trust and eff ective exchange of  information. This 
vertical semi- integration diff ers from full integration in that it is a more easily 
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reversible relationship that will not have as strong a negative impact on the 
fl ow of  information as full integration. 
 Such subsets of  user– producer relationships might involve elements of  
hierarchy. The user might dominate the innovative activities within producer 
units, which are formally independent and vice versa. We do not, however, 
believe that all user– producer relationships can be described exclusively in 
terms of  hierarchy. If  mutual trust and responsibility are totally absent, such 
hierarchies will be diffi  cult to operate for the dominant part. 
 We shall propose that the predominance of  product innovations only can 
be explained by the fact that markets become organized. The clear- cut dis-
tinction between market and organization might be a useful analytical tool, 
but it does not refl ect reality. We shall also propose that the element of  orga-
nization entering the market cannot be reduced to a dimension of  hierarchy. 
Hierarchical relationships are combined with elements of  cooperation and 
mutual trust. In markets where complex product innovations are addressed 
to professional users, opportunistic behaviour will be counterproductive for 
producers as well as users. 
 More generally, one might ask why opportunism should be the most domi-
nating characteristic of  human behaviour. Substantial resources are invested 
in bringing up children to be honest, responsible and caring for others. The 
reason why the result should be professional liars is not obvious. The pre-
dominance of  competition and economic incentives may foster opportunistic 
behaviour within private fi rms, but even in this sphere, countervailing forces 
are at work. At least, this will be the case when complex product innovations 
are involved. 
 2.3.9  Williamson on innovations and technical change 
 In Williamson ( 1975 ), there is a chapter on market structure in relation to 
technical and organizational innovation. It is, however, characteristic that the 
part of  it relating to technical innovation almost exclusively refers to how big 
fi rms perform compared to small fi rms. The exchange of  information between 
user and producer relating to innovative activities is not taken into account. 
This might explain why Williamson concludes that his analysis ‘makes it evi-
dent that it is transactions rather than technology that underlie the interesting 
issues of  microeconomic organisations.’ 6 
 A user– producer perspective brings forward radically diff erent conclusions. 
The interaction between users and producers exchanging product innova-
tions and information is a process that has a strong impact on microeconomic 
organization. In this section we have focused on situations where the users 
and the producers are separated by a market. An extension of  the analysis to 
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the internal structure of  organizations might also produce interesting results. 
Later, we shall mention some instances where diff erences in the internal user– 
producer relationships seem to infl uence the rate and direction of  technical 
change. 
 2.4  Unsatisfactory Innovations 
 An economist has been characterized as one who by training, thinks of  him-
self  ‘as the guardian of  rationality, the ascriber of  rationality to others, and the 
prescriber of  rationality to the social world’ (Arrow  1974 ). One of  the main 
preoccupations of  economists has been to assess how diff erent institutional 
frameworks infl uence the performance as compared to what is ‘optimal’. 
Mostly, however, this has been done in static framework. Welfare econom-
ics has been more geared to problems of  how to allocate a given bundle of  
resources than to problems relating to innovations. 
 Microeconomics and industrial economics have focused on how diff er-
ent market forms infl uence prices and quantities produced. Antitrust policies 
reducing the gap between actual and optimal behaviour have been recom-
mended. Is it possible to extend such a perspective to the dynamic effi  ciency 
properties of  constellations of  users and producers? Can we explain devia-
tions from the optimal rate and direction of  innovation by specifi c properties 
of  user– producer relationships? Can we develop a set of  policy recommenda-
tions based on such an analysis? 
 The fi rst problem involved is related to defi ning what is optimal? Innovations 
might be regarded as ‘invasions of  unknown territories’. How should we pos-
sibly be able, ex ante, to deem if  extensions in one direction are better than 
extensions in another? The optimal pattern of  innovation is not a useful con-
cept. However, this does not mean that any assessment of  innovative perfor-
mance is without meaning. It might be possible to locate situations where the 
actual rate and direction of  innovations does deviate from the potential in a 
conspicuous way. A  systematic analysis of  technical opportunities and user 
needs can demonstrate that actual innovations do not exploit fully the oppor-
tunities present or do not refl ect user needs. 
 One explanation of  such deviations between a satisfactory development 
and the actual development might be rooted in the specifi c user– producer 
relationships prevailing. There are several factors that promote stability and 
even inertia in those relationships. The costs involved in establishing new 
channels and codes of  information work in this direction. So do the organized 
markets, where patterns of  domination and mutual trust will reinforce stable 
relationships and make changes diffi  cult to achieve. 
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 A specifi c constellation of  user– producer relationships might foster specifi c 
trajectories of  innovations. Such trajectories might prove quite insensitive to 
new technical opportunities and new user needs. A kind of  dynamic inertia 
might become built into the user– producer relationships. 
 In this section, we shall present some results from a project on microelec-
tronics and its impact on the Danish economy (the MIKE project). We shall 
illustrate the concept of  ‘unsatisfactory innovations’ by referring to some 
results from four case studies, each of  them analysing innovative activities 
within a vertical of  production. In the fi rst three cases presented, we gathered 
information by expert interviews and technical literature, etc. In the fourth 
case, this type of  material was combined with a questionnaire addressed to the 
whole population of  users. 
 The purpose of  the presentation is to illustrate rather than to verify specifi c 
hypotheses. This permits us to present the material in a brief  and anecdotic 
form. Each case involves a more complicated picture than the one given here. 
We have tried to present the skeleton rather than the full body of  each case. 7 
 2.4.1  Dairy processing – a case of  hyper- automation 
 We found that dairy processing plants designed by the producers of  equip-
ment and systems were more capital intensive, more infl exible and highly 
automated than what corresponded to cost- eff ective solutions and to the needs 
of  the users. Only recently, had the biggest of  the users involved developed a 
capacity of  its own to design and produce its own plants. The fi rst new plant 
designed in- house diverged radically from earlier generations of  plants and it 
is supposed to diminish costs substantially. 
 We ascribed this example of  unsatisfactory innovations to some character-
istics of  the user– producer relationships. Two big producers dominated the 
supply of  design and construction of  plants. The number of  users was high, 
therefore several hundreds of  plants operated in Denmark. The users were 
organized into cooperative companies, the biggest one controlling more than 
half  of  the processing capacity. Those companies have, however, until recently 
been mainly oriented towards controlling the market for dairy products rather 
than towards coordinating the procurement of  plants and equipment. 
 The competence of  users and producers was only partially overlapping and 
in certain key areas it was very unequally distributed – a clear case of  infor-
mation asymmetry. The producers had specialized R&D departments devel-
oping electronic- based regulation systems, while the users had very limited 
competence in this area. The technology itself  is systemic in character. The 
control and regulation systems built into the plant are determining how the 
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production process becomes organized. The room for later user adjustments 
is relatively small. 
 In this relationship, a hierarchy had developed where the producers were 
able to impose their standards rather than adjusting to the needs of  the users. 
But why did producers develop technology that was not cost- eff ective at the 
user level? Economic motives can be pointed out. The producers were pro-
ducing not only the design of  the plant but also essential elements of  the hard-
ware. The solutions developed were more intensive in terms of  this hardware 
than what would have been satisfactory from the point of  view of  the users. 
The design of  plants infl uenced the demand for hardware. It is diffi  cult to sub-
stantiate, but we got the impression that noneconomic factors were even more 
important. It seemed as the producers were following a technological trajec-
tory in the direction of  higher and higher levels of  automation. It was (implic-
itly) assumed that a growing level of  automation would imply an increasing 
degree of  eff ectiveness. Apparently, for a long period of  time, such a perspec-
tive was implicitly accepted also by the users. This trajectory was developed 
during a phase when it was rational to substitute capital for labour. It was, 
however, followed long after that changes in the factor proportions and in the 
relative prices should have induced a new direction of  innovations. 
 We believe that the unsatisfactory direction of  innovations would have been 
changed earlier: 
 •  If  the users had coordinated their procurement of  equipment, 
 •  If  the users had had a stronger competence in relation to electronics- based 
regulation systems, and 
 •  If  the technology had been less systemic and complex. 
 2.4.2  Clothing industry – a case of  unexploited technical 
opportunities 
 Our study of  the clothing industry as user of  new technology was less com-
plete, because we did not have direct access to the main producers of  sew-
ing machinery. References to a recent study of  users and producers of  textile 
machinery at the international level by Hoff man and Rush ( 1982 ) should be 
seen as an attempt to complete the picture in this respect. 
 The clothing industry resembles dairy processing in several ways. The core 
of  the technology is produced by a small number of  fi rms, and the users are 
numerous. The R&D activity and technical competence of  most users is lim-
ited. On this background, one should expect that unsatisfactory innovations 
might occur. Studying the user industry and interviewing independent experts 
in Denmark revealed no obvious examples indicating that the technology did 
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not respond to user needs. We ascribe this to the character of  the technology 
involved. 
 The production process in the clothing factory is not systemic. The user 
remains in control of  how to combine the diff erent pieces of  equipment pro-
cured from the producer. A low formal competence in process regulation is 
compensated by ‘learning- by- combining’ within the user units. 
 The Hoff man and Rush ( 1982 ) study indicates, however, unsatisfactory 
innovations in another dimension. The application of  radical innovations in 
electronics, laser technology and chemistry to the main processes within cloth-
ing production is developing in a slow tempo. The main producers of  sewing 
technology are reluctant to introduce radical innovations. They point to low 
user competence and conservatism among users as a reason for this strategy. It 
is argued that economic interest in securing a market for traditional products 
might infl uence the strategy. 
 Again, one might regard this deviation from what is satisfactory in terms of  
how a specifi c user– producer relationship fosters a trajectory that is only slowly 
changing in response to new needs and opportunities. The user– producer 
relationship in this vertical production both refl ects and reinforces a process 
of  gradual product improvement. The producers have no traditional ties, 
channels of  information or linkages to the science- based industries where the 
new technical opportunities develop. The users are competing on the basis of  
production- based know- how rather than science- based know- how. The large 
number of  relatively small user units makes it diffi  cult for users to bypass the 
producers and develop radical process innovations on their own. 
 This is not to rule out that clothing technology may change radically in the 
future. As the gap between actual and satisfactory technology grows, either the 
old producers or new producers will try to close this gap (the case of  quartz 
watches demonstrates how some new science- based producers can invade a 
traditional market in a dramatic way). But we shall propose that it might be a 
question of  decades rather than months and years before such gaps are closed. 
 In this connection, it might be interesting to observe that the Ministry of  
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan has developed a compre-
hensive research and development program oriented towards the moderniza-
tion of  clothing and textile technology. The main thrust in this program – as 
in programs in the information technology area – is to bring together users 
of  the technology, producers of  the core technology and science- based pro-
ducers in electronics. Such an eff ort might be regarded as an attempt to 
compensate for the weak channels of  information between producers and 
science- based industries and to break the inertia built into the traditional 
user– producer relationship. I  shall suggest that an important explana-
tion of  the success of  Japanese technology policy is that the importance of  
40
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE40
user– producer interaction has been realized both in the private and in the 
public sector. 
 The analysis by Sciberras and Payne ( 1985 ) on the  competitiveness of  the 
Japanese machine tools industry also points in this direction. Japanese produc-
ers of  machine tools had a closer relationship both to their domestic users and 
to domestic producers of  advanced control technology than their counter-
parts in the United States and Europe. Even when US producers where inte-
grated into multidivisional corporations together with users and together with 
producers of  control technology, they were operating at arm’s length, with 
each unit oriented towards its own partial fi nancial goals rather than towards 
strengthening the innovative capability of  the whole corporation. 
 2.4.3  Waste water treatment – lack of  interdisciplinary 
innovations 
 In order to extend our perspective from mature to new industries, we also stud-
ied users and producers of  wastewater treatment technology. The users studied 
were 300 local authorities. Today, one domestic producer is dominating the 
Danish market. The product is systemic. Control and regulation technology 
plays an important role and the distribution of  competence between users and 
producer is unequal. This pattern of  user– producer relationships is not very 
diff erent from the one we found in the case of  dairy processing. We should 
expect a hierarchical interaction where the producer dominates the process 
of  technical change, and solutions not refl ecting the needs of  the users might 
occur. However, we could not substantiate any clear tendency in this direction. 
 We found that the expertise in the fi eld were embodied in a small num-
ber of  persons, some of  those were employed by the producer. Others were 
employed in an independent technological institute fi nanced partially by the 
government, at the technical universities and in the Ministry of  Environment. 
It was characteristic that most of  the experts were ‘job circulating’ between 
those institutions and that they all knew each other personally. The experts 
within the Ministry of  Environment assist the users in formulating standards 
for the systems procured from the producer. The fact that we could not observe 
any discrepancy between technical solutions and user needs might refl ect this 
pattern of  close- built expertise. 
 On one hand, it may be argued that the close interaction between the 
experts was eff ective in communicating user needs to the producers. On the 
other hand, one might argue that it was diffi  cult to fi nd truly independent 
experts able to evaluate the actual trajectory pursued. We believe that both 
mechanisms may have been at work, but we cannot say which has been the 
dominating one. 
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 Another factor counteracting unsatisfactory innovations might be that the 
design of  the plant and the production of  the hardware have not been so inti-
mately related as in the dairy case. It has been the norm that an independent 
engineering consultancy fi rm should design and coordinate the construction 
of  the plant while the hardware should be delivered by other producers. The 
extreme degree of  concentration on the producer side is also quite a new 
phenomenon; 10 years ago there were almost 10 fi rms operating as producers. 
 We found, however, a third type of  unsatisfactory innovations in this area. 
The decisive technological bottlenecks for using new control technology were 
found at the interface between the mechanical, biological and chemical con-
ditions prevailing in the wastewater and the data processing equipment used. 
The lack of  sensors eff ectively transmitting information about the changes in 
the wastewater and the recipient was a bottleneck seriously reducing the use-
fulness of  advanced control technology. 
 In spite of  this fact, we found that most R&D and innovative activities 
were taking place either in electronic- based fi rms with no expert knowledge 
in biology, biochemistry or chemistry or in biochemical- oriented fi rms with 
little know- how relating to control technology. There are economic mecha-
nisms at work; the immediate market might be too small to allow a specialized 
interdisciplinary producer to be established whereas the innovative activities 
mentioned were typically taking place in big fi rms where the activity related 
to waste water treatment was marginal. 
 But again, we shall argue that the lack of  linkages and information chan-
nels plays an important role. In this case, the absence of  horizontal linkages 
between science- based fi rms results in unsatisfactory innovations. Such link-
ages might be both easier and more diffi  cult to establish than vertical ones. On 
one hand, both parties are used to communicating by scientifi c codes, and, on 
the other hand, those codes are extremely complex and diverging in content 
refl ecting the specialization within the scientifi c community. 
 We shall suggest that there are promising arenas for potential innovations 
located at the interfaces between science- based industries that are not exploited 
today, More specifi cally, one can point to combinations of  biotechnology and 
microelectronics as one such area. In our study of  the Danish economy, we sug-
gested that such new combinations might have a radical impact on traditional 
industries. But such interindustrial and interdisciplinary innovative eff orts are 
hampered by the lack of  linkages, information channels and common codes. 
 2.4.4  Software products – a case of  ‘hyper- centralization’ 
 The fourth case studied was data processing and offi  ce technology in 300 
kommuner  – the local administrative units in Denmark. The dominating 
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producer was one company, Kommunedata, owned by the nationwide asso-
ciation of  local governments (Kommunernes Landsforening). The products 
studied were software systems related to data processing and offi  ce automa-
tion. Kommunedata has at its disposal, a very big central data processing 
capacity and develops programs that are designed to give the local units access 
to this central capacity. The local units pay for each specifi c program and for 
their use of  the central processing capacity. The relationship is thus a peculiar 
combination of  market and administrative relations. 
 This user– producer constellation has been extremely eff ective in diff using 
the data processing technology to the local administrations. Today EDP is 
used in every single local unit, also in relatively small ones. We found, however, 
that the relationship had fostered unsatisfactory innovations as well. The sys-
tems and programs were more centralized in their design than both technical 
opportunities and user needs should infer. A number of  local units had devel-
oped their own data processing capacity, and some had even broken all con-
nections with Kommunedata. Independent expertise argued that the concept 
behind Kommunedata’s program development does not refl ect new needs for, 
as well as technical opportunities for, decentralization. 
 The most striking characteristic of  the relationship between user and pro-
ducer is extreme inequality in the distribution of  competence. Kommunedata 
has more than 1,000 professionals with a formal education in relation to EDP. 
Only the biggest of  the local units had more than one expert and the vast 
majority had none. The technology is systemic – meaning the programs can-
not easily be changed in order to refl ect local needs. 
 Those characteristics were refl ected in the way the users adopted the sys-
tems. We found that 80 per cent of  the users were passive. They had no strat-
egy of  their own either in relation to data processing or to offi  ce automation. 
They procured programs from Kommunedata but made no eff orts to adapt 
the programs to their local needs. They were often frustrated in their use 
because of  breakdowns in the central computer and because of  limitations 
built into the programs. 
 In this case, we ascribed the tendency towards ‘over- centralization’ mainly 
to two factors: Kommunedata has its roots back in the 1950s and the most 
rapid expansion took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Its main activities were 
developed during a period when big mainframes off ered the most economical 
solution to data- processing problems. The fi rst programs widely distributed 
to local units were related to taxes and population statistics. In both cases, 
the immense fl ow of  data involved as well as the need for central registration 
of  data reinforced centralized solutions. Later new programs introducing ele-
ments of  offi  ce automation have been developed, for example, offi  ce automa-
tion programs which link together diff erent branches of  the respective local 
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administration. But still a majority of  the professionals at Kommunedata are 
engaged full time in developing and maintaining the traditional programs, 
and those are still the ‘cash cow’ of  the organization. The new programs 
seem to be infl uenced by the general centralized approach. The fact that the 
price policy has linked the income of  the organization to its sale of  processing 
capacity reinforces a trajectory of  centralization that has historical roots. 
 The other factor at work is the lack of  competence in the user units. We 
found that a main reason for not developing an independent local processing 
capacity was lack of  qualifi ed personnel. In a period with shortage in EDP 
expertise, it is almost impossible for the local units to attract qualifi ed person-
nel. Their wage policy does not allow them to off er extreme benefi ts, and the 
environment they can off er is not necessarily the most attractive to specialists 
in this fi eld. 
 This, we believe, refl ects a more general problem. We shall argue that new 
basic innovations might stimulate a tendency towards an uneven distribution 
of  competence between the producers of  the new technology and its users. 
At the early stages of  development, the producers can off er more stimulating 
and more rewarding working conditions for experts in the fi eld. Users will be 
reluctant to off er the economic incentives necessary to compensate for a less 
attractive environment. 
 2.4.5  Concluding remarks 
 In all the four cases, there was a tendency towards producer dominance. In at 
least two of  the cases, the lack of  competence on the user side was reinforcing 
the unsatisfactory trajectory of  innovations. This pattern might inspire a  tech-
nology policy that is more oriented towards strengthening the competence of  
users than the supply- oriented technology policy dominating today. An exten-
sion of  such a new orientation that encompasses the ‘fi nal users’, workers and 
consumers might have radical implications. 
 In two of  the cases, a lack of  established linkages and channels of  infor-
mation reinforced unsatisfactory innovations. In one case, the linkage was 
between a traditional industry and a science- based industry. In the other, it 
was between two diff erent science- based industries. This pattern might inspire 
a technology policy that brings together users and producers into new constel-
lations. Such a concept seems to inspire the Japanese technology policy. 
 The fact that all four cases only illustrated producer- dominated relation-
ships does not imply that this corresponds to a general pattern in the economy. 
Automobile and aerospace industries will be dominating users in relation to 
many smaller units producing components and process equipment. In such 
areas, other types of  unsatisfactory innovations might develop refl ecting that a 
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few big users are able to direct the innovative process towards their own spe-
cifi c needs. The innovations brought forward might be less adequate for a big 
population of  smaller users. The development of  the machine tool technology 
might refl ect such a pattern. 
 In our analysis, we focused on three sets of  variables, namely numbers of  
users and producers, the distribution of  competence and the character of  the 
technology (systemic or nonsystemic). This list is to be regarded as prelimi-
nary, and further empirical work might bring forward other characteristics 
that are more important. 
 2.5  User– Producer Perspective on Location of  Production 
 The unequal distribution of  production in geographical space has been 
explained by agglomeration eff ects. In this section we shall discuss one impor-
tant dimension of  this concept  – user– producer interaction in relation to 
innovative activities. We shall argue that long- distance interaction will be 
prohibitively costly in some phases of  the technology life cycle because of  
the information problems involved. This contributes to an explanation of  the 
actual division of  labour between nations and regions. 8 
 We shall also argue that learning by interacting reinforces historically devel-
oped user– producer linkages. This contributes to an explanation of  the rela-
tive stability of  the division of  labour between regions and nations. 
 2.5.1  Distance and costs of  transportation and communication 
 The costs of  transportation and communication are growing with the distance. 
This is the case for goods and persons as well as for telecommunicated mes-
sages. In modern times, the innovations reducing such costs  have been dramatic. 
Drastic reductions in the costs have been achieved and today such costs are 
prohibitive only for few types of  products – cheap, bulky and perishable goods – 
and for long distances. The impact of  distance on the location of  production 
and consumption seems to vanish. At the same time, geographical concentra-
tion of  production and innovative activities seems to be growing in certain areas, 
Silicon Valley tendencies can be observed also in Japan and Western Europe. 
 How can we explain this apparent paradox? We shall argue that while 
the development of  telecommunication and other related technologies have 
reduced the costs of  simple signals, the same has not become true for the 
transfer of  complex and ever- changing messages. When user needs and tech-
nical opportunities are complex and going through a process of  discontinuous 
change, geographical distance and cultural distance will make the user– 
producer interaction less eff ective. 9 
   45
PRODUCT INNOVATION AND USER–PRODUCER INTERACTION 45
 2.5.2  The cultural distance 
 If  the cultural environment of  a user is very diff erent from that of  the pro-
ducer, it will be costly to establish a channel of  information and to develop 
a common code. Not only will diff erent national languages impair the com-
munication, diff erences in culture will be refl ected in diff erent interpretations 
of  identical signals. This will be even more so when market relations are jux-
taposed with organizational relations. Codes of  conduct, mutual trust and 
responsibility will typically be easier to establish between parties with a com-
mon cultural background. 
 Within the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) area, the postwar period has witnessed a decrease in cultural distance 
across diff erent nations. The diff usion of  social innovations from the United 
States relating to the work process, the capital market and not least the pattern 
of  fi nal consumption has diminished the heterogeneity within this area. The 
export of  management models has decreased the distance between diff erent 
national corporate cultures. Still the diff erences persist, and still they favour 
national rather than international user– producer interaction. This will espe-
cially be the case, when user needs and technical opportunities are complex 
and discontinuously changing. 
 2.5.3  Paradigms and basic innovations 
 Within science, there is a continuous work going on aiming at the establish-
ment of  a common set of  concepts. A common code is necessary in order to 
transmit scientifi c results within the scientifi c community. The standards of  
performance of  a scientifi c unit are related to its ability to gain worldwide 
acknowledgement. This can only be attained if  the results can be put into a 
code intelligible worldwide. At the same time, new paradigms develop and 
old paradigms become obsolete. When this happens, the old code becomes a 
restraint for further progress and new codes begin to develop. This will typi-
cally take place in an erratic way, and a kind of  crisis develops within the sci-
entifi c community. Several diff erent codes might coexist and compete during 
such circumstances, some of  them mixtures of  the old and a new code. The 
producers of  the new paradigm will have diffi  culties in communicating their 
results and the users will have diffi  culties in decoding what is going on. During 
such a period, long- distance communication becomes extremely diffi  cult. 
Local scientifi c communities facilitating face- to- face contact become more 
well suited to overcome such diffi  culties than the global scientifi c community. 
Not only might the immaturity of  the code make ‘hands- on experiment-
ing’ necessary, the traditional criteria of  scientifi c success might also become 
46
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE46
inadequate. Mutual trust between scientists and personal friendships might 
be essential in order to stimulate further progress when rational yardsticks do 
not work. 
 As a new paradigm becomes more widely accepted, a new process towards 
a common code develops. Long- distance communication and interaction 
becomes more eff ective as more and more users learn the new code. Scientifi c 
training has as one important function to disseminate a common code to 
potential users. It follows that a general diff usion of  a new code normally will 
be time consuming, perhaps a couple of  decades, corresponding to the time 
it takes for universities to adopt it and communicate it to new generations of  
students. 
 The introduction of  science- based innovations will have eff ects similar to 
the development of  new paradigms within science. The codes once learned by 
engineers and technicians, will not work anymore. It becomes diffi  cult for dis-
tant users to assess specifi c product innovations in relation to their own needs. 
Conversely, distant producers addressing users engaged in the new areas will 
have diffi  culties in decoding information about user needs. Geographical and 
cultural proximity becomes a critical variable. 
 As the technology stabilizes and becomes mature, the technical code 
becomes simplifi ed. 
 In technology, as in science, there are permanent forces working towards 
standardization and towards a common code. In the former case, the incen-
tive is the potential extension of  the market to a broader set of  users. The 
importance of  cultural and geographical distance declines as the technology 
becomes mature. 10 
 The product life cycle explanation of  the dynamics of  international spe-
cialization can be reinterpreted in the light of  a user– producer perspective. 
According to this explanation, the optimal factor proportions change dur-
ing the life cycle. The early phase is R&D intensive, the second management 
intensive while the mature phase is intensive in terms of  capital and unskilled 
labour. This explains why industries become relocated from developed to less 
developed countries. 
 A reinterpretation would suggest that the standardization and simplifi ca-
tion of  the technology make users of  technology less dependent on cultural 
and geographical distance to the producers of  technology. The fact that textile 
production technology has been easier to transfer than other manufacturing 
technologies can be ascribed to its relative stability as much as to its labour 
intensity. This reinterpretation does not necessarily contradict the predictions 
of  the product life- cycle explanation. But it highlights some of  the mecha-
nisms behind this phenomenon. 
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 2.5.4  Proximity and innovativeness 
 Empirical work in Aalborg, using the OECD data bank on foreign trade, has 
demonstrated that a substantial part of  the specialization in engineering prod-
ucts can be explained by the degree of  international specialization of  domes-
tic users of  the equipment involved (see for instance IKE seminar 1981). If  
we regard the index of  specialization for a product as an indicator of  innova-
tiveness and technical competence (this might be reasonable when the coun-
tries compared have similar factor proportions and when access to natural 
resources is not the decisive factor), we can relate this result to the interaction 
between users and producers. 
 One interpretation of  the result is that the producers of  capital goods will 
be better off  if  they have domestic innovative and competent users to interact 
with. The geographical and cultural proximity makes the establishment of  
channels and codes of  information less costly and the exchange of  informa-
tion more eff ective. 
 An alternative interpretation is that the presence of  domestic innovative 
and competent producers of  equipment gives the users an advantage in rela-
tion to foreign competitors. Again, the geographical and cultural proximity 
might give the users more direct and easy access to information from domestic 
producers. We shall propose that both those mechanisms are at work. Both 
users and producers are learning by interacting. A virtuous circle with cumula-
tive consequences is at work. 
 Such mechanisms will result in a rather stable pattern of  international spe-
cialization refl ecting historical background rather than proportions of  general 
factors or production. Learning by interacting creates poles of  competitiveness 
that refl ect specifi c know- how divided between domestic users and producers. 
The existence of  such poles of  international competitiveness might prove to be 
rather insensitive to new technical opportunities and to changing user needs. 
The existing national network of  user– producer interaction will only slowly 
adjust to external shocks. The ‘virtuous circles’ might become factors delaying 
a necessary adjustment of  the national economy to new external conditions. 
 2.6  The Science– Technology Nexus 
 The interaction between producers and users of  scientifi c results has its 
own properties. In this section, we shall discuss some of  the specifi cs of  this 
interaction. Some of  the ideas presented have been inspired by the notes of  
Paul David on ‘The Perilous Economics of  Modern Science’ (1984), while 
others are closely related to articles by Nathan Rosenberg in  Inside the Black 
Box: Technology and Economics (1982) . 
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 In the fi rst part of  this section, we shall discuss how a user– producer 
approach relates to respectively technology push and demand pull hypotheses. 
In the second part, we shall outline ‘a system of  innovation’. In the third and 
fourth parts, we try to apply the user– producer perspective to science- based 
industries and to university– industry interaction. 
 2.6.1  Technology push or demand pull? 
 Innovational activities are often treated as a linear process starting within basic 
research and ending in economic growth. The results from basic research are 
regarded as inputs to applied research. Inventions taking place within science 
are supposed to give rise to innovations. As innovations become diff used they 
aff ect productivity and growth in the sphere of  production. This unidirec-
tional fl ow of  information might be hampered by lacking competence on 
behalf  of  potential users and considerable time lags might be involved, but 
it is still regarded as unidirectional. Such a perspective will correspond to a 
 technology policy supporting science and R&D activities. 
 Another approach has emphasized the importance of  demand as a factor 
stimulating and directing innovations. When demand grows, it will pull R&D 
inventions and innovations forward and result in productivity growth. Such a 
perspective might give rise to policy recommendations of  a laissez- faire char-
acter. Innovative activities are assumed to adjust automatically to the market 
forces. 
 A user– producer perspective raises critical objections to both of  those two 
schools. The supply school underestimates the active role of  users in the inno-
vation process. The demand school does not distinguish demand as a quantita-
tive category from user needs as a qualitative category. Increasing investment 
in R&D might give small marginal returns if  the relationships to the potential 
users are weak and if  information about user needs is costly to obtain for the 
producers. Increasing demand does not necessarily imply that the quality of  
user– producer interaction increases. 
 Both approaches can be accused of  regarding the system of  production as 
a black box. The supply school concentrates on the bottom of  the black box 
where R&D is introduced and expects benefi cial eff ects to come out at the top 
of  the box. The demand school assumes that changes at the top of  the box 
(i.e., changes in demand) will have benefi cial eff ects at the bottom. A user- 
– producer approach might be regarded as one revealing the content of  the 
black box. The network of  user– producer relationships transmits signals from 
the top to the bottom and vice versa. We shall propose that such an approach 
will demonstrate that neither the demand nor the supply hypotheses have gen-
eral, but possibly selective, validity in the economy. 
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 2.6.2  A system of  innovation  11  
 In the economy, some key institutions are involved in diff erent types of  inno-
vative activities. The vertical division of  labour between institutions is far 
from clear- cut, but certain types of  activities are predominating in each type 
of  institution. The universities are centres for basic research and scientifi c 
training. At the same time, they constitute the decisive part of  an academic 
community characterized by its own social norms, criteria of  success and 
incentives. 
 Not all science is produced within the universities. Private fi rms as well 
as public agencies have their own dependent research units. Such units will 
typically be engaged in applied research (i.e., research aiming at the solution 
of  problems relevant to the mother organization). In such research units the 
criteria of  success and the incentives will be refl ecting the goal of  the mother 
organization rather than those of  the academic community. 
 In between those two levels, there is a multitude of  specialized research 
organizations that are neither integrated in the universities nor directly sub-
ordinated to any mother organization. Some of  those are exclusively engaged 
in either basic or applied research; others combine the two types of  activi-
ties. Such organizations might work more or less in accordance with the rules 
predominating within the academic community. A crucial factor determining 
their behaviour will be the funding mechanisms involved. 
 There are units closer to the process of  production. R&D units operate 
within fi rms and public organizations while technological institutes oper-
ate as independent units. Their main function is to convert scientifi c results 
into practical technical solutions rather than to extend the stock of  scientifi c 
knowledge. In such units the norms of  the academic community will play a 
secondary role. 
 Finally, we shall consider all other professional units as engaged in pro-
duction of  tangible goods. Also, in these units activities related to innovation 
take place. Learning by doing and learning by using produce information that 
might be crucial to units engaged in applied research and development. The 
recognition of  bottlenecks and other specifi c problems in production directs 
the activity of  dependent and semidependent R&D units. Phenomena that 
cannot be accounted for by science will occur in material production and 
stimulate new eff orts in applied as well as basic research. The agenda of  the 
units of  research and development will be infl uenced by what is going on in 
the production sphere. 
 We shall suggest that innovativeness and competence in the production 
sphere are factors that have a positive infl uence on the units engaged in devel-
opment and research units. 
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 We shall also suggest that the strength and form of  the relationships 
between producing units and R&D units infl uence the overall innovative per-
formance. The pattern of  historically established information channels and 
codes will determine how easily the agenda responds to signals from the pro-
duction sphere. 
 In order to illustrate those two propositions, we shall discuss two diff erent 
sets of  problems. One relates to the concept of  the science- based industry, and 
the second to the cooperation between university and industry. 
 2.6.3  Science- based industries 
 It is obvious that some industries are using results produced by science more 
frequently than other parts. Electronics industry and chemical industry are 
R&D intensive and interact intensively with institutions pursuing research, 
including the universities. Other industries, such as textiles and machinery, 
are less R&D intensive, and they have a more distant relationship to research 
institutions and universities. 
 This fact is normally interpreted in terms of  the linear unidirectional model 
of  innovations. Scientifi c breakthroughs in chemistry and physics are assumed 
to have created the basis for basic industrial innovations. The user– producer 
approach might give a more balanced interpretation of  the historical process, 
which has made some industries science- based, but not others. 
 Textiles, as well as machinery industries, were established on the basis of  
practical experience rather than on the basis of  systematic knowledge during a 
period when scientifi c activities were weak and only weakly related to techno-
logical problems. The fact that they still operate at arm’s length from science 
is not necessarily refl ecting that the problems they try to solve are unsuitable to 
scientifi c treatment. It might also refl ect a historical pattern of  user– producer 
relationships, which, once established, has been reinforced. 
 On the one hand, the practical orientation of  their innovation process 
might have been contagious in relation to the scientifi c disciplines closest to 
their fi eld of  operation. The lack of  ability to express problems in the scien-
tifi c code may have failed to stimulate the related scientifi c institutions. The 
very practical character of  work within such institutions may have repelled 
the most ambitious and competent scientists from those fi elds of  research. The 
predominance of  small- scale production, making it more diffi  cult to exploit 
increasing returns to R&D, may have reinforced such a tendency. 
 Looking at the so- called science- based industry, a reverse process might 
have been at work. Those industries were developed during a later historical 
period when the scientifi c institutions were more developed and more geared 
towards industrial problems. They were able to recruit engineers with a formal 
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education and were from the beginning able to communicate in a scientifi c 
code. The strong innovative activity within those fi rms and their ability to 
present their problems in a form suitable to a scientifi c treatment stimulated 
the scientifi c institutions and disciplines most closely related to their activ-
ity. Strong and eff ective relationships between users and producers of  science 
were established. 
 If  this is true, one should expect that a new symbiosis between traditional 
industries and science should off er dramatic returns. Investing in making 
the related research activities more scientifi c, stimulating the ability of  the 
industry to communicate in scientifi c terms and strengthening the interaction 
between industry and scientifi c institutions should be very rewarding. At the 
same time one should realize, however, that the investments necessary might 
be considerable and the lead time before the new channels of  information will 
work eff ectively might be very long. 
 The interaction between the science- based industries and the scientifi c insti-
tutions is already working smoothly and will, therefore, promise higher returns 
in the short run, both for the parties involved and for society as a whole. The 
hypothesis that the distinction between science- based and traditional indus-
tries is the result of  historical accident, rather than inherently based in the 
technology used, might therefore never be tested in practice. 
 2.6.4  The interaction between university and industry 
 One of  the few instances where the importance of  user– producer interac-
tion has been explicitly recognized in policy terms relates to the interaction 
between university and industry. OECD has published several reports on the 
subject and a new ad hoc group studying regional development and technical 
change seems to put the linkage between university and industry at the centre 
of  its analysis (OECD  1984 ). The growing interest for this linkage refl ects that 
science- based industries have become more important for international com-
petitiveness. It also refl ects that a tendency towards a new type of  agglomera-
tions, the so- called Centres of  excellence or Technopolises, where industrial 
development seems to be closely linked to ‘excellent’ universities, has been 
registered. The fact that most universities have rather weak relationships to 
industry, and that most attempts to strengthen the interaction have failed, 
has put this item on the agenda of  national governments and international 
organizations. 
 The analysis will often end up with a call for more cooperation. The lack 
of  cooperation is often ascribed to a lack of  goodwill and especially to a cer-
tain snobbish attitude within the academic community. Without denying that 
such mechanisms are at work, it could be argued that the lack of  cooperation 
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refl ects more fundamental ones with origin in the character of  the user– 
producer relationships. Without recognition of  the more fundamental mecha-
nisms, attempts to link universities and industries together based on goodwill 
might result mainly in disappointment and frustration. 
 The cultural distance between the industrial community and the academic 
community is refl ecting diff erences in social norms, criteria of  success and 
incentives. While global communication of  research results tends to make the 
products of  academic science a public good, secrecy is an important element 
in industrial R&D. While material incentives play a subordinate role within 
the academic community, the contrary is the case within industry. 
 This cultural distance can be diminished either by changing the academic 
culture or changing the industrial culture. Introducing secrecy and material 
incentives into the academic community will in the long run impair its stan-
dard and its contribution to economic welfare, not to mention its basic criti-
cal function. Introducing the norms of  the academic community on industry 
would imply radical change in the institutions of  the market economy. A cer-
tain cultural distance seems to be inevitable and this will make it more costly 
to establish channels of  information and an intelligible code. 
 Second, the scientifi c code that is predominating within the academic com-
munity is diff erent from the code predominating within industry. The scientifi c 
code is developed to serve as a medium for communication between special-
ized scientists, while the code of  industry is problem oriented. The organiza-
tion of  academic science into very specialized disciplines, each with its own 
code, is a factor making communication with industry more diffi  cult. 
 In this area a reorganization of  the universities, or rather of  some parts 
of  them, into interdisciplinary units might facilitate communication. Such a 
reorganization might also have a stimulating eff ect on research itself, putting 
new items on the agenda and giving rise to new disciplines and to new para-
digms within the old disciplines. A total disruption of  the discipline orienta-
tion of  academic research would, of  course, be unacceptable but a mixture 
of  research units oriented towards the traditional disciplines and problem- 
oriented units might be benefi cial both to the academic community itself  and 
to its ability to communicate with external users. 
 Taking into account all the diffi  culties in communication involved, the fact 
that centres of  excellence, where university and industry cooperate, do develop 
might seem diffi  cult to understand. Is it not true that Stanford University has 
played an important role in promoting the growth of  hi- tech industry in the 
Silicon Valley? In order to solve the apparent contradiction we have to take 
into regard the role of  the users in the interaction. 
 First, we shall argue that the users involved in Silicon Valley – primar-
ily the electronics industry – have certain specifi c characteristics that have 
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facilitated the interaction. The culture of  this industry has been less distant 
from that of  the academic community. The problems to be solved have been 
easier to pose in terms of  specifi c scientifi c disciplines. As a consequence, the 
costs of  establishing channels of  information and common codes have been 
relatively less. 
 Second, we shall question the idea that the excellence of  the university has 
been the driving force behind the Silicon Valley phenomenon. The innova-
tiveness of  the electronics industry and its ability to communicate with the 
university has brought new items on the agenda of  academic research. The 
fact that the industry has been at the forefront of  science, often having a lead 
in relation to worldwide academic research, has meant that the items brought 
on the agenda have been real challenges to academic science. The ability to 
communicate those problems in a scientifi c code has made it easier to address 
them from a scientifi c point of  view. This has made Stanford University an 
environment more attractive to ambitious and competent academic scientists. 
Everything equal, it is easier to produce Nobel Prizes in such an environment 
than at universities having less advanced users. The excellence of  the univer-
sity refl ects the excellence of  its users. 
 This is not to deny that an impact working in the opposite direction has 
been important. The interaction has been to the mutual benefi t of  user and 
producer, again a virtuous circle with cumulative eff ects has been at work. 
Our argument is rather one directed against simplistic ideas which exaggerate 
the role of  the university in relation to industrial development. Not all kinds 
of  university– industry interaction will result in mutual benefi ts. If  the indus-
try involved is traditional rather than innovative, distant from the culture of  
the academic community and not able to communicate in scientifi c code, an 
interaction will be diffi  cult to establish. Such an interaction might even have 
serious detrimental eff ects on the universities. The new questions entered on 
their agendas might be trivial and posed in terms not well suited for scientifi c 
treatment. The industry might get responses diffi  cult to decode and adopt to 
their problems, for instance. 
 A policy recommending a closer cooperation between university and indus-
try must take those complications into account. One implication might be 
that the fi rst step must be the strengthening of  the competence of  the users. 
Making recruitment of  labour with academic training more attractive to tradi-
tional industries might be a necessary step in this direction. This would dimin-
ish the cultural distance and increase the capability to communicate with the 
academic community. If  this analysis is correct, the establishment of  an eff ec-
tive interaction between universities and traditional industries will take some 
time. In the meantime, we might witness how well- intended eff orts to cooper-
ate create frustration both in the academic and in the industrial community. 
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 We have argued elsewhere that one of  the secrets behind the success-
ful Japanese industrial policy is a more fundamental understanding of  the 
user– producer relationships. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Japan, 
according to a recent OECD document, is planning to establish a new type of  
geographical agglomerations – the so- called technopolises. This concept does 
not put the main emphasis on the role of  universities but seems to give at least 
equal weight to the user side of  the relationships. 12 
 2.7  Units of  Analysis and Propositions 
 The traditional units of  analysis in economics are horizontal rather than verti-
cal. The economy is regarded as composed of  sectors like agriculture, manu-
facturing and services and each sector will be decomposed into industries and 
subsectors. A user– producer perspective brings into focus vertically organized 
units of  analysis, which typically cross the traditional borders between main 
sectors and subsectors. 13 
 In this section, we shall relate to each other such vertically organized units 
and related propositions. This brief  recapitulation might also be regarded as a 
series of  research proposals brought forward by a user– producer perspective. 
 The world economic system might be regarded as a complex network of  
user– producer relationships connecting units dispersed in economic and geo-
graphical space. This network is a product of  historical development, and it 
will only slowly adapt to exogenous and discontinuous change. When change 
of  this kind occurs, we should expect a growing gap between actual perfor-
mance and satisfactory performance. The oil price shock and the dramatic 
development in new all- pervasive technologies as microelectronics have 
undermined the eff ectiveness of  the existing global network. This has dimin-
ished the positive impact of  the basic innovations. A policy that stimulates 
the reshaping of  user– producer linkages will diminish the performance gap 
and stimulate innovative activities and economic growth. ‘Long waves’ in 
economic development might refl ect the inertia of  user– producer relation-
ships (Perez  1983 ). 
 International specialization might be regarded as refl ecting competition 
between verticals of  production rather than competition between national 
industries. The relative or absolute advantages of  a specifi c national industry 
refl ect not only its own eff orts but also the innovativeness and competence of  
domestic producers delivering process equipment, and domestic users deliver-
ing information inputs about user needs to the industry. A policy that aims at 
strengthening a specifi c industry should be based on an analysis of  all stages 
within the vertical of  production. In the long run, the competences of  users 
might be as important as the competences of  producers. 
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 National systems of  production will be more or less competitive and dif-
fer in their innovative capacity. The existing  network of  user– producer link-
ages, including linkages between applied science and basic science as well 
as linkages between the scientifi c and the technological sphere, will have an 
impact on innovative capacity and international competitiveness. In a specifi c 
historical period, certain user– producer linkages might become of  strategic 
importance. A policy aiming at strengthening the international competitive-
ness should address such strategic linkages. What is and what is not strategic 
linkages will depend on the existing network of  user– producer relationships as 
well as on new needs and opportunities. 
 Industrial complexes related to a broad set of  needs (the military– industrial 
complex) or to a specifi c primary sector (the agro- industrial complex) are 
semi- autonomous networks of  user– producer relationships. They are closely 
knit together internally, and their linkages to the rest of  the economy are rela-
tively weak. Such complexes might have great innovative capabilities because 
of  the historically stable and close relationships between clusters of  users and 
producers. They might also represent, however, a strong resistance to radical 
change in the network, the code and the channels of  information used, etc. 
This will be reinforced when they become a basis for social and political alli-
ances encompassing broad segments of  the population. The case of  Danish 
environmental industry gave an illustration of  the impact on technological 
trajectories of  a closely knit network of  experts. 
 During a period when needs and technical opportunities change radically, 
the existence of  such industrial complexes might become conservative ele-
ments that delay the restructuring of  the economy. A policy that aims at secur-
ing dynamic effi  ciency should be addressed to the creation, reshaping and 
demolition of  industrial complexes. 
 The interindustrial user– producer relationship involves two diff erent steps 
in a vertical of  production. It corresponds to what is at the centre of  micro-
economic theory – the  market where fi rms confront with consumers. We shall 
suggest that this is an area where a user– producer perspective brings forward 
several interesting results: 
 •  Perfect Competition  – anonymity in the relation between user and pro-
ducer – is an environment hostile to product innovations. Uncertainty and 
lack of  channels of  information transmitting qualitative information has a 
negative infl uence on the process of  innovation as well as on the diff usion 
of  innovations. 
 •  When small numbers are involved, market failure will result when product 
innovations occur. Uncertainty and limited rationality will prevail in such 
situations. 
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 •  The logical outcome is an economy where no product innovations take 
place. All innovations should be in- house process innovations. This does not 
correspond to historical evidence. Product innovations are introduced on 
the market place. 
 •  This paradox can only be resolved if  we accept that the distinction between 
 market and hierarchy becomes blurred in the real world. In markets where 
product innovations are frequent and important anonymity is eliminated, 
pure markets become infi ltrated with organizational linkages. 
 •  Organizational relationships might in some instances be described in terms 
of  a hierarchy where the producer dominates the user or vice versa. Certain 
constellations of  user– producer relationships cannot, however, be explained 
in such terms. Elements of  cooperation and mutual trust must be introduced 
in order to explain why product innovation takes place when the user and 
the producer are of  equal strength. 
 •  The interaction between an innovating producer and a user might be cap-
tured better by a model of  a cooperative positive sum game than by models 
emphasizing confl icts of  interests. 
 Microeconomic theory assumes that the single fi rm is adjusting its behaviour 
to signals in the form of  prices and quantities. A user– producer perspective 
introduces the need for qualitative information about new use values, treated 
as inputs, and about the needs of  users. More realistic models describing 
fi rm behaviour introduce the environment of  the fi rm as a factor infl uenc-
ing its conduct and performance. We shall suggest that a breakdown of  this 
environment into user– producer relationships can clarify the analysis of  fi rm 
behaviour. 
 An important aspect of  fi rm strategies is related to user– producer relation-
ships. The existing forward and backward linkages will act as strong restraints 
on what the fi rm can do, the opening up of  new channels of  information and 
the development of  new codes will involve investment costs and the outcome 
is uncertain. The acquisition of  formerly independent units operating in a 
diff erent network of  user– producer relationships is not necessarily motivated 
primarily by the production capacity acquired. It might be motivated by the 
access it gives to new channels of  information and to new codes. 
 Internal user– producer relationships might diff er between diff erent fi rms. 
The ability of  the internal organization to transform internal and external 
user needs into innovations might refl ect diff erent organizational arrange-
ments, diff erent incentive systems and diff erent cultural characteristics. Is the 
competitiveness of  Japanese fi rms an expression for their ability to establish 
proximity between users and producers within the multidivisional fi rms? Is 
   57
PRODUCT INNOVATION AND USER–PRODUCER INTERACTION 57
the US model, characterized by arm’s length relations between profi t centres, 
detrimental to innovation? 
 How do the ‘fi nal users’ – workers and consumers – infl uence innovational 
activities? A strengthening of  their competence and infl uence might have dra-
matic eff ects on the innovative capability of  the economy. Which types of  
reforms are necessary in order to realize such eff ects? 
 2.8  A Final Remark 
 What has been introduced here is neither a general nor a pure theory. One of  
the more general results obtained in our empirical work has been that user– 
producer interaction works in diff erent ways in diff erent parts of  the economy. 
The fact that we focus on use value rather than exchange value introduces a 
strong historical element in the analysis. 
 In this chapter, we have studied user– producer relationships where the 
user is professional and the innovations involve a certain degree of  com-
plexity. The results obtained, therefore, have specifi c rather than general 
validity. 
 We do not, however, regard this only as a weakness of  the user– producer 
perspective (Kornai  1971 , 28– 29). Especially in innovation theory, it has 
proven diffi  cult to produce hypotheses of  general validity. Attempts to reduce 
innovative activities to be either supply- or demand- induced have failed. 
Attempts to devote to respectively small and big fi rms special innovative abili-
ties have not been successful. 
 Regarding innovative activities from a user– producer perspective might be 
a way to open up the black box and disclose the mechanisms that are at work. 
In doing so, it might become possible to develop hypotheses which have at 
least a specifi c and specifi ed validity. 
 Important work in this direction has been pursued at SPRU, UK, where 
Keith Pavitt ( 1984 ) has used an extensive database on UK innovations to 
develop a taxonomy of  innovation. The user– producer relationships refl ected 
in his taxonomy are related primarily to interbranch rather than to the inter-
organizational interaction treated here ( 1984 ). We believe that a combination 
of  the two approaches will prove useful. 
 Notes 
 1  This point was made by Kenneth Arrow at a private conversation when I  visited 
Stanford University 1984. 
 2  This has become an increasingly important phenomenon analysed in depth by von 
Hippel ( 2005 ). 
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 3  It is interesting to note that Kirman and Vriend ( 2000 ) demonstrate this even for 
consumer markets (their main case is the fi sh market in Marseille), where there is lit-
tle ‘innovation’ and sellers and customers develop relationships of  loyalty and trust. 
This case agrees with the patterns analysed in this chapter that there is information 
asymmetry – the supplier has more insight in the quality of  the product than the 
customer. 
 4  The basic idea in this section, that pure markets are dynamically ineffi  cient, has been 
developed further in a broader discussion of  the limits of  the pure market economy (see 
Johnson and Lundvall  1989 ). 
 5  Here I could have referred to the importance for innovating fi rms to have access to 
a diverse set of  customers/ suppliers as a special case of  ‘the strength of  weak ties’ 
Granovetter ( 1973 ). 
 6  The criticism of  the transaction theory approach and its neglect of  innovation and 
learning have been developed further in Lundvall ( 1992a ). 
 7  The concept of  unsatisfactory innovations was developed further and linked to macro-
economic stagnation in a paper presented at the OECD conference on the productivity 
slow- down in Paris 1990 (Lundvall  1991 ). 
 8  The role of  innovation and user– producer interaction in determining location has been 
further developed in Lundvall ( 1999 ) and in Lundvall and Maskell ( 2000 ). The specifi c 
problems involved in establishing international user– producer interaction where dis-
cussed in Lundvall ( 1992b ). 
 9  The role (and limitations) of  information technologies in facilitating long- distance com-
munication has been developed further in Lundvall ( 1997 ). 
 10  The interplay between innovation and standardization has been further developed in 
Lundvall ( 1995 ). 
 11  This may be the fi rst use of  the concept ‘innovation system’ in a publication with ISBN 
No. As referred to in Lundvall ( 2004 ). Chris Freeman introduced the innovation system 
concept in an unpublished paper for OECD already in 1982. 
 12  The interaction between universities and industry is covered in much more depth in 
Lundvall ( 2002 ). 
 13  Using the user– producer perspective to link input– output analysis to innovation may be 
seen as one way to operationalize the ideas in this chapter (Lundvall 1996). 
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 Chapter 3 
 INNOVATION AS AN INTERACTIVE 
PROCESS: FROM USER– PRODUCER 
INTERACTION TO THE NATIONAL 
SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 3.1  Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on the interactive nature of  the process of  innovation. 
The analysis takes as its points of  departure two important characteristics of  
an industrial economy: the highly developed vertical division of  labour and 
the ubiquitous and all- pervasive character of  innovative activities. It analyses 
the implications from the fact that a substantial part of  innovative activities 
takes place in units separated from the potential users of  the innovations. 
 Here we shall argue that the separation of  users from producers in the pro-
cess of  innovation, being ‘a stylized fact’ of  a modern industrial society (capital-
ist or socialist), has important implications for economic theory. When we focus 
on innovation as an interactive process, the theoretical and practical problems 
tend to present themselves diff erently than in mainstream economic theory. 
 The interactive aspects of  the process of  innovation can be studied at dif-
ferent levels of  aggregation. First, we discuss the ‘microeconomics of  interac-
tion’. Second, we present some preliminary ideas on how the understanding 
of  a national system of  innovation can be developed. 
 3.2  The Micro- Foundation: Interaction between 
Users and Producers 
 In standard microeconomics the agents – fi rms and consumers – are assumed 
to behave as maximizers of  profi ts and utility. Perfect competition with 
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numerous buyers and sellers, and the fl ow of  information connecting them 
encompassing nothing but price signals, is the normative and analytical point 
of  reference of  the theory. Monopolistic structures and complex client rela-
tionships are regarded as deviations from this normal and ideal state. 
 The kind of  ‘microeconomics’ to be presented here is quite diff erent. While 
traditional microeconomics tends to focus on decisions made on the basis of  
a given amount of  information, we shall focus on a  process of  learning , perma-
nently changing the amount and kind of  information at the disposal of  the 
actors. While standard economics tends to regard optimality in the allocation 
of  a given set of  use values as the economic problem,  par preference , we shall 
focus on the capability of  an economy to produce and diff use  use values with 
new characteristics. Moreover, while standard economics takes an atomistic view 
of  the economy, we shall focus on the  systemic interdependence between formally 
independent economic subjects. 
 3.2.1  Product innovations in a pure market 
 In an economy characterized by vertical division of  labour and by ubiqui-
tous innovative activities, a substantial part of  all innovative activities will be 
addressed towards users outside the innovating units. In such an economy, suc-
cessful innovations must be based on knowledge about the needs of  potential 
users, and this knowledge is as important as knowledge about new technical 
opportunities (Freeman  1982 , 124,  passim ). 
 When an innovation has been developed and introduced, it will diff use only 
if  information about its use- value characteristics is transmitted to the potential 
users of  this innovation. Within organizations, this constitutes an intraorgani-
zational problem to be solved through interaction and information exchange 
involving diff erent individuals and departments belonging to the organization. 
 Here, however, the focus will be on those innovative activities that are ori-
ented towards new products to be presented to a market. For simplicity, we 
shall label such innovations as ‘product innovations’ keeping in mind that they 
might constitute new materials and new process equipments, as well as new 
consumer products. Further, we shall not primarily treat innovations as single 
events. By using terms such as ‘the process of  innovation’ and ‘innovative 
activities’, we indicate that the traditional separation between discovery, inven-
tion, innovation and diff usion is of  limited relevance in this specifi c context. 
 How can the mutual information problem be solved when the producer and 
the user are separated by a market? If  the market is ‘pure’, in the neoclassical 
sense, the problem must remain without a solution. In such a market the only 
information exchanged relates to products already existing in the market, and 
it contains only quantitative information about price and volume. Anonymous 
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relationships between buyer and seller are assumed. In such a market the inno-
vating units as well as the potential users will operate under extreme uncer-
tainty. Producers have no information about potential user needs, and users 
have no knowledge about the use value characteristics of  new products. If  the 
real economy was constituted by pure markets, product innovations would be 
haphazard and therefore exceptional. 
 It is interesting to note that the pure market hailed by most neoclassical 
economists, for its ability to establish an effi  cient allocation of  resources on the 
basis of  very limited amount of  information, forms an environment hostile to 
innovative activities. Second, that product innovations would be all but absent 
in a capitalist economy characterized by perfect competition. At an abstract 
level, a  socialist economy might be expected to overcome this crucial informa-
tion problem more easily through a planning mechanism, taking into account 
the need for the exchange of  qualitative information. According to a study of  
innovations in the Soviet Union, however, the lack of  effi  cient user– producer 
interaction seems to be a major problem in the ‘real existing socialist coun-
tries’ (Amann and Cooper  1982 ). 
 Anne P. Carter ( 1986 ) points to the neglect of  product innovation in produc-
tion models as a general and serious weakness. But this neglect is consistent with 
the microeconomic assumption of  pure markets as the norm. In a world where 
all products were characterized by constant use- value characteristics, pure mar-
kets could survive, and those pure markets would tend to reproduce the existing 
set of  use values. Introducing product innovations into economic models cannot 
but erode the foundation for using pure market transactions as a norm. 
 3.2.2  Product innovations and transaction costs 
 One alternative conception of  the process of  information exchange is the 
transaction cost approach presented by Oliver E. Williamson ( 1975 ). What are 
the implications of  product innovations if  we take this approach as our point 
of  departure? According to Williamson, markets characterized by small num-
bers, uncertainty, limited rationality and opportunistic behaviour will tend to 
become hierarchies. High transaction costs will induce vertical integration. 
 A market where product innovations were frequent would certainly involve 
fundamental uncertainty at both sides of  the market. The uncertainty would 
emanate not from the external conditions for the transaction but from quali-
tative change in the commodity itself. It would also imply what Williamson 
refers to as ‘informational impactedness’ . This would be rooted in asymmet-
rical distribution of  information. The innovating unit would, typically, have 
much more, and more certain, information about the use- value characteristics 
of  the new product than the potential user. 
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 In the Williamson framework, as in the neoclassical world, we would expect 
product innovations to be exceptional. We would expect them to become inter-
nalized and transformed into process innovations through vertical integration. 
It is, of  course, quite diffi  cult to measure in a precise manner, the proportion of  
innovative activities directed towards product innovations. One of  the few sys-
tematic innovation data banks is the one developed at the Science Policy Research 
Unit, Sussex University. Among more than 2,000 important postwar innova-
tions reported in Pavitt ( 1984 ), more than a half  had been developed for outside 
fi rms (Ibid. p. 348). Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) data on the allocation of  R&D activities confi rm that product innova-
tion is as important a phenomenon as process innovation in the OECD area. 
 Thus neither standard microeconomics nor the transaction cost approach 
is easily reconciled with the stylized facts of  a modern industrial economy. In 
order to explain the actual importance of  product innovations, we must take a 
closer look at the (assumed) market- hierarchy dichotomy. 
 3.2.3  The organized market as solution 
 If  all transactions in the real world were taking place either in ‘pure mar-
kets’ or in ‘pure organizations’, innovative activities would be less frequent 
than they are and would mainly take the form of  process innovations. The 
fact that product innovations are frequent in the real world demonstrates that 
most real markets are ‘organized markets’ rather than pure markets. The actu-
ally observed relative effi  ciency of  the capitalist system in terms of  innovative 
behaviour can only be explained by the fact that the invisible hand of  the pure 
market economy has been replaced by bastard forms, combining organization 
elements with market elements. 1 
 The organized market is characterized by transactions between formally 
independent units and by a fl ow of  information on volume and price. But 
it also involves  relationships of  an organizational type. Those relationships 
might involve fl ows of  qualitative information and direct cooperation. They 
might take a hierarchical form, refl ecting that one party dominates the other, 
by means of  fi nancial power or of  a superior scientifi c and technical compe-
tence. As we shall see, a purely hierarchical relationship will, however, often 
prove insuffi  cient. Mutual trust and mutually respected codes of  behaviour 
will normally be necessary in order to overcome the uncertainty involved. 
 3.2.4  User– producer interaction in the process of  innovation 
 We shall now take a closer look at the specifi c forms of  user– - producer inter-
action in relation to the process of  innovation. The producer will have a strong 
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incentive to monitor what is going on in user units. First, process innovations 
within user units might be appropriated by producers or represent a potential 
competitive threat. Second, product innovations at the user level may imply 
new demands for process equipment. Third, the knowledge produced by 
learning by using can only be transformed into new products if  the producers 
have a direct contact with users. Fourth, bottlenecks and technological inter-
dependencies, observed within user units, will represent potential markets for 
the innovating producer. Finally, the producer might be interested in monitor-
ing the competence and learning potential of  users in order to estimate their 
respective capability to adopt new products. 
 The user, on the other hand, needs information about new products, and 
this information involves not only awareness but also quite specifi c informa-
tion about how new use value characteristics relate to her/ his specifi c needs. 
When new user needs develop, for example, when bottleneck problems occur, 
the user might be compelled to involve a producer in the analysis and solution 
of  the problem. This can only be done successfully if  the user has a detailed 
knowledge about the competence and reliability of  diff erent producers. 
 When complex and specialized equipment is developed and sold to users, 
there will be a need for  direct cooperation during the process of  innovation. The 
cooperation is not a single act but takes place at diff erent stages of  the pro-
cess (Rothwell and Gardiner  1985 ). First, the user may present the producer 
with specifi c needs to be fulfi lled by the new product. Second, the producer 
might install it and start it up in cooperation with the user. At this stage, the 
producer might off er specifi c training to the user. After the product has been 
adopted, there might follow a period where the producer would have obliga-
tions regarding repair and updating of  the equipment. 2 
 The uncertainty involved in this kind of  transaction will be considerable. 
Not only is the user unit buying a product with unknown characteristics, it is 
also buying the cooperation of  an external party for a future period. It should 
be obvious that the room for an opportunistic producer to cheat is consider-
able. Conversely, this implies that ‘trustworthiness’ becomes a decisive param-
eter of  competition. If  a user has a choice between a producer known for low 
price and technically advanced products, but having a weak record in terms 
of  moral performance, and one well known for trustworthiness, the fi rst will 
be passed by. This implies limits to opportunistic behaviour. These limits are 
reinforced when users pool their information about the reliability of  diff erent 
producers. 
 The exchange of  information between user and producer also involves 
uncertainty and room for cheating and disloyal behaviour. The users must 
disclose their needs to the producer in order to get workable solutions. The 
producer unit has an interest in disclosing the full capacity of  its product and 
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in giving the users insight into its technical competence as a potential co- 
operator. Nevertheless, in both cases, a full disclosure might be abused by the 
other party. Information might be spilled to competitors, and each party may 
invade the market of  the other party. Again, the abuse can only be restrained 
if  codes of  behaviour and mutual trust form an element of  the relationship. 
Without any such restraints, transaction costs would become prohibitive and 
vertical integration would become a necessary outcome. 
 3.2.5  What determines the strength of  the elements of  
organization? 
 The element of  organization might be quite weak in certain markets. If  the 
product is simple with slow changes in its use- value characteristics and the 
expenditure for its procurement forms a negligible part of  the user’s budget, 
the market might become quite ‘pure’. When its use- value characteristics are 
complex, rapidly changing and the product is expensive, the element of   orga-
nization will be strong. The former type of  goods will typically be developed 
by the producer alone and bought ‘off  the shelf ’, while the latter will be devel-
oped in an interaction between the user and producer, and the act of  exchange 
will involve direct cooperation and exchange of  qualitative information. 
 3.2.6  The fl ow of  information 
 In markets where element of   organization is strong, the fl ow of  information 
might be analysed in terms parallel to those applied in the theoretical analysis 
of  organizations. Here we shall use elements from a conceptual framework 
developed by Kenneth Arrow ( 1974 ). 
 The fl ow of  information can only take place if  there are channels of  infor-
mation through which the message can pass. Further, a code of  information is 
necessary in order to make the transmission of  messages eff ective. The estab-
lishment of  channels of  information may, according to Arrow, be regarded as 
parallel to a process of  investment in physical capital. It is a time- consuming 
process involving costs. The development of  a common code is also time con-
suming and involves learning. The more the code is used in transmitting infor-
mation, the more eff ective it becomes. ‘Learning by interacting’ increases the 
eff ectiveness of  a given set of  channels and codes of  information. 
 3.2.7  The selectivity of  user– producer interaction 
 The organizational element will not link  every single producer to every single 
user – here we disregard pure monopolistic and pure monopsonistic situations. 
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Normally, each producer will have a close interaction with a subset of  all 
potential users and each user will be attached to only one, or a small subset of  
all potential producers. This selectivity refl ects the need to develop noneco-
nomic relationships of  hierarchy and mutual trust. It also refl ects the need to 
develop eff ective channels and codes of  information. 
 3.2.8  User– producer relationships in time 
 It takes time to develop selective relationships involving elements of  hierarchy 
and mutual trust. It also takes time to develop eff ective channels and codes of  
information. Once those relationships have become established, it will not be 
costless to sever the connections. Inertia, refl ecting a combination of  a general 
resistance to change and risk aversion with rational motives, will reinforce exist-
ing user– producer relationships. Ceteris paribus, the user unit will prefer to trust 
a producer known from its own experience rather than getting involved with a 
new producer. The investment in information channels and codes will be lost 
if  the old relationships are severed, and new investment in the creation of  new 
relationships will be required. Therefore user– producer relationships will tend 
to become enduring and resistant to change. Only if  the costs of  continuing the 
existing relationships are apparent or the economic incentives off ered by new 
relationships are substantial will a reorganization of  the markets take place. 
 3.2.9  User– producer relationships in space 
 The user– producer relationship is defi ned in ‘economic space’ coupling units, 
close to each other, in an input– output system. The selective user– producer 
relationships will involve units more or less distant from each other in geo-
graphical and cultural space. 
 The importance of  distance will vary with the type of  innovative activ-
ity involved. When the technology is standardized and reasonably stable, 
the information exchanged may be translated into standard codes and long- 
distance transmission of  information can take place and involve low costs. 
Here, user– producer relationships involving units located far away from each 
other might be eff ective. 
 When the technology is complex and ever changing, a short distance might 
be important for the competitiveness of  both users and producers. Here, the 
information codes must be fl exible and complex and a common cultural back-
ground might be important in order to establish tacit codes of  conduct and 
to facilitate the decoding of  the complex messages exchanged. The need for 
a short distance will be reinforced when user needs are complex and ever 
changing. 
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 When the technology changes rapidly and radically – when a new techno-
logical paradigm (for a discussion and a defi nition, see Dosi  1982 ) develops – 
the need for proximity in terms of  geography and culture becomes even more 
important. A new technological paradigm will imply that established norms 
and standards become obsolete and that old codes of  information cannot 
transmit the characteristics of  innovative activities. In the absence of  gener-
ally accepted standards and codes able to transmit information, face- to- face 
contact and a common cultural background might become of  decisive impor-
tance for the information exchange. 
 3.2.10  Vertical integration as a means of  overcoming 
geographical and cultural distance 
 The development of  transnational capital and  vertically integrated fi rms oper-
ating all over the world refl ects that ‘organizational proximity’ may overcome 
geographical and cultural distance. However, vertical integration may have its 
price. It tends to exclude integrated units from the interaction with producer 
units and user units outside the integrated fi rm. Such independent fi rms will 
tend to guard themselves against an open information exchange with a verti-
cally integrated unit. As users, they risk getting less effi  cient technology than 
their integrated counterpart and competitor. As producers, they fear that the 
know- how built into their product innovations will become expropriated by 
the integrated user and transferred to an integrated competing producer. 
 In addition, the vertically integrated units may prove to be more rigid and 
less susceptible to new technological opportunities and new user needs than 
the parties operating in an organized market. The tendency towards verti-
cal integration is strong, but there are also countertendencies at work. The 
trade- off  between saved transaction costs and the losses in terms of  more nar-
row interaction with external parties will diff er between diff erent parts of  the 
economy. It will, among other things, refl ect the state of  the technology and 
the character of  the process of  innovation. 
 3.2.11  User and producer characteristics and the innovative 
potential of  interaction 
 Not all user– producer relationships promote innovative activities. Being 
closely linked to conservative users with weak technical competence might 
be a disadvantage for a producer and vice versa. The innovativeness and the 
competences of  users and producers are important qualities that might stimu-
late the other party. The degree of  standardization among users might also 
be important. Being dependent on a set of  users with diversifi ed needs might 
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make it diffi  cult for the producer to accumulate experience and to exploit scale 
economies. 
 The eff ectiveness of  the user– producer relationships grows with time. As a 
subset of  users and producers accumulates more experience from interaction, 
the elements of  hierarchy and mutual trust are strengthened and the exchange 
of  information becomes more open. The code of  information becomes more 
eff ective in transmitting complex messages related to the process of  innova-
tion. As we shall see below, this ‘eff ectiveness’ does not, however, guarantee 
 effi  ciency if  the criterion is user satisfaction at a low cost. The negative side is 
growing inertia and resistance to change. 
 3.2.12  Unsatisfactory innovations 
 Traditional welfare economics tends to disregard innovative activities. It 
analyses the allocation of  a given set of  use values with given characteristics. 
Neither are the concepts used in welfare economics applicable to a normative 
analysis of  the process of  innovation. There is, for instance, no point in asking 
how actual innovations deviate from ‘an optimum’. The characteristics and 
usefulness of  innovations not yet conceived are not known and therefore there 
are no well- defi ned points of  reference for such an analysis. 
 In certain instances it might, however, be possible to demonstrate how 
innovative activities and technological trajectories deviate systematically from 
user needs. We might label such innovations as being ‘unsatisfactory’, when 
deviations neither can be ascribed to a lack of  technical opportunities nor 
to an unwillingness among users to pay the costs for adaptation to the user 
needs. 
 When the user– producer relationships are characterized by a strong domi-
nance of  producers in terms of  fi nancial strength and technological compe-
tence, such deviations become more likely. In the fi eld of  consumer goods, the 
producer dominance is accentuated. The producer organizes both the process 
of  innovation and most of  the information exchange with users. In this fi eld 
we should expect ‘unsatisfactory innovations’ to be frequent (Freeman  1982 , 
202ff ). 
 Patterns of  dominance and hierarchy might also be found when the user 
is a professional organization. If  a few big fi rms produce scientifi cally based, 
complex and systemic products for a great number of  small, independent user 
units – each with low technical and scientifi c competence – the producers will 
dominate the process of  innovation and the likelihood of  unsatisfactory inno-
vations becomes high. In a study of  the Danish dairy industry, such a pattern, 
resulting in ‘hyper automation’, was found to characterize the relationships 
between producers and users of  dairy equipment (Lundvall et al.  1983 ). 
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 In such situations coordination among users might develop and resources 
might be pooled in order to develop their competence. Such coordination will 
often be more diffi  cult to make effi  cient when the users are consumers than 
when they are professional units. Government regulation or government sup-
port to user organizations might be necessary in order to rectify an unsatisfac-
tory trajectory in consumer technology. 
 Another background for unsatisfactory innovations might be inertia in 
user– producer relationships and the level of  ‘eff ectiveness’ of  already estab-
lished channels and codes of  information. In a historical period characterized 
by the development and introduction of  basic radical innovations, the rigidity 
of  the existing set of  user– producer relationships tends to become manifest. 
A basic radical innovation will often be produced by a new sector with weak 
forward linkages. The potential users of  the innovation will be found in most 
parts of  the economy, and those users will have backward linkages to produc-
ers having little experience and competence in relation to the new technology. 
Existing user– producer networks will prove to be tenacious, and it will take 
considerable time for a new network to become established. During such a 
period of  transition, productivity might be stagnating while new technological 
opportunities seem to fl ourish. 
 Here, the problem is not only the specifi c unsatisfactory technical inno-
vations but rather a general ‘mismatch’ in the whole economy. Christopher 
Freeman and Carlota Perez ( 1986 ) have discussed how a ‘technological revo-
lution’, based on information technology, might provoke mismatch problems 
related not only to capital and labour but also to the existing socioeconomic 
institutional set- up. The rigidity of  user– producer relationships might be 
regarded as one important aspect of  this last type of  mismatch. It is important 
because it has its roots in the very core of  the market system. Policy strategies, 
putting all the emphasis on fl exibility through market regulation and minimiz-
ing the role of  government in the process of  adjustment, seem to be somewhat 
off  the point when rigidities are produced and reproduced within and by the 
markets themselves. 
 3.2.13  Is innovation induced by supply or by demand? 
 One classical dispute in innovation theory refers to the role of  demand and 
supply in determining the rate and direction of  the process of  innovations 
(Mowery and Rosenberg  1979 ; Freeman  1982 , 211). The user– producer 
approach puts this question in a new perspective. On the one hand, it dem-
onstrates that demand does play an important role in the process of  innova-
tion. On the other hand, it puts more emphasis on the  quality of  demand than 
on demand as a quantitative variable. The very substantial user expenditure 
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channelled into the demand for private transportation has not resulted in radi-
cal product innovations in the automobile industry. Conversely, very compe-
tent and demanding users have provoked radical innovations in areas where 
the volume of  expenditure has been miniscule. The role of  users in relation 
to the development of  new scientifi c instruments is illustrative in this respect. 
 Individual innovations might appear unrelated to user needs, such as inno-
vations emanating from science. In the second part of  this chapter, it will be 
argued that even science has its users and that many innovations, appearing 
as purely supply- determined, have their roots in a user– producer interaction 
placed early in the chain of  innovation. In this perspective,  general statements 
about the role of  ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ do not seem very relevant. 
 3.2.14  Some implications for industrial and technology policy 
 The fact that technology is infl uenced by the demand side has been used to 
argue for a  laissez- faire technology policy. If  demand is provoking the innovations 
called for, there is no need for state intervention. Those arguing that the supply 
side plays the dominating role will often recommend government support to 
R&D activities and education, combined with an active labour market policy. 
 The implications of  a user– producer approach are somewhat more com-
plex. First, technology policy should not only take into account the compe-
tence and innovativeness of  units placed early in the chain of  innovation. 
The lack of  competence of  users and the tendency of  producers to dominate 
the process of  innovation might be as serious a problem as a lack of  com-
petence on the producer side. Even when the state itself  acts as a user, one 
will often fi nd that the competence will be too weak, and this might result in 
‘unsatisfactory innovations’. Two Danish case studies, looking into the role of  
local government as user of  waste- water technology and offi  ce technology, 
demonstrated how a lack of  local user competence had a negative eff ect on 
the technological systems developed and used (Gregersen  1984 ; Brændgaard 
et al.  1984 ). 
 Second, government may intervene, directly or indirectly, in relation to the 
establishment and restructuring of  patterns of  user– producer relationships. 
In a period characterized by gradual technological change and incremental 
innovations, a national government might sustain national and international 
user– producer linkages that already exist. It might also support the establish-
ment of  specifi c organizations intermediating between groups of  users and 
groups of  producers, pooling information and thereby stimulating the produc-
tion and diff usion of  innovations. 
 In a period characterized by radical innovations and a shift in techno-
logical paradigm, the task of  government becomes vastly more complex and 
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important. In such a period, there is a need for a transformation of  the exist-
ing network of  user– producer relationships. The inertia originating in the 
organized markets will at the national level be supported by the political power 
of  strong interest groups closely associated with the prevailing structure. The 
diffi  cult task for government will be to stimulate the renewal, or severance, 
of  well- established user– producer relationships and the establishment of  new 
relationships. 
 3.2.15  Standard microeconomics and the user– producer 
approach 
 Our results can now be confronted with the microeconomic theory presented 
in standard textbooks. We make the following observations: 
 •  The element of  organization will be diff erent, in terms of  content and 
strength, between diff erent markets, and it will change over time. Some mar-
kets will be more susceptible to an analysis based on the concepts of  opti-
mizing agents acting at arm’s- length distance than others. This raises doubt 
about the intentions to construct one single model of  micro- behaviour, 
assumed to be generally valid for all markets, a problem discussed by Kornai 
(1971, 207ff ). 
 •  The standard approach will be most relevant when technological 
opportunities are limited and user needs remain constant. When product 
innovations are continuously provoked by changing technological 
opportunities and user needs, it is no longer meaningful to assume optimizing 
behaviour. ‘Short run’ decisions, by producers to become involved in certain 
lines of  innovating activities, and by users to choose among new products, 
will be characterized by fundamental uncertainty, as will, a fortiori, ‘long 
run’ decisions, referring to the establishment of  (and investment in) new 
relationships and information channels. 
 •  Standard microeconomics regards technological change as an exogenous 
process and its outcome as technological ‘progress’, indicating growing 
effi  ciency. In organized markets the existing set of  user– producer relationships 
may produce technological trajectories, deviating systematically from what is 
‘satisfactory’, even when users and producers act according to profi t motives. 
 •  In standard microeconomics, changes in relative prices will infl uence the 
decisions taken by users and producers automatically and instantaneously. 
A world characterized by organized markets will be sluggish in this respect. 
The existing set of  user– producer relationships and the continuous qualita-
tive change in products will reduce the responsiveness to changes in relative 
prices. 
   73
INNOVATION AS AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS 73
 3.3  National Systems of  Innovation 
 In the fi rst part of  this chapter, we found that the microeconomic framework, 
as presented in standard textbooks, is not easily reconciled with the stylized 
facts of  the modern economy. A highly developed vertical division of  labour, 
when combined with ubiquitous innovative activities, implies that most mar-
kets will be ‘organized markets’ rather than pure markets. In this second and 
fi nal part, we shall sketch some of  the implications of  this micro- approach for 
the national and international level. Elements of  a model of  a national system 
of  innovation will be introduced. 
 The subdisciplines in economics, most relevant in this context, are theo-
ries of  economic growth and international trade. Standard growth models 
are developed under the assumption of  a closed economy. This is a natu-
ral assumption in so far as the models regard new technology as falling ‘as 
manna from heaven’ and as equally accessible for all actors, sectors, regions 
and nations. Standard foreign trade theory assumes labour and capital to be 
perfectly immobile and commodities to be perfectly mobile across national 
borders. It has the assumption of  a perfectly free and mobile technology in 
common with standard growth theory. 
 This last assumption is at odds with what can be observed in the real world 
where some countries establish themselves as technological leaders, generally 
or in specifi c technologies, while others tend to lag behind. According to the 
user– producer approach, geographical and cultural distance is a factor that 
may impede the interaction between users and producers. This might con-
tribute to an explanation of  why diff erent national systems display diff erent 
patterns of  development. 
 3.3.1  The nation as a framework for user– producer interaction 
 The tendency towards internationalization of  trade, capital and production 
has been strong during the postwar period. Some would even argue that 
nations tend to become obsolete as economic subjects. But this process of  
internationalization has not wiped out idiosyncratic national patterns of  spe-
cialization in production and international trade. The fact that Denmark is 
strongly specialized in dairy machinery, Sweden in metal- working and wood-
cutting technology and Norway in fi shery technology cannot be explained by 
the general factor endowments in these countries. Rather, we should look for 
the explanation in the close interaction between producers of  such machinery 
and a competent and demanding domestic- user sector (Andersen et al.  1981 ). 
 Interaction between users and producers belonging to the same national 
system may work more effi  ciently for several reasons. Short geographical 
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distance is part of  the explanation; more important may be a common lan-
guage and the cultural proximity. It is thus interesting to note that fi rms in the 
Nordic countries tend to regard all the Nordic countries as their ‘home mar-
ket’. This might refl ect that those nations have very much in common in terms 
of  culture and social organization (Dalum and Fagerberg  1986 ). 
 Another factor of  importance is, of  course, national government. The 
role of  government in relation to the process of  innovation has been seri-
ously underestimated according to recent historical studies (Yakushiji  1986 ). 
Besides more direct interventions in relation to specifi c innovations, govern-
ment imposes standards and regulations making domestic interaction more 
effi  cient. In important instances the state intervenes directly in the network 
and supports existing user– producer relationships. 
 The fact that national economies have idiosyncratic technological capabilities 
refl ects that international transfer of  technology is neither costless nor instanta-
neous. Some parts of  knowledge can be embodied in the traded commodities 
while others are embodied in the labour force. The limited mobility of  labour 
across national borders can partly explain why technology is not easily trans-
ferred internationally. The structure of  the national systems of  production and 
innovation is a product of  a historical process, and it cannot be transferred as eas-
ily as ‘factors of  production’. It might be here that we fi nd the most fundamental 
restriction to international learning and international transfer of  technology. 
 The importance of  nations as frameworks for user– producer interaction 
does not rule out transnational interaction. In some industries and technolo-
gies, the required scale of  the R&D eff ort is so enormous that not even the big-
gest of  the transnational fi rms can aff ord to go alone when developing a new 
product. This is the case for civil aircrafts manufacturing, space technology 
and nuclear power. Here, the pattern of  user– producer interaction transcends 
national borders. But even in these areas, national interests related to inter-
national competitiveness and military goals put certain limits to the actual 
cooperation taking place, according to case studies (OECD  1986 ). 
 Applying a user– producer perspective to international relations brings for-
ward the structural interdependency, characterizing the process of  innovation 
within and between nations. On this background we shall sketch the outlines 
of  ‘a national system of  innovation’. Earlier research involving international 
comparisons of  innovative capabilities has demonstrated important interna-
tional diff erences at the micro level in terms of  management strategies and 
fi rm behaviour, sometimes taking into account diff erences in the environment 
of  fi rms, fi nancial institutions and labour relations, for example. Such studies, 
useful as they are, might underplay the importance of  the structure of  the full 
system of  innovation, however. When the process of  innovation is regarded as 
the outcome of  a complex interaction, it is obvious that the whole system must 
be more than a sum of  its parts. 
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 The concept of  the national system of  innovation will be developed step by 
step, using earlier contributions on systems of  production and on the division 
of  labour within systems of  innovation as some of  its elements. 
 3.4  National Systems of  Production 
 While Anglo- Saxon industrial economics tends to regard national economies 
as ‘a bunch of  industrial sectors’, the French tradition has been more oriented 
towards the systemic interdependence between diff erent parts of  the economy. 
Verticals of  production or  fi lières , that encompass all stages of  production from 
raw materials to fi nal products, are important units of  analysis in this tradition 
(de Bandt and Humber  1985 ). A broader concept also bringing public agen-
cies and fi nancial institutions into the analysis, industrial subsystems or  meso-
systemes industriels , has been developed and proposed as the units most adequate 
for analysis and for industrial policy (de Bandt  1985 ). 
 An even more ambitious approach, presented by some French Marxists 
and inspired by the work of  Francois Perroux, defi nes ‘the national system 
of  production’ as unit of  analysis. The national industrial system is divided 
into a small number of  sections, defi ned by the economic function of  the out-
put and by its sector of  use (investment goods, semi- manufactured goods and 
consumer goods) (GRESI  1975 ). Some of  the contributions in this tradition 
assume the section producing investment goods for the production of  invest-
ment goods (machine tool industry) to be strategic for economic growth and 
development. National systems, having a strong position in this area, will tend 
to have a strong international competitiveness and vice versa. The national 
system of  production is thus not assumed to be a closed system. On the con-
trary, it is the specifi c degree and form of  openness that determines the spe-
cifi c dynamics of  each national system of  production. 
 3.4.1  Production and innovation 
 In order to judge the relevance of  this model, it is necessary to look into the 
relationship between the process of  production and the process of  innovation. 
These processes diff er in important respects but they are obviously mutually 
interdependent. 
 Production is a repetitive process where routines tend to develop. The fl ows 
of  goods and services between diff erent subsystems can, if  use value character-
istics remain constant, easily be quantifi ed in terms of  value and volume. The 
process of  innovation might be continuous and cumulative, but it will always 
have a unique element stressing the importance of  creativity, as opposed to 
routine decision- making. The fl ows between the subsystems will be complex 
and systemic information will be diffi  cult to translate into quantitative terms. 
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 The interdependence between production and innovation goes both ways. 
On the one hand, learning taking place in production – as ‘learning by doing’ or 
as ‘learning by using’ – forms an important input into the process of  innovation. 
‘Learning by interacting’ will typically take place between parties linked together 
by fl ows of  goods and services originating from production (this is a prerequi-
site for user– producer relationships to become enduring and selective). On the 
other hand, the process of  innovation might be the single most important factor 
restructuring the system of  production by introducing new sectors, breaking 
down the old linkages and establishing new ones in the system of  production. 
 This interdependency between production and innovation makes it legiti-
mate to take the national system of  production as point of  departure for defi ning 
a system of  innovation. But the division of  labour in the system of  innovation is 
not just a refl ection of  the division of  labour in the system of  production. Some 
parts of  the production system will be more active in terms of  innovations, while 
others primarily will be users of  innovations developed by others. 
 3.4.2  The vertical division of  labour in the national 
system of  innovation 
 Most innovation studies focusing on vertical interaction have put the empha-
sis on the division of  labour in the process of  innovation. The pioneering 
studies of  the sector producing scientifi c instruments, made by von Hippel 
( 1976 ), demonstrated that process innovations were often developed by the 
sector itself. Even when independent producers were involved, users played an 
important active part in the process of  innovation. 
 Pavitt ( 1984 ) presents a taxonomy referring to diff erent types of  indus-
tries according to their respective role in the process of  innovation. Using 
a database for important UK innovations, containing information of  origin 
and address of  each innovation, three diff erent types of  sectors were identi-
fi ed: supplier- dominated sector, production- intensive sector and science- based 
sector. This taxonomy and the further  subdivisions made are extremely useful 
in defi ning the division of  labour within the national system of  innovation. 
 3.4.3  Flows and stocks in the national system of  innovation 
 Earlier we pointed out that the fl ows within the system of  innovation take the 
form of  complex and systemic information – messages diffi  cult to translate into 
quantities. This is also true for the stocks of  the system. Knowledge, scientifi c as 
well as know- how and tacit knowledge, is diffi  cult to measure. Other important 
‘stocks’ may be the inventiveness and creativity of  individuals and organiza-
tions, and those are even more diffi  cult to assess in quantitative terms. 
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 In standard economics there is a tendency to defi ne scientifi c analysis as 
synonymous with the establishment of  quantitative and mathematical mod-
els. If  we accepted this dictum, important aspects of  the national system of  
innovation would be regarded as being outside the realm of  economics sci-
ence. As pointed out by Georgescu- Roegen ( 1971 , 316ff ), this ideal of  science 
is not uncontroversial, however. It refl ects an epistemology imported from 
Newtonian physics. Georgescu- Roegen demonstrates that ‘dialectical con-
cepts’ – along with what he refers to as ‘arithmomorphic’ concepts – must be 
a part of  any science analysing change. 
 Further, there have been diff erent attempts to develop a quantitative analy-
sis of  the fl ows within national systems of  innovation. As a matter of  fact, 
the already mentioned study by Pavitt ( 1984 ) may be regarded as a quantita-
tive approach using the number of  ‘important UK innovations’ as the unit 
of  account. Another interesting contribution in this fi eld is ‘Inter- industry 
technology fl ows in the United States’ (Scherer  1982 ). Here a detailed input– 
output matrix for the US industrial system is developed on the basis of  infor-
mation gathered on patenting and R&D activities. In both of  these papers, it 
is the industrial system that is at the centre of  analysis. This is natural in so 
far as most innovations emanate within this system. But when we look at the 
system of  innovation from a user– producer perspective, it becomes interesting 
to take a closer look at the interfaces between industry and the academic com-
munity and at the interfaces between industry and some of  the ‘end users’ of  
industrial innovations – workers, consumers and the public sector. 
 In Nelson ( 1986 ) the division of  labour and performance of  the US systems 
of  innovation is discussed. It is demonstrated that universities and other public 
institutions involved in the production of  science are important parts of  this 
system, acting in a way which makes them complementary to the innova-
tive activities going on in the private sector. It is obvious that any model of  a 
national system of  innovation must take into account the interaction between 
universities and industry. 
 3.4.4  Science and technology in a user– producer perspective 
 In the fi rst part of  this chapter we focused mainly on the interaction between 
fi rms producing goods and services. The user– producer perspective might, 
however, be applied to early stages in the chain of  innovation from basic 
research to applied research and developmental activities. It is almost built 
into the defi nition of  ‘basic research’ (as nonapplied), that it should take place 
without any specifi c purpose or address. This picture is too simple, however. 
Even pure science, as mathematics and logics, has its users, and the agenda 
of  science will often be determined by users in applied science. Also in this 
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area, the innovativeness and competence of  users may infl uence the rate and 
direction of  scientifi c discovery. In a case study referring to Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, Nelson ( 1962 ) has demonstrated the close interaction between 
basic and applied research. 
 What separates pure science from technology is primarily the institutional 
framework. Science will typically be produced in universities according to an 
academic ‘mode of  behaviour’, while technology primarily will be produced 
in private fi rms according to a profi t- oriented ‘mode of  behaviour’. The aca-
demic mode will typically be characterized by nonpecuniary incentives – with 
the ‘search for excellence’ as a strong motive power (sometimes combined with 
curiosity and an urge to understand what is going on). The output of  science 
will be widely dispersed because the worldwide diff usion of  research results is 
a precondition for recognition of  excellence (David  1984 ). This mode implies 
a diff erent culture from the one predominant in profi t- oriented fi rms. Norms, 
values and incentives are diff erent as well as the language and the codes of  
information used in the two spheres. 
 It is not surprising that the link between universities and industry has 
become a political issue. The growing recognition of  the role of  science 
in relation to technology and production has made it a national priority to 
strengthen this link. The symbolic eff ect of  Silicon Valley characterized by a 
close interaction between ‘excellent’ universities and hi- tech fi rms in diff er-
ent parts of  the world has given the debate further impetus. In most OECD 
countries the establishment of  ‘science parks’ and ‘technopolises’ has become 
an important part of  industrial policy. 
 The eff orts made to integrate and subordinate academic activities in 
relation to industry may not be costless, however. If  the academic mode of  
production is undermined and replaced by a profi t- oriented mode, where 
pecuniary incentives become more important and where secrecy regarding 
the output becomes more frequent, the academic mode may lose one of  its 
principal merits – its tradition for worldwide diff usion of  knowledge. In the 
fi eld of  biotechnology this process seems already to have reached a criti-
cal level (Chesnais  1986 ). National systems of  innovation may temporarily 
become strengthened when universities become subordinated to industry. In 
the long run, the production and worldwide distribution of  knowledge may 
be weakened. 
 3.4.5  Introducing the fi nal users of  technology into the system 
 The classical actors studied in innovation studies are individual entrepreneurs 
and the  R&D laboratories of  big fi rms. Secondary parts may be played by sci-
entists and policymakers. The user– producer approach points to the fact that 
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‘fi nal users’ in terms of  workers, consumers and the public sector may have a 
role to play in relation to innovation. 
 The fact that workers and consumers tend to be absent from the scene in 
most innovation studies refl ects, to a certain degree, the reality of  a modern 
industrial system. Both in planned and market economies, the process of  inno-
vation tends to become a professionalized activity and workers and consumers 
tend to become passive benefi ciaries or victims in relation to new technology 
rather than subjects taking active part in the process of  innovation. It is, how-
ever, not self- evident that such a division of  labour is ‘natural’ and appropri-
ate. Active and competent fi nal users might enhance the innovative capability 
of  a national system of  innovation. 
 Further, the actual participation of  ‘fi nal users’ may be underrated in the 
literature on innovation. Workers play an important part in the daily learning 
process taking place in production and many incremental innovations may 
be the product of  skilled workers’ improvements on the process equipment. 
Where workers are directly involved in the process of  innovation, the outcome 
in terms of  productivity and effi  ciency might be more satisfactory than when 
they are excluded. Some studies of  the Japanese experience seem to point in 
this direction. 
 Among consumers, we fi nd some interesting examples in the user clubs 
established in relation to specifi c brands of  personal computers. Here, private 
consumers act as professional users developing new software in an interaction 
with producers of  hardware and software. However, for most consumer goods, 
the interaction is organized exclusively by producers gathering information 
about, and manipulating, consumer needs. An interesting theoretical contri-
bution giving consumer learning an important role in the overall development 
of  the national economy is Pasinetti ( 1981 ) who maintains that the learning 
of  new needs is of  crucial importance for the maintenance of  full employ-
ment. When productivity is growing and demand for existing consumer goods 
becomes satisfi ed, the learning of  new needs of  consumers is a necessary con-
dition for avoiding ‘technological unemployment’. 
 We have already pointed out the importance of  public sector as a fi nal 
user in relation to technology policy. The most comprehensive and important 
historical example might be the military industrial complexes in the United 
States and the Soviet Union. In both these cases, the state has acted as a 
competent and very demanding user on a very big scale. Through long- term 
contracts, radically new and advanced products have been developed. In the 
Scandinavian countries, there is a growing debate on the possibilities of  build-
ing ‘welfare- industrial complexes’ oriented towards the fulfi lment of  social 
needs in relation to energy, housing, environment, transport and the health 
service. Such complexes might, if  the public sector acts as a competent user 
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with a long- term perspective, be as eff ective as ‘warfare- industrial complexes’ 
in provoking new technology. There is no reason to believe that the positive 
impact on the well- being of  citizens should be less. 
 3.4.6  Social innovation as the basis for technical innovation 
 In a period characterized by radical change in the technological basis of  the 
economy, established organizational and institutional patterns might prove to 
be important obstacles to the exploitation of  the full potential of  new technol-
ogy. In such a period, social innovations might become more important for 
the wealth of  nations than technical innovations. The Gorbatchev drive for 
social change and democratization in Soviet Union might be seen in this light. 
In the capitalist countries the focus is still narrowly oriented, either towards 
the manipulation of  fi nancial variables or towards an ‘acceleration of  tech-
nological progress’. Institutional change, strengthening the competence and 
the power of  fi nal users, might be one of  the social innovations that can give 
national systems of  innovation a stronger position in the world economy. It 
would also imply that unsatisfactory innovations became less frequent. 
 The need for social innovations and institutional change is even more 
urgent at the global level. The enormous and growing gaps between rich and 
poor countries refl ect that the international transmission of  knowledge and 
technology is not working as assumed by standard economic theory. In so far 
as specifi c technological capabilities are rooted in national networks of  user– 
producer relationships, ‘technology transfer’ can only solve part of  the prob-
lem, however. There is a need for strengthening the whole national system of  
innovation, including science, industry and fi nal users in the poor countries. 
 3.5  Conclusion 
 This chapter introduces the concept of  user– producer interaction and the 
national systems of  innovation to meet the theoretical challenge of  under-
standing the systemic interactions and dynamics that take place at diff erent 
levels of  economic systems. 
 It starts from the stylized fact that ubiquitous innovation takes place in an 
economic system with a highly developed vertical division of  labour. On this 
basis, we show that there is a need to revise some basic elements in neoclas-
sical economics. In a system with pure markets and with arm’s length and 
anonymous relationships between producers and users, there would be little 
innovation. 
 A key element in a dynamic economic is the organized market where users 
and producers interact and build lasting relationships. This micro perspective 
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is then applied at a more aggregate level such as on the relationship between 
science and technology and between university and industry. It is argued that 
whenever new knowledge is produced, there is a need for feedback from the 
users of  the knowledge to those engaged in producing it. National systems 
diff er not only in terms of  their production specialization but also in terms of  
how institutions link users and producers of  knowledge in the system. 
 The analysis of  user– producer interaction and product innovation has 
been presented as the micro- foundation of  new understanding of  national 
innovation systems. 
 Notes 
 1  Williamson, in his most recent work, recognizes that most transactions take place in 
organized markets. The dichotomy between pure markets and pure hierarchies is sub-
stituted by a scale where those two forms represent the extreme points. It is now argued 
that most transactions take place ‘in the middle range’ of  such a scale (Williamson 1985, 
83). Still his analysis tends largely to neglect the process of  innovation per se as a fac-
tor reinforcing vertical integration and organized markets. Recent contributions by 
Japanese economists (Imai and Itami 1984) do take into account technical innovation as 
a factor aff ecting the pattern of  organized markets, but their focus is primarily manage-
ment strategies rather than the implications for economic theory. 
 2  Adam Smith recognized the signifi cance of  this separation, presenting it as an impor-
tant source of  wealth and productivity growth:  ‘All the improvements in machinery, 
however, have by no means been the inventions of  those who had occasion to use the 
machines. Many improvements have been made by the business of  a peculiar trade’ 
( 1776 , 8). 
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 Chapter 4 
 NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF 
INNOVATION: TOWARDS A THEORY 
OF INNOVATION AND INTERACTIVE 
LEARNING 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 4.1  Introduction 
 Theories in the social sciences may be regarded as ‘focusing devices’. Any 
specifi c theory brings forward and exposes some aspects of  the real world, 
leaving others in obscurity. That is why a long- lasting hegemony of  one single 
theoretical tradition is damaging, both in terms of  understanding and policy-
making. In the fi eld of  economics, the dominating neoclassical paradigm puts 
its analytical focus on concepts such as scarcity, allocation and exchange in a 
static context. Even if  these concepts refl ect important phenomena in the real 
world, they only bring forward some aspects of  the economic system. One aim 
of  this book is to demonstrate the need for an alternative and supplementary 
focusing device that puts interactive learning and innovation at the centre of  
analysis. 
 Through more than a decade, a group of  economists at Aalborg University 
working on a research program on Innovation, Knowledge and Economic 
Dynamics – the IKE group – has worked together studying industrial devel-
opment and international competitiveness from such a perspective. This book 
presents results from this work in relation to one specifi c subject: national sys-
tems of  innovation. 1 
 Our choice of  perspective and subject is based on two sets of  assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that the most fundamental resource in the modern econ-
omy is knowledge and accordingly that the most important process is learn-
ing. The fact that knowledge diff ers in crucial respects from other resources in 
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the economy makes standard economics less relevant and motivates eff orts to 
develop an alternative paradigm. 2 
 Second, it is assumed that learning is predominantly an interactive, and 
therefore a socially embedded, process that cannot be understood without tak-
ing into consideration its institutional and cultural context. Specifi cally, it is 
assumed that the historical establishment and development of  the modern 
nation state was a necessary prerequisite for the acceleration of  the process 
of  learning, which propelled the process of  industrialization during the last 
centuries. Finally, it is recognized that the traditional role of  nation states in 
supporting learning processes is now challenged by the process of  internation-
alization and globalization. 
 These ideas are refl ected in the overall structure of  the book, which is 
divided into three main parts. The fi rst part presents the theoretical frame-
work, the second part analyses the most important elements of  the system of  
innovation and the third part is devoted to the opening of  national systems 
through internationalization and globalization. This introductory chapter 
presents basic defi nitions, theoretical starting points, a road map for the book 
as a whole and fi nally references to other attempts to analyse national systems 
of  innovation. 
 4.2  National Systems of  Innovation 
 4.2.1  A fi rst defi nition 
 According to Boulding ( 1985 ), the broadest possible defi nition of  a system is 
‘anything that is not chaos’. Somewhat more specifi cally, a system is consti-
tuted by a number of  elements and by the relationships between these ele-
ments. It follows that a system of  innovation is constituted by elements and 
relationships that interact in the production, diff usion and use of  new and eco-
nomically useful knowledge and that a national system encompasses elements 
and relationships, either located or rooted inside the borders of  a nation state. 3 
 Using the terminology of  Boulding, it is obvious that the national system 
of  innovation is a  social system. A central activity in the system of  innovation 
is learning, and learning is a social activity that involves interaction between 
people. It is also a  dynamic system, characterized by both positive feedback and 
reproduction. Often the elements of  the system of  innovation either reinforce 
each other in promoting processes of  learning and innovation or, conversely, 
combine into constellations blocking such processes. Cumulative causation 
and virtuous and vicious circles are characteristics of  systems and subsystems 
of  innovation. Another important aspect of  innovation system relates to the 
reproduction of  knowledge of  individuals or collective agents. 
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 4.2.2  Nation states and national systems 
 The concept of  national systems of  innovation presumes the existence of  
nation states, and this phenomenon has two dimensions: the national– cultural 
and the political. The ideal ‘abstract nation state’ is the one where the two 
dimensions coincide, that is, where all individuals belonging to a nation  – 
defi ned by cultural, ethnical and linguistic characteristics – are gathered into 
one single geographical space controlled by one central state authority (with-
out foreign nationalities). 
 It is diffi  cult to fi nd any nation states, in this strict sense, in the real world. 
Countries diff er both in the degrees of  cultural homogeneity and political 
centralization. In some cases it is not even clear where to locate the borders of  
a ‘national’ system of  innovation. This might be true both for ‘multinational’ 
states such as Belgium, Canada and Switzerland and for single- national but 
federal states such as Germany. At the extreme, a country might be solely con-
stituted by a joint foreign policy with little in common in terms of  institutional 
set up and culture. In such cases, the concept of  a ‘national’ system of  innova-
tion would be of  little relevance. 
 Most of  the contributors to this book have their roots in a minority of  
small countries, which may be characterized as culturally homogeneous and 
socioeconomically coherent systems (Sweden, Denmark and Norway). This 
gives a certain bias to our world outlook (it should do so according to our basic 
understanding where theoretical  conceptualization is assumed to be cultur-
ally bound). However, it may be argued that it is quite useful, analytically, to 
use concepts that are archetypes rather than ‘averages’. In order to bring out 
sharply the limits and consequences of  globalization and regionalization, it is 
useful at least as a starting point, to assume that countries are homogeneous in 
political and cultural terms. 
 4.2.3  National systems, globalization and regionalization 
 Readers might ask why we are focusing on the  national level, in an era where 
many analysts point to an accelerating process of  internationalization and 
globalization characterized by multinational fi rms, loosening their relations to 
their home countries and entering into alliances with foreign fi rms. This pro-
cess might actually be most advanced when it comes to the production of  new 
knowledge and innovations in science- based technologies such as biotechnol-
ogy, pharmaceuticals and electronics. 
 At the same time, a growing number of  social scientists – often inspired by 
new sets of  ideas labelled as ‘fl exible specialization’, ‘networking’ and ‘post- 
Fordism’ – have argued that regional production systems, industrial districts 
88
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE88
and technological districts are becoming increasingly important. Some 
authors analyse these two tendencies as interconnected and mutually reinforc-
ing (Storper  1991a ; Camagni  1990 and also Porter  1990 ). They assume that 
globalization and international specialization have their roots in the strength-
ening of  specialized technological districts and regional networks. 
 Both globalization and regionalization might be interpreted as processes 
that weaken the coherence and importance of  national systems. In this book, 
we do not deny the validity of  these trends. Actually, we think that they make 
it even more pertinent to understand the role and implications of  national 
systems of  innovation, both historically and in the present era. 
 First, we believe that national systems still play an important role in sup-
porting and directing the processes of  innovation and learning. The uncer-
tainties involved in innovation and the importance of  learning imply that the 
process calls for a complex communication between the parties involved. This 
will especially be the case when the knowledge exchanged is tacit and diffi  cult 
to codify. When the parties involved originate in the same national environ-
ment – sharing its norms and culturally based system of  interpretation – inter-
active learning and innovation will be easier to develop. 
 However, it must be recognized that important elements of  the process of  
innovation tend to become transnational and global rather than national, and 
here the trend will be most important in science- based areas where the com-
munication is easier to formalize and codify. Some of  the big corporations are 
weakening their ties to their home countries while beginning to spread their 
innovative activities and to ‘source’ diff erent national systems of  innovation. 
These changes are important as they challenge the traditional role of  national 
systems of  innovation, but they do not make it less important to understand 
how national systems work. 
 When an old institutional order is threatened and a new one is beginning to 
develop, it becomes critically important to understand the basic mechanisms 
of  the old order. Without such an understanding, the costs of  transforma-
tion might become unnecessarily high. More specifi cally, the process of  far- 
reaching European integration may run into serious problems if  it does not 
take into account the complex interaction between institutions and economic 
structure in promoting innovation at the national level. 
 Behind the analysis lies also, as mentioned earlier, the hypothesis that the 
modern nation states in the Western world – not necessarily the new states in 
the former colonies – have worked as ‘engines of  growth’. They were con-
stituted and shaped into their present form in a period characterized by a 
rapid economic transformation, including the massive movement of  labour 
from agriculture to industrial production. Their social institutions and state 
policies have supported such a transformation as well as the new institutions 
   89
NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION 89
aiming directly at economic wealth creation through innovation have been 
established in the course of  the last century and have become integral parts of  
national systems of  production. 
 From what has been said, it is obvious that national systems of  innova-
tion are open and heterogeneous systems. Processes of  innovation transcend 
national borders and sometimes they are local rather than national. Actually 
this has always been the case for most national systems. The rapid industrializa-
tion and modernization of  European countries, starting more than 100 years 
ago, was closely connected with an opening up of  the national economies in 
terms of  foreign trade, capital import and import of  foreign ideas and experts, 
and already at that time the international specialization was often refl ected in 
a regional specialization within the countries. 
 4.2.4  Public policy and national systems of  innovation 
 As pointed out at the very beginning of  this introduction, one main purpose of  
this book is to contribute to a theoretical understanding of  interactive learning 
and innovation. However, the concept ‘national systems of  innovation’ may 
also be useful when it comes to inspire public policies at the national and the 
international level. 
 First, in order to determine what governments should do in order to pro-
mote innovation, it is useful to know the specifi c systemic context in which a 
national government intervenes. Otherwise, government policies might either 
reproduce weaknesses of  the national system or introduce mechanisms incom-
patible with the basic logic of  the system. 
 Second, in the increasingly serious international confl icts, about which 
countries are paying for (the United States) and respectively appropriating 
benefi ts from (Japan) the investment in science and development of  new tech-
nology, it is important to understand how diff erent and very diverse national 
systems work. This is a point made by experts close to the General Agreement 
on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) negotiations (Ostry  1990 ). 
 Third, in a world characterized by a radical shift in techno- economic foun-
dations, the ability of  national systems to successfully cope with change and to 
exploit new technical opportunities seems to be quite divergent (Freeman and 
Perez  1988 ). Learning from the experience of  foreign systems in this respect 
might be facilitated if  the workings of  the respective national systems as a 
whole are properly understood. Strategies based on naive copying may be 
avoided and institutional learning across national borders might be stimu-
lated. Not least, the development in Eastern Europe points to a strong need to 
develop a realistic understanding of  the workings of  ‘real market economies’ 
in relation to innovation. 
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 Actually, the concept ‘national systems of  innovation’ has already entered 
the vocabulary of  policymakers at the national and the international level. An 
ambitious eff ort to understand the importance of  technology for economic 
change was launched by OECD in  1988 as the ‘Technology/ Economy pro-
gramme’ (TEP). When the outcome of  this programme was summed up in 
Montreal in 1991, the concept of  ‘national systems of  innovation’ was given a 
prominent place in the conclusions. 
 It was pointed out that the assignment of  proper roles for respectively the 
government and the private sector in enhancing technological capabilities 
should build on a better understanding of  national systems of  innovation. 
Moreover, it was concluded that the growing international confl icts, regard-
ing the global sharing of  burdens, and benefi ts emanating from development 
and use of  new technology might be kept within reasonable limits only if  the 
parties get a better understanding of  the diversity of  the National Innovation 
Systems (NSIs) (OECD – Canada  1991 ). The fact that the concept has already 
entered the everyday vocabulary of  policymakers makes it even more impor-
tant to give the NSI concept an analytical basis. 
 4.2.5  Performance of  national systems of  innovation 
 In order to design policies relevant for national system of  innovation, it is 
necessary to agree on which should be the ‘desiderata’ of  the system (Kornai 
 1971 , 214). From the standpoint of  general equilibrium theory, the main per-
formance dimension refers to the more or less effi  cient allocation of  scarce 
and given resources. A more dynamic version would point to the adaptability 
of  the system. A Keynesian perspective would emphasize the degree of  utiliza-
tion of  existing resources and especially of  the labour force. 
 At this general level, we would like to propose that the most relevant perfor-
mance indicators of  national system of  innovation should refl ect the effi  ciency 
and eff ectiveness in producing, diff using and exploiting economically useful 
knowledge. Such indicators are not well developed today. One of  the classical 
measures for comparing diff erent national systems is R&D expenditure as a 
proportion of  GDP. There are two obvious problems with this indicator. First, 
it refl ects only an input eff ort and does not say anything about what comes out 
of  the eff ort. Second, R&D expenditure is only one kind of  relevant input to 
the process of  innovation; learning in connection with routine activities may 
be more important than R&D. 
 The output measures used are more recently developed and include patents 
(Pavitt and Patel  1988 ), the proportion of  new products in sales (Kristensen 
and Lundvall  1991 ) and the proportion of  hi- tech products in foreign 
trade (Dalum et al.  1988 ). Each one of  these indicators has its own specifi c 
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weaknesses, and it is wise to combine them in order to get a more satisfactory 
picture of  the performance of  a national system. A common weakness is that 
these measures do not take into account the diff usion of  process technology 
and in order to get a more complete picture, indicators for diff usion should be 
taken into account (Edquist and Jakobsson  1988 ). 
 Technical progress is not regarded as a goal in itself. The main reason why 
national governments engage in innovation policy is the assumption that inno-
vation is a key element in national economic growth. Diff erent indicators of  
economic growth (national income or consumption per capita) are relevant 
when it comes to comparing the systems. But such indicators will refl ect fac-
tors that have little to do with innovation, and more importantly, they give little 
insight into how innovation takes place in diff erent countries. One interesting 
observation is that diff erent systems may develop diff erent modes of  innova-
tion while still following parallel growth paths. 4 Bringing together several dif-
ferent specifi c innovation indicators helps characterizing the specifi c national 
mode of  innovation. 
 4.2.6  The normative dimension 
 The choice of  performance criteria and of  the respective weights to be 
assigned to these criteria is fundamentally a normative decision. One of  the 
most developed attempts to come to grips with implicit and explicit value 
judgements in economic analysis is by Myrdal ( 1968 ). He argues that as a 
minimum requirement, economists should make their value premises explicit. 
Further, Myrdal actually presents a method for bringing value premises into 
the analysis of  national economies. While studying problems of  the poor 
Asian countries, he chooses to accept the set of  value premises predominat-
ing among the national establishments in the countries studied – the ideal of  
modernization. 
 Given the lack of  alternatives, it is tempting to use a similar approach to 
national systems of  innovation. To identify the ambitions and goals of  national 
governments in the area of  innovation is apparently quite easy. The public 
discourse is dominated by references to the international competitiveness of  
the national economy and to national economic growth. There seems to be a 
broad social acceptance in the national establishment that these are the main 
goals. However, this is not the only relevant level to be taken into account. 
 Another level of  analysis refers to international organizations of  the rich 
countries such as the European Union and OECD. Politicians and experts at 
this level are more oriented towards strengthening economic growth in their 
respective region and towards avoiding international confl icts within the com-
munity of  countries they represent. 
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 Finally, there is a global level of  analysis with a rather weak representation 
in organizational terms such as the UN organizations, global environmental-
ist organizations, etc. At this level, it becomes more obvious to experts and 
politicians that the long- term survival of  the global economy is dependent on 
ecological sustainability and on a reduction of  the extreme social inequality 
at the global level. 
 We do not fi nd it proper to adopt the set of  value premises of  any single one 
of  these three levels, however. On the one hand, we consider national poli-
cies and goals relating to innovativeness and competitiveness to be legitimate 
to a certain degree. The pursuit of  such goals has been an important motor 
behind the dramatic increase in economic wealth in the OECD area and in 
some newly industrialized countries in Asia. Additionally, policies designed to 
strengthen the system of  innovation are less of  ‘beggar- thy- neighbour’ char-
acter than exchange rate or incomes policies. 
 On the other hand, we realize that some forms of  national science and 
technology policy may actually be zero- sum games and that there is a growing 
number of  examples of  unpleasant trade- off s between short- term national 
economic growth and long- term global sustainability (in terms of  environ-
ment, natural resources, etc.). The national context tends to become too 
narrow when it comes to solving problems such as global inequality and sus-
tainability. The value premises of  the national establishment must be con-
fronted with these broader long- term concerns. 
 This is one reason why we welcome the development and strengthening 
of  organizations and agencies operating at the international and global level. 
However, as already pointed out, it might be premature to dismantle the 
nation states and the national systems of  innovation. The ongoing process of  
innovation changes the social conditions of  citizens and regions – some for the 
better and some for the worse. The most important role of  the nation state 
in this context has been to compensate the weak and to put some restraint on 
the strong. Without the formation of  new agencies capable of  realizing such a 
‘social dimension’, a process of  internationalization and globalization, which 
undermines national systems of  innovation, might result in a long- term social 
and political crisis rather than in creative destruction. 
 4.3  Towards a Theory 
 4.3.1  Innovation as a cumulative process 
 In the models of  standard economics, innovations appear as extraordinary 
events, coming from the outside, which temporarily disturb the general 
equilibrium. After a process of  adjustment, refl ecting the work of  the price 
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mechanism, a new state of  equilibrium is established. This approach might 
have been adequate in preindustrial societies where innovations seemed to 
occur as rare and exogenous events. In modern capitalism, however, inno-
vation is a fundamental and inherent phenomenon; the long- term competi-
tiveness of  fi rms and national economies refl ects their innovative capability. 
Moreover, fi rms must engage in activities that aim at innovation just in order 
to hold their ground. 
 One of  our starting points is that innovation is a ubiquitous phenomenon 
in the modern economy. In practically all parts of  the economy, and at all 
times, we expect to fi nd ongoing processes of  learning, searching and explor-
ing that result in new products, new techniques, new forms of  organization 
and new markets. In some parts of  the economy, these activities might be slow, 
gradual and incremental, but they will still be there if  we take a closer look. 
 The fi rst step in recognizing innovation as a ubiquitous phenomenon is to 
focus on its gradual and cumulative aspects. Such a perspective gives rise to 
simple hypotheses about the dependence of  future innovations on those that 
took place in the past. In this context, an innovation may be regarded as a new 
use of  preexisting possibilities and components. Here, Schumpeter’s choice 
of  terminology, where ‘innovations’ and ‘new combinations’ are used as syn-
onyms, is enlightening. Almost all innovations refl ect elements of  already 
existing knowledge combined in new ways. 
 This is, however, not to say that a step towards a new combination is always 
of  the same character. Sometimes an innovation might be inevitable; the new 
combination might be easy to fi nd and to realize. In other cases, it might take 
an enormous intellectual eff ort or an extremely creative mind to identify a 
potential new combination. And sometimes the process of  innovation results 
in radical breaks with the past, making a substantial part of  accumulated 
knowledge obsolete. Another of  Schumpeter’s concepts, ‘creative destruction’, 
points to this discontinuity, and it might be applied not only to the structure of  
production but also to the structure of  knowledge. 
 Nevertheless, we will put some emphasis on the ubiquitous and cumulative 
character of  innovation. In such a perspective, the distinction made in inno-
vation theory between invention, innovation and diff usion as three separate 
stages necessarily becomes blurred. We also understand why it is diffi  cult to 
date invention and innovation in time, and why an innovation does not stay 
the same throughout its diff usion. Innovation appears now, not primarily as a 
single event, but rather  as a process . 
 A second starting point is that interactive learning and collective entre-
preneurship are fundamental to the process of  innovation. In his early work 
on the theory of  economic development, Schumpeter pointed to entrepre-
neurs who act individually as the most important economic agents bringing 
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innovations into the economic system (Schumpeter  1934 ). Later he revised his 
theoretical scheme, however, by giving a critical role to the collective work in 
R&D laboratories (Schumpeter  1942 ). In a sense, through introducing systems 
of  innovation, we take this trajectory from individual towards collective entre-
preneurship a further step ahead. 
 We will argue that the most important forms of  learning may fundamen-
tally be regarded as interactive processes and that together the economic 
structure and the institutional set up form the framework for, and strongly 
aff ect, the processes of  interactive learning sometimes resulting in innovations. 
In the chapters to follow, this general point will be illustrated at diff erent levels 
of  analysis. 
 4.3.2  Learning and the structure of  production 
 One of  the most important institutional innovations in the last century was the 
establishment of  R&D laboratories in the big private fi rms (Freeman  1982 ). 
Scientifi c activities and technical change have been brought closer together 
becoming increasingly interdependent activities, and today the capability to 
innovate cannot be assessed in isolation from eff orts in science, research and 
development. However, here we will insist on the fact that not all important 
inputs to the process of  innovation emanate from science and R&D eff orts. 
We thus assume that learning takes place in connection with routine activities 
in production, distribution and consumption, and produces important inputs 
to the process of  innovation. The everyday experiences of  workers, produc-
tion engineers and sales representatives infl uence the  agenda determining the 
direction of  innovative eff orts as they  produce knowledge and insights forming cru-
cial inputs to the process of  innovation. 
 When bottleneck problems are met and registered in production or in the 
use of  a product, the agendas of  producers change, aff ecting the direction of  
their innovation eff orts. Everyday experience also increases technical knowl-
edge and gives ideas about in which direction solutions should be looked for. 
Such activities involve learning by doing – increasing the effi  ciency of  produc-
tion operations (Arrow  1962 ), learning by using – increasing the effi  ciency of  
the use of  complex systems (Rosenberg  1982 ) and learning by interacting – 
involving users and producers in an interaction resulting in product innova-
tions (Lundvall  1988 ). 
 If  innovation refl ects learning and if  learning partially emanates from 
routine activities, innovation must be  rooted in the prevailing economic struc-
ture . The areas where technical advance will take place will primarily be 
those where a fi rm, or a national economy, is already engaged in routine 
activities. 5 
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 4.3.3  Learning and the institutional set- up 
 The institutional set- up (of  a specifi c fi rm, a constellation of  fi rms, or a nation) 
is the second important dimension of  the system of  innovation. Institutions 
provide agents and collectives with guideposts for action. In a world char-
acterized by innovative activities, uncertainty will be an important aspect of  
economic life. Institutions make it possible for economic systems to survive 
and act in an uncertain world. Institutions may be routines guiding everyday 
actions in production, distribution and consumption, but they may also be 
guideposts for change. In this context, we may regard technological trajec-
tories and paradigms, which focus the innovative activities of  scientists, engi-
neers and technicians as one special kind of  institution. 6 
 One of  the fundamental characteristics of  institutions is their relative sta-
bility over time. They arise because in a changing and uncertain world, agents 
and organizations need guidance and institutions make life more manageable 
and comfortable (not necessarily more effi  cient in any sense of  this term) for 
them. 
 4.3.4  Product innovation and user– producer interaction 
 One way to illustrate how the structure of  production and the institutional set- 
up together aff ect the rate and direction of  innovation is to focus on product 
innovations and their roots in the interaction between producers and users. 
First, at the micro level, the structure of  production defi nes sets of  user– 
producer relationships, which condition the scope and direction of  the process 
of  innovation. Second, the institutional form, which characterizes these rela-
tionships and especially the elements of  organization in these markets, refl ects 
the characteristics of  the process of  innovation. Third, the institutional set- up, 
once established, will aff ect the rate and direction of  innovation. Fourth, one 
interesting dimension of  user– producer relationships can be shown to be dis-
tance in cultural and geographical space. 
 4.3.5  Learning, searching and exploring 7 
 Above, we have indicated the importance of  learning rooted in routine activi-
ties. But of  course, economic agents and organizations also consciously invest 
time and resources in expanding their technical knowledge.  Searching is another 
important activity, creating inputs to the system of  innovation. 
 Organizations normally learning only from routine activities of  production 
and distribution might engage in search activities under certain extreme cir-
cumstances. When the survival of  the organization is threatened, its members 
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become engaged in what might be called ‘desperate search’. This kind of  
search might begin as local search, looking for alternatives (in terms of  prod-
ucts, processes, markets, etc.) close to the ones already well known to the orga-
nization and only if  it is impossible to fi nd any satisfactory solutions in this 
area, expanding search to more distant alternatives. 8 
 However, desperate search is not always very effi  cient. Especially when 
technology is science based, complex and changing, it becomes attractive to 
establish special departments permanently engaged in searching activities. 
Divisions with searching as their special mission might be departments for 
market analysis as well as R&D departments and laboratories. 
 Searching which takes place in academic or science- oriented organizations, 
outside the private fi rms, brings forward another kind of  raw material for 
the process of  innovation. We call this kind of  search ‘exploring’. The most 
important diff erence between exploring and searching is that ‘exploring’ is less 
goal- oriented than profi t- oriented search. If  we take a closer look at scientifi c 
activities, we shall however often fi nd that they too have a specifi c aim and 
direction. Even if  the paradigms and trajectories, which determine the aims 
and directions of  basic science, develop more according to their own internal 
logic and are less responsive to changes in economic parameters than innova-
tions in private fi rms, the producers of  basic science will, to a certain extent, 
be oriented towards users outside the realm of  pure science. The direction of  
research in mathematics and logic may, for example, refl ect new needs devel-
oped by computer scientists and software experts. 
 Exploring, because of  its weaker goal orientation, will sometimes result in 
outcomes neither foreseen nor looked for by profi t- oriented organizations. This 
adds to technological change a dimension of  dynamism and radical change, 
extremely important in the long run. Exploring will sometimes result in breaks 
in cumulative paths and create the basis for new technological paradigms. 
 4.3.6  Incremental versus radical innovations 
 If  innovation is rooted in learning, and learning in routine activities, we might 
expect all innovative activities to be incremental, and it would be rather simple 
to predict the direction of  technical change. But we must take into account the 
fundamentally uncertain and disruptive character of  the process of  innova-
tion. As mentioned earlier, uncertainty rules in the process of  scientifi c activi-
ties and these activities produce, from time to time, results which were neither 
anticipated nor looked for. Uncertainty also rules regarding the economic 
impact of  an innovation. A new product might fail either for technical reasons 
or because it does not successfully address potential user needs. Conversely, 
a product originally addressed towards the needs of  a small subset of  users 
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might later prove to be a commercial success applicable in very substantial 
parts of  the economy. 
 When distinguishing between incremental and radical innovations, we may 
refer primarily either to the technical or to the economic dimension. On the 
one hand, some innovations, incremental in technical terms, may have a cru-
cial impact on the economy. This will be true for a small technical change solv-
ing a bottleneck problem of  strategic importance (the introduction of  vehicles 
with infl ated rubber wheels in agriculture did not represent any radical techni-
cal break, but it had a dramatic impact on the productivity of  this sector). On 
the other hand, an innovation very radical in technical terms and signalling a 
new technological paradigm, might for technical reasons, be premature and 
have a very limited impact on the economy (it took the Babbage version of  
the computer, obviously a radical innovation in technical terms, more than a 
century before it had any economic impact at all). It follows that many radical 
innovations will be radical only in one of  the two dimensions while remaining 
incremental in the other dimension. 
 For these reasons, we assume that the process of  innovation is neither totally 
accidental nor totally predetermined by the economic structure and the insti-
tutional set- up. The analysis of  systems of  innovation helps us to understand 
and explain why technology develops in a certain direction and at a certain 
rate, but a strong element of  randomness will always remain. 
 4.3.7  Defi ning the NSI – the role of  theory and history 
 From what has been said, it follows that we may make a distinction between 
a system of  innovation in the narrow sense and a system of  innovation in the 
broad sense. The narrow defi nition would include organizations and institu-
tions involved in searching and exploring, such as R&D departments, techno-
logical institutes and universities. The broad defi nition that follows from the 
theoretical perspective presented above includes all parts and aspects of  the 
economic structure and the institutional set- up aff ecting learning as well as 
searching and exploring – the production system, the marketing system and 
the system of  fi nance present themselves as subsystems in which learning takes 
place. 
 Determining in detail which subsystems and social institutions should be 
included, or excluded, in the analysis of  the system is a task involving historical 
analysis as well as theoretical considerations. 
 In diff erent historical periods, diff erent parts of  the economic system or dif-
ferent interfaces between subsystems may play a more or less important role 
in the process of  innovation. In the early British industrialization, new tech-
nology refl ected primarily the learning inside fi rms that developed and tested 
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new production equipment, either developed in- house or in cooperation with 
artisans from small workshops. The development of  the new industries of  
chemistry and electricity at the end of  the eighteenth century changed the 
location of  the innovation nexus and brought it closer to the R&D laboratories 
of  big fi rms. 
 Today, it seems as if  the crucial interfaces of  systems of  innovation have 
shifted again. Radical innovations in information technology, which are them-
selves science based, have put the focus on the coupling of  routine- based learn-
ing to searching and R&D. ‘The factory as a laboratory’ formula refl ects these 
new trends. At the same time, however, more and more innovative activities 
have to draw on quite diff erent and separate sets of  generic knowledge (bio-
technology, microelectronics, new materials) making the process of  science- 
based innovation even more costly and complex. 
 However, the theoretical perspective is also important. The broad defi nition 
of  the system used in this book refl ects the importance attached to interactive 
learning as a basis for innovation. Alternatively, a ‘linear model of  technical 
change’ – where technical innovations were assumed to follow mechanically 
from scientifi c eff orts and from research eff orts inside fi rms – would defi ne 
the system of  innovation much more narrowly and identify it with the R&D 
system. 
 On this background, it should be obvious that a defi nition of  the system 
of  innovation must, to a certain degree, be kept open and fl exible regarding 
which subsystems should be included and which processes should be studied. 
It also follows that we cannot insist on one single approach to the national sys-
tem of  innovation as the only legitimate one. Diff erent theoretical perspectives 
bring forward diff erent aspects of  the system. 
 4.4  The Elements of  the System 
 In the real world, the state and the public sector are rooted in national states 
and their geographical sphere of  infl uence is defi ned by national borders. 
The focus on  national systems refl ects the fact that national economies diff er 
regarding the structure of  the production system and regarding the general 
institutional set- up. Specifi cally, we assume that basic diff erences in historical 
experience, language and culture will be refl ected in national idiosyncrasies in: 
 •  Internal organization of  fi rms 
 •  Inter- fi rm relationships 
 •  Role of  the public sector 
 •  Institutional set- up of  the fi nancial sector 
 •  R&D intensity and R&D organization 
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 International diff erences in these elements are important for the working of  
the system as a whole, but the relationships between the elements are just as 
important. For example both the organization and strategies of  the public 
sector, including its responsibility for education and R&D, and the fi nancial 
sector will aff ect the way fi rms organize and form networks. The other way 
around, the historical specialization of  fi rms and networks of  fi rms will be 
refl ected in the public infrastructure of  education and R&D. 
 First, we assume that the internal organization of  private fi rms is one 
important aspect of  the system of  innovation. Most innovations are developed 
by fi rms and many innovation studies have demonstrated that the organiza-
tion of  the fl ow of  information and of  the learning process is important and 
aff ects the innovative capability of  the fi rm. The interaction between diff er-
ent departments engaged in, respectively, sales, production and R&D is one 
important aspect of  the organization, which is attracting a growing interest in 
comparative innovation studies. 
 However, we also assume that inter- fi rm relationships are important in 
structuring the system of  innovation. In standard economics, these rela-
tionships are assumed to be characterized by competition and by pure mar-
kets. Focusing on innovation makes it clear that cooperation between fi rms 
is a necessary supplement to competition, and one form of  cooperation is 
user– producer interaction. In an increasing number of  knowledge- intensive 
industries, other forms of  inter- fi rm cooperation tend to become increasingly 
important such as network relationships and industrial districts including 
informal exchange of  technical know- how. 
 The public sector plays an important role in the process of  innovation. It is 
involved in direct support of  science and development, and its regulations and 
standards infl uence the rate and direction of  innovation. Moreover, it is the 
single most important user of  innovations developed in the private sector and 
may act as a more or less competent user of  innovations. 
 The connection between the fi nancial system and the process of  innovation 
was strongly emphasized earlier by Schumpeter and recently there has been a 
growing public interest in the enabling role of  the fi nancial system in regards 
to innovation. As already noted, the process of  innovation is closely connected 
to the R&D system, its resources, competencies and organization. 
 Missing among these elements is the national education and training system. 
For diff erent reasons, this extremely important element of  the national system 
of  innovation has not been given its proper treatment in this book. There are 
big diff erences between countries in their formal and informal education and 
training systems, which aff ect their innovative capabilities. This refers to the 
quantitative investment in education, the enrolment in science and engineer-
ing, the investment in training of  skilled workers, etc. Other diff erences are 
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qualitative and also relate to the social norms and values reproduced by the 
system and to the degree of  egalitarianism versus elitism in the society. An 
important task for future research is to integrate both education and training 
systems with innovation systems in one single analytical framework. 9 
 4.5  Opening the System 
 As pointed out, we do not assume the process of  innovation to be exclusively 
localized inside national borders. On the contrary, we recognize that the pro-
cess of  innovation has increasingly become multinational and transnational 
refl ecting, for example, R&D cooperation between big fi rms based in diff erent 
nations. In four of  the chapters in  National Systems of  Innovation: Toward a Theory 
of  Innovation and Interactive Learning (Lundvall  1992 ), we analysed how national 
systems of  innovation are open and increasingly becoming wide open. 
 In ‘Export Specialisation, Structural Competitiveness and National Systems 
of  Innovation’ (Dalum  1992 ), some important structural features of  national 
systems of  innovation are characterized by data on export specialization. The 
long- term development patterns of  specialization were analysed in terms of  
industry life cycles; distinctly diff erent patterns country by country were found. 
The specialization patterns were revealed in relation to structural competitive-
ness and in this context the strategic role of  the engineering sector is emphasized. 
 Fagerberg ( 1992 ) focuses on one branch of  trade theory with special rel-
evance for the analysis of  national systems of  innovation: the home market 
theory. The relative importance of  linkages between export specialization in 
user and producer industries are tested econometrically. This chapter and the 
one by Dalum ( 1992 ) are focused on trade patterns (arm’s length trade) and do 
not take into account foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises. 
 Andersen and Bræ ndgaard ( 1992 ) present an analysis of  economic integra-
tion from an evolutionary perspective and study what might be regarded as an 
embryonic transnational system of  innovation. The empirical case relates to 
the specialization and competitiveness of  the European Community in infor-
mation technology and refers to some of  the political eff orts to strengthen the 
European Community in this fi eld in relation to Japan and United States. 
 While these three chapters mentioned above focus on internationaliza-
tion in the form of  international trade and specialization, Chesnais ( 1992 ) 
brought foreign direct investment and multinational capital into the picture. It 
describes and analyses how the process of  internationalization has entered a 
new phase of  globalization, which fundamentally changes the role of  national 
systems of  innovation. Chesnais shows that the new tendencies challenge the 
relative autonomy of  national systems and weaken their coherence but also 
give a new and even more important role to public policy. 
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 4.6  Alternative Approaches and Methods 
 4.6.1  Introduction 
 As pointed out, the defi nition of  the national system of  innovation is depen-
dent on the theoretical approach, and therefore it is useful to see how diff erent 
authors have used the concept and to relate the approach of  this book to these 
alternatives. 10 
 4.6.1.1  Friedrich List 
 The fi rst systematic and theoretically based attempt to focus on national sys-
tems of  innovation goes back to Friedrich List ( 1841 / 1959). His contribution 
is also interesting because it is developed as an explicit alternative to Adam 
Smith and his contemporary followers. List makes a distinction between 
Adam Smith’s ‘cosmopolitan’ approach, which puts the focus on exchange 
and allocation, and his own national perspective focusing on the development 
of  productive forces. We think that this is a fruitful and interesting distinction. 
 The only element of  List’s quite complex and rich – sometimes somewhat 
confusing – analysis still left in modern economics is his argument for protec-
tion of  ‘infant industries’. His analysis went much further, however, indicat-
ing the need for governmental responsibility for education and training and 
for developing an infrastructure supporting industrial development. Actually, 
he sketched some of  the most important elements of  the national system of  
innovation. 
 4.6.1.2  Christopher Freeman 
 The fi rst explicit use of  the concept national systems of  innovation may be 
the one in Freeman’s ( 1987 ) book on Japan. Here the concept refers both 
to the nation- specifi c organization of  subsystems and to the interaction 
between subsystems. The organization of  R&D and of  production in fi rms, 
the inter- fi rm relationships and the role of  government and MITI 11 are at 
the centre of  the analysis, which is both historical and based on modern 
innovation theory. 
 4.6.1.3  Richard Nelson 
 Almost at the same time, Nelson presented studies of  the US system ( 1987 , 
 1988 ). The focus of  the analysis was on the combined public and private char-
acter of  technology and the role of  government, universities and private fi rms 
respectively in the production of  new technology. It was shown that diff erent 
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industrial sectors use diff erent methods to appropriate the benefi ts from their 
innovations. 
 The approaches of  the two authors diff er in two important respects. First, 
while the focus in Nelson’s work is on the production of  knowledge and inno-
vation and on the innovation system in the narrow sense, Freeman focuses on 
the interaction between the production system and the process of  innovation. 
Second, while Freeman applies a combination of  organization and innovation 
theory – which organizational forms are most conducive to the development 
and effi  cient use of  new technology? – Nelson’s main theoretical tool is related 
to law and economics – how well can diff erent institutional set- ups take into 
account and solve the private/ public dilemma of  information and technical 
innovation? 
 The approach of  this book is closest to Freeman’s because we focus on 
organizational matters as related to processes of  learning, but we also rec-
ognize the importance of  institutional factors of  the kind brought forward 
by Nelson’s work in this area. If  one should point to one specifi c dimension 
that characterizes our approach, it would be the emphasis put on interactive 
learning anchored in the production structure and in the linkage pattern of  
the system of  production. 
 4.6.1.4  Michael Porter 
 The book by Michael Porter ( 1990 ) may be read as a work on national systems 
of  innovation. Porter points to four diff erent determinants aff ecting the com-
petitiveness of  a national industry: Firm strategy, factor conditions, demand 
conditions and supporting industries. 
 Actually, Porter refers to the constellation of  determinants as a system 
(p. 75), and he argues that the level at which this system works most strongly 
is national (and local) rather than international and global. Our approach is 
akin to Porter’s in some respects but diff erent in others. One might say that the 
basic elements overlap but their ordering is diff erent. 
 The main focus in this book is on explaining learning and innovation and 
this corresponds to the creation of  qualitatively new ‘factor conditions’. We 
regard the economic structure (including ‘demand conditions’ and ‘support-
ing industries’) as one important determinant aff ecting these processes. The 
second fundamental determinant of  processes of  learning is the institutional 
set- up and this includes ‘fi rm strategy’ – including modes of  cooperation as 
well as competition. 
 The most important diff erence between our approach and Porter’s may 
be the level of  analysis. While Porter tends to present national systems as 
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environments to single industries involved in international competition, our 
focus is on the working of  the national system in its own right. 12 
 4.6.1.5  Diff erent methods to analyse national systems of  innovation 
 Most discussions of  national systems of  innovation have been connected to 
one single or to a comparison of  a few specifi c country cases. In  National Systems 
of  Innovation; A Comparative Study (Nelson  1993 ), 14 diff erent country- specifi c 
case studies are presented. The strength of  his approach is that the stories told 
may refl ect the complex historical interplay of  social, institutional and cultural 
factors in shaping current systems (Edquist and Lundvall  1993 ). The weakness 
might be the lack of  a common and explicit theoretical basis and the fact that 
the elements brought into the analysis are idiosyncratic refl ecting the special 
interests of  each author. 
 In  National Systems of  Innovation: Toward a Theory of  Innovation and Interactive 
Learning (Lundvall  1992 ), we do not recount any specifi c case stories even if  
we refer to relevant cases in order to illustrate some general points. Instead we 
have tried to present a theoretical perspective that might be used in the case 
studies and to discuss some of  the most important subsystems in the system of  
innovation. The price we have to pay for choosing this more general approach 
is a loss in terms of  historical richness, especially when it comes to the social 
and cultural dimensions. 
 This is the reason why we believe that together this book, Nelson ( 1993 ) 
and Porter ( 1990 ) may give a good starting point for future work on national 
systems of  innovation. 
 Notes 
 1  The IKE group had through the last decade (1980s) cooperated with Christopher 
Freeman from Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University; Jan Fagerberg from 
the Institute of  Foreign Aff airs, Oslo and Francois Chesnais, University of  Paris and 
OECD. Previous contributions from the IKE group on national systems of  innovation 
are to be found in Lundvall ( 1988 ), Andersen and Lundvall ( 1988 ) and Johnson and 
Lundvall ( 1991 ). 
 2  Knowledge does not decrease in value when used. On the contrary, its use increases 
its value (i.e., knowledge is not scarce in the same sense as other natural resources and 
technical artefacts). Some elements of  knowledge may be transferred, easily, between 
economic agents, while others are tacit and embodied in individual, or collective, 
agents. Knowledge is not easily transacted in markets and not easily privately appro-
priated. In spite of  attempts to fi nd institutional solutions to the problem (patent laws, 
etc.), property rights to knowledge are not easily defi ned. When it comes to knowledge, 
market failure is the rule rather than the exception. 
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 3  This implies, for example, that a foreign- owned fi rm will be part of  two diff erent 
national systems – its home country and its host country. 
 4  For the case of  Denmark versus Sweden, see Edquist and Lundvall ( 1993 ). A number 
of  diff erent European countries are compared in Bruno et al. ( 1991 ). 
 5  One specifi c illustration of  this general phenomenon is that countries strongly special-
ized in exports of, for example, agriculture and food products will also be strongly spe-
cialized in machinery for agriculture and food industry. The explanation of  this pattern 
is that export- oriented users often are both competent and demanding and that the 
feedback of  knowledge from the users forms a critical input to the innovation process 
of  producers of  specialized machinery (Andersen et al.  1981b ). 
 6  In this context, we use the concepts  technological trajectories and  paradigms in the sense they 
were introduced in Dosi ( 1982 ). For a discussion of  diff erent uses of  these concepts see 
Dosi ( 1988a , 223– 228). 
 7  The distinction between ‘learning’ and ‘searching/ exploring’ may seem somewhat 
awkward; in everyday language, ‘searching/ exploring’ will result in ‘learning’. The 
terminology chosen in this chapter refl ects our wish both to distinguish clearly between 
and to combine two diff erent perspectives – structuralist oriented (learning) and action 
oriented (searching/ exploring). This combined perspective has much in common with 
recent developments in social theory such as structuration theory (Giddens  1984 ). 
 8  This corresponds to the central behavioural assumption in the evolutionary model of  
economic growth developed by Nelson and Winter ( 1982 ). 
 9  The OECD publication ‘New Technologies in the 1990s’ represents a step towards 
such an integration (OECD  1988 ). 
 10  For an overlapping but more detailed discussion, see McKelvey ( 1991 ) who compares 
some of  the recent literature on national systems of  innovation. 
 11  Ministry of  International Trade and Industry is currently known as Ministry of  
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
 12  One problem with Porter’s approach (1992), is that it is unclear how he moves from the 
analyses of  cases, at the industry level to his conclusions, which refer to national systems 
as a whole. 
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 Chapter 5 
 THE LEARNING ECONOMY 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall and  Björn  Johnson 
 Our juxtaposition of  the extreme X- society and the extreme Y- society should have demonstrated 
fully that such purely competitive or purely planned societies never have and never will exist. But 
this is not all: we have also tried to show that both these types of  societies are incomprehensible 
as logical constructs . (Akerman  1936 , 141; our translation) 
 5.1  Introduction 
 One of  the most fundamental and recurring discourses in political economy 
has concerned how society should be instituted in terms of  self- organized 
markets versus conscious government regulations, intervention and plan-
ning. In this chapter we join this discourse from a quite specifi c and original 
 perspective. If  we take it seriously that knowledge  is the most fundamental 
resource in our contemporary economy and that learning is therefore the most 
important process, what are the implications for the institutional set- up of  the 
economy? And what are the implications for economic theory? What are the 
consequences for the plan / market discourse? 
 The institutional set- up of  modern capitalism may be analysed from two 
perspectives:  what  is and what  should be . In this chapter we primarily pres-
ent refl ections on what  is from the perspective of  how it aff ects the use of  
knowledge and learning. Starting from assumptions regarding the character 
of   knowledge, learning and innovation, we end up by supporting the stance 
of  the Swedish institutionalist economist Johan Åkerman quoted above. The 
learning economy is, and must be, ‘a mixed economy’, and it is mixed in a 
much more fundamental sense than normally assumed. 
 We cannot totally avoid the discussion of  what ‘should be’, however. 
Specifi cally we conclude that many of  the most common arguments for and 
against the free market are either mistaken or one sided. There is actually a 
need to reopen the old discourse on a totally new basis: How does the market 
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mechanism allocate knowledge and how does it aff ect learning? This is espe-
cially interesting in a period characterized by post- Fordism in the West and 
by postsocialism in the East. The need for open mindedness about how to 
organize the economy is greater than ever, while adherents to mainstream 
economics seem to believe that the breakdown of  socialism marked the fi nal 
victory of  pure capitalist principles. 
 This chapter represents an eff ort to develop concepts in relation to learn-
ing processes in the economy. It is inspired by and based on both theoretical 
and empirical research about the relation between technical and economic 
change conducted at the Department of  Business Studies at the University 
of  Aalborg in Denmark. In particular, research about the introduction of  
microelectronics- based production methods and products into the economy 
have convinced the authors of  the central role that interactive learning and 
new combinations of  knowledge play in the process of  economic change. We, 
therefore, need to develop a conceptual framework to give knowledge and 
learning the central roles that they deserve in the analysis of  economic change. 
This chapter is a modest step in that direction. 
 5.2  The Knowledge-Intensive Economy 
 In a sense knowledge has always been a crucial resource in the economy. The 
natural resources and the pure, physical, human eff ort put very strict limits 
on how much and what can be produced and consumed. In addition, the 
so- called primitive economies have relied on the know- how of  producers and 
consumers in order to make a living possible in adverse and diffi  cult envi-
ronments. Knowledge was layered in traditions and routines passed on from 
generation to generation and learning led to increased know- how and made 
population growth possible. 
 The most important consequence of  the advent of  industrialization was 
not that it involved the use of  knowledge but rather that it made learning a 
much more fundamental and strategic process than before. While inventions 
and innovations did develop and diff use in, for example, feudal Europe, the 
process was marginal, slow and uneven. During the period of  industrializa-
tion, learning and  innovation became a ubiquitous process. While most people 
in traditional societies could live their whole life on the basis of  a rather nar-
row and constant set of  skills used in environments with rather constant char-
acteristics, this is no longer the case in the industrial economy. 
 The early industrialization process had an ambiguous eff ect on skills. On 
the one hand, it increased the demand for skill- intensive mechanical engineer-
ing for constructing machinery. On the other hand, the workers using the 
machinery were often characterized by low and narrow skills. But technical 
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change became the order of  the day both for engineers and workers, and in 
all kinds of  enterprises, demand for skills in management and coordination 
increased. The Fordist paradigm, which is a caricature of  the development 
of  some core industries in the fi rst half  of  this century, may be regarded as 
an attempt not only to harvest the benefi ts of  scale economies but also as an 
attempt by management to reduce their dependency on the skills of  workers. 
 5.3  Knowledge Intensity and Learning in the 
Post- Fordist Era 
 The post- Fordist era has brought into being new constellations of  knowledge 
and learning into the economy. These may be related to three interconnected 
phenomena. The fi rst relates to the development of  the information, com-
puter and telecommunication technologies (ICT), the second to the move-
ment towards fl exible specialization and the third to changes in the process of  
innovation. 
 ICT has drastically reduced the costs of  handling, storing and moving 
information. The gathering of  data, however, is still expensive even if  the new 
technologies make it possible to reduce these costs in the future, for instance, 
through interactive information networks. What is even more costly is the 
competence to use the relevant data in an effi  cient way. Information fl ows are 
becoming so rich that the main problem has become how, where and when to 
dip into these fl ows. 
 Flexible specialization is a model or ‘ideal type’ of  what is going on in 
parts of  the industrial system today. The fl exibility refers to the possibility 
to adapt, rapidly and with small costs, to changes in demand and to other 
external changes. In the short term, it refers to minor changes in the prod-
ucts. In the long term, it may be related to the capability to develop product 
innovations to meet new user needs. The most fundamental aspect of  fl exible 
specialization may be that it signals some limits to both economies of  scale and 
to the possibilities of  increasing the division of  labour in the narrow sense. In 
this era specialization goes hand in hand with communication and coopera-
tion between workers, departments, fi rms and even competitors. All parts of  
the organization become involved in cooperation and many parts are also 
involved in external communication and cooperation. One consequence is 
that knowing how to do things in isolation is not the decisive type of  knowl-
edge any more. Knowing how to communicate and cooperate becomes much 
more important than before. 
 Finally, the process of  innovation has changed in important respects. 
Continuing, incremental innovation has become a necessity for the survival of  
fi rms. This process emanates from interactive learning taking place at a great 
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number of  interfaces inside and outside the fi rm. This is true also for many 
applications of  information technology, where the need to cooperate closely with 
specialized users is important in developing useful new systems or machinery. 
 At the same time important parts of  industry (computers, nuclear technol-
ogy, aviation, automobiles etc.) are confronted by a steep increase in the costs 
connected to the development of  a new product or system. They are also 
confronted with an increase in the diversity of  knowledge sources, which must 
be mobilized in any successful innovation process. When this is combined with 
shorter product life cycles, a series of  implications follows. First, it becomes 
crucial to develop organizational forms, which increase the learning ability 
of  the fi rm; this includes the opening up of  horizontal communication at all 
levels of  the fi rm. Second, it makes it necessary to enter into cooperation and 
alliances with other fi rms, both in order to share the fi nancial risks and gain 
access to a more diversifi ed knowledge base. 
 These changes aff ect the demand for knowledge in diff erent ways. First, 
there is a growing need for a broader participation in learning processes. Swift 
and effi  cient innovation processes must involve all layers in the fi rm. Second, 
multi- skilling and networking skills become of  crucial importance. Third, the 
capability to learn and to apply learning to the processes of  production and 
sales becomes the most important dimension for the viability of  the modern 
fi rm. Management skills become related to the establishment of  routines and 
rules, which stimulate interactive learning. 
 This is why we regard the contemporary fi rst- world capitalist economies 
not only as knowledge- based economies but also as ‘learning economies’. In 
a way all economies are learning economies, in the sense that economic life 
always forms a basis for some processes of  interactive learning, which results 
in the production and introduction of  new knowledge. But in the modern 
learning economy, technical and organizational change has become increas-
ingly endogenous. Learning processes have been institutionalized and feed-
back loops for knowledge accumulation have been built in such a way that the 
economy as a whole, including both its production and consumption spheres, 
is ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’. 
 In the learning economy the organizational modes of  fi rms are increas-
ingly chosen in order to enhance learning capabilities; networking with 
other fi rms, horizontal communication patterns and frequent movements 
of  people between posts and departments are becoming more and more 
important. The fi rms of  the learning economy are to a large extent ‘learning 
organizations’. 
 In a world of  learning economies the specialization of  fi rms and countries 
becomes increasingly important for economic performance. Some areas of  
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production and consumption are characterized by steep learning curves, rap-
idly falling costs and growing markets. This may be the case for a broad set of  
ICT areas but also for niches in more traditional product areas. 
 The learning economy is a dynamic concept; it involves the capability to 
learn and to expand the knowledge base. It refers not only to the importance 
of  science and technology systems – universities, research organizations, in- 
house R&D departments and so on – but also to the learning implications 
of  the economic structure, the organizational forms and the institutional 
set- up. 
 Even if  all economies are in some sense learning economies, the concept 
refers fi rst of  all to the ICT- related techno- economic paradigm of  the post- 
Fordist period. It is through the combination of  widespread ICT, fl exible 
specialization and innovation as a crucial means of  competition in the new 
techno- economic paradigm that the learning economy gets fi rmly established. 
Firms start to learn how to learn. 
 Of  course, diff erent countries are not equally successful in coping with 
the challenges of  the new techno- economic paradigm. Thus, it is well known 
and much discussed that the Japanese system of  innovation (Freeman  1987 ) 
has some characteristics that are important in relation to interactive learn-
ing. It has been observed, for example, that many Japanese corporations 
rely heavily on participatory communication and cooperation between 
workers and employers. Japanese markets are also said to be organized to a 
higher degree than in the United States and Western Europe. Loyalty and 
voice seem to be relatively important and government intervention plays 
an important role in promoting interaction and cooperation. It has been 
suggested, however, that this is not primarily a Japanese cultural phenom-
enon but rather a rational response by competing fi rms to their changing 
environment (Aoki  1990 ). In this sense Japanese fi rms have simply been the 
fi rst to introduce elements of  a new techno- economic paradigm of  univer-
sal relevance. 
 The concept of  the learning economy refers to an ideal type, and of  
course the learning economies of  the real world are very diff erent from each 
other. A  large part of  economic learning is in the form of  learning from 
abroad. Technologies, as well as organizational forms and institutions are 
borrowed from other countries. In relation to this, there are important dif-
ferences between ‘front’ learners and ‘catching- up’ learners. But there may 
be other diff erences as well; especially when it comes to organizational forms 
and institutional set- ups, it is not easy to identify best practice. An interna-
tional diversity of  institutions and organizational forms may be an impor-
tant part of  the environment of  the learning economy (Dalum et al.  1992 ). 
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 5.4  What Is Economic Knowledge? 
 It is a risky enterprise to enter a discussion of  how to defi ne knowledge and 
learning. These concepts touch on areas where many scientifi c disciplines have 
important things to say and what can be contributed by economists is not nec-
essarily the most interesting. But, if  what we have said above is only partially 
true, economists have no choice but to enter this discussion. Knowledge is a 
crucial economic resource. 
 We think that it is useful to make distinctions between diff erent kinds of  
knowledge. We suggest that economically relevant knowledge can be grouped 
into four broad categories:  know- what, know- why, know- who (when and 
where) and know- how. These categories refer to the possibilities to carry 
through transactions with economically relevant knowledge and to combine 
pieces of  knowledge in new ways. Such a taxonomy should make it easier to 
analyse the institutional set- up of  the learning economy. 
 Know- what refers to the knowledge about ‘facts’. How many people live in 
New York, what are the ingredients in pancakes and when was the battle of  
Waterloo are examples of  this kind of  knowledge. Here knowledge is close 
to what is normally called information – it can be broken down into bits. An 
extremely developed ability to know- what may be profi table in TV shows, but 
generally its relevance has been diminished by the information revolution. Still 
there are complex areas where experts must have a lot of  this kind of  knowl-
edge in order to fulfi l their jobs – practitioners of  law and medicine belong to 
this category. It is interesting to note that many of  these experts will, typically, 
work in independent, specialized consulting fi rms. 
 Know- why refers to scientifi c knowledge of  principles and laws of  motion in 
nature, in the human mind and in society. This kind of  knowledge has been 
extremely important for technological development in certain areas such as, 
for example, in the chemical and electric/ electronic industries. To have access 
to this kind of  knowledge will often make advances in technology more rapid 
and reduce the frequency of  errors in procedures of  trial and error. Today, 
however, experts on innovation emphasize that the coupling between basic 
science and technological advance is much less direct than assumed by the 
public and policymakers. Again, the production and reproduction of  know- 
why is to an important degree organized in specialized organizations such as, 
for example, universities; fi rms, which need access to this kind of  knowledge, 
have to interact with these organizations. 
 Know- who refers to specifi c and selective social relations. It is not a question 
of  knowing that person A is the director of  fi rm B – this we would include 
in know- what – but to know  who knows what and can do what and to have 
social relations to those who know relevant things. The rather peculiar know- 
who form of  knowledge is introduced here because innovation is basically an 
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interactive process. To know key persons and to be integrated in knowledge 
intensive networks may be more important to the success in innovation than 
knowing basic scientifi c principles. 
 The interactive and cumulative character of  the innovation process also 
makes know- when and know- where important categories of  knowledge. In 
the learning economy, which continuously introduces novelty, questions about 
time and space are of  strategic importance for successful innovation. When 
and where are there good chances to introduce and diff use innovations? Since 
know- when and know- where are closely related to know- who, they will in the 
following be treated as belonging to the same category. Basically they refer to 
concrete and economically useful knowledge about markets. 
 Know- how refers to skills (i.e., the capability to do diff erent kinds of  things). 
It might relate to production activities but also to many other activities in the 
economic sphere, including management, research and consumption. 
 It might be useful to refl ect on these four kinds of  knowledge and how they 
relate to fundamental economic concepts. From a transactional point of  view 
there are important diff erences between them. The fi rst two categories, which 
include very diff erent elements from trivial information to the understanding 
of  the laws of  nuclear physics, have certain common features. Databases can 
be precisely described and copied by others. The growing number of  expert 
systems demonstrates that the  know- what type of  knowledge of  experts is also 
becoming reproducible. The same is true for normal science (as distinguished 
from science in a process of  paradigmatic change). The observed diff erences 
between know- what and know- why in terms of  public access and reproduc-
ibility may simply be a question of  convention. While access to databases and 
expert knowledge is often given only after a pecuniary compensation, science 
is widely published and scientifi c knowledge is only kept private in very spe-
cifi c circumstances (for example biotechnology is one area where academic 
research has become regarded as a private commodity). 
 The privatization of  both these kinds of  knowledge involves, of  course, all 
the classical problems pertaining to information as a commodity. Information 
cannot be transacted as an ideal private commodity, and the transaction costs 
are often very high. The buyers will know little about the value of  information 
without having access to it, and if  they get access to it, there is no longer any 
reason to pay for it. The transfer of  property rights is problematic because 
normally the seller keeps the knowledge sold. Finally, it is very diffi  cult to make 
sure that the knowledge once sold is not duplicated by the buyer and sold to 
other potential customers. This is a problem for software companies and video 
producers, but it refl ects a much broader set of  problems. 
 Also, the information is unevenly distributed between buyer and seller. 
This asymmetry, which is actually the basis for the transaction, gives the seller 
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opportunities to exploit the buyer. As a reaction to this case of  market failure, 
a complex set of  formal and informal institutions have developed in this area. 
 According to the original transaction cost approach, we should expect 
vertical integration to take place, but on the contrary, these are areas where 
expertise is often concentrated in independent units (Williamson 1975). This 
may refl ect the fact that the scale and learning eff ects are so important that 
they compensate for high transaction costs. Know- what and know- why in a 
complex and changing area may be so demanding that it takes cooperation in 
specialized teams and frequent confrontations with many diff erent situations 
to develop and keep up with the knowledge. 
 An interesting point made by Elam ( 1993 ) is that information, because of  
the market failures connected to it, may be used as a gift. When it proves 
impossible to appropriate a specifi c piece of  knowledge, which might be useful 
for another party, it is given away. But there are seldom completely free gifts. 
Strings are attached and without it being stated in any contract, it is expected 
that the donor may be repaid with relevant knowledge sometime in the future. 
This kind of  ‘gossiping’ is obviously an important activity not only at coff ee 
parties but in clubs and in professional societies as well. It does not only refer 
to the private life of  colleagues, but involves technical information central for 
innovation processes as well. 
 Information as a gift may also be part of  establishing social relationships in 
terms of  respect, trust and friendships. It is obvious that this kind of  informa-
tion exchange is not something that can be managed from the top of  the fi rm. 
Management may try to establish some ground rules and a more or less open 
atmosphere in the organization, but any attempt to regulate such processes 
in any detail would make them lose their original meaning. Even if  strings 
are attached, information given as a gift should not be interpreted as being 
purely instrumental. We all know of  gifts which everyone knows are purely 
instrumental, and we also know that such gifts mean little when it comes to 
developing and deepening social relationships. Therefore, as a minimum, it is 
necessary that at least one of  the parties involved regards the gift as more than 
purely instrumental. 
 Know- who (when and where) and know- how diff er from the kinds of  
knowledge discussed above. None of  them can be easily translated into codes 
understandable by other agents, and therefore they are not commodities in the 
normal sense. In modern Western society conventions dictate that the know- 
who kind of  knowledge should not be regarded as something which may be 
bought on the market. But there are instances of  markets for this kind of  
knowledge, for example, diff erent forms of  corruption, where a payment to a 
person in a hierarchy may be necessary in order to get in touch with someone 
at a higher level. What you get for your money is not very valuable, however. 
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As Arrow has pointed out, you cannot buy trust, and if  you could buy it, it 
would be of  little value ( 1971 ). There might be a gift element involved: I intro-
duce this important person to you and later you introduce me to one of  your 
infl uential friends. But again, if  such social games become too cynical, they 
tend to lose their intrinsic value for the parties involved. 
 Know- how is at the very centre of  the economic process. What makes the 
economy grow are new combinations in the forms of  new methods and new 
products and, in a sense, knowing how to do and change things is more dif-
fi cult to learn, than it is to learn about facts and science. Often this kind of  
knowledge cannot be transformed into codes understandable by others; often 
you cannot even describe for yourself  how you do things. This is not true for 
all activities however. In the processing industries, much of  the know- how is 
science based and well understood. 
 Parts of  the know- how can be sold as patents and other parts as turnkey 
plants, but important parts remain tacit and cannot be removed from their 
human and social context. To a certain degree the labour market is a market for 
know- how. Firms may compete in recruiting persons with specifi c know- how. 
The problem here is that know- how and tacit knowledge is often specifi c and 
related to its original context. One might say that important elements of  tacit 
knowledge are collective rather than individual. Here, takeovers and mergers 
may be regarded as attempts to gain access to tacit knowledge and know- how. 
 In this case the market fails for two diff erent reasons. The parts of  know- 
how that are general, explicit and codifi able will give rise to the same kinds 
of  market failures as discussed earlier. The parts that are specifi c, tacit and 
impossible to codify cannot be transacted on the market without taking over 
parts or the whole of  the organization in which the knowledge is embedded. 
Again, there are strong theoretical grounds for vertical integration but the 
actual pattern shows that vertical integration is not taking place in most of  
these cases. Instead, we get diff erent kinds of  organized markets, for example, 
durable user– producer relationships and network relationships. One reason 
for the high frequency of  these kinds of  relationship might be that they give 
access to know- how, which is at the middle of  the scale between tacitness and 
codifi ability and between specifi city and generality. 
 In the learning economy, all diff erent categories of  knowledge are com-
bined in the innovation process. If  we regard innovation as ‘the craft of  com-
bination’ (Elam  1993 ) and the entrepreneur, individual or collective, as the 
wielder of  this craft, then entrepreneurial knowledge consists of  know- what, 
know- why, know- how and, to a considerable extent, of  know- who, when and 
where. Since all these forms of  knowledge have transactional peculiarities, the 
pure market does not constitute a proper institutional set- up. Thus, the insti-
tutional characteristic of  the learning economy becomes a crucial question. 
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 5.5  Is Knowledge a Scarce Resource? 
 Scarcity, in the sense that resources are limited in relation to needs and wants, 
is at the very foundation of  economics. If  there were no scarcity or if  the econ-
omy were not able to continuously create and recreate needs and wants, the 
allocation of  resources would be of  little interest. Innovations might be done 
for the fun of  it, but they would not be important for the well- being of  society. 
Knowledge is an interesting resource in this context. While one should restrict 
the use of  most resources because they diminish in use value when used, this is 
not true for most forms of  knowledge. The exchange value of  knowledge may 
be reduced if  it is used in a way that gives other people access to it, but even 
that is not necessarily true. Teaching people to drive a car and to use a com-
puter may be the only way to stimulate the demand for more teaching in these 
areas. Learning increases the appetite for knowledge and vice versa. There is 
an important diff erence between commodities like materials and energy, on 
the one hand, and knowledge, on the other. While materials and energy are 
used up in the production process, knowledge is increased. Production is a 
source of  diff erent kinds of  learning and even if  a certain amount of  ‘forget-
ting’ (loss of  knowledge) is an aspect of  production too, the economy can be 
organized so as to stimulate the growth of  knowledge. 
 Of  course, the knowledge we have at any specifi c point in time is scarce in 
the sense that we, as collectives and individuals, know very little of  all there is 
to know. It is a good idea to economize with knowledge and use it as sensibly 
as possible. But this is not the traditional economic problem of  fully employ-
ing the available resources. In a sense, there is always too much knowledge 
around, stored in diff erent ways, which is more or less accessible. The problem 
often becomes one of  knowing which sources of  knowledge to draw on and 
which sources not to use. Again, this could be thought of  as a question of  
transaction costs. 
 At other times, it is a problem of  fi tting relevant pieces of  knowledge to 
each other in order to make them more productive. New pieces of  knowledge 
do not automatically fi t with older pieces; knowledge can easily become obso-
lete without necessarily actually ceasing to be knowledge. 
 Much knowledge is, for diff erent reasons, not put to use. Consumer prefer-
ences and consumer habits may not be in favour of  it. Prices may not stimulate 
it. Organizational forms and management routines may not be adapted to it. 
Product standards may lag behind. Much scientifi c knowledge has not been 
transformed into working technologies and some technologies are not put to 
active use or are not diff using. A lot of  technical knowledge may not become 
ingrained into the economy in the forms of  norms, routines, standards and 
habits; it has not been institutionalized. 
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 If  the existence of  large amounts of  unused resources means that these 
resources are abundant, then knowledge is abundant. Maybe we could say 
that knowledge is abundant but the ability to use it is scarce. This has impor-
tant implications for how to allocate it. We should, for example, use it more 
than would be called for by a myopic calculation, and we should pay a lot of  
attention to how the stock of  knowledge changes and how its diff erent ele-
ments fi t with each other. 
 5.6  Interactive Learning 
 We might say that the stock of  knowledge is aff ected by two fl ows. The one 
that increases knowledge we might call learning, and the one that reduces 
it, we might call forgetting. In addition we have to recognize that knowledge 
deteriorates when not used (forgetting by not doing), which means that it has 
to be maintained by a process we might call remembering. These three activi-
ties – learning, forgetting and remembering – in the change of  knowledge are 
central processes in the learning economy. It is not obvious, however, what 
constitutes rational choice in this context, since every change in knowledge 
changes the basis on which rational calculations must rest. When we discuss 
changes in knowledge, it is more relevant to think in terms of  communicative 
and interactive processes rather than in terms of  rational choice with given 
resources at specifi c points of  time. 
 Almost all learning is interactive, but it may be useful to take into account 
that there are diff erent kinds of  learning that involve diff erent degrees of  social 
interaction (Johnson  1992 ). Undoubtedly there is some simple, individual and 
isolated imprinting of  immediate experiences on the memory, but this is cer-
tainly not the most important form of  learning. There is also rote learning 
(i.e., you learn by repetition, but you do not necessarily have to understand 
what you are doing). This usually includes observing and learning from other 
people and thus involves more human interaction than simple imprinting. 
A lot of  learning is done by feedback, which involves still more interaction. 
We do try or say something and get a response from other people, which tells 
us something about our fi rst action and so on. Finally there is systematic and 
organized searching for new knowledge, for example, in universities, research 
institutes and R&D departments; it involves intense and complex forms of  
interaction. Technical change often requires dialogue or conversation (i.e., 
sequences of  exchanges of  information and knowledge between diff erent peo-
ple in diff erent departments and at diff erent levels, within fi rms and between 
fi rms). The more technically or scientifi cally advanced the innovations, the 
more complicated the communication processes they usually require. 
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 It is a fundamental feature of  the learning economy that it gradually develops 
its capability to learn. Modern fi rms often search systematically and in orga-
nized ways for new knowledge to be used in production as new processes or new 
products. This searching is restricted and channelled in diff erent ways. First, to 
the extent that technical change is a rent- seeking activity under competition, 
searching will always be conducted under some degree of  concealment so that 
the results from learning in one fi rm are not immediately accessible by other 
fi rms. Second, the specifi c combination of  skills, education, knowledge and 
experience that characterizes the personnel of  the R&D department of  a fi rm 
will infl uence the innovation process including the problems formulated, the 
methods chosen and the solutions sought. Third, because of  the particular tech-
nological opportunities and bottlenecks of  the fi rm’s product area, the search-
ing is likely to follow specifi c technological trajectories (Dosi  1988 ). Fourth, the 
dominant ‘techno- economic paradigm’ infl uences learning and searching at all 
levels in society (Freeman and Perez  1988 ). The habits of  thought created by 
the dominant paradigm instruct researchers in how to pose their problems and 
choose their methods, and they also hint at possible solutions. 
 Knowledge is also gained from economic activities, which are  not explicitly 
or primarily aimed at its generation. Learning is often connected, for example, 
to the routine procurement, production and sales activities of  the fi rm and 
to normal communication between fi rms. It is, then, rather a byproduct of  
activities organized with other aims in mind. 
 The distinction between intentional learning (education, training, R&D, 
market research) and learning as a byproduct of  routine economic activities 
(learning by doing, by using and by interacting in relation to normal pro-
duction and marketing activities by fi rms) is important in the learning econ-
omy. We might call the fi rst kind ‘learning by searching’, and the second kind 
‘learning by producing’. Learning by searching and learning by producing 
are not, however, mutually exclusive activities. They are interdependent, and 
there are many mixed forms in between. On the one hand, routinized search-
ing is certainly a possibility in modern production, especially in production 
areas where technological trajectories are well established. Habits of  thought 
are important elements in research. On the other hand, repetitive production 
activities can be consciously and systematically monitored and controlled in 
order to stimulate innovations. They can be organized in ways that increase 
the learning potential. 
 5.7  Remembering and Forgetting 
 Since human knowledge does not exist all by itself  but is coded into the central 
nervous system of  human beings, it may easily and quickly get lost. Knowledge 
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can be stored in many ways, however. Usually we presume, for both insti-
tutional and epistemological reasons, that learning is cumulative so that the 
stock of  knowledge is increasing over time. This need not be the case, how-
ever. Maintaining the knowledge requires continuous reinvestments in both 
human and physical capital. Economic knowledge, which is not actively used 
deteriorates and context- dependent knowledge can be destroyed quite quickly, 
for example, by closing down a department or an organization. Knowledge is 
thus changed both by learning and by forgetting. 
 In fact, forgetting is neither rare nor unimportant. Knowledge which is 
not institutionally supported and does not fi t into a cultural context tends to 
be forgotten (Douglas  1987 ). Sometimes knowledge is destroyed very quickly 
and veritable bursts of  forgetting have occurred several times in history, as 
for example through the demise of  great cultures. In fact, every change of  
scientifi c or techno- economic paradigm involves massive losses of  knowledge. 
 The positive role of  forgetting in the development of  new knowledge has 
probably been underestimated. The enormous power of  habits of  thought 
in the economy constitutes a permanent risk for blocking potentially fertile 
learning processes. It may be argued that some kind of  creative destruction 
of  knowledge is necessary in order to make it possible for radical innova-
tions to diff use throughout the economy. Old habits of  thought, routines 
and patterns of  cooperation, within as well as between fi rms, have to be 
changed. Forgetting is an essential and integrated part of  learning even if  
it is not always easy to separate ex ante between creative forgetting and just 
forgetting. 
 Economic development can be looked on as an unfolding sequence of  
transformations going on at many levels of  aggregation. Termination of  exist-
ing activities is often a prerequisite for the development of  new ones, not only 
at the fi rm level in the form of  bankruptcies and births of  new fi rms but also 
within fi rms. Departments are closed down. Production of  specifi c commodi-
ties and the use of  certain processes are stopped, and so on. Closing down of  
activities is thus a normal and integrated part of  economic development. 
 5.8  Learning in Pure and Mixed Economies 
 Since learning is interactive, it is aff ected by the institutional set up of  the 
economy. Institutions are here defi ned as the sets of  habits, routines, norms 
and laws that regulate the relationships between people and thus shape human 
interaction and learning (Johnson  1992 ). In the next sections we will discuss 
the institutional preconditions for the learning economy. The learning econ-
omy is neither a pure market economy nor a pure planned economy; it is a 
mixed economy in the fundamental sense of  the term. 
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 One way to illustrate the limits of  the pure market economy as environ-
ment for learning and innovation is to focus on how diff erent institutional 
settings aff ect product innovations. In mainstream theoretical models of  pro-
duction and growth, technical change is assumed to be refl ected in changes 
in technical coeffi  cients. Implicitly all innovations are assumed to be process 
rather than product innovations. Macroeconomic growth is often analysed 
in models describing either a one- commodity world or proportional growth 
in all sectors. But this is rather misleading; economic growth could not be 
sustained in any of  these worlds. What keeps demand growing is the devel-
opment of  radically new products and change in the composition of  aggre-
gate demand as incomes grow. It is obvious that neither national economies 
nor private fi rms could survive competition if  they did not introduce new 
products. Gradually, the demand for any specifi c product will stagnate, and 
increases in productivity through process innovations will, at best, delay the 
time when fi rms and nations have to introduce new products in order to 
survive. 
 Thus, there are good reasons for putting product innovations at the centre 
of  the analysis. How will such a change in perspective aff ect our understand-
ing of  fi rms and markets as environments for learning and innovation? Will 
perfect competition and pure markets – the ideal institutional set up for allo-
cation of  given resources – be ideal also, when it comes to bringing forward 
new ideas and materializing them into new products adapted to the needs of  
potential users? 
 Scientists who develop new instruments for their own use, in order to be 
able to pursue a specifi c experiment in the laboratory, know better than any-
one else which needs the instruments should address and satisfy. They will also 
have a better insight into the new use- value characteristics of  the resulting 
innovation than anyone else. Here insights about needs and technical oppor-
tunities are combined in one single person. 
 The R&D laboratory engaged in the development of  new process equip-
ment and the production department in the same fi rm are in a more diffi  cult 
situation. A reciprocal fl ow of  qualitative information, with regard to techni-
cal opportunities and user needs, must connect the two departments. How to 
effi  ciently organize this relationship is not a simple matter. 
 But the problem of  organizing coordination and exchange of  qualitative 
information will be even more diffi  cult when the innovating producer and 
the potential user belong to two diff erent organizations linked only by a pure 
market relation. Therefore, it seems paradoxical that such a large propor-
tion of  innovative activities (measured both as input and as output) aims at or 
results in product innovations (Pavitt  1984 ). How can the producer know the 
needs of  potential users when markets separate users from producers? How 
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can the potential user gain information about the specifi c characteristics of  a 
new product? 
 It is obvious that product innovations would be rare and accidental if  mar-
kets were characterized simply by anonymous relationships between produc-
ers and users. Producers would have diffi  culties in observing new user needs 
and users would lack qualitative information as to the characteristics of  the 
new products. It is also evident that there would be very little learning going 
on within the fi rms; at least not when fi rms are pictured as in standard neo-
classical theory (i.e., as technical input– output relationships). There is not 
much room for novelty- generating or novelty- utilizing communication and 
interaction in a production function. Although the pure market is presented 
as an ideal norm in the neoclassical analysis of  allocation, it represents an 
institutional set- up that is hostile to innovation. 
 The extreme organizational alternative to the pure market in economic 
theory is the pure hierarchy (the centrally planned economy can be thought 
of  as a hierarchy of  hierarchies) in which prices play no role at all and all com-
munication is in terms of  simple messages up and clear orders down. From 
the discussion above of  the character of  economic knowledge and learning, 
it follows that such organizations would be eff ective innovation brakes. The 
communication in a pure hierarchy is too restricted and simple to constitute 
the main substance in complicated interactive learning processes. New combi-
nations of  diff erent pieces of  knowledge are rare in pure hierarchies, and these 
would also have diffi  culties in utilizing unexpected novelty. 
 In a purely planned economy, there would be problems with both process 
innovations and product innovations. It is true that users and producers would 
not necessarily have any diffi  culties to meet, in a way they would be members 
of  the same organization, but the simple character of  their communication 
and interaction would prevent advanced learning. Simple learning by doing 
and learning by using might exist, and learning by searching might be eff ective 
in special basic research organizations separated from production, but innova-
tion would not be a ubiquitous process. 
 5.9  The Organized Market as Institutional Response 
 Paradoxically, product innovations are not rare in the real world. Why? The 
simple answer is that most markets are not pure markets characterized by 
anonymous relationships between buyers and sellers. Most markets involve 
an element of  mutual exchange of  qualitative information and sometimes 
direct cooperation between users and producers in the process of  innovation. 
The relative importance of  product innovations indicates that most markets 
are organized markets, which allow for interactive learning. This implies that 
122
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE122
modern economies are ‘mixed’ in a fundamental sense. Not only does the 
private sector coexist with a large public sector but the relative success of  
the market economies in terms of  technical progress refl ects not the purity 
of the markets but rather their impurities. 
 The basic function of  the user– producer relationships, in relation to prod-
uct innovations, is to communicate information about both technological 
opportunities and user needs. Sometimes, the relationships between users and 
producers will involve direct cooperation. For example, a user might invite a 
producer to take part in solving a specifi c problem within the organization. 
Cooperation might take place at diff erent stages – while defi ning the problem, 
developing the solution or introducing it in the user organization. 
 User– producer relationships will often involve elements of  power and hier-
archy and the direction of  innovations will refl ect the dominance of  one of  the 
parties. But in most user– producer relationships, we fi nd other social elements 
beside hierarchy and dominance. Without a certain degree of  commitment, 
loyalty, mutual respect of  each other’s autonomy and mutual trust, transac-
tion costs would become prohibitively high and vertical integration would take 
place. 
 It follows from what has been said that user– producer relationships tend to 
be durable and selective. It takes time to develop effi  cient codes and channels 
of  information. This might be even more so when it comes to establishing 
relationships of  commitment, trust and common codes of  conduct. In order 
to obtain communication economies, the number of  producers and users con-
nected must be limited, and this implies that user– producer relationships must 
be selective, connecting to each other relevant subsets ofall potential users and 
producers. 
 The main reason why markets tend to become organized, therefore, is that 
they support innovative activities. It follows that the intensity and the charac-
ter of  user– producer relationships might be very diff erent in diff erent parts 
of  the economy. In parts where product technology remains almost constant, 
the relationships might become close to the ideal of  the pure market. In other 
areas, a high degree of  complexity and radical change in technologies might 
result in a complete and formal vertical integration. But in between these two 
extremes, we should expect to fi nd the vast majority of  markets, each one 
including varying elements of  organization. 
 5.10  Benefi ts and Costs of  Organized Markets 
 What, then, are the relative advantages of  organized markets as compared to 
the pure market and the pure hierarchy? Here, it might be useful to repeat an 
argument put forward by Arrow ( 1974 ). The formation of  an organization 
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might be regarded as a process involving both growing effi  ciency and growing 
infl exibility. The positive eff ect from an extension of  the organization is that 
communication is likely to become more effi  cient through the development of  
common codes and channels of  information. The negative aspect of  bringing 
more and more activities into organizations is that the activities get ‘locked 
in’ within a network of  communication codes and channels, diffi  cult to adjust 
when faced with radical change in the environment. The organized market 
might be regarded as a compromise, taking into account both the advantages 
of  acting collectively – in our context, primarily, to stimulate learning by inter-
acting – and the costs of  rigidity. The organized market represents a degree of  
rigidity necessary to produce innovations, but a rigidity of  a lower degree than 
the one represented by complete integration. 
 We must also take into account how vertical integration aff ects the partici-
pation of  integrated units in interactive learning taking place outside the pair 
of  integrated units. Integrating a producer will give a user more direct access 
to technological know- how and at the same time, the integrated producer will 
get more direct access to knowledge about the changing needs of  this particu-
lar user. 
 But the price paid for these intimate relationships might be high in the long 
run. Users and producers not integrated will be reluctant to give away sensi-
tive information to the pair of  integrated units. Nonintegrated users will be 
reluctant to surrender information about their strategic bottleneck problems 
to a producer integrated with a competitor. And nonintegrated producers will 
be unwilling to give away their most advanced technical know how to a user 
unit integrated with a competing producer. 
 As a result, interactive learning becomes specialized and limited in scope. 
Thus, there is a trade- off  between the short- term advantages of  a closer inter-
action between the integrated units and the long- term costs of  their isolation 
from the broader process of  interactive learning involving several formally 
independent users and producers. The informal solution of  the organized 
market is less exclusive in this respect and keeps open a more diversifi ed net-
work for interactive learning. Firms may prefer relatively high communica-
tion and transaction costs in the organized market rather than join a pure 
hierarchy locking them into a more narrowly defi ned space for interactive 
learning. 
 We have used the user– producer relationship to illustrate the idea of  an 
organized market. It should be underlined, however, that the informally orga-
nized markets of  the learning economy can take many forms. The heart of  the 
matter is interactive learning by creative combinations of  knowledge. In the 
learning economy these interactions are not only going on in the science and 
technology system but also on much more anonymous and mundane levels. 
124
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE124
 Let us take an example. A few years ago a small furniture producing fi rm 
(about 30 employees) in Jutland, Denmark, with considerable success intro-
duced a new work bench specially designed for repair and service work on 
television sets, hi- fi  equipment, personal computers and so on. It was con-
structed of  a dust- repelling material, which also prevents interference from 
static electricity. It had a very practical size and form and was equipped with 
a handy set of  shelves and drawers and had, generally speaking, an attractive 
design. This work bench can be taken as an example of  a kind of  everyday 
incremental innovation which a surviving furniture industry has to be able to 
repeat over and over again. At the same time, it is a result of  a rather sophis-
ticated process of  interactive learning. It started at a furniture exhibition. The 
fi rm was approached by some people from an autonomous repair and service 
department within a major Danish fi rm in the consumer electronics industry. 
They had for a long time been looking for a better work bench and had some 
specifi c ideas as to what properties it should have. A  furniture architecture 
fi rm, which previously had cooperated with the furniture producer, was con-
tacted and a project group was set up. This group soon discovered that they 
needed to consult experts on material technology from the Danish technologi-
cal service system, a state- sponsored body. After a series of  meetings between 
the four parties, a prototype of  the new work bench was constructed, tested 
and introduced onto the market. The whole process took less than a year. This 
is not a big thing. It is just a small example of  what goes on within a bewilder-
ing diversity of  interactive learning activities in the learning economy. It is 
very important for the dynamic effi  ciency of  the economy, but it still waits to 
be systematically observed and analysed by scholars. 
 5.11  Government Intervention in the Learning Economy 
 Is there also a role of  government involvement in the learning economy? 
In fact, not only general equilibrium theory but also economic theories, 
which treat the economy as a process rather than as an equilibrium system, 
are predominantly sceptical as to the possibilities of  planning, learning and 
innovation processes. In connection with the learning economy, the general 
equilibrium framework becomes rather empty. A modern defi nition of  gen-
eral equilibrium says that it is a situation in which no signals are generated, 
which can cause agents to change their theories or policies. This is a situation 
where nothing happens, where nothing can change the situation. All kinds of  
learning have ceased. 
 There is, for example, the ‘Austrian’ argument that the market is a very 
eff ective discovery process, the results of  which cannot be improved by policy-
makers. The signifi cance of  the market is that it coordinates the use of  widely 
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dispersed knowledge, and during this process, through competitive entrepre-
neurial entry and intervention, discovers new possibilities. In Hayek’s words, 
the market ‘turns out to be a more effi  cient mechanism for digesting dispersed 
information than any man has deliberately designed’ ( 1975 ). 
 Such arguments warn against intervening in subtle processes whose future 
directions and results we know very little about. In a ‘kaleidic society’ (Shackle 
 1972 ), where unexpected novelty is sooner or later bound to disintegrate, 
change and rearrange existing patterns into new ones, economic policy is 
an uncertain aff air. The market process of  discovery is necessarily decentral-
ized, subtle and surprising. Any attempt to centralize it risks destroying it, so 
it seems. 
 But there is still room for economic policy in relation to long- term eco-
nomic development and growth. First, the evolution of  knowledge is not only 
accidental in its character. It is also cumulative and often developing along 
‘trajectories’, which may remain quite stable for long periods. This perspective 
makes it clear that the role of  policy might be twofold. It might either stimu-
late the progress along the prevailing trajectories – and this is what industrial 
policies often end up doing – or it may take on the more demanding task of  
making it easier for agents to shift from one trajectory to another. 
 First, the cumulativeness and path dependency of  innovation highlights 
the risks of  lock- in within technological and institutional cul- de- sacs. In such 
a context, there is a need for economic policy to keep options open and to 
stimulate and protect technological and institutional diversity which can be 
done through the educational system, the research system, the system of  tech-
nological service and so on. 
 Second, there is no such thing as an unregulated market. Markets are 
always embedded in institutions. For example, we have demonstrated that 
markets characterized by product innovation are ‘organized markets’, even 
if  they are not organized by the government. There are no strong reasons 
to believe, however, that politically determined rules  – for example, rules 
for environmental protection today or rules against child labour during the 
Industrial Revolution  – necessarily harm market discovery processes more 
than they stimulate them. It is not at all obvious that a government- supported 
technological service system, for example, will hamper entrepreneurial action. 
 Third, the impossibility of  acquiring any certain knowledge about the 
future state of  the world does not mean, for example, that safeguards against 
risks and incentive mechanisms for stimulating learning cannot be designed. 
After all, the fact that you do not know tomorrow’s weather is a poor argument 
against building some form of  weather proofi ng on your house today. 
 In addition, the argument that unregulated market processes are invinci-
ble mechanisms for discovering new knowledge does not distinguish clearly 
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enough between knowledge and learning. The Austrian argument is mostly 
about coordinating already existing but dispersed knowledge and about dis-
covering persistently emerging imbalances between revenues, costs and wants, 
knowledge about changing market conditions, unused opportunities, ‘which 
things or services are wanted and how urgently they are wanted’ (Hayek  1978 ). 
It shares with the neoclassical tradition the focus on the allocation of  scarce 
resources. In this sense, the Austrian learning process  is subordinated to the 
allocation process. It has not much to do with institutional, organizational and 
technological learning. In fact, it has nothing to do with innovation or learn-
ing. Analysis of  the learning economy calls for a completely fresh approach. 
 In the perspective of  this chapter, the role of  government in the learning 
economy becomes one of  supporting learning processes and sometimes pro-
cesses of  forgetting. It has important roles to play in relation to the following 
topics, at least: 
 •  The means to learn 
 •  The incentives to learn 
 •  The capability to learn 
 •  The access to relevant knowledge 
 •  Learning to forget 
 5.12  The Means to Learn 
 The most important and obvious way public policy can strengthen the capa-
bility to learn and to innovate is through investing in education and training 
and through continuously renewing the form and content of  these activities. 
Education policy is not just a question of  the quantity of  government fund-
ing. The ability of  the education and training system to adapt to new social 
and technological developments is extremely important in the present era. 
The increasingly systemic character of  new technologies, where old borders 
between technical and scientifi c disciplines are broken down, makes it nec-
essary to review the traditional departmentalized organization of  academic 
training and research. 
 5.13  The Incentives to Learn 
 Incentives to engage in learning may be of  a pecuniary kind. At the level 
of  the individual, systems of  salaries and wages and income taxes may be 
designed to promote learning and creative eff orts. At the level of  the fi rm, 
patent laws and tax rules, including depreciation allowances for investment 
in tangible and intangible resources, may aff ect learning activities and eff orts. 
   127
THE LEARNING ECONOMY 127
 The importance of  pecuniary incentives may be overstated, however. In 
the present period, individual entrepreneurship plays a more limited role 
than it has done and ‘collective entrepreneurship’ has become much more 
important. The cooperation and interaction between departments within 
the fi rm as well as between fi rms in industrial networks has become an 
important source of  innovation. The public sector has a role to play as a pro-
fessional user interacting with private fi rms and government programmes 
supporting projects of  cooperation; networks between fi rms may help to 
establish a more effi  cient communication between parties otherwise reluc-
tant to cooperate. Individualized pecuniary incentive systems will hamper 
processes of  interactive learning if  they reinforce instrumental rationality, 
weaken the capability to engage in open communication with other parties 
and foster opportunism, making all kinds of  cooperation burdened by high 
transaction costs. 
 5.14  The Capability to Learn 
 The fi rm’s  capability to learn refl ects the way it is organized. The movement 
away from tall hierarchies with vertical fl ows of  information towards more fl at 
organizations with horizontal fl ows of  information is one aspect of  the learn-
ing economy. Other elements relate to the circulation of  personnel between 
departments and functions and the broad defi nition of  jobs. One obvious way 
for government to promote organizational change in this direction would be 
to study systematically how domestic fi rms advance in this area and then to 
diff use information about experiences made by ‘lead fi rms’ to laggards and 
give fi nancial support to organizational innovations and experimenting. This 
is the content of  government- inspired ‘Best Practice’ programmes. 
 5.15  Access to Relevant Knowledge 
 Old and new scientifi c results may be inputs to the process of  learning and 
innovation at diff erent stages. Here, access to universities and  technical insti-
tutes is of  importance. One of  the main problems in this context is com-
munication between industry and university. Big science- based fi rms in fi ne 
chemistry, biotechnology and electronics sectors, for example, might be well 
prepared to communicate with universities knowing their codes and their cul-
ture, while smaller engineering fi rms may have great diffi  culties in this respect. 
When there are ‘bridging’ problems, agents aff ecting links between knowledge 
producers and knowledge users may be established by government. Public and 
semi- public technological service institutions and libraries are also important 
in this connection. 
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 Another kind of  knowledge source is the informal, not codifi ed and more 
or less tacit knowledge accumulated through learning inside fi rms. One of  the 
reasons why fi rms establish network relationships is that these relationships 
give access to such knowledge. Network formation may be stimulated by gov-
ernment programmes supporting projects of  cooperation. 
 5.16  Learning to Forget 
 One important aspect of  the learning economy is its capacity to preserve and 
store knowledge. Again, government agencies may play a role together with 
private consultants and institutes. But in a learning economy it is also impor-
tant to be able to forget, both in the literal meaning and in a broader sense. 
For the individual, the interpretation of  forgetting relates to the abandoning 
of  obsolete skills and professional expertise. Within fi rms it is a question of  
having mechanisms to put an end to outmoded activities, projects and prod-
ucts. Between fi rms it is a question of  having a mechanism that helps to distin-
guish the fi rms with a future from those with no learning capability. The most 
apparent mechanism in this context is the market, But in some countries, for 
example, Japan and South Korea, the state has also played an important role 
in the closing down of  ailing industries. 
 For all kinds of  forgetting, people are burdened with the costs of  change. 
These may be very unevenly distributed and may provoke resistance. One 
obvious way to support ‘creative forgetting’ is a system of  redistribution that 
compensates the victims of  change and makes it easier for them to move 
ahead into more promising activities. This will typically involve diff erent kinds 
of  social security arrangements, active labour market and retraining policies. 
 The need for and role of  state intervention will diff er dramatically between 
nations. But fundamentally, in addition to providing the means to learn by public 
investment in education and training, the role will be one of  stimulating creativity 
and the generation of  novelty, preserving knowledge and keeping technological 
options open and dispersing the personal and social costs of  change (Dalum et al. 
 1992 ). Since learning is interactive and partly emanates from routine activities 
in production and consumption, government intervention should in general be 
oriented primarily at shaping the overall structure of  production and the insti-
tutional set- up so that these promote self- organized learning and thereby reduce 
the need for fi ne tuning and detailed intervention into the economy. 
 5.17  Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, we have taken up the classical ‘market versus state intervention’ 
discourse from the perspective of  the learning economy. We have disregarded 
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the traditional discussion of  effi  cient allocation of  given scarce resources of  
capital, labour and land and concentrated on the development and allocation 
of  the rather peculiar but crucial resource of  knowledge. We have argued that 
knowledge is not scarce in the usual sense. We have discussed how it is changed 
by the social processes of  learning, remembering and forgetting. Furthermore, 
we have discussed innovation as an interactive, ubiquitous process of  introduc-
ing new knowledge into the economy and treated innovations as the results of  
learning. 
 Our conclusion is that the learning economy is neither a pure market 
economy nor a pure planned economy. Such economies would not learn very 
much, if  they could exist and survive at all. The learning economy is, and 
has to be, a mixed economy in a very fundamental sense. In such economies 
(despite some infl uential arguments to the contrary), there are important roles 
for the public sector and for diff erent kinds of  policy. In the learning economy, 
very basic economic institutions such as fi rms and markets are mixed. Markets 
are embedded in habits, rules and norms and are organized for the communi-
cation and exchange of  qualitative, nonprice type of  information. Firms show 
a diversity of  diff erent organizational forms, which infl uence communication 
between diff erent persons and departments. Its continually changing institu-
tional set- up forms the environment for interactive learning- by- producing and 
learning- by- searching processes, which are the main mechanism for recom-
bining and introducing new knowledge in the economy. Thus it is mixed in the 
sense that it displays a rich mix of  organizational forms between the extremes 
of  market and hierarchy. 
 If  this picture is only a little bit true, if  knowledge is the crucial resource 
and learning the most important process in the modern economy, we are, as 
economists, in trouble. We need a new theoretical orientation since the models 
of  pure market economies in mainstream economics are not very helpful in 
understanding the critical features of  the learning economy. 
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 Chapter 6 
 FROM THE ECONOMICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE TO THE LEARNING 
ECONOMY 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 6.1  Introduction 
 In this chapter we present a conceptual framework to analyse knowledge and 
learning from an economic perspective. The starting point is the assumption 
that we are in a knowledge- based economy, but we conclude by proposing 
that it is more adequate to characterize the current era as ‘a learning econ-
omy’ . Crucial issues analysed here are distinctions between private/ public, 
local/ global and tacit/ codifi ed knowledge. While appearing ‘academic’ at 
fi rst sight, these distinctions have important implications both for innovation 
policy and for the management of  innovation and knowledge at the level of  
the fi rm. 
 It has become commonplace among policymakers to refer to the current 
period as characterized by a knowledge- based economy, and increasingly it 
is emphasized that the most promising strategy for economic growth is one 
aiming at strengthening the knowledge base of  the economy. 1 This discourse 
raises a number of  unresolved analytical issues. What constitutes the knowl-
edge base? At what level can we locate and defi ne a knowledge base? What are 
the specifi cities of  local- and sector- specifi c knowledge bases? How stable is 
the knowledge base? In order to approach an answer to these questions, three 
diff erent themes are introduced: fi rst, basic concepts related to knowledge and 
learning; second, the contribution of  economic analysis to the understanding 
of  the production, mediation and use of  knowledge; and third, new economic 
trends and the formation of  a learning economy. 
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 6.2  A Terminology of  Knowledge 
 6.2.1  Is knowledge a public or a private good? 
 Sidney Winter concluded his seminal paper on knowledge and management 
strategy by pointing out that there is ‘a paucity of  language’ and ‘a serious 
dearth of  appropriate terminology and conceptual schemes’ for analysing the 
role of  knowledge in the economy ( 1987 ). Since then, the number of  relevant 
publications has grown immensely but little headway has been made in terms 
of  a terminology acceptable to all. There is little agreement on questions such 
as: What is the meaning of  knowledge and knowledge production? What sep-
arations and distinctions between diff erent kinds of  knowledge are most useful 
for understanding the interaction between learning, knowledge and economic 
development? 
 Knowledge and information appear in economic models in two diff erent 
contexts. The most fundamental assumption of  standard microeconomics is 
that the economic system is based on  rational choices made by individual agents . 
Thus,  how much and what kind of  information agents have about the world in 
which they operate and their  ability to process the information are crucial issues. 
 The other major perspective is one in which knowledge is regarded as an 
 asset . Here, knowledge may appear both as an input (competence) and output 
(innovation) in the production process. Under certain circumstances, it can be 
privately owned and/ or bought and sold in the market as a commodity. The 
economics of  knowledge is to a high degree about specifying the conditions 
for knowledge to appear as ‘a normal commodity’ (i.e., as something similar 
to a producible and reproducible tangible product). 
 In what follows, attention is on knowledge in this latter sense. In analysing 
knowledge as an asset, its properties in terms of  transferability across time, 
space and people is central. This issue is at the core of  two diff erent strands of  
economic debate. One is the public/ private dimension of  knowledge and the 
role of  government in knowledge production; the second is the formation of  
industrial districts and the local character of  knowledge. 
 Is knowledge a private or a public good? In economic theory, the properties 
that give a good the attribute of  ‘public’ are the following: 
 a)  Its benefi ts can be enjoyed by many users concurrently as well as 
sequentially without being diminished 
 b)  It is costly for the provider to exclude unauthorized users 
 One reason for the interest in this issue is that it is crucial for defi ning the role 
of  government in knowledge production. If  knowledge is a public good that 
can be accessed by anyone, there is no incentive for rational private agents 
   135
FROM ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE TO LEARNING ECONOMY 135
to invest in its production. If  it is less costly to imitate than to produce new 
knowledge, the social rate of  return would be higher than the private rate 
of  return and again, private agents would invest too little. In Nelson’s article 
‘The Simple Economics of  Basic Economic Research’ ( 1959 ) and Arrow’s 
‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of  Resources for Invention’ ( 1962b ), 
classical contributions demonstrated that, in such situations, there is a basis for 
government policy either to subsidize or to take charge directly of  the produc-
tion of  knowledge. Public funding of  schools and universities, as well as of  
generic technologies, has been motivated by this kind of  reasoning, which also 
brings to the fore the protection of  knowledge, for instance by patent systems. 
 In a sense, this fundamental problem remains at the core of  the econom-
ics of  knowledge production. However, another strand of  thought, which has 
roots far back in the history of  economic theory, has become more strongly 
represented in the debate in the last decades. It is the question of  how to 
share knowledge that is diffi  cult to mediate. Marshall ( 1923 ) was concerned to 
explain the real- world phenomenon of   industrial district :  w hy is it that certain 
specialized industries are located in certain regions and why do they remain 
competitive for long historical periods. His principal explanation was that 
knowledge was localized in the region and rooted both in the local labour 
force as well as in local institutions and organizations. This perspective with its 
focus on localized knowledge has, in the light of  the Silicon Valley phenom-
enon, resurfaced strongly among industrial and regional economists over the 
last decades. Correspondingly, the management literature has seen a growing 
interest in the promotion of  ‘knowledge sharing’ within and between fi rms. 
 These two perspectives, while seemingly opposed in their contrasting 
emphasis on protection and sharing of  knowledge, raise the same fundamental 
questions. Is knowledge public or private? Can it or can it not be transferred? 
Is the consent of  the producer needed for the mediation to be successful or 
can knowledge be copied against the will of  the producer? How diffi  cult is it 
to transfer knowledge, and what are the transfer mechanisms? Is it possible 
to change the form of  knowledge so that it gets easier (or more diffi  cult) to 
mediate? How important is the broader sociocultural context for the transfer-
ability of  knowledge? One reason for the distinctions between diff erent kinds 
of  knowledge proposed below is that they help sort out these questions. 
 Responding to these questions is also a way of  specifying what constitutes 
the knowledge base of  the economy. If  knowledge was completely public, it 
would be meaningful to speak of  one common knowledge base for the whole 
economy, and there would be a strong need for coordinating investments in 
knowledge production at the global level. Conversely, if  knowledge was com-
pletely individual and private, there would be no common knowledge base at 
all, and investment in knowledge production could be left to the individuals 
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themselves. As we shall see, reality is complex and most knowledge is neither 
completely public nor completely private. The knowledge base is fragmented 
and may best be illustrated as constituted by a number of  semi- public ‘pools’ 
to which access is shared regionally, professionally and through networking. 
 6.2.2  Four diff erent kinds of  knowledge 
 Knowledge is divided here into four categories, which in fact have ancient 
roots (Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ). 2 
 •  Know- what 
 •  Know- why 
 •  Know- how 
 •  Know- who 
 Know- what refers to knowledge about ‘facts’. How many people live in 
New  York, what the ingredients in pancakes are, and when the battle of  
Waterloo took place are examples of  this kind of  knowledge. Here knowledge 
is close to what is normally called information; it can be broken down into bits 
and communicated as data. 
 Know- why refers to knowledge about principles and laws of  motion in 
nature, in the human mind and in society. This kind of  knowledge has been 
extremely important for technological development in certain science- based 
areas such as the chemical and electric/ electronic industries. Access to this 
kind of  knowledge will often make advances in technology more rapid and 
reduce the frequency of  errors in procedures involving trial and error. 
 Know- how refers to skills (i.e., the ability to do something). It may be related 
to the skills of  artisans and production workers, but actually it plays a key 
role in all important economic activities. The businessmen judging the market 
prospects for a new product or the personnel managers selecting and training 
staff  use their know- how. It would also be misleading to characterize know- how 
as practical rather than theoretical. One of  the most interesting and profound 
analyses of  the role and formation of  know- how is actually about scientists’ 
need for skill formation and personal knowledge (Polanyi  1958 / 1978 ). Even 
fi nding solutions to complex mathematical problems is based on intuition and 
on skills related to pattern recognition, which are rooted in experience- based 
learning rather than on the mechanical carrying out of  a series of  distinct logi-
cal operations (Ziman  1979 , 101– 102). 
 Know- how is a kind of  knowledge developed and kept within the borders 
of  an individual fi rm or a single research team. As the complexity of  the 
knowledge base increases, however, cooperation between organizations tends 
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to develop. One of  the most important reasons for industrial networks to form 
is the need for fi rms to be able to share and combine elements of  know- how. 
Similar networks may, for the same reasons, be formed between research 
teams and laboratories. 
 This is one reason why  know- who becomes increasingly important. The 
general trend towards a more composite knowledge base with new products 
typically combining many technologies, each of  which is rooted in several dif-
ferent scientifi c disciplines, makes access to many diff erent sources of  knowl-
edge more essential (Pavitt  1998 ). Know- who involves information about who 
knows what and who knows what to do. But it also involves the social ability to 
cooperate and communicate with diff erent kinds of  people and experts. 
 6.2.3  How public or private are the four kinds of  knowledge? 
 The public or private character of  these kinds of  knowledge diff ers both in 
terms of  degree and form. Databases can bring together ‘know- what’ in a 
more or less user- friendly form. Information technology extends enormously 
the information potentially at the disposal of  individual agents, although the 
information still has to be found and selected what is relevant. The eff ective-
ness of  search engines developed in connection with the Internet is highly rele-
vant in this context as this helps to specify how accessible the data actually are. 
Even with the most recent advances in this area, access to this kind of  knowl-
edge is still far from perfect (Shapiro and Varian  1999 ). Even today, the most 
eff ective medium for obtaining pertinent facts may be through the ‘know- who’ 
channel (i.e., contacting an outstanding expert in the fi eld to obtain directions 
on where to look for a specifi c piece of  information. 
 Scientifi c work aims at producing theoretical models of  the type  know- why , 
and some of  this work is placed in the public domain. Academics have strong 
incentives to publish and make their results accessible. The Internet off ers 
new possibilities for speedy electronic publishing. Open and public access is 
of  course a misnomer, in that it often takes enormous investments in learning 
before the information has any meaning. Again know- who, directed towards 
academia can help the amateur obtain a ‘translation’ into something more 
comprehensible. 
 This is one strong motivation for companies’ presence in academic envi-
ronments and sometimes even engaging in basic research. Some big com-
panies contribute to basic research and they tend to take over functions of  
‘technical universities’ (Eliasson 2000). But at the same time, the close connec-
tions between academic science and the exploitation of  new ideas by business 
in fi elds such as biotechnology tend to undermine the open exchange that has 
characterized academic knowledge production. 
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 To gain access to scientifi c know- why, it is necessary, under all circum-
stances, to pursue R&D activities and to invest in science. This is true for 
individuals and regions as well as for fi rms. There is much less completely free 
‘spill- over’ available than assumed in standard economics; absorptive capacity 
will refl ect historical investment in R&D (Cohen and Levinthal  1990 ). 
 In fi elds characterized by intense technological competition, technical solu-
tions are often ahead of  academic know- why. Technology can solve problems 
or perform functions without a clear understanding of  why it works. Here, 
knowledge is more know- how than know- why. 
 Know- how is the kind of  knowledge with the most limited public access 
and for which mediation is the most complex. The basic problem is the dif-
fi culty of  separating the competence to act from the person or organization 
that acts. The outstanding expert – cook, violinist, manager – may write a 
book explaining how to do things, but what is done by the amateur on the 
basis of  that explanation is of  course less perfect than what the expert would 
produce. Attempts to use information technology to develop expert systems 
show that it is diffi  cult and costly to transform expert skills into information 
that can be used by others. It has also been demonstrated that the transforma-
tion always involves changes in the content of  expert knowledge (Hatchuel 
and Weil  1995 ). This is true of  an individual’s skills and competence, of  pro-
fessional skills and a team’s competence. 
 Eliasson ( 1996 ) has illustrated the limits of  using management information 
systems as a substitute for management skills by pointing out the strategic fail-
ures of  IBM and other big ICT fi rms. Know- how is never a completely public 
good and normally fi rms get access to it only by hiring experts or merging with 
companies with the knowledge they want. 
 Know- who refers to a combination of  information and social relationships. 
Telephone books that list professions as well as databases that list producers of  
certain goods and services are in the public domain and can, in principle, be 
accessed by anyone. In the economic sphere, however, it is extremely impor-
tant to obtain quite specialized competencies and to fi nd the most reliable 
experts, hence the enormous importance of  good personal relationships with 
key persons one can trust. These social and personal relationships are by defi -
nition not public. They cannot be transferred and more specifi cally, they can-
not be bought or sold on the market. As pointed out by Arrow ( 1971 ), ‘You 
cannot buy trust and, if  you could, it would have no value whatsoever’. 
 However, the social context may support to a greater or lesser degree, the 
formation of  know- who knowledge, while the cultural context determines the 
form it takes. When characterizing national business systems, Whitley empha-
sizes factors having to do with trust and the capacity to build extra- family 
collective loyalties ( 1996 , 51). This is also an important aspect of  the concept 
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of  social capital (Woolcock  1998 ). In situations where technology is character-
ized by rapid change or where the knowledge base is not well documented, it 
is necessary to meet face to face from time to time in order to fi rst to defi ne 
and then to solve problems. 
 6.2.4  Most knowledge is neither strictly public nor 
strictly private 
 It is clear from what precedes that very little knowledge is ‘perfectly pub-
lic’. Even information of  the know- what type may be impossible to access 
for those not connected to the right telecommunications or social networks. 
Moreover, at the current stage of  development of  information technology 
access for those who are connected remains limited. And while scientifi c and 
other types of  complex knowledge may be perfectly accessible in principle for 
eff ective access, the user must have invested in building absorptive capacity. 
Know- how is never fully transferable since how a person does things refl ects 
that individual’s personality (even organizations have a ‘personality’ in this 
sense). 
 However, little economically useful knowledge is completely private in the 
long run. Tricks of  the trade are shared within the profession. Know- how can 
be taught and learnt in interaction between the master and the apprentice. 
New technological knowledge may be costly to imitate, but when it is much 
more effi  cient than the old, there are several ways to obtain it. Even when the 
possessor of  private knowledge does not want to share it with others, there are 
ways to obtain it such as reverse engineering, which involves taking products 
apart to fi nd out how to produce them. If  necessary, private agents will engage 
in intelligence activities aimed at getting access to competitors’ secrets. 
 Diff erent parts of  economic theory handle this mixed situation diff erently. 
Underlying much of  the neoclassical theory of  production and economic 
growth is the simplifying assumption that there is a global bank of  blueprints 
from which anybody can get a copy to be used for starting up production. This 
ignores the fact that skilled agents can only use most accessible knowledge and 
that skills diff er and are not easily transformed into blueprints. 
 The resource base theory of  the fi rm takes the opposite view and assumes 
that the competence of  the fi rm determines the directions in which it expands 
its activities (Penrose 1959/ 1995). It is the specifi city of  the knowledge base 
that determines the specifi c pattern of  economic growth. However, actually, 
this model implies an even more dynamic perspective characterized by con-
tinuous creation of  new competencies within the fi rm, and it points towards 
the need to develop ‘learning organizations’. Otherwise, imitation and innova-
tions in competing fi rms would, sooner or later, erode the fi rm’s competencies. 
140
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE140
 In real- life fi rms will have to engage simultaneously in copying well- known 
routines from others, exploiting internal capabilities and engaging in build-
ing new ones. This is what makes management a diffi  cult art and why fi rms 
cannot be reduced to maximizing algorithms in the way they are presented in 
standard textbooks based on neoclassical economics. 
 6.2.5  On tacitness and codifi cation of  knowledge 
 There is currently a lively debate among economists about the role of  tacit-
ness in knowledge (Cowan et al.  2000 ; Johnson et al.  2002 ). The reason for 
the interest is, of  course, that tacitness relates to the transferability and to the 
public character of  knowledge. It has been assumed that the more knowledge 
is tacit, the more diffi  cult it is to share it between people, fi rms and regions. 
Specifi cally, markets might fail and other mediation mechanisms would have 
to be given more attention. 
 Tacit knowledge is knowledge that has not been documented and made 
explicit by the one who uses and controls it. The fact that a certain piece 
of  knowledge is tacit does not rule out the possibility of  making it explicit 
if  incentives to do so are strong enough. To make this clear, it is useful to 
distinguish between tacit knowledge that can be made explicit – tacit for lack 
of  incentives – and knowledge that cannot be made explicit – tacit by nature 
(Cowan et al.  2000 ). 
 Knowledge about the state of  the world can, to a certain extent, be made 
explicit. Know- what can be entered into databases and know- why can be 
made explicit in theorems. Skills embodied in persons and competencies 
embodied in organizations can only be documented to a much more limited 
degree. There are ‘natural’ limits to how far it is possible to make ‘know- how’ 
explicit; only approximations are possible. This is why outstanding experts 
whose activities are based on their unique know- how and fi rms whose activi-
ties are based on unique competencies and permanent innovation may earn 
extra rents for long periods. 
 An important issue in this context is how much eff ort should be made to 
‘codify’ knowledge. Only those with access to the code can access knowledge 
written down in a code. Two parties can share the knowledge or one party 
can sell the knowledge to another. Codifi ed knowledge is potentially shared 
knowledge while noncodifi ed knowledge remains individual, at least until it 
can be learnt in direct interaction with the possessor. Sectors where the knowl-
edge base is dominated by noncodifi ed but potentially codifi able knowledge 
may be sectors where systematic progress towards more effi  cient practices is 
diffi  cult. Economists have used education as a typical example of  a produc-
tion process characterized by tacit techniques (Murnane and Nelson  1984 ). 
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OECD ( 2000 ) presents a unique attempt to compare the production, diff usion 
and use of  knowledge across some important sectors – health and education 
among them. 
 The debate on codifi cation has been complicated by the fact that two diff er-
ent meanings of  ‘codes’ have been alluded to. Some are explicit and available 
in the form of  textbooks, manuals, formulas and organizational diagrams. 
Other ‘codes’ have developed spontaneously as a means of  communication 
within or between organizations (Arrow  1974 ). The latter are implicit and no 
individual in the organization may be able to give a full description. The issue 
concerning to what extent such implicit codes can be transformed into explicit 
ones is important. It is well known that organizational diagrams and man-
agement information systems lose some of  the complexity and richness that 
characterize real existing social systems. If  these codes could be made explicit, 
they could be made available to external parties, and mediation of  knowledge 
would become less diffi  cult. Another reason for making implicit codes explicit 
could be that, in some instances, codifi cation might make it easier to formulate 
and realize strategies of  change. 3 
 What has just been considered as important attributes of  knowledge (public/ 
private, codifi ed/ tacit) suggests that there may be marked diff erences among 
various sectors with regard to their knowledge base. Some science- intensive 
sectors base their activities mainly on codifi ed knowledge, while others oper-
ate and compete mainly on the basis of  unstructured and experience- based 
implicit knowledge. But there are no pure cases. Even in the most strongly 
science- based sectors, tacit knowledge will be a key element in their competi-
tive position, and conversely, it is diffi  cult to fi nd fi rms in the OECD area 
that can avoid completely the need to codify. Accounting and reporting to 
tax authorities requires a minimum in this respect and the wide diff usion of  
computers both contributes to and refl ects the trend among fi rms towards 
operating on the basis of  codifi ed knowledge (information). 
 6.3  An Economic Perspective on the Production, Mediation 
and Use of  Knowledge 
 6.3.1  What is produced when fi rms produce knowledge? 
 Most  authors using the concept of  knowledge creation and knowledge pro-
duction refer to technological knowledge and technical innovation as the out-
puts of  the process (Antonelli  1999 ; Nonaka and Takeuchi  1995 ). In the new 
growth theory, the output of  the R&D sector is viewed either as a blueprint for 
a new production process that is more effi  cient than the previous one assum-
ing that it can be protected by private property instruments such as patents, or 
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as a production of  new semi- manufactured goods that cannot easily be copied 
by competitors (Verspagen  1992 , 29– 30). 
 A striking characteristic of  knowledge production resulting in innovation 
is the fact that knowledge, in terms of  skills and competencies, is the most 
important input. In this sense, it recalls a ‘corn economy’ in which corn and 
labour produce corn. But it diff ers from such an economy in one important 
respect. While the corn used to produce corn disappears in the process,  skills 
and competencies improve with use . Important characteristics of  knowledge refl ect 
that its elements are not scarce in the traditional sense:  the more skills and 
competencies are used, the more they develop. This points to knowledge pro-
duction as a process of  joint production in which innovation is one kind of  
output and the learning and skill enhancement that takes place in the process 
is another. 
 6.3.2  Innovation as one major outcome of  knowledge 
production 
 There are two reasons for regarding innovation as an interesting outcome 
of  knowledge production. One is that innovation represents, by defi nition, 
something new and therefore adds to existing knowledge. The second is that 
innovation is, again by defi nition, knowledge that is in demand. (Innovation 
is defi ned as an invention that has been introduced in the market, and it thus 
represents knowledge that has proven its relevance for the market economy.) 
 On the other hand, it is important to note that innovation, as Schumpeter 
emphasized, is part of  a process of  ‘creative destruction’. An innovation may 
open up new markets and create the basis for new fi rms and jobs but it will, 
at the same time, close down some old markets and some fi rms and jobs will 
disappear. This has a parallel in the impact on the stock of  knowledge used 
in the market economy. Moral depreciation of  intellectual capital is the other 
side of  innovation. For instance, the know- how necessary to produce mechani-
cal offi  ce equipment and the competencies of  fi rms engaged in their produc-
tion became obsolete when semiconductors and computers were introduced. 
 There are important sectoral diff erences in knowledge production. Such dif-
ferences are refl ected in the character, the mode and the outcome of  the inno-
vation process. The taxonomy developed by Keith Pavitt ( 1984 ) represents an 
important eff ort to capture these diff erences systematically. By analysing 2,000 
important technical innovations in the United Kingdom, Pavitt defi ned four 
categories of  fi rms and sectors. First, there are  supply- dominated sectors (e.g., 
clothing, furniture) in which fi rms develop few important innovations on their 
own but obtain some from other fi rms. Second, there are  scale- intensive sectors 
(e.g., food, cement), which focus their innovation activities on developing more 
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effi  cient process technology. Third, there are  specialized suppliers (e.g., engineer-
ing, software, instruments), and these carry out frequent product innovations, 
often in collaboration with customers. Finally, there are  science- based producers 
(e.g., chemical industry, biotechnology, electronics) that develop new products 
as well as processes in close collaboration with universities. 
 For a long time, knowledge production/ innovation processes were largely 
considered as the province of  the fourth category; still there is a bias in this 
direction, often in combination with a linear view that assumes that new 
scientifi c results are the fi rst step in the process, technological invention the 
second step and the introduction of  innovations as new processes or prod-
ucts the third. There is now a rich body of  empirical and historical work 
that shows that this is the exception rather than the rule (Rothwell  1977 ; von 
Hippel  1988 ; Lundvall 1988). Of  all scientifi c advances, very few are imme-
diately transformed into innovations, and  vice versa , innovations very seldom 
refl ect recent scientifi c breakthroughs. It is nonetheless true that knowledge 
production/ innovation processes are facilitated by science in various ways, 
although normally it is old rather than new scientifi c results that support the 
innovation process. Kline and Rosenberg ( 1986 ) have reviewed the com-
plex interaction between science and technology throughout the innovation 
process. 
 The recent models of  innovation emphasize that knowledge production/ 
innovation is an interactive process in which fi rms interact with customers, 
suppliers and knowledge institutions. Empirical analysis shows that fi rms sel-
dom innovate alone. 4 
 6.3.3  Competence as the other major outcome of  knowledge 
production 
 The change from a linear to an interactive view of  innovation and knowledge 
production has also been a way to connect innovation and the further devel-
opment of  competence. As now understood, the innovation process may be 
described as a process of   interactive learnin g in which those involved increase 
their competence while engaging in the innovation process. 
 In economics, there have been various approaches to competence build-
ing and learning. One important contribution is Arrow’s analysis of  ‘learning 
by doing’ (Arrow  1962a ) in which he demonstrated that the effi  ciency of  a 
production unit engaged in producing complex systems (aeroplane frames) 
grew with the number of  units already produced and argued that this refl ected 
experience- based learning. 5 Later, Rosenberg ( 1982 ) introduced ‘learning by 
using’ to explain why effi  ciency in using complex systems increased over time 
(the users were airline companies introducing new models). The concept of  
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‘learning by interacting’ points to how interaction between producers and 
users in innovation enhances the competence of  both (Lundvall 1985, 1988) 
 In most of  the contributions mentioned above, learning is regarded as 
the unintended outcome of  processes with a diff erent aim than learning and 
increasing competence. Learning is seen as a side eff ect of  processes of  pro-
duction, use, marketing or innovation. An interesting new development that 
refers to learning as an instrumental process is the growing attention given to 
‘learning organizations’ (Senge  1990 ). The basic idea is that the way an orga-
nization is structured and the routines followed will have a major eff ect on the 
rate of  learning that takes place. The appropriate institutional structures may 
improve or speed up knowledge production in terms of  competence building 
based on daily activities. 
 The move towards learning organizations is refl ected in changes both in 
the fi rm’s internal organization and in inter- fi rm relationships. Within fi rms, 
the accelerating rate of  change makes multilevel hierarchies and strict bor-
ders between functions ineffi  cient. It makes decentralization of  responsibility 
to lower level employees and formation of  multifunctional teams a necessity. 
This is refl ected in the increasing demand for workers willing to learn, and at 
the same time skilful, fl exible, cooperative and willing to shoulder responsibil-
ity. Inter- fi rm relationships with suppliers, customers and competitors become 
more selective and more intense. ‘Know- who’ becomes increasingly impor-
tant in an economy that combines a complex knowledge base and a highly 
developed, rapidly changing specialization. 
 Apart from these organizational changes, there is growing emphasis on 
making employees and teams of  employees more aware of  the fact that they 
are engaged in learning. It has been suggested that second- loop learning (i.e., 
a process in which the crucial element is that agents refl ect on what has been 
learnt and on how to design the learning process) is more effi  cient than simply 
relying on the impact of  experience (Argyris and Schön 1978). 
 It is much more diffi  cult to capture, empirically, competence building through 
learning than innovation. Competence is primarily revealed in practice and 
sometimes in no other way. This may become a problem as experience- based 
learning and competence become increasingly important for the competitive-
ness of  workers, fi rms and regions. Tomlinson ( 1999 ) has made an interesting 
and original attempt to map sector diff erences in competence building through 
experience. Using UK labour market survey data, he shows that learning is 
more intensive and extensive at the top than at the bottom of  organizations. 
His data also indicate that learning is more important in sectors characterized 
by frequent innovation. When it comes to the development of  indicators, this is 
the most diffi  cult but perhaps also the most important area. 
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 These measurement problems refl ect the general state of  economic analy-
sis in this fi eld. While economists have made substantial contributions to the 
economics of  innovation, their contribution to understanding competence 
building is much more modest. With scholars such as Christopher Freeman, 
Richard R. Nelson and Nathan Rosenberg as entrepreneurs and spiritual lead-
ers, there has been a massive eff ort to understand the process of  innovation in 
relation to economic theory (Dosi et al. 1988) and in a historical and empirical 
perspective, including the development of  statistical indicators. There is no 
parallel for knowledge production as learning and competence building. On 
this aspect of  knowledge production, sociologists, psychologists and anthro-
pologists have more to off er economists in terms of  systematic insights than 
vice versa (see, for instance, Kolb  1984 ). 
 6.3.4  Production of  knowledge as a separate activity or as a 
byproduct of  regular routine activities: A diff erentiation 
which is becoming blurred 
 It is useful to separate two diff erent perspectives on the process of  knowledge 
production, which are not mutually exclusive but which can be found, in more 
or less pure form, in the literature on innovation systems and the information 
society. They are also refl ected in attempts to measure the relative importance 
of  knowledge in the economy and in theoretical models such as models of  
economic growth. 
 On the one hand, one might look for  a separate sector in charge of  producing 
new knowledge or handling and distributing information. Such a sector could 
involve universities, technical institutes and government S&T policies, as well 
as R&D functions in fi rms. Here, the production of  knowledge would take 
place as a deliberate activity, outside the realm of  production. On the other 
hand, one might regard the creation and diff usion of  knowledge as rooted in 
and emanating from routine activities in economic life, such as learning by 
doing, by using and by interacting. Here, the production of  knowledge would 
take place as a byproduct of  ordinary economic activities through learning by 
doing or learning by using. 
 Another important distinction already touched upon is between ‘offl  ine’ 
and ‘online’ learning activities. Above we referred to the growing focus on 
establishing learning organizations. Another related new trend is the emer-
gence of  a form of  learning qualifi ed as ‘experimental’. This form of  learning 
taking place ‘online’ (i.e., during the process of  producing the good or pro-
viding the service) involves experimenting during the production process. By 
doing so, one creates new options and variety. This form of  learning is based 
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on a strategy whereby experimentation allows for collecting data, on the basis 
of  which the best strategy for future activities is chosen. 
 With the emergence of  experimental learning and learning organiza-
tions, the feedback and reciprocal links that tie ‘online’ learning process and 
in- house R&D together become crucial. One issue here is determining the 
extent to which the knowledge produced ‘by doing’ is valued. It might be a 
problem that management rarely considers routine activities as activities that 
produce knowledge, although diff erent national systems diff er markedly in 
this respect. The establishment of  feedback loops requires eff ective recogni-
tion, identifi cation and valorization of  the knowledge produced through the 
learning process. 
 6.3.5  Mediation of  knowledge 
 While the production of  knowledge is important for the overall dynamics of  
the global economy in the long run, the greatest economic impact comes from 
broadening the use of  knowledge in the economy. This is refl ected in public 
eff orts to increase the diff usion of  innovations as well as in training and edu-
cation aimed at the formation of  skills and competencies. How can diff erent 
aspects of  knowledge be mediated? The natural starting point for an economic 
analysis is to see under what conditions the market can mediate knowledge. 
 Some of  the diffi  culties in mediating knowledge through the market have 
already been indicated. Tacit knowledge in the form of  know- how or an 
implicit code or competence cannot be separated from the person or orga-
nization containing it. This is what von Hippel (1994) calls ‘sticky data’. In 
this case, mediation may take the form of  the purchase by a customer of  the 
services of  the person or the fi rm rather than the competence itself. 
 Carriers of  such knowledge may have a problem demonstrating the qual-
ity of  their competence to potential buyers, and buyers may have a problem 
locating the best off ers in terms of  quality. Reference from key customers, 
which can be shown as evidence to potential customers, is one strategy used 
by fi rms operating in this kind of  market. 
 This form of  mediation and the problems it involves tend to take on grow-
ing economic importance. The increasing specialization in the production of  
knowledge makes mediation more crucial for the system as a whole. This is 
refl ected in the fact that knowledge- intensive business services, a sector directly 
engaged in the production and sale of  knowledge, are among the most rapidly 
growing sectors in OECD countries. Consultancy fi rms, accountancy fi rms 
and fi nancial fi rms have taken over the role of  ‘strategic sector’ historically 
played by the sector producing machinery, summarizing and generalizing 
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experiences from local learning and delivering embodied and disembodied 
knowledge to a broad set of  users. This is confi rmed by econometric studies 
demonstrating a close correlation between the input of  these kinds of  services 
and productivity growth in user sectors (Tomlinson 2001). 
 A second way to mediate this kind of  knowledge is to engage in a process 
of  interactive learning with the carrier of  the knowledge. This may be a con-
scious choice, for example, when an apprentice enters into a contract with a 
master, or it may be a side eff ect of  cooperation between people and organiza-
tions to solve shared problems. A third way to obtain this kind of  knowledge 
is to hire experts as employees or take over the organization controlling the 
knowledge. 
 Even when knowledge is explicit and can be separated from its carrier, 
there are problems with using the market as a mediator, which Kenneth Arrow 
in particular has worked to defi ne. One is for the customer to determine the 
value of  the information before the transaction has taken place; a user wants 
to know something in advance about the knowledge and the seller does not 
want to give information away for free. Another is the diffi  culty for the seller 
to restrict the use of  the information once it has been sold and, vice versa, the 
diffi  culty for the buyer to restrict its further distribution by the seller. 
 Despite these diffi  culties, a large and growing amount of  knowledge is the 
object of  transactions in something that looks like a market (there is a buyer, a 
seller and a price). One reason why markets work is that formal and informal 
institutions – including legal protection in terms of  patents, licenses and copy-
right – support transactions. Reputation mechanisms lower the risk for enter-
ing into contractual relationships. An even more fundamental reason is that 
many markets for knowledge transactions are not pure but rather organized 
markets. Long- term relationships with elements of  experience- based trust 
often play a major role in knowledge markets (Lundvall 1985, 1988). 
 So far, the discussion has been limited to the mediation of  what econo-
mists call disembodied knowledge. Substantial fl ows of  knowledge are built 
into products. Scientifi c instruments and computers embody a great deal of  
knowledge, and users with suffi  cient competence can perform very advanced 
operations with this kind of  equipment. Mediation of  knowledge via embod-
ied technology is sometimes combined with a transfer of  disembodied knowl-
edge. For example, suppliers of  complex process equipment may off er training 
to the personnel of  the customer organization. 
 Finally, knowledge can be mediated in several other informal ways. One 
way to overcome market limitations is for professionals belonging to separate 
and sometimes even competing organizations to exchange pieces of  knowl-
edge on a barter basis (Carter  1989 ). 
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 6.4  Towards the Learning Economy 
 Many indicators show that there has been a shift in economic development in 
the direction of  a more important role for knowledge production and learn-
ing. This section looks at some of  these changes and the issues they raise for 
the knowledge base of  the education system. 
 Moses Abramowitz and Paul David ( 1996 ) have demonstrated that this 
century has been characterized by increasing knowledge intensity in the pro-
duction system. The OECD’s structural analysis of  industrial development 
supports their conclusion. It has been shown that the sectors that use knowl-
edge inputs such as R&D and skilled labour most intensively grow most rapidly. 
At the same time, the skill profi le is on an upward trend in almost all sectors. 
In most OECD countries, in terms of  employment and value added, the most 
rapidly growing sector is knowledge- intensive business services (OECD 1998, 
48– 55). 
 These observations have led more and more analysts to characterize the 
new economy as ‘knowledge based’, and there is in fact little doubt about a 
relative shift in the demand for labour towards more skilled workers (OECD 
1994). However, this perspective may underestimate the destructive aspects of  
innovation and change. In an alternative interpretation of  the change in the 
composition of  the labour force, Anne P. Carte r (1994) pointed out that the 
main function of  most nonproduction workers is to introduce or cope with 
change. The rising proportion of  nonproduction workers may thus be taken 
as the expression both of  the growing cost of  change and of  acceleration in 
the rate of  change. 
 Acceleration in the rate of  change implies that knowledge and skills are 
more exposed to rapid moral depreciation. Therefore, the increase in the stock 
of  knowledge may be less dramatic than it appears. An alternative hypothesis 
is that we are moving into a learning economy where the success of  individuals, 
fi rms, regions and countries will refl ect, more than anything else, their ability 
to learn. The speeding up of  change refl ects the rapid diff usion of  information 
technology, the widening of  the global marketplace with the inclusion of  new 
strong competitors and deregulation of  and less stability in markets (Drucker 
 1993 ; Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ; Archibugi and Lundvall  2001 ). 
 In this context, learning is defi ned as a process, the core of  which is the 
acquisition of  competence and skills that allow the learning individual to be 
more successful in reaching individual goals or those of  his/ her organization. 
It will also involve a change in context of  meaning and purpose for the indi-
vidual and aff ect his/ her existing knowledge. This corresponds closely to what 
is commonly meant by learning and to what experts on learning, who are 
not economists, understand by the concept (Kolb  1984 ). It is also the kind of  
learning most crucial to economic success. At the same time, it diff ers from 
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some defi nitions of  learning in standard economic theory where it is synony-
mous either with ‘information acquisition’ or treated as a black- box phenom-
enon assumed to be refl ected in productivity growth. 
 6.5  Conclusion 
 It may be argued that, in a sense, all economic theory is about information 
and knowledge. Problems of  coordination have been at the core of  economic 
theory since Adam Smith. Individual agents make choices independently on 
the basis of  information off ered by the market. Important diff erences between 
economic models and theories refl ect diff erences in the assumptions made 
about what agents know and about the degree to which they learn anything 
from what they do. This separates neoclassical economics from Austrian eco-
nomics: the former takes fully informed agents as the reference whereas the 
latter emphasizes ignorance as the starting point for learning (von Hayek). It 
also separates those who assume hyperrationality and rationality from those 
who assume limited rationality (Herbert A. Simon). 
 Modern economics is more than ever aware of  the importance of  knowl-
edge and learning. New growth theory and new trade theory assume a strong 
link between the increase in knowledge base and the rate of  productivity 
growth. Austrian economists treat learning as a fundamental process in the 
analysis of  market transactions. Over the last decades we have witnessed many 
new contributions related to institutional economics and the economics of  
innovation. In these new fi elds, knowledge and learning play a pivotal role in 
economic development. New theories of  the fi rm focus on building capabili-
ties and competencies. The management literature has made the concept of  
‘learning organizations’ central for theoretical developments and especially 
for practitioners. 
 However, in almost all of  these contributions, the understanding of  knowl-
edge and learning remains narrow. In theories that form the core of  standard 
economics, it is assumed that rational agents make choices on the basis of  a 
given amount of  information. The only kind of  learning allowed for is agents’ 
access to new bodies of  information. The most recent developments within 
standard economics are contradictory and ambivalent in this respect. On the 
one hand, new growth theory and new trade theory focus on the importance 
of  investments in education and research. On the other hand, some of  the 
most fashionable developments in macroeconomics assume rational expec-
tations and general equilibrium frameworks, thus operating with even more 
extreme assumptions leaving no room for learning by agents. 
 Recent developments outside standard economics have been less con-
strained in these respects. Research on the economics of  institutional and 
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technical change has resulted in many new insights. Institutional economics, 
evolutionary economics, socioeconomic research, industrial dynamics and the 
economics of  innovation have typically developed in close interaction with 
historical and empirical research programmes. This is why we know much 
more than before about how innovation takes place in diff erent parts of  the 
economy now than we did 20 years ago. 
 When it comes to the other aspect of  knowledge production (i.e., com-
petence building and learning), it is only recently that research has begun to 
address important questions about who learns what and how learning takes 
place in the context of  economic development. In this area, economists have 
a lot to learn from other disciplines and not least from education specialists 
who have developed a more systematic and empirically based understanding 
of  learning (Kolb  1984 ). This refl ects the fact that when economists begin to 
focus on learning, they face issues for which their traditional toolbox is insuf-
fi cient. Scholars in philosophy, psychology, education, anthropology and other 
disciplines have illuminated diff erent aspects of  these issues. The increasing 
division of  labour in the production of  knowledge – useful as it might have 
been for the rapid advances within special fi elds – has had as a major negative 
consequence the lack of  a deep and systematic understanding of  the complex 
process of  knowledge creation and learning. 
 In this chapter I have used a broad defi nition of  economics as a reference 
platform, but at the same time, I have broadened the perspective to include 
perspectives from other disciplines whenever an understanding of  the real- 
world phenomena requires it. One of  the major conclusions is that it is not 
meaningful to pretend that economic performance can be explained without 
bringing into the analysis social relationships and organizational structures. 
The innovation literature has been instrumental in opening up the black box 
of  technical change; now the time has come to open up the black box of  social 
interaction through focus on how learning takes place in the real world. 
 Notes 
 1  OECD has pursued several analytical activities along these lines (Foray and Lundvall 
 1996 ; OECD  1996 ). The Portuguese chairmanship for the EU Ministerial Council for 
the fi rst half  of  2000 was pursued under the theme of  ‘a Europe based on knowledge 
and innovation’. 
 2  Knowledge has been at the centre of  analytical interest from the very beginning of  
civilization. Aristotle distinguished between:   Epistèmè : knowledge that is universal and 
theoretical;  Technè : knowledge that is instrumental, context specifi c and practice related; 
 Phronesis : Knowledge that is normative, experience based, context specifi c and related 
to common sense: ‘practical wisdom’. At least two of  our categories have roots that go 
back to these three intellectual virtues; know- why is similar to  epistèmè and know- how to 
 technè . But the correspondence is imperfect since we will follow Polanyi and argue that 
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scientifi c activities always involve a combination of  know- how and know- why. Aristotle’s 
third category,  phronesis , which relates to the ethical dimension, will be refl ected in what 
is to be said about the need for a social and ethical dimension in economic analysis and 
about the importance of  trust in the context of  learning. 
 3  For two diff erent perspectives on the limits and the usefulness of  codifi cation, see Cowan 
et al. ( 2000 ) and Johnson et al. ( 2002 ) 
 4  This is also the background for developing a systemic approach to knowledge pro-
duction (Freeman 1987; Lundvall  1992 ; Nelson  1993 ; Edquist  1997 ). Innovation 
systems may be defi ned as regional or national or as sector or technology specifi c. 
The common idea is that the specifi cities of  knowledge production refl ect unique 
combinations of  technological specialization and institutional structure. In national 
systems, the education and training system and the institutional set up of  labour mar-
kets are among the most important factors explaining national patterns and modes of  
innovation. 
 5  A more recent analysis of  learning by doing focuses on how confronting new prob-
lems in the production process triggers searching and learning, which imply interaction 
between several parties as they seek solutions (von Hippel and Tyre  1995 ). 
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 Chapter 7 
 FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
MODES OF INNOVATION 
 Morten Berg  Jensen ,  Björn  Johnson ,  Edward  Lorenz and 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 7.1  Introduction 
 This chapter is about the tension between two ideal type modes of  learning 
and innovation. One mode is based on the production and use of  codifi ed sci-
entifi c and technical knowledge namely Science, Technology and Innovation 
(STI) mode, while the other one is an experience- based mode of  learning 
through Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI- mode). At the level of  the fi rm, 
this tension may be seen in the need to reconcile knowledge management strat-
egies prescribing the use of  Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) as tools for codifying and sharing knowledge with strategies emphasiz-
ing the role played by informal communication and communities of  practice 
in mobilizing tacit knowledge for problem solving and learning. 
 The tension between the STI- and DUI- modes corresponds to two dif-
ferent approaches to national innovation systems: One perspective focusing 
on the role of  formal processes of  R&D that produce explicit and codifi ed 
knowledge and another perspective focusing on the learning from informal 
interaction within and between organizations resulting in competence build-
ing often with tacit elements. 
 There is, of  course, an important body of  empirical and historical work 
showing that both these modes of  learning and innovation play a role in most 
sectors, the role being diff erent depending on the sector characteristics as well 
as the strategy of  the fi rm (von Hippel  1976 ; Rothwell  1977 ; Rosenberg 1982; 
Pavitt  1984 ). Recent models of  innovation emphasize that innovation is an 
interactive process in which fi rms interact both with customers and suppliers 
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and with knowledge institutions (Freeman  1986 ; Kline and Rosenberg  1986 ; 
Lundvall  1988 ; Vinding  2002 ). 
 Despite the broad acceptance of  this literature, there remains a bias among 
scholars and policymakers to consider innovation processes largely as aspects 
connected to formal processes of  R&D, especially in the science- based indus-
tries. At the policy level, this can be seen in the emphasis on benchmarking 
variables related to STI and in the focus on instruments such as tax subsidies to 
R&D, the training of  scientists in high- tech fi elds such as ICT, bio and nanotech-
nology and strengthening the linkages between fi rms and universities in these 
specifi c fi elds. At the level of  scholarly research, there is a tendency to expect 
that the increasing reliance on science and technology in the ‘knowledge- based 
economy’ will enhance the role played by formal processes of  R&D requir-
ing personnel with formal science and technology qualifi cations. And the vast 
majority of  quantitative survey based studies of  innovation simply have little to 
say about the relation of  DUI- mode learning to innovative performance. 1 
 In what follows we argue that by focusing the analysis on the frameworks 
and structures that promote learning within and across organizations, it is 
both possible to develop meaningful measures of  DUI- mode learning and to 
demonstrate that fi rms can promote such learning through particular prac-
tices and policies. Utilizing data from a project on the Danish innovation sys-
tem in comparative perspective (the DISKO- project (see Lundvall 2002 for a 
report from the project), we present what we believe to be the fi rst quantitative 
survey based analysis of  the way the two modes of  learning contribute to inno-
vative performance. Our empirical results not only show that the two modes 
of  learning are practiced with diff erent intensities in diff erent fi rms but also 
that fi rms combining them are more innovative. 
 In  sections 7.2 and  7.3 we develop defi nitions of  the two modes of  learning 
and show how they are connected to diff erent types of  knowledge.  Section 7.4 
explores the relations between the two modes, pointing to factors that encour-
age fi rms to adopt mixed strategies combining the two modes rather than 
relying predominately on one mode or the other.  Section 7.5 develops the 
empirical indicators of  the modes and explores econometrically the relation 
between their use and innovative performance for a representative sample 
of  Danish fi rms.  Section 7.6 relates the two modes of  learning to innovation 
system research and points to important policy implications. 
 7.2  What Is Knowledge? 
 7.2.1  Explicit versus implicit knowledge 
 The two learning modes presented and analysed in this chapter relate to dif-
ferent types of  knowledge. Thinking about knowledge seems to have resulted 
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in a number of  two- sided distinctions (dichotomies). We have already men-
tioned the distinction between tacit and codifi ed knowledge (or rather between 
tacit and codifi ed elements of  knowledge) on which there is now a vast lit-
erature and a lively debate (Cowan et  al.  2001 ; Johnson et  al.  2002 ). One 
way to make knowledge explicit is to write it down. Knowledge that can be 
written down may be passed on to others and be absorbed by those who can 
read and understand the specifi c language. But absorbing such knowledge 
is seldom automatic – the idea of  eff ortless ‘knowledge transfer’ is normally 
misleading and a ‘prepared mind’ helps a lot when it comes to absorbing codi-
fi ed knowledge. Furthermore, often knowledge can be partially but not totally 
written down as for example in the typical ‘book of  instruction’. In order to 
understand messages about the world, you need to have some prior knowledge 
about it. In order to implement ‘recipes’ about how to manage and change the 
world, you will often need to have prior skills and competences. Scientifi c texts 
give meaning only to other scientists and manuals may prove useful only to 
highly skilled workers. This implies that codifi ed knowledge that stands alone 
is not economically useful. 
 7.2.2  Local versus global knowledge 
 Codifi cation and eff orts to make explicit what is implicit may be seen as one 
important way to enhance the capacity to share knowledge in society. But to 
codify knowledge does not necessarily make it more accessible to others. Using 
a ‘secret code’ is a way to establish the opposite eff ect. In his seminal article 
from 1974, Kenneth Arrow uses the concept ‘codes of  information’ with ref-
erence to more effi  cient means of  communication inside an organization to 
the exclusion of  outsiders. Lundvall ( 1988 ) drew on Arrow’s insight in arguing 
that establishing common codes provides a basis for effi  cient local communi-
cation between users and producers in the context of  product innovation. 
 Neither is codifi cation the only way to generalize knowledge. Education 
and training systems generalize knowledge and ‘embody’ knowledge in peo-
ple. Machinery producers may embody general knowledge in technical sys-
tems and knowledge intensive business service fi rms may deliver disembodied 
general knowledge to customers as standard solutions. The mobility of  work-
ers is another important mechanism for spreading experience- based knowl-
edge. 2 From the point of  view of  the whole economy, the transformation of  
local knowledge into global knowledge is of  great interest. 
 Actually in economic practice, it is seldom a question of  working with 
knowledge that is either tacit or codifi ed. The zone in between and the com-
plementarities between the tacit and codifi ed elements of  knowledge are often 
what matters most (Nonaka and Takeuchi  1995 ). The same is true for the 
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distinction between local and global knowledge. When we make the distinc-
tion between the two modes of  innovation and relate this to the diff erent forms 
of  knowledge, this should be kept in mind. What is referred to are two ‘ideal 
types’ that appear in a much more mixed form in real life. 
 7.2.3  From know- what to know- who 
 The dichotomies mentioned above have played an important role in the dis-
cussion of  the concept of  knowledge in business and economics, and they have 
contributed to a better understanding of  its intricacy. They, in turn, can be 
linked to a somewhat more elaborate set of  distinctions developed by Lundvall 
and Johnson ( 1994 ) that are useful for understanding the diff erent channels 
and mechanisms through which learning of  diff erent types of  knowledge takes 
place. 
 •  Know- what 
 •  Know- why 
 •  Know- how 
 •  Know- who 
 Learning these four types of  knowledge tends to take place in diff erent ways 
and through diff erent channels. While important aspects of  know- what and 
know- why may be obtained through reading books, attending lectures and 
accessing databases, the other two categories are more rooted in practical 
experience. Written manuals may be helpful but in order to use them, some 
prior basic skills in the fi eld of  application are usually needed. The STI- mode 
gives high priority to the production of  ‘know- why’ while the DUI- mode typ-
ically will produce ‘know- how’ and ‘know- who’ . However, at the same time, 
very specialized ‘know- what’ is often a prerequisite for operating in a science- 
based learning mode. 
 Know- how will typically be learnt in apprenticeship relations where the 
apprentice follows his master, studies his ‘body language’ as well as his spoken 
language and relies on his authority (Polanyi 1958/ 1978, 53 et passim). Know- 
how is what characterizes a skilled worker and an artisan, but it is also some-
thing that distinguishes the fi rst-rate from the average manager and scientist. 
 Know- who is also learnt in social practice, and some of  it is learnt in spe-
cialized education environments. Communities of  engineers and experts are 
kept together through reunions, conferences and professional societies, etc. 
giving the participant access to discussion of  experiences and information bar-
tering with professional colleagues (Carter  1989 ). It also develops through day- 
to- day dealings with customers, subcontractors and independent institutes. 
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Relational learning may contribute both to common codes of  information 
and to social bonds of  friendship. 
 7.3  Forms of  Knowledge and Modes of  Learning 
 7.3.1  The STI- mode 
 The diff erent types of  knowledge may be related to diff erences in the two 
modes of  learning and innovation that we have identifi ed. It will be easier to 
bring out these relationships if  we start by recognizing that technologies should 
be ‘understood as involving both a body of  practice, manifest in the artefacts 
and techniques that are produced and used, and a body of  understanding 
which supports, surrounds and rationalizes the former’ (Nelson 2004, 457). 
Some of  this understanding takes the form of  empirical- based generalizations 
made explicit by practitioners about what works and what constitutes reliable 
problem- solving methods. Although this kind of  know- how may be specifi c to 
particular fi rms, much of  it is more generalized knowledge common to wider 
professional or technical communities who work within the same technologi-
cal fi elds. 
 However, as Nelson (1993,  2004 ) and others have observed 3 over the twen-
tieth century, most powerful technologies have come to be connected to and 
supported by diff erent fi elds of  science. One of  the stylized facts emerging 
from the research on the relation between science and technology is that in 
most areas, the results of  scientifi c research are not directly useful for tech-
nological advance. 4 Rather, the contribution of  science is usually more indi-
rect. General scientifi c understanding both ‘illuminates how artefacts and 
techniques employed work’, thus providing guidance and clues for their fur-
ther development, and provides ‘powerful ways of  experimenting and testing 
new departures’ (Nelson 2004, 458). 5 For example, as Pavitt (2005, 92) has 
observed, advances in computing and simulation methods can reduce the 
costs of  search in technological advancement by making it possible to explore 
virtually alternative technical confi gurations. 
 Thus, as Brooks ( 1994 , 478) notes, technology should be seen as incorpo-
rating generic understanding (know- why), which makes it seem like science. 
Yet it is the understanding pertaining to particular artefacts and techniques 
that distinguishes technology from science. The STI- mode of  innovation 
most obviously refers to the way fi rms use and further develop this body of  
science- like understanding in the context of  their innovative activities. Over 
the twentieth century, and still today, a major source for the development of  
this knowledge about artefacts and techniques has been the R&D laboratories 
of  large industrial fi rms (Mowery and Oxley  1995 ; Chandler  1977 ). 
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 The emphasis placed here on the way STI uses and further develops 
explicit and global know- why and know- what should not be taken to imply 
an insignifi cant role for locally embedded tacit knowledge. For instance, scien-
tists operating at the frontier of  their fi elds in the R&D departments of  large 
fi rms need to combine their know- why insights with know- how when making 
experiments and interpreting results, and specifi c R&D projects will often be 
triggered by practice, for example, problems with new products, processes and 
user needs. We will still defi ne it as predominantly STI because almost imme-
diately attempts will be made to restate the problem in an explicit and codifi ed 
form. The R&D department will start going through its earlier work, looking 
for pieces of  codifi ed knowledge, as well as looking for insights that can be 
drawn from outside sources. In order to communicate with scientists and sci-
entifi c institutions outside, it will be necessary to make knowledge explicit and 
translate the problem into a formal scientifi c code. In the empirical section of  
the chapter, we use R&D activities and collaboration with scientists attached 
to universities and research institute as indicators of  the STI- mode. 
 All through the process, documenting results in a codifi ed form remains 
important. It is not suffi  cient that a single scientist keeps results in his own 
memory as tacit knowledge. Often the project involves teamwork and modu-
larization where single results are used as building blocks for other members 
in the team. At the end of  the process – if  it is successful – a transfer of  the 
results within the organization or across organizational borders will call for 
documentation as well. In the case that an application is made for a patent, the 
documentation needs to be made in a techno- scientifi c language that allows 
the patenting authority to judge the originality of  the innovation. 
 This means that, on balance, the STI- mode of  learning even if  it starts 
from a local problem will make use of  ‘global’ knowledge all the way through 
and ideally, it will end up with ‘potentially global knowledge’ (i.e., knowledge 
that could be used widely if  it were not protected by intellectual property 
rights). In terms of  knowledge management it corresponds well to a strategy 
of  knowledge sharing through wide access to codifi ed knowledge inside the 
fi rm. The generalization of  the knowledge in the form of  a patent and the use 
of  licenses will make it disembodied at least when compared to what comes 
out of  the DUI- mode of  innovation. 6 
 7.3.2  The DUI- mode 
 While scientifi c understandings have increasingly come to illuminate 
and support technological practice, it is still the case that ‘much of  prac-
tice in most fi elds remains only partially understood and much of  engi-
neering design practice involves solutions to problems that professional 
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engineers have learned “work” without any particularly sophisticated under-
standing of  why’ (Nelson 2004, 458). This provides the fi rst hint as to why 
the DUI- mode is crucial to successful innovation. This kind of  knowledge, 
regardless of  the extent to which it is ultimately codifi ed, is acquired for the 
most part on the job as employees face ongoing changes that confront them 
with new problems. Finding solutions to these problems enhances the skills 
and know- how of  the employees and extends their repertoires. Some of  the 
problems are specifi c while others are generic. Therefore learning may result 
in both specifi c and general competencies for the operator. When the process 
is complex – a good example is the learning by using of  new models of  air-
planes – it will involve interaction within and between teams, and it may result 
in new shared routines for the organization. As the whole organization gets 
more insight into the actual working of  the system, it might fi nd more effi  cient 
ways to organize work and solve problems as they pop up. This is the kind of  
case that Rosenberg (1982) uses to illustrate learning by using. 
 Both learning by doing and using normally also involve interaction 
between people and departments. In particular, an important result coming 
out of  empirical surveys on the innovation process is that successful innovation 
depends on the development of  links and communication between the design 
department and production and sale (Rothwell  1977 ). These links are typically 
informal and serve to transmit the tacit elements that contribute to making 
successful designs that can be produced and that respond to user demands. As 
Lundvall ( 1992 ) and others have shown, these links extend beyond the bound-
aries of  the fi rm to connect relatively small specialized machinery producers 
and business service providers with their mostly larger clients. 
 As the above discussion implies, the DUI- mode of  learning most obviously 
refers to know- how and know- who, which is tacit and often highly localized. 
While this kind of  learning may occur as an unintended byproduct of  the 
fi rm’s design, production and marketing activities, the point we want to make 
here is that the DUI- mode can be intentionally fostered by building struc-
tures and relationships, which enhance and utilize learning by doing, using 
and interacting. In particular, organizational practices such as project teams, 
problem- solving groups, and job and task rotation, which promote learning 
and knowledge exchange, can contribute positively to innovation performance. 
 There is a vast business literature on ‘high performance work systems’ that 
examines the relation of  such organizational practices to enterprise productiv-
ity and fi nancial performance in general (see, for example, Becker and Huselid 
 1998 ; Osterman 1994, 2000; Ramsay et al.  2000 ; Wood  1999 ). One of  the 
most interesting empirical results based on the statistical analysis of  national or 
international survey data is that there is a positive relation between the organi-
zational practices identifi ed in this high performance literature and successful 
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product innovation (Laursen and Foss  2003 ; Lorenz et al.  2004 ; Lorenz and 
Valeyre  2006 ; Lundvall and Nielsen  1999 ; Michie and Sheenan 1999). 
 Since this experience- based learning results in ‘local’ knowledge, we should 
not expect it to have any radical impact on the growth of  the whole economy. 
To lift knowledge out of  its local context, to generalize it and to make it global, 
there are diff erent mechanisms including learning by interacting, which we 
regard as part of  the DUI- mode of  learning (Christensen and Lundvall  2004 ). 
For the economy as a whole,  a specifi c sector may become the one that – through 
its engagement in processes of  interactive learning with a diverse set of  users – 
generalizes local knowledge and diff uses it widely in the economy. 
 Historically, as Rosenberg ( 1976 ) has shown, machinery production consti-
tuted a strategic sector. Machinery producers addressed many diff erent users 
and gathered knowledge about their needs and about the performance of  dif-
ferent technical solutions. In this way, they developed more global and effi  cient 
solutions on the basis of  local knowledge and learning. Today, we may see 
similar specialization and technological convergence with respect to informa-
tion technology (Pavitt 2005) and to the role played by  knowledge intensive business 
service (KIBS) providers. For the single manufacturing fi rm, it is attractive to 
outsource certain service functions to specialized KIBS fi rms. The KIBS fi rm 
will address several customers and help them to solve their problems in a well- 
defi ned fi eld. This gives access to many diff erent processes of  local learning 
taking place under diverse conditions. The KIBS fi rm will be able to transform 
this diversity of  experiences into more global and more effi  cient solutions. 
 7.4  The Need for a New Empirical Approach 
 The importance of  both STI- and DUI- mode learning for innovation per-
formance is well documented in both the theoretical and the qualitative case 
study literature on innovation. Yet, when one turns to policy analysis and pre-
scription as well as to the quantitative survey- based studies, which often serve 
to support and justify policy, we would contend there is a clear bias to consider 
innovation processes largely as aspects connected to formal scientifi c and tech-
nical knowledge and to formal processes of  R&D. 
 At the European level, this kind of  bias can be most easily seen by exam-
ining the empirical measures used and the supporting research undertaken 
for EU- sponsored benchmarking exercises, such as Trendchart. 7 Trendchart’s 
annual ranking of  the innovative performance of  EU member nations is 
based largely on conventional S&T measures such as R&D expenditures, 
patenting, the share of  the population with tertiary education, the weight of  
S&E graduates in the workforce, ICT expenditures and the importance of  
venture capital. None of  the 22 individual measures that are used to construct 
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the 2004 ‘summary innovation index’ for EU member countries are designed 
to capture organizational aspects linked to informal processes of  learning by 
using, doing and interacting. 
 A Trendchart workshop focusing on the extent of  an ‘innovation gap’ 
between the EU and the United States is representative of  the survey- based 
research supporting such innovation benchmarking exercises. It is notable that 
the scoping paper for the workshop explains the gap exclusively in terms of  
R&D expenditures, patenting and the importance of  tertiary education. 8 
 Of  course it can be argued with some justifi cation that this sort of  bias in 
policy and quantitative research refl ects the kinds of  quantitative measures 
that are available for comparative research. There now exist internation-
ally harmonized data on R&D, patenting, the development of  S&T human 
resources, ICT expenditures and innovation expenditures more generally, 
whereas at present there are no harmonized data that could be used to con-
struct measures of  learning by doing and using. We would contend, though, 
that these limitations of  the data simply refl ect the same bias at a deeper level. 
The ongoing development of  harmonized S&T indicators over the postwar 
period has resulted from political initiatives at the EU and international levels. 
The lack of  DUI measures refl ects political priorities and decision- making 
rather than any inevitable state of  aff airs. 
 A fi nal argument seeking to justify the existing bias in quantitative mea-
sures is that organizational change and learning processes linked to DUI- 
mode learning are simply too complex to capture with survey- based methods. 
While we would agree that the multi- dimensional and multi- level nature of  
these informal learning dynamics creates problems for measurement that go 
beyond those confronted in measuring R&D and the development of  human 
resources for science and technology, we fi rmly believe that these can be sur-
mounted. In what follows we propose a set of  indicators for DUI- mode learn-
ing, and we show that the DUI- mode when combined with the STI- mode 
serves to improve innovation performance. 
 7.5  Empirical Analysis 
 7.5.1  Illustrating empirically how DUI- and STI- learning 
promote innovation 
 In what follows we will show that the probability of  successful product innova-
tion increases when the fi rm has organized itself  in such a way that it promotes 
DUI- learning. We will also show that fi rms that establish a stronger science 
base will be more innovative than the rest. But the most signifi cant and impor-
tant result is that fi rms using mixed strategies – that combine organizational 
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forms promoting learning with R&D- eff orts and cooperation with researchers 
at knowledge institutions – are much more innovative than the rest.  It is the fi rm 
that combines a strong version of  the STI- mode with a strong version of  the DUI- mode that 
excels in product innovation. 
 The empirical analysis is based on a survey addressed to all Danish fi rms 
in the private sector – not including agriculture – with 25 or more employ-
ees, supplemented with a stratifi ed proportional sample of  fi rms with 20– 25 
employees. Selected fi rms received 6,991 questionnaires. This survey collected 
information from management. In total, 2,007 usable responses from man-
agement have been collected and integrated in a cross- sectional data set. This 
makes the overall response rate of  the survey 29 per cent. A closer response 
analysis broken down on industries and size shows acceptable variations on 
response rates here, and nonrespondent information on some of  the potential 
dependent variables together with comparison to other surveys does not indi-
cate unacceptable bias. 
 The survey, which was carried out in 2001, was supplemented in 2004 by 
additional questions designed to obtain further information on STI- mode 
learning processes. The sampling frame in the 2004 survey was the 1,688 fi rms 
from the 2001 survey, which were still alive according to the information held 
by Statistics Denmark. However, of  these 1,688 fi rms, 45 were unreachable, 
which left us with a sampling frame of  1,643 fi rms. Of  these fi rms, 1,141 
answered the second questionnaire, resulting in an impressive response rate 
for the second questionnaire of  almost 70 per cent. The subsequent analysis of  
the response rates indicates no unacceptable variation within size and industry. 
 Finally, we have access to register data, allowing us to determine the work-
force composition for the relevant fi rms. As the latent class analysis requires 
answers to all the questions considered in the analysis, the number of  fi rms 
available for undertaking this analysis (see  Table 7.2 ) is reduced to 692. 
 Obtaining a meaningful quantitative measure of  innovation and innovative 
behaviour on the basis of  information collected in fi rms belonging to indus-
tries with very diff erent conditions is not unproblematic. The phenomenon 
that fi rms refer to may vary in relation to conditions and confi gurations. Our 
data indicate that for the most part we are confronted with incremental quali-
tative change rather than radical change when we ask the fi rms whether they, 
during the period of  1998– 2000, have introduced new products or services 
to the market. Three- fourths of  the innovations introduced within the period 
1998– 2000 were already known at the national as well as international mar-
kets. Thirteen per cent of  the fi rms have introduced at least one innovation 
new to the national market, although already existing in the world markets. 
A small group of  fi rms (6%) have introduced at least one innovation that is 
new both to the national and the world market. 
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 7.5.2  Developing indicators of  STI- and DUI- mode learning 
 Two of  the three measures we used to capture STI- mode learning are stan-
dard measures used to benchmark science and technology development in 
innovation policy studies: expenditures on R&D and the employment of  per-
sonnel with third- level degrees in science or technology. Although of  recog-
nized importance, the third measure – cooperation with researchers attached 
to universities or research institutes – is less commonly used in policy studies 
due to the lack of  survey data. 
 For DUI- mode learning, the choice of  measures is based on a reading of  
two complementary literatures that deal with the characteristics of  ‘learning 
organizations’: the ‘high performance work system’ literature referred to above 
(Clegg et al.  1996 ; Dertoutzos et al.  1989 ; Gittleman et al.  1998 ; Osterman 
1994, 2000; Ramsay et al.  2000 ; Truss  2001 ; Wood  1999 ) and the literature 
dealing with the relation between organizational design and innovation (Burns 
and Stalker  1961 ; Mintzberg  1979 ; Lam  2005 ). Both of  these literatures draw 
a distinction between relatively bureaucratic or rigid organizations and those 
with a greater capacity for learning and innovative response, though the latter 
has tended to develop somewhat more elaborate typologies of  organizational 
forms. The ‘high performance’ literature focuses on the diff usion of  specifi c 
organizational practices and arrangements that enhance the fi rm’s capacity 
for responding to changes in markets and technology. These include practices 
designed to increase employees’ involvement in problem solving and decision- 
making such as autonomous teams, problem- solving groups and systems for 
collecting employee suggestions. The fi rst four of  our six indicators of  DUI- 
mode learning measure whether or not the fi rm makes use of  the core high- 
performance work practices. 
 A similar contrast between rigid and adaptable organizations can be seen 
in Burns and Stalker’s ( 1961 ) distinction between ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ 
organizations, or in Mintzberg’s ( 1979 ) distinction between the ‘machine 
bureaucracy’ and the ‘operating adhocracy’. Lam ( 2005 ) also distinguishes 
between rigid and fl exible organizations while making a further distinction 
between two relatively fl exible organizational forms that support learning and 
innovation:  the ‘operating adhocracy’ and the ‘J- form’. The term J- form is 
used because its archetypical features are best illustrated by the ‘Japanese- type’ 
organization discussed in the work of  Aoki ( 1988 ) and Nonaka and Takeuchi 
( 1995 ). In order to capture the diff erence between relatively hierarchical and 
rigid organizations, on the one hand, and the more fl exible and decentralized 
structure of  learning organizations, on the other, we included a measure of  
the extent to which functions are integrated and a measure of  the extent to 
which demarcations are softened ( Table 7.1 ). 9 
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 Table 7.1  Indicators of  DUI- and STI- mode learning 
 Indicators 
 DUI- mode learning 
Interdisciplinary 
workgroups
1 if  the fi rm makes some use of  interdisciplinary 
groups, 0 otherwise
Quality circles 1 if  the fi rm makes some use of  quality circles, 0 
otherwise
Systems for collecting 
proposals
1 if  the fi rm makes some use of  systems for collective 
proposals, 0 otherwise
Autonomous groups 1 if  the fi rm makes some use of  autonomous groups, 
0 otherwise
Integration of  functions 1 if  the fi rm makes some use of  integration of  
functions, 0 otherwise
Softened demarcations 1 if  demarcations between employee groupings have 
become more indistinct or invisible during 1998– 




1 if  the fi rm has developed closer cooperation with 
customers during 1998– 2000 to a high extent, 0 if  
to a small or medium extent or not at all
 STI- mode learning 
Expenditures on R&D 
as share of  total 
revenue




1 if  the fi rm cooperates with researches attached 
to universities or scientifi c institutes rarely, 
occasionally, frequently or always, 0 if  it never 
engages in these forms of  cooperation
Indicator for workforce 
composition
Register data indicating whether a fi rm employs 
scientifi cally trained personnel. 10 1 if  the fi rm 
employs scientifi cally trained personal, 0 otherwise
 In order to fi nd out how the diff erent DUI measures are combined with the 
capacity to handle scientifi c and codifi ed knowledge, we have pursued a clus-
tering across fi rms using latent- class analysis. Latent- class analysis can be seen 
as an alternative to the more familiar cluster analysis methods (e.g., methods 
based on proximity measures of  the observations. For an elaborate review, 
see e.g., Hagenaars and McCutcheon ( 2003 )). The latent- class analysis is able 
to cope with data that are measured on a nominal or ordinal measurement 
scale. In addition the technique is based on a statistical model such that the 
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goodness- of- fi t of  the model can be measured and tested. The outcome of  the 
latent- class analysis consists of  the conditional probabilities for implementing 
a particular practice given that the fi rm is from a particular cluster. Moreover, 
it is possible to estimate the cluster membership given a fi rm has implemented 
a particular set of  practices. The latter is used in the logistic analysis further 
ahead.  Table  7.2 presents the results as they come out when the 4- cluster 
solution is used and in Appendix 2 the goodness- of- fi t of  the model is shown 
together with the results of  an alternative 5- cluster solution. The percentage 
fi gures presented in  Table 7.2 show the probability that a fi rm in a particular 
cluster is characterized by a practice or policy. 
 The fi rst cluster is a static or low- learning cluster. It brings together fi rms 
that neither have highly developed forms of  organizations that support DUI- 
learning nor engage in activities that indicate a strong capacity to absorb and 
use codifi ed knowledge. The low- learning cluster encompasses fi rms that 
do not spend on R&D nor cooperate with researchers. The latter may be 
explained by the fact that these fi rms have a low probability of  employing 
scientifi cally trained personnel. 
 The second cluster, which we refer to as the STI cluster, encompasses 
about 10 per cent of  the fi rms. Firms belonging to the STI cluster have activi-
ties that indicate a strong capacity to absorb and use codifi ed knowledge. 
However, the fi rms in the STI cluster have rarely implemented organiza-
tional characteristics typical for the learning organizations. The STI cluster 
includes fi rms that have established the STI- mode without combining it with 
the DUI- mode. 
 The third cluster, which we refer to as the DUI cluster, brings together 
about one- third of  the fi rms in a group that is characterized by an over- 
average development of  organizational characteristics typical for the learning 
organization but without activities that indicate a strong capacity to absorb 
and use codifi ed knowledge. The fi rms in this cluster have a low probabil-
ity of  employing scientifi cally trained personnel and their cooperation with 
researchers attached to universities or research institutes is below average. 
This cluster includes fi rms that have introduced elements of  the DUI- mode 
but are weak in terms of  using the STI- mode. 
 The fourth cluster includes fi rms using mixed strategies that combine 
the DUI and STI modes. It includes one- fi fth of  the fi rms and these fi rms 
tend to combine the characteristics indicating a strong capacity for informal 
experience- based learning with activities that indicate a strong capacity to 
absorb and use codifi ed knowledge. 
 These outcomes of  the latent class analysis are interesting. They indicate 
that quite a number of  fi rms that operate in economic activities where scien-
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practices designed to promote knowledge exchange, problem solving and 
learning among their employees (DUI/ STI cluster). But there are also a num-
ber of  fi rms in the STI cluster where knowledge fl ows exist between the fi rm 
and external partners with over 95 per cent spending on R&D and more than 
85 per cent cooperating with researchers, but where there is little evidence of  
the practices designed to promote employee learning and problem solving. 
Finally, the share of  fi rms belonging to the DUI cluster is quite high. Hence 
there exists a signifi cant group of  fi rms that might well be transformed so 
as to acquire the characteristics of  the combined DUI/ STI cluster. Below 
we present evidence that indicates that such a transformation might stimulate 
innovation. 
 Table 7.3 shows the frequency distribution of  the diff erent clusters by fi rm 
size, industry, group ownership and production. It is clear that the diff erent 
clusters are distributed unevenly across industry, size and ownership. In terms 
of  size, it is not surprising to fi nd that relative to the population average the 
smallest fi rm size category is overrepresented in the low- learning cluster. The 
other result that stands out is the marked overrepresentation of  the 100 and 
over employee size category in the combined STI/ DUI cluster. The mid- range 
50– 99 employee category is somewhat overrepresented in the stand alone STI 
and DUI clusters. In terms of  sector, it is not surprising to fi nd that construc-
tion, trade and other services are underrepresented in the STI and DUI/ STI 
clusters given the relatively low levels of  R&D expenditure that character-
ize these sectors. Foreign groups tend to be overrepresented in the STI and 
DUI/ STI clusters suggesting that they are characterized by relatively high 
levels of  R&D and relatively well- developed links with universities or research 
institutes. Single fi rms, on the other hand, tend to be underrepresented in 
these two clusters. The frequency distribution of  the standard and custom-
ized product categories across the clusters tends to conform to the population 
averages with the exception that the standard product category is slightly over-
represented in the STI cluster. 
 In order to examine the eff ect of  the learning modes on the fi rm innovative 
performance, we use logistic regression analysis as reported in  Table 7.4 . The 
dependent variable for this exercise is whether or not the fi rm has introduced 
to the market a new product or service (P/ S innovation) over the last three 
years. The independent variables in the Model 1 specifi cation are binary vari-
ables indicating whether or not the fi rm belongs to a particular cluster. In the 
Model 2 specifi cation, we include control variables to account for the eff ects 
of  industry, fi rm size, ownership structure and whether the fi rm produces cus-
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 Table 7.4  Logistic regression of  learning clusters on product/ service innovation 
Model 1 
 (without controls) 
Model 2 








Coeffi  cient 
estimate
STI cluster 3.529 1.2611** 2.355 0.8564**
DUI cluster 2.487 0.9109** 2.218 0.7967**
DUI/ STI cluster 7.843 2.0596** 5.064 1.6222**
Business services 1.433 0.3599







Other services 0.747 – 0.2923
100 and more 
employees
1.757 0.5635*
50– 99 employees 0.862 – 0.1481
Danish group 0.859 – 0.1524
Single fi rm 0.521 – 0.6526*
Customized product 1.378 0.3203
Pseudo  R 2 0.1247 0.1247 0.1775 0.1775
 N  692  692  692  692 
 Note : ** = signifi cant at the .01 level; * = signifi cant at the .05 level. 
 Using the static or low- learning cluster as benchmark, the Model 1 results 
without controls show that the probability of  introducing a new product or 
service to the market for fi rms belonging to the DUI cluster is more than twice 
as high, while for the STI cluster the probability is more than three times. The 
diff erence is signifi cant for both clusters. We fi nd an almost eight times as high 
a chance of  P/ S innovation for the combined DUI/ STI cluster fi rms, and 
here the diff erence is also highly signifi cant. 11 
 When we add the control variables to account for the eff ects of  size, 
sector, ownership and product type (Model 2), the diff erence observed in 
the probability of  P/ S innovation between the STI and DUI clusters dis-
appears. For fi rms grouped in the combined DUI/ STI cluster, the prob-
ability of  innovating decreases substantially to approximately fi ve times 
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as high as for those grouped in the low- learning cluster. In the case of  the 
STI cluster, the diff erence between the Model 1 and Model 2 results can 
most plausibly be accounted for by this cluster’s overrepresentation in the 
high- tech sector, which has a positive and signifi cant impact on the prob-
ability of  innovation, and its underrepresentation in the construction and 
single- fi rm categories both of  which have negative and signifi cant impacts 
on the probability of  innovation. For the combined DUI/ STI cluster, the 
decrease in the size of  the odds ratio estimate in the Model 2 results can 
similarly be explained by this cluster’s overrepresentation in the high- 
tech category and its underrepresentation in construction. A further fac-
tor is the overrepresentation of  the DUI/ STI cluster in the 100 and over 
employee fi rm size category, which has a positive impact on the probability 
of  innovation. 
 Overall, the results of  the logistic analysis show that adopting DUI- mode 
enhancing practices and policies tends to increase fi rm innovative perfor-
mance. Further, they support the view that fi rms adopting mixed strategies 
combining the two modes tend to perform better than those relying predomi-
nately on one mode or the other. 
 7.6  Conclusion: Implications for Innovation 
Analysis and Policy 
 Our empirical analysis indicates the existence in the Danish economy of  both 
DUI and STI fi rms. The indication is a bit stronger for the STI- mode, but 
we can also discern a group of  fi rms that have introduced DUI- mode prac-
tices without connecting strongly to external research and without engaging 
in R&D. 
 One of  the areas where the explicit distinction between the two modes of  
learning may be of  special interest is the study of  innovation systems (Freeman 
1987; Lundvall  1992 ; Nelson 1993; Edquist  1997 ). One common assumption 
behind the idea of  innovation systems is that elements of  knowledge important 
for economic performance are localized and not easily moved from one place 
to another. It is obvious that in a fi ctive neoclassical world where knowledge 
was identical to information and where society was populated with perfectly 
rational agents, each with unlimited access to information, national innova-
tion systems would be a completely unnecessary construct. In this sense, there 
is an implicit assumption that some of  the learning in a system of  innovation 
takes place in the DUI- mode. 
 Further, recognizing and analysing the coexistence, coevolution and 
synergies between the DUI- and STI- modes more systematically may 
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represent progress in innovation theory. It might correspond to how the 
‘innovation as an interactive process’ perspective overcame the traditional 
split between those who argued that supply- side factors were most impor-
tant and those arguing that demand factors determine the rate and direc-
tion of  innovation. 
 In this respect, it is important to note that the two modes of  learning and 
innovation, though present to a greater or lesser degree, do not exclude each 
other. Actually, elements of  both are present in all business activities in sectors 
where innovation is an option. Any strategy to promote innovation needs to 
take both of  these sources of  innovation into account. While the STI- mode 
may be of  marginal importance in some informally organized businesses the 
fi rms that use the STI- mode most intensely will be highly dependent on the 
successful organization of  the DUI- mode. 
 Our cluster analysis indicates that many fi rms that are involved in STI 
learning have established organizational elements related to the DUI- 
mode. They will operate in sectors where there is supply- driven and some-
times radical change in products and processes. To cope with these changes, 
the need for learning by doing, using and interacting will be strongly felt. 
Likewise for fi rms in traditional sectors, it is no longer suffi  cient to base 
competitiveness on know- how and DUI- learning. Firms that connect more 
systematically to sources of  codifi ed knowledge may be able to fi nd new 
solutions and develop new products that make them more competitive. 
Moreover, the cluster analysis shows that what really improves innovation 
performance is using mixed strategies that combine strong versions of  the 
two modes. 12 
 It also shows that the two modes of  learning coexist and can be made 
to complement each other, which doesn’t necessarily mean that they are 
always in harmony with each other. Sometimes there may be contradic-
tions between them, which have to be tackled before potential benefi ts 
could be reaped. The STI- mode calls for codifi cation and for codes that 
are general while the DUI- mode tends to thrive on the basis of  implicit and 
local codes. It is a major task for knowledge management to make strong 
versions of  the two modes work together in promoting knowledge creation 
and innovation. 
 Our results strongly suggest that fi rms with an exclusive focus on devel-
oping their science and technology base are foregoing important gains that 
could be reaped by adopting practices and measures designed to promote 
informal learning by using and doing. This has major implications for bench-
marking innovation systems and for innovation policy. As we have observed in 
the current European ‘innovation scoreboard’, there is a strong bias towards 
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indicators that refl ect the STI- mode while those referring to the DUI- mode 
are absent. Our results clearly point to the need to develop harmonized indi-
cators of  the DUI- mode to arrive at an adequate understanding of  the bases 
for diff erences in innovative performance. 
 Correspondingly, it also implies the need for a realignment of  policy 
objectives and priorities given the tendency to develop innovation policy 
with a one- sided focus on promoting the science base of  high- technology 
firms. Equally, it suggests that too little attention is being given to poli-
cies that serve to strengthen linkages to sources of  codified knowledge 
for firms operating in traditional manufacturing sectors and services more 
generally. 
 Thinking in terms of  the two modes and their evolution in the learning 
economy may also have implications for wider aspects of  public policy and 
institution building. Education may prepare students to work with special-
ized global codes in the diff erent disciplines as well as involve them in learn-
ing to develop and use local codes through problem- based learning. The 
design of  intellectual property rights and of  labour contracts might need 
to strike a balance between the two modes. Organizing innovation policy 
and distributing responsibility between, for instance, ministries of  educa-
tion, science, industry and economic aff airs needs to balance the two modes 
in innovation policy. 
 It is our contention that applying the STI- and DUI- modes of  learn-
ing to innovation systems and to analyse how they coevolve is a way to 
clarify and further develop this concept. This is true not only for national 
systems but also for sectoral, technological and regional systems (Breschi 
and Malerba  1997 ; Carlsson and Jacobsson  1997 ; Maskell and Malmberg 
 1997 ). Our empirical analysis demonstrates, not surprisingly, that the modes 
are applied with diff erent weights in diff erent sectors, and this implies that 
regional specialization and clustering will also make them appear diff erently 
in geographical space. 
 Of  course in the context of  this chapter, we can only hint at these pos-
sible consequences of  our framework. Our main objective has been to dem-
onstrate the usefulness of  the conceptual distinction between the DUI- and 
STI- modes of  learning and to demonstrate that these concepts can be made 
operational. If  we have succeeded at that task, we are confi dent that future 
research will take up the wider implications for institution building in the 
learning economy. 
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 Appendix 2 The Goodness of  Fit of  the Model 
 Table A7.2  Summary statistics from the latent class analysis 
Solution BIC(L 2 ) AIC(L 2 ) p- value
2- cluster – 3471.06 – 515.788 0
3- cluster – 3491.35 – 527.002 0.502
4- cluster – 3535.77 – 503.201 0.288
5- cluster – 3396.10 – 513.462 0.432
 The choice between the various solutions is determined by the fi t of  the 
model to the data, the Bayesian information criteria (BIC), the Akaike infor-
mation criteria (AIC) and the interpretability. 
 To examine the fi t of  the model, we test the null hypothesis, which states 
that each model fi ts the data whereas the alternative hypothesis states that the 
model involved does not fi t the data. The test is a standard chi- squared test, 
well known from the analysis of  contingency tables. From  Table A7.2 , we see 
that a 3- cluster, 4- cluster as well as a 5- cluster solution all fi t the data as the 
p- values are well above 0.1. 
 With respect to the information criteria, we have a mixed pattern. From 
the literature it is well known that that the BIC criteria is too conservative 
with respect to the number of  classes, whereas the AIC is known to be too 
liberal (see e.g., McLachlan and Peel ( 2000 )). Therefore we have chosen to 
report both. We see that the BIC points towards a 5- cluster solution, whereas 
AIC indicates that a 4- cluster solution is the most appropriate. Thus, the 
information criteria do not unequivocally identify the most appropriate 
solution. 
 Therefore the interpretability becomes the decisive criteria. In  Table A7.3 , 
we have reported the 5- cluster solution. It is possible to identify a low learn-
ing, a STI, a DUI and a STI/ DUI cluster in the 5- cluster solution. However, 
the fi fth cluster is a mixture of  cluster 3 and 4 (DUI/ STI and STI). All things 
considered, we decided to use the 4- cluster solution, which will be the premise 
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 Notes 
 1  This bias is similar to the ‘S&T perspective that gives too much weight to S&T indi-
cators, especially R&D spending, for understanding technological innovation as 
discussed by Laestadius ( 1998 ). On the basis of  in- depth case studies from the pulp 
and paper sector in Sweden, he argues that this bias has implied a relative neglect of  
innovation in, for example, mechanical technologies and other low- and medium- tech 
areas. Furthermore, development costs in these areas are often underreported and/ or 
accounted as other types of  costs. It turns out that R&D data only have a weak relation 
to what is actually going on in the sector. We share Laestadius view that such a bias 
exists in both theory and policymaking. Our methodology diff ers from Laestadius’s, 
however, in that we use quantitative survey data. Our focus is also a bit diff erent since 
we concentrate on types of  learning rather than on technologies. 
 2  For example, in the early industrialization of  Sweden, the use of  synthetic dyestuff  in 
textiles was learnt through immigration of  skilled labour from Germany. The electrifi -
cation of  Sweden was based upon headhunting of  Scandinavians that had migrated to 
the United States and worked in that country’s electric industry (Fridlund  1999 ). 
 3  See Pavitt (2005) and Brooks (1994). 
 4  The notable exceptions are the fi elds of  biotechnology and ICT software, where 
university research often results in inventions with direct industrial applications. See 
Mansfi eld (1991) and Pavitt and Steinmueller (2001). 
 5  See Price (1984) for a classic statement. 
 6  There are several caveats to this ideal type of  STI- mode of  learning. R&D may be 
oriented to solve very local problems, and the results may be kept secret by other means 
than patents. The most talented scientists will in spite of  documentation be carriers 
of  ‘personal knowledge’ that cannot be easily substituted. There are stories about the 
Swedish Company ASEA – now part of  Asea Brown Bowery – that an important rea-
son that major breakthroughs were made in strong current technology was a lack of  
documentation and control that made it possible to have private projects in the desk 
drawer. And fi nally the patenting may be seen as the tip of  the iceberg and as a signal 
that a lot of  tacit knowledge is hidden under the surface. 
 7  See  http:// www.trendchart.org/ 
 8  See  http:// trendchart.cordis.lu/ ws_ paper.cfm?ID=9 . While this is obviously not the 
place to survey the vast amount of  literature to be found on the Trendchart website, we 
would contend that the STI bias will be evident to anyone who takes the time to browse 
through it. 
 9  In Appendix 1 the exact formulation of  the questions and the distribution of  the 
answers can be found. 
 10  Scientifi cally trained personnel include bachelors, master and PhD students within the 
natural sciences, as well as civil engineers. 
 11  There may, of  course, be reverse causality involved in these results in the sense that 
fi rms that succeed in innovating are better able and motivated to introduce DUI orga-
nizational traits and invest in R&D. This sort of  problem, however, applies for any 
study that relies on cross- sectional data. What we show here is simply that some sets of  
fi rm characteristics are good predictors of  innovative performance. 
 12  These results are consistent with the presence of  complementarities between the sets 
of  practices making up the two modes but are not suffi  cient to demonstrate such com-
plementarity. Demonstrating complementarity between the two modes would require 
showing that using to a greater extent the practices making up one mode increases the 
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returns from using to a greater extent the practices making up the other. For a useful 
discussion of  the diff erent statistical approaches that have been used to test for the pres-
ence of  complementarity among a group of  variables, see Galia et al. ( 2004 , 1191– 92). 
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 Chapter 8 
 HOW EUROPE’S ECONOMIES 
LEARN: A COMPARISON OF WORK 
ORGANIZATION AND INNOVATION 
MODE FOR THE EU- 15 
 Anthony  Arundel ,  Edward  Lorenz ,  Bengt- Åke 
 Lundvall and  Antoine  Valeyre 
 8.1  Introduction 
 The innovation literature has long recognized the role of  research and devel-
opment (R&D) and skilled scientists and engineers in successful innovation 
in science- based sectors. More recent works within the national innovation 
systems perspective highlighted the importance of  other factors to successful 
innovation, particularly in low- and medium- technology sectors, where formal 
R&D frequently plays a secondary role. These other factors include inter-
actions with suppliers and customers, other forms of  ‘open innovation’ and 
feedback mechanisms from the market. These interactions frequently form 
within localized networks creating unique innovation systems at the regional 
or national level (Lundvall  1988 ; Nelson  1993 ). 
 Both innovation strategies based on science and on interactive networks 
require learning in order to develop competences and to be able to rapidly 
exploit external and internal change. In such a ‘learning economy’, the speed 
of  the innovation process is a critical factor in economic performance. Using 
Danish data, Jensen et al. ( 2007 ) show that innovation performance is signifi -
cantly enhanced when fi rms combine science- based learning with experience- 
based learning. One possibility is that how fi rms organize the production and 
distribution of  responsibilities among their workforce could have a signifi cant 
eff ect on learning and hence on innovative capabilities. 
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 Some of  the early contributions to the innovation literature evaluated the 
eff ect of  organizational structures on the success of  innovation. The Sappho 
study pointed to the importance of  interactions between diff erent divisions 
of  the same fi rm (Rothwell  1972 ). Indirectly, Kline and Rosenberg’s ( 1986 ) 
‘chain- link’ model of  innovation points to the importance of  feedback loops 
and interactions between agents within the same organization but operating 
at diff erent stages of  the innovation process. Freeman’s ( 1987 ) analysis of  the 
Japanese innovation system partly explained the success of  Japanese innova-
tion performance by the specifi c organizational characteristics of  Japanese 
fi rms, while Gjerding ( 1992 ) looked at the role of  organizational change in 
national innovation systems. More recently, there have been several system-
atic attempts to evaluate the eff ect of  specifi c modes of  work organization 
on national innovation performance (Lundvall 2002; Lam  2005 ; Lam and 
Lundvall  2006 ; Lorenz and Valeyre  2006 ). 
 Work organization could infl uence innovation performance through two 
main mechanisms 1 . First, forms of  work organization that stimulate interac-
tion among agents with a diverse set of  experiences and competences could be 
more creative, leading to the development of  original ideas for new products 
and processes. Second, work organization forms that delegate responsibility 
for problem solving to a wide range of  employees could be more successful 
both in upgrading the competences of  workers and in transforming ideas into 
new products and processes. 
 Despite a growing acceptance of  the importance of  work organization to 
innovation, only a few studies have used quantitative survey methods to explore 
the link between organizational environments and learning and innovation 
(Laursen and Foss  2003 ; Nielsen and Lundvall  2006 ; Jensen et al.  2007 ). There 
is a need to further explore the linkages between workplace organization and 
the dynamics of  innovation at the level of  the fi rm as well as at the level of  
sectoral, regional and national innovation systems. This partly requires indica-
tors that capture how material and human resources, such as R&D and skilled 
scientists and engineers, are used within the fi rm and whether or not the orga-
nization of  work promotes innovation. This could occur through forms of  
 work organization that encourage responsibility and further development of  
the knowledge and skills of  employees. 
 This chapter uses quantitative survey data at the national level to assess 
the eff ect of  diff erent analytical concepts of  work organization on innovative 
capabilities. The chapter develops a set of  aggregate indicators to explore, at 
the level of  national innovation systems, the relation between innovation and 
the organization of  work. The indicators are constructed from the results of  
two European surveys. Indicators on the organization of  work are obtained 
from the third European Survey of  Working Conditions in 2000 carried out 
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at the level of  occupied persons. Indicators on national innovative capabilities 
are obtained from the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS- 3) conducted 
in 2001 but covering innovation activities of  enterprises between 1998 and 
2000. The survey data on working conditions are used to develop what we 
believe to be the fi rst EU- wide mapping of  the adoption of  diff erent types of  
work organization. The innovation survey data are used to develop a typol-
ogy of  innovation at the fi rm level and to calculate the distribution of  these 
innovation types within each of  14 EU countries for which data are available. 
 The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 8.2 describes the variables to 
characterize work organization in the 15 countries of  the European Union 
and presents the results of  a factor analysis and a hierarchical clustering used 
to construct a typology of  forms of  work organization.  Section 8.3 examines 
diff erences in the relative importance of  these forms across the EU, controlling 
for the eff ects of  sector, fi rm size and occupational category.  Section 8.4 pres-
ents the data used to construct a typology of  fi rm level innovative capabilities 
or innovation modes, based on the work of  Arundel and Hollanders ( 2005 ) 
in cooperation with Eurostat. 2  Section 8.5 combines the two sets of  results 
to examine, at the national level, the relationship between the forms of  work 
organization adopted in a nation and the distribution of  fi rm level innovation 
capabilities. The concluding section considers some of  the main implications 
of  the research for European policy. 
 8.2  Measuring Forms of  Work Organization in 
the European Union 3 
 In order to map  the forms of  work organization adopted by fi rms across 
the European Union, we draw on the results of  the third European Survey 
of  Working Conditions undertaken by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of  Living and Working Conditions. 4 The survey questionnaire 
was directed to approximately 1,500 active persons in each country with the 
exception of  Luxembourg with only 500 respondents. The total survey popu-
lation is 21,703 persons, of  which 17,910 are salaried employees. The sur-
vey methodology is based on a ‘random walk’ multistage random sampling 
method involving face- to- face interviews undertaken at the respondents’ 
principal residence. In order to provide comparable data to the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS), which is limited to industrial and service fi rms in 
the private sector, the analysis is based on the responses of  8,081 salaried 
employees working in industry or service sector fi rms with at least 10 employ-
ees. This excludes employees in agriculture and fi shing, public administration 
and social security, education, health and social work and private domestic 
employees. 
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 It is important to emphasize that the use of  employee level data allows 
us to capture the prevalence of  diff erent forms of  work organization within 
private sector establishments in the EU. However, we are unable to determine 
the prevalence of  particular types of  fi rms or organizational structures. This 
means that our results allow for the obvious possibility that multiple forms of  
work organization are in use within the same establishment. We return to the 
implications of  this point in  section 8.5 on the relationship between diff erent 
forms of  work organization and modes of  innovation. 
 The choice of  variables for the analysis is based on a reading of  two com-
plementary literatures that address the relation between the forms of  work 
organization used by fi rms and the way they learn and innovate:  the ‘high 
performance work system’ literature dealing with the diff usion of  Japanese- 
style organizational practices in the United States and Europe (Dertouzos 
et al. 1989; Gittleman et al.  1998 ; Osterman 1994, 2000; Ramsay et al.  2000 ; 
Truss  2001 ; Wood  1999 ) and the literature dealing with the relation between 
organizational design and innovation (Burns and Stalker  1961 ; Lam  2005 ; 
Lam and Lundvall  2006 ; Mintzberg 1979, 1983). The ‘high performance’ 
literature focuses on the diff usion of  specifi c organizational practices and 
arrangements that are seen as enhancing the fi rm’s capacity for making incre-
mental improvements to the effi  ciency of  its work processes and the qual-
ity of  its products and services. These include practices designed to increase 
employee involvement in problem solving and operational decision  making 
such as teams, problem- solving groups and employee responsibility for quality 
control. Many of  the practices identifi ed in this literature were innovations 
developed by large Japanese automobile and electronics fi rms in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Some authors refer specifi cally to the diff usion of  the ‘lean produc-
tion’ model associated with Toyota (Womack et al.  1990 ; MacDuffi  e and Pil 
 1997 ). The diff usion of  these Japanese style organizational practices is thought 
to have contributed to the progressive transformation of  more hierarchically 
structured fi rms that relied on Taylor’s principles of  task specialization and a 
clear distinction between the work of  conception and execution. 
 The distinction between hierarchical and fl exible or ‘transformed’ work 
organization developed in the ‘high performance’ literature can also be seen 
in Burns and Stalkers’s (1961) classic distinction between ‘bureaucratic’ and 
‘organic’ organizations. Mintzberg (1983), within the context of  a broad dis-
tinction between bureaucratic and organic organizations, develops a more 
complex typology of  organizational forms. He identifi es two types of  organic 
organization with a high capacity for adaptation: the operating adhocracy and 
the simple organization. The forms of  work organization and types of  work 
practices that characterize these two organic forms are quite diff erent. The 
simple form relies on direct supervision by one individual (typically a manager) 
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and a classic example of  this type of  organization is the small entrepreneurial 
fi rm. Adhocracies rely on mutual adjustment in which employees coordinate 
their own work by communicating informally with each other. Various liaison 
devices such as project teams and task forces are used to facilitate the process 
of  mutual adjustment. Work autonomy is low in the simple organization and 
high in the adhocracy. 
 In contrast to these ‘organic’ forms, Mintzberg identifi es two basic bureau-
cratic forms with a limited capacity for adaptation and innovation: the machine 
bureaucracy and the professional bureaucracy. 5 The key characteristic of  work 
organization in the former is the standardization of  jobs and tasks through the 
use of  formal job descriptions and rules imposed by management. Thus there 
is a high degree of  centralization and limited employee discretion over how 
work is carried out or over the pace of  work. In the professional bureaucracy, 
on the other hand, centralization is low and behaviour is regulated and stan-
dardized through the acquisition of  standardized skills and the internalization 
of  professional norms and standards of  conduct. As a result, operating proce-
dures are stable and routinized despite considerable autonomy in work. 
 Lam ( 2005 ) synthesizes and extends these two literatures by contrasting two 
ideal organizational forms that support diff erent styles of  learning and innova-
tion: the ‘operating adhocracy’ and the ‘J- form’. 6 She observes that the oper-
ating adhocracy relies on the expertise of  individual professionals and uses 
temporary project structures to creatively combine the knowledge of  these 
experts. High levels of  discretion in work provide scope for exploring new 
knowledge, creating a superior capacity for radical innovation. Compared 
to the operating adhocracy, the J- form is a relatively bureaucratic form that 
relies on formal team structures and rules of  job rotation to embed knowledge 
within the collective organization. Stable job careers within internal labour 
markets provide incentives for members to commit themselves to the goals of  
continuous product and process improvement. Consequently, the J- form tends 
to excel at incremental innovation. 
 In summary, both the high performance and the organizational design lit-
eratures identify diff erent organizational archetypes and posit a relationship 
between how a fi rm organizes work and its innovative style and capacity. In 
order to identify the prevalence of  specifi c types of  work organization, we 
use the Working Conditions survey data to construct 15 binary variables that 
cover work responsibilities and tasks and then use cluster analysis to identify 
four main types of  work organization. The 15 binary variables are presented 
in  Table 8.1 . 7 
 The fi rst four variables measure the use of  the core work practices identi-
fi ed in the high performance literature:  teamwork, job rotation, employee 
responsibility for quality control and precise quality norms. Two of  these 
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variables capture whether employees engage in learning and problem solv-
ing, characteristics of  both adhocracies and the J- form. One question cap-
tures whether work tasks are complex or not and is relevant to the operating 
adhocracy. 
 Work discretion, a characteristic of  adhocracies, is measured by two vari-
ables that capture whether employees are able to choose or change their work 
methods and their pace of  work. Four variables measure diff erent constraints 
on employee discretion in setting their pace of  work: ‘automatic’ constraints 
on work pace, which is linked to the rate at which equipment is operated or 
a product is displaced in the production fl ow; ‘hierarchical’ constraints linked 
to the direct control, which is exercised by one’s immediate superiors; ‘norm- 
based’ constraints on work pace linked to the setting of  quantitative produc-
tion norms; and ‘horizontal’ constraints linked to how one person’s work rate 
is dependent on the work of  their colleagues. Hierarchical and automatic con-
straints are classic characteristics of  Taylorist work settings, while norm- based 
constraints characterize both Taylorism and the Japanese forms of  work orga-
nization. The horizontal constraints variable provides a measure of  whether 
 Table 8.1  Variables for work organization and tasks 
Per cent of  employees aff ected
Teamwork 64.2
Job rotation 48.9
Responsibility for quality control 72.6
Quality norms 74.4
Problem- solving activities 79.3
Learning new things at work 71.4
Complexity of  tasks 56.7
Discretion in fi xing work methods 61.7
Discretion in setting work pace 63.6
Horizontal constraints on work pace 53.1
Hierarchical constraints on work pace 38.9
Norm- based constraints on work pace 38.7
Automatic constraints on work pace 26.7
Monotony of  tasks 42.4
Repetitiveness of  tasks 24.9
 N  8081 
 Source : Third Working Conditions survey, European Foundation for the Improvement 
of  Living and Working Conditions. 
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work is carried out collectively rather than individually. Finally, the two vari-
ables measuring task repetitiveness and task monotony capture typical features 
of  Taylorist work settings. 
 8.2.1  Variety in European organizational practice 
 In order to assign employees to distinct categories or groups, we use factor 
analysis 8 to identify the underlying associations that exist among the 15 vari-
ables described in  Table 8.1 . We then use the factor scores or the coordinates 
of  the observations on all 15 factors as a basis for clustering individuals into 
distinct groups of  work systems, using Ward’s hierarchical clustering method. 
This method identifi es four basic systems of  work organization as presented 
in  Table 8.2 . 9 The four clusters capture forms of  work organization that are 
characteristic of  several of  the main organizational forms discussed in the 
literature:  ‘Discretionary learning’, which corresponds to work organization 
in the notion of  an adhocracy; ‘Lean production’ or the J- form organization; 
the hierarchically structured Taylorist form; and the ‘Traditional’ organiza-
tion based on a simple management structure. 
 The fi rst cluster, which accounts for 39 per cent of  the employees,   10  is dis-
tinctive for the way high levels of  autonomy in work are combined with high 
levels of  learning, problem solving and task complexity. There is a below- 
average prevalence of  the variables measuring constraints on work pace, 
monotony and repetitiveness. The use of  team work is near the average, while 
less than half  of  the employees in this cluster participate in job rotation, which 
points to the importance of  horizontal job specialization. The forms of  work 
organization in this cluster correspond rather closely to those found in adhoc-
racies and due to the combined importance of  work discretion and learning 
we refer to this cluster as the ‘discretionary learning’ form. 
 The second cluster accounts for 28 per cent of  the employees. Compared to 
the fi rst cluster, work organization is characterized by low levels of  employee 
discretion in setting work pace and methods. The use of  job rotation and 
teamwork, on the other hand, are much higher than in the fi rst cluster, and 
work eff ort is more constrained by quantitative production norms and by the 
collective nature of  work organization. The use of  quality norms is the highest 
of  the four clusters and the use of  employee responsibility for quality control is 
considerably above the average level for the population as a whole. These fea-
tures point to a more structured or bureaucratic style of  organizational learn-
ing that corresponds rather closely to the characteristics of  the Japanese or 
‘lean production’ model associated with the work of  MacDuffi  e and Krafcik 
( 1992 ) and Womack et al. ( 1990 ). This cluster also has the highest prevalence 
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 The third class, which groups 14 per cent of  the employees, corresponds 
in most respects to a classic characterization of  Taylorism. The work situ-
ation is in most respects the opposite of  that found in the fi rst cluster, with 
low discretion and low level of  learning and problem solving. Interestingly, 
three of  the core work practices associated with the lean- production 
model – teams, job rotation and quality norms – are somewhat overrep-
resented in this cluster implying that these practices are highly imperfect 
measures of  a transition to new forms of  work organization character-
ized by high levels of  learning and problem solving. The characteristics of  
this cluster draw attention to the importance of  what some authors have 
referred to as ‘fl exible  Taylorism’ (Boyer and Durand  1993 ; Cézard et al. 
1992; Linhart  1994 ). 
 The fourth cluster groups 19 per cent of  the employees. All the variables 
are underrepresented with the exception of  monotony in work, which is 
close to the average. The frequency of  the two variables measuring learning 
and task complexity is the lowest among the four types of  work organiza-
tion, while at the same time there are few constraints on the work rate. As 
shown below, the sectoral breakdown suggests that this class consists of  
traditional forms of  work organization based on informal and noncodifi ed 
systems. 
 8.3  How Europe’s Economies Work and Learn 
 The cluster analysis identifi es three forms of  work organization whose features 
correspond rather closely to the forms of  work organization found, respec-
tively, in adhocracies, J- form organizations and machine bureaucracies or 
Taylorist fi rms. As the fi gures in  Table 8.3 show, the discretionary learning 
form of  work organization is especially prevalent in several service sectors, 
notably business services, banks and insurance and in the gas, electricity and 
water utilities. As one would anticipate, the lean model of  production is more 
developed in the manufacturing sector, notably in the production of  transport 
equipment, electronics and electrical production, wood and paper products 
and printing and publishing. The Taylorist form is notably present in textiles, 
clothing and leather products, food processing, wood and paper products and 
transport equipment, while underrepresented in the service sectors. The tra-
ditional organizational form is found principally in the services, notably land 
transport, personal services, hotels and restaurants, post and telecommunica-
tions and wholesale and retail trade. 
 Table 8.4 links the four types of  work organization by occupational cat-
egory. As one would expect, the discretionary learning form of  work organiza-
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technicians, while the lean form of  work organization primarily characterizes 
the work of  employees in craft and related trades and machine operators and 
assemblers. The Taylorist form is most frequent among machine operators 
and the unskilled trades. Finally, the traditional form is most prevalent among 
service workers and shop and market sales persons. 
 Establishment size is only weakly correlated with the diff erent organiza-
tional models. The learning form of  work organization is slightly underrepre-
sented in the medium- size category of  establishments (100 to 249 employees). 
The lean and Taylorist forms increase with establishment size (>250 employ-
ees) while the reverse tendency can be observed for the traditional forms of  
work organization. 
 In combination,  Tables 8.2 ,  8.3 and  8.4 gives us a better idea of  what the 
diff erent clusters represent. Discretionary learning refers to jobs where a lot 
of  responsibility is allocated to the employees who are expected to solve prob-
lems on their own. The business services sector is a typical example where 
many jobs continuously deal with new and complex problems. Although some 
of  the tasks take place in a team, teamwork is not seen as imposing narrow 
constraints on the work. In this category, teamwork may involve brainstorm-
ing by professional experts as much as collectively solving narrowly defi ned 
problems. 
 Lean production also involves problem solving and learning but here the 
problems are more narrowly defi ned and the scale of  possible solutions less 
broad. The work is highly constrained, and it is often repetitive and monot-
onous. The extensive use of  management techniques such as job rotation 
(between similar tasks within the same division) and team work may be seen 
as attempts to overcome the limits of  Taylorist production and to create some 
degree of  active participation of  production workers and sales staff  in order to 
limit labour turnover and absenteeism. 
 Taylorism is distinctive for low levels of  learning and for the virtual 
absence of  problem- solving activity. The work is highly constrained and 
monotonous. It may be seen as the old- style factory work where the tasks 
to solve are narrowly defi ned and repetitive. It is a kind of  work where the 
required qualifi cations are limited and the worker can easily be substituted 
by another worker or by a machine. In the era of  globalization, this cat-
egory of  work is interesting because it can be easily outsourced to low- wage 
countries. 
 Traditional organization involves even less complex problems. It is more 
individualistic than all the other categories and less monotonous than lean 
production and Taylorism. It includes traditional service jobs. Many of  those 
involve a direct and indirect interaction with local customers, and they may 
therefore be less footloose than the Taylorist jobs. 
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 8.3.1  National eff ects on the diff usion of  organizational 
practice 
 Table 8.5  shows that there are wide diff erences in the importance of  the four 
forms of  work organization across European nations. The discretionary learn-
ing form of  work organization is most prevalent in the Netherlands, the Nordic 
countries and to a lesser extent Germany and Austria, while it is the least prev-
alent in Ireland and the Southern European nations. The lean model is most 
in evidence in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain and to a lesser extent 
in France, while it is less developed in the Nordic countries or in Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands. The Taylorist form of  work organization shows 
almost the reverse trend compared to the discretionary learning forms, being 
most frequent in the Southern European nations and in Ireland. Finally, the 
traditional form of  work organization is most prevalent in Greece and Italy 
and to a lesser extent in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. 
 As shown in  Tables  8.3 and  8.4 , each form of  work organization tends 
to be associated with particular sectors and occupational categories. This 
raises the question of  what part of  the variation in the importance of  these 
forms across EU nations can be accounted for by the nation’s specifi c indus-
trial and occupational structure or by other unexplained national factors, such 
as sociocultural attitudes on the part of  management and workers, historical 
developments and the rate at which new organizational forms are adopted by 
fi rms. In order to determine the importance of  ‘national factors’, we use logit 
regression analysis to provide estimates of  the impact of  national eff ects on the 
relative likelihood of  adopting the diff erent types of  work organization (See 
 Table 8.6 ). Germany, the most populous nation within the EU, is the reference 
case for the estimates of  national eff ects. In each case the dependent variable 
is a binary variable measuring whether or not the individual is subject to the 
particular form of  work organization. On the left side of   Table 8.6 (columns 
1 through 4), there is only one independent variable for the country where 
the employee works, with Germany as the reference category. Thus column 1 
gives the likelihood that employees are subject to the ‘discretionary learning’ 
form of  work organization in each country relative to the German case. 
 On the right side of   Table 8.6 (columns 5 through 8), the independent vari-
ables include nationality plus three control variables for each employee’s sector of  
work, the establishment size, and occupational category. The respective reference 
categories for the estimates are the vehicle sector – fi rms with 10 to 49 employ-
ees – and the occupational category of  machine operator and assembler. 11 
 As the column 1 results show, the country where the employee works has a 
signifi cant impact on the relative likelihood of  discretionary learning forms of  
employment. Compared to the German case, for which the use of  the discre-
tionary learning form of  work organization is near the 15- country weighted 
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average (see  Table  8.5 ), there are three countries where the discretionary 
learning model is more frequent:  Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
There are no signifi cant diff erences in the use of  discretionary learning in 
four countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland and Austria. This work form is 
less frequent in the remaining seven countries. Column 5 indicates that these 
results are robust after controlling for the eff ect of  fi rm size, industry structure 
and occupation, with the exception of  Sweden, for which the coeffi  cient esti-
mate though still positive is no longer signifi cant. 
 Column 2 of   Table 8.6 presents the estimates of  national eff ects on the 
likelihood of  using the lean form without controls. Compared to Germany, 
where the use of  the lean model is relatively low in relation to the 15- country 
weighted average (see  Table 8.5 ), Spain, France, Ireland, Finland, the United 
Kingdom and Portugal display a relatively high propensity to use lean produc-
tion methods. The coeffi  cients are especially high for the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Spain, and they increase slightly and remain signifi cant when 
structural controls are included. 
 Overall, the results show that the large national diff erences in the prevalence 
of  diff erent forms of  work organization are not due to national diff erences in 
the distribution of  fi rm size, industry and occupation. Instead, unexplained 
national factors that could be due to historically inherited management- 
worker relations or attitudes to organizational innovation strongly infl uence 
national diff erences in the use of  diff erent sets of  organizational practices. 
 In so far as the organizational practices adopted by fi rms can infl uence their 
ability to develop and profi t from innovation, the results in  Table 8.6 suggest 
that the large diff erences within the European Union in national innovative 
performance 12 might refl ect national diff erences in the distribution of  diff er-
ent types of  work organization, particularly the use of  discretionary learning 
forms that enhance the opportunities for learning. This possibility is explored 
in  sections 8.4 and  8.5 . 
 8.4  Measuring Diff erences in Innovation Mode 
 Economists and business scholars frequently measure innovation by R&D 
expenditures or by the number of  patents applied for or granted. The weak-
nesses of  these measures are well known. R&D doesn’t necessarily result in the 
development of  new products or processes and many innovative fi rms do not 
perform R&D. A large fraction of  innovations are not patented and the impor-
tance of  patenting varies according to sector. Furthermore, R&D and patents 
entirely fail to capture innovation that occurs through diff usion processes, such 
as when a fi rm purchases innovative production equipment or product com-
ponents from other fi rms. The Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) were 
in part designed to respond to these limitations by providing survey- based 
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estimates of  the percentage of  manufacturing fi rms and selected service sec-
tor fi rms 13 that have developed or introduced a new product or process over a 
three- year time period. However, the CIS estimates of  the percentage of  inno-
vative fi rms are based on a very broad defi nition of  innovation ranging from 
intensive in- house R&D that results in new- to- market products or processes to 
minimal eff ort to introduce manufacturing equipment purchased from a sup-
plier. Consequently, a broad all- encompassing defi nition where a distinction is 
made between ‘innovative fi rms’ and ‘non- innovative fi rms’ is both misleading 
in international comparisons and fails to provide a clear picture of  the struc-
ture of  innovation capabilities within individual countries. 
 In order to overcome these limitations, we draw on a taxonomy developed 
by Arundel and Hollanders ( 2005 ), in collaboration with Paul Crowley of  
Eurostat, in order to classify all innovative CIS respondent fi rms into three 
mutually exclusive innovation modes that capture diff erent methods of  inno-
vating, plus a fourth group for noninnovators. 14 The classifi cation method uses 
two main criteria: the level of  novelty of  the fi rm’s innovations and the cre-
ative eff ort that the fi rm expends on in- house innovative activities. The three 
innovation modes are as follows: 
 Lead innovators : For these fi rms, creative in- house innovative activities form an 
important part of  the fi rm’s strategy. All fi rms have introduced at least one 
product or process innovation developed at least partly in- house, performed 
R&D at least on an occasional basis and have introduced a new- to- market 
innovation. These fi rms are also likely sources of  innovations that are later 
adopted or imitated by other fi rms. 
 Technology modifi ers :  These fi rms primarily innovate through modifying 
technology developed by other fi rms or institutions. None of  them perform 
R&D on either an occasional or continuous basis. Many fi rms that are 
essentially process innovators that innovate through in- house production 
engineering will fall within this group. 
 Technology adopters : These fi rms do not develop innovations in- house, with all 
innovations acquired from external sources. An example is the purchase of  
new production machinery. 
 Table 8.7 presents the distribution of  fi rms according to innovation mode for 
14 EU nations for which the necessary data are available and also includes the 
percentage of  fi rms that did not innovate. The results are weighted to refl ect 
the distribution of  all fi rms within the industry and service sectors covered by 
CIS- 3. The results show that Finland, Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg 
have the highest percentage of  fi rms in the lead category of  innovators, while 
Germany, Luxembourg and Austria have the highest percentages of  fi rms that 
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 Table 8.7  Distribution of  innovation modes in 14 EU member nations, 1998– 2000 
Leaders Modifi ers Adopters Noninnovators Total
Belgium 20 16 14 50 100
Denmark 19 11 14 56 100
Germany 25 25 11 39 100
Greece 13 5 10 72 100
Italy 18 15 4 64 100
Spain 8 5 19 67 100
France 20 10 11 59 100
Luxembourg 24 20 4 52 100
Netherlands 22 16 8 55 100
Portugal 18 16 13 54 100
United 
Kingdom
11 5 16 68 100
Finland 29 10 3 55 100
Sweden 25 14 8 53 100
Austria 20 20 9 51 100
 Source : Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
are technology modifi ers. In Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom over 80 
per cent of  fi rms are either adopters or noninnovators. 
 8.5  The Relation between Organizational Practice 
and Innovation Mode 
 As our introductory discussion pointed out, much of  the discussion in the 
organizational behaviour literature on the relation between organization and 
innovation focuses on whether or not particular organizational designs are 
better suited for undertaking radical or incremental innovations. Radical 
innovations can be defi ned as innovations that transform existing markets or 
industries and on which many incremental innovations are developed. For 
example, Lam ( 2005 ) and Lam and Lundvall ( 2006 ) argue that Mintzberg’s 
( 1979 , 1983)  ‘operating adhocracy’ form of  organization, which relies on 
networks of  professional experts and the creation of  ad hoc project teams, 
is especially adapted to developing novel or radical innovations characteris-
tic of  new emerging technologies. The fi rms of  Silicon Valley provide good 
examples of  this organizational form (Bahrami and Evans 2000; Saxenian 
1996). In contrast, it is widely asserted in the literature on the Japanese fi rm 
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that its organizational design is especially suited for progressive or incremental 
improvements in product quality and design (Aoki  1990 ; Coriat  1991 ; Womack 
et al.  1990 ). The Japanese organization relies on fi rm- specifi c knowledge that 
is embedded in the fi rm’s organizational routines and relatively stable team 
structures for continuous product and process improvement. 
 Since the business practices and forms of  work organization captured in 
our discretionary learning and lean clusters correspond rather closely to those 
that characterize the ‘operating adhocracy’ and the ‘Japanese- fi rm’, this lit-
erature led us to anticipate diff erences in the relative frequency of  radical and 
incremental innovations in a nation depending on the relative prevalence of  
the discretionary learning and lean forms of  work organization. Developing 
empirical indicators to identify radical and incremental modes of  innova-
tion is problematic, however. Survey manuals, such as the Oslo Manual that 
provide the basis of  the CIS questions, do not propose guidelines for how 
to measure radical innovations. This makes it diffi  cult to bring survey- based 
evidence to bear on the various propositions developed in the organizational 
literature. 
 Our typology of  innovation modes captures a diff erent but related distinc-
tion in the nature of  innovation by distinguishing between fi rms that have 
developed in- house, ‘new- to- market’ product or process innovations (lead 
innovators) versus fi rms that have only introduced ‘new to fi rm’ innovations 
that were partly or entirely developed outside the fi rm (technology modifi ers 
and technology adopters). This distinction is not identical to the diff erence 
between radical and incremental innovations, since not all ‘new- to- market’ 
innovations will have major transformative impacts on markets or indus-
tries. However, there are large diff erences along the continuum between lead 
innovators and technology adopters in each fi rm’s capacity to explore new 
knowledge, which is conceptually similar (although on a diff erent scale) to the 
diff erence between radical and incremental innovations. 
 In order to provide evidence that bears on the proposed link between orga-
nizational practices and innovation modes, in this section we start by present-
ing a series of  scatter plot diagrams showing, for all sectors, the correlations 
between the frequency of  the four innovation modes and the frequency of  the 
discretionary learning, lean and Taylorist forms of  work organization for the 
14 EU nations for which data are available. We then present separate sets of  
correlations for manufacturing and for services. 15 
 Figure 8.1 presents the results of  this exercise for the discretionary learn-
ing (DL) form of  work organization. The main result is that there is a positive 
correlation between discretionary learning and the frequency of  the two inno-
vation modes for which the levels of  novelty and creative in- house eff ort are 
the highest, the lead innovators and modifi ers, while there is a negative cor-
relation between discretionary learning and the frequency of  noninnovators. 
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Furthermore, the strongest positive correlation is between lead innovators and 
discretionary learning, with an  R 2 of  0.39. 16 
 Figure 8.2 presents the same analysis using the frequency  of  the lean form 
of  work organization. The results tend to go in the opposite direction of  those 
for discretionary learning. Thus they show a negative correlation between the 
frequency of  the lean form and the frequency of  the two innovation modes, 
which depend on in- house creative eff ort for innovation, and a positive cor-
relation with the frequency of  adopters and noninnovators. 17 
 Figure 8.3 shows that the frequency of  the Taylorist forms of  work orga-
nization is negatively correlated with the frequency of  lead innovators and 
positively correlated with the frequency of  noninnovators. The correlations 
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 Figure 8.1  Correlations between innovation modes and discretionary learning, all 
sectors 
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 These results provide support for the view that there are systemic links 
between the way work is organized in a nation and the distribution of  diff er-
ent innovation modes. 18 More specifi cally, the positive correlation between dis-
cretionary learning and the frequency of  lead innovators provides support for 
the hypothesis developed in the qualitative literature that the forms of  work 
organization characteristic of  operating adhocracies support the exploration 
of  new knowledge that is needed for creative, in- house innovative activities 
that can lead to the development of  new- to- market innovations and possibly 
radical innovations. 
 The results, however, are unexpected in two respects. First, while the nega-
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the positive correlation between Taylorism and noninnovators are consistent 
with the ideas developed in the organizational design literature; the correla-
tions are relatively weak compared to those observed for the discretionary 
learning and lean forms of  work organization. One possible explanation for 
this is that our employee level data is picking up that some innovating fi rms 
use Taylorist work organization for production operations while discretionary 
learning is practised in more knowledge- intensive activities. If  this were the 
case, there would be little reason to expect variations in its use to be strongly 
correlated with innovation mode. This possibility is further explored below in 
the section comparing manufacturing and services. 
 Second, while the negative correlations shown in  Figure 8.2 between the 
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 Figure 8.3  Correlations between innovation modes and Taylorist organization, all 
sectors 
206
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE206
consistent with our reading of  the organizational design literature, the negative 
correlation with the frequency of  modifi ers is not.  Based on the Japanese expe-
rience, we expected the frequency of  the  lean forms to be positively correlated 
with the prevalence of  technology modifi ers, which are dominated by innova-
tion based on minor incremental improvements. Furthermore, the results in 
 Table 8.2 show that employees subject to the lean forms of  work organization 
report above average rates of  problem solving and learning. Nevertheless, the 
negative correlation with the frequency of  technology modifi ers is the highest 
observed (R 2 value of  0.44) while the lean forms are positively correlated with 
the prevalence of  fi rms that either do not innovate or only innovate through 
adopting new technology. Firms grouped in this latter category do not need to 
invest very much in exploring new knowledge in order to innovate. 19 
 The lack of  a positive correlation between the lean form of  work organiza-
tion and the prevalence of  modifi ers could be due to limitations with the data. 
However, an alternative possibility is that the lean model could have been adopted 
by European fi rms as a more effi  cient alternative to Taylorism, without adopt-
ing the Japanese emphasis on the delegation of  decision- making responsibility to 
shop- fl oor employees. Under these conditions, the problem solving and learning 
tasks reported by employees subject to lean organization could be severely limited 
by the high prevalence of  reported constraints (see  Table 8.2 ), limiting opportu-
nities to suggest or implement incremental improvements. 20 This interpretation 
fi nds support in the fact that monotonous and repetitive work is as frequent or 
even more frequent in the lean production category than it is in Taylorist work 
form. If  true, such restrictions on lean organizational forms could explain part of  
an innovation performance gap between Europe and Japan. 
 8.6  Diff erences between Manufacturing and Services 
 The relationships observed at the level of  national aggregates could be the 
outcome of  contradictory patterns in diff erent parts of  the economy. Due to 
access limitations to the CIS data, we were unable to conduct detailed analy-
ses at the sector level, 21 but it is possible to divide the economy into two main 
sectors – services and manufacturing. Below we present a series of  scatter plot 
diagrams showing, for manufacturing and services separately, the correlations 
between the frequency of  the four innovation modes and the frequency of  the 
discretionary learning, lean and Taylorist forms of  work organization. This 
analysis is interesting since it will also allow us to determine in a preliminary 
manner whether the observed relations between forms of  work organization 
and modes of  innovation display sector specifi cities. 
 Figure 8.4 presents  the correlations between the frequency of  discretionary 
learning and the innovation modes. In both manufacturing and services, the 
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 Figure 8.4  Correlations between discretionary learning and innovation modes for 
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Figure 8.4. (cont.)
frequency of  discretionary learning varies between a low of  about 20 per cent 
and a high of  about 70 per cent. The frequency of  lead innovators tends to 
be somewhat higher in manufacturing than in services and the frequency of  
noninnovators somewhat lower. 
 The relations between the frequency of  discretionary learning and the fre-
quency of  the innovation modes that are observed for all sectors combined are 
for the most part reproduced for manufacturing and for services separately, 
though the positive correlation with lead innovators is somewhat higher for 
manufacturing. The results support the basic conclusion about the positive 
relation between the use of  discretionary learning and fi rms’ capacities for 
knowledge exploration and innovation. 
 Figure 8.5 presents scatter plot diagrams showing the correlations between 
the frequency of  use of  lean organization and the innovation modes. 
Manufacturing and services exhibit some noticeable diff erences, with services 
displaying stronger negative correlations between the frequency of  lean orga-
nization and the frequencies of  both lead innovators and modifi ers, and a 
stronger positive correlation between the frequency of  lean organization and 
the frequency of  noninnovators. The results suggest that while the lean forms 
of  work organization are poorly suited to the requirements of  knowledge 
exploration and innovation in general, this is especially the case for services. 
One possible explanation for this pertains to the coverage of  CIS- 3, which 
excludes retailing, hotels and restaurants and personal services and so is rela-
tively weighted to the more knowledge- intensive service sectors such as busi-
ness and fi nancial services. Some of  the defi ning characteristics of  lean work 
organization, such as strong hierarchical and norm- based constraints on work 
pace, may be especially unsuited to the dynamics of  knowledge exploration 
and innovation in these service sectors. 
   209




























































































































































































% Adopter by % lean in services
 Figure 8.5  Correlations between innovation modes and lean organization for manu-
facturing and services 
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Figure 8.5 (cont.)
 Figure 8.6 shows the correlations between the  frequency of  Taylorist forms 
of  work organization and the innovation modes. The diff erences between 
manufacturing and services are even more striking than for the case of  the 
lean forms of  work organization. While there is no obvious relation between 
the frequency of   Taylorism and the frequency of  the innovation modes for 
services, there is a statistically signifi cant negative correlation between the 
frequency of  Taylorism and the frequency of  lead innovators and a com-
parably strong positive correlation between  Taylorism and the frequency of  
noninnovators. This diff erence between manufacturing and services might 
be accounted for along the lines suggested above. Although the frequency of  
use of  Taylorist methods of  work organization varies considerably across EU 
nations, it is relatively low in the service sectors with an average frequency 
of  less than 9 per cent. This low frequency of  use of   Taylorism could simply 
refl ect the fact that within the service sectors under consideration, Taylorist 
work methods are primarily used for ancillary operations within fi rms that 
are predominately organized according to either the discretionary learning or 
lean principles of  work organization. Under these circumstances, there would 
be little reason to expect that variations in the use of  Taylorism would be 
sharply correlated with the frequency of  each innovation mode. A fuller treat-
ment of  this question would require access to disaggregated data. 
 8.7  Conclusion 
 This chapter develops a set of  EU- wide aggregate measures that are used to 
explore, at the level of  the national innovation system, the relation between 
innovation and the organization of  work. Although our data can only show 
correlations rather than causality and are aggregated at the national level, they 
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Figure 8.6 (cont.)
support the view that the way work is organized is highly nation- specifi c and 
that it coevolves with an equally highly nation- specifi c distribution of  diff erent 
modes of  innovation. 
 Before going further in terms of  conclusions, we need to introduce some 
caveats. Both the dataset behind the work organization analysis and the 
dataset behind the pattern of  innovation modes are from surveys pursued 
in parallel in the EU- 15: in the fi rst case addressed to employees and in the 
second to management. There are obvious problems with interpreting sur-
vey data emanating from diff erent countries. Diff erent responses to the same 
question may refl ect national ‘cultural’ diff erences rather than real existing 
diff erences. For instance the big gap in the share of  innovative fi rms between 
Germany and the United Kingdom calls for closer scrutiny. Another issue is 
if  the substantial diff erences, both in terms of  work organization and innova-
tion modes, between the two Nordic countries of  Denmark and Finland are 
real or refl ect diff erent attitudes among employees and managers. Finding 
new ways to ‘triangulate’ results of  national surveys with the aim to make 
them more reliable – for instance by combining detailed case studies with 
testing questionnaire responses in diff erent countries – is a major challenge. 
Until we get more reliable methods, we must work on the assumption that 
the observed national diff erences are either real or that the cultural biases 
equally aff ect the responses from employees and from managers. With this 
in mind, we will point to what we see as the main fi ndings and their implica-
tions for future research, indicator work and public policy. 
 A fi rst major fi nding is that in nations where work is organized to support 
high levels of  discretion in solving complex problems, fi rms tend to be more 
active in terms of  innovations developed through their own in- house creative 
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eff orts. In countries where learning and problem solving on the job are con-
strained and little discretion is left to the employee, fi rms tend to engage in a 
supplier- dominated innovation strategy. Their technological renewal depends 
more on the absorption of  innovations developed elsewhere. The negative 
correlation between ‘lean production’ and ‘modifi er innovation’ raises impor-
tant questions about how successful European fi rms have been able to make 
the J- form of  organization support innovation. Our analysis gives rise to new 
hypotheses on how management techniques such as job rotation and team-
work are related to innovation. They point to a need to develop analytical 
concepts that can link workplace organization and the dynamics of  innovation 
at the level of  the fi rm. 
 Second, the results indicate that learning and interaction within the orga-
nizations and at workplaces are at least as important for innovation perfor-
mance as learning through interactions with external agents. Therefore, in 
order to understand national systems of  innovation, it is necessary to bring 
the organization of  work into the analysis. Early conceptions of  national 
innovation systems were built on an analysis of  interactive learning between 
producers and users. Now the analysis needs to be founded also on an under-
standing of  how people interact and learn at the workplace in diff erent 
national economies. 
 A third implication is that the indicators for innovation need to do more 
than capture material inputs such as R&D expenditures and human capital 
inputs, such as the quality of  the available pool of  skills based on the num-
ber of  years of  education. Indicators also need to capture how these mate-
rial and human resources are used and whether or not the work environment 
promotes the further development of  the knowledge and skills of  employees. 
One step towards more adequately addressing the relation between orga-
nization and innovation is to gather and analyse complementary fi rm- level 
data on both innovation modes and organizational forms. One option is to 
develop better indicators of  organizational innovation and practices in future 
CIS surveys, as proposed by the third revision of  the Oslo Manual in 2005. 
The CIS could respond to some of  the limitations inherent in relying on the 
employee- level data of  the European Survey on Working Conditions by sup-
plying establishment- level data on the way knowledge fl ows and knowledge 
sharing are organized within fi rms and how they relate to other aspects of  
corporate strategy. 
 Fourth, some tentative policy implications may be drawn from the analy-
sis. Though based on simple correlations that cannot establish a causal rela-
tion, our results suggest that European policy eff orts to improve innovation 
performance as part of  the revised Lisbon strategy need to take a close look 
at the eff ects of  organizational practices on innovation. The bottleneck to 
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improving the innovative capabilities of  European fi rms might not be low 
levels of  R&D expenditures, but the widespread presence of  working envi-
ronments that are unable to provide a fertile atmosphere for innovation. 
If  this is the case, European policy should make a major eff ort to develop 
policy instruments that could stimulate the adoption of  ‘pro- innovation’ 
organizational practice, particularly in countries with poor innovative 
performance. 
 Finally, a striking result is that there are fundamental diff erences between 
the countries with respect to both in how work is organized and in how fi rms 
innovate. These diff erences remain after controlling for diff erences in industrial 
structure. It is a major challenge for future research to understand the underly-
ing ‘unexplained’ national factors that infl uence fi rms’ organizational (work 
organization) choices as well as their innovation performance. Preliminary 
analysis suggests that some specifi c variables refl ecting institutional diff erences 
among the countries are quite strongly correlated with the prevalence of  dis-
cretionary learning (levels of  trust, labour market and welfare- state charac-
teristics as well as frequency of  vocational training). We have chosen not to 
introduce these issues here since it would require a thorough analysis of  the 
role of  institutions in shaping national systems of  innovation. Such an analysis 
is a major challenge for future research. 
 We hope our results will widen the debate and stimulate further theoretical 
work and comparative research exploring the links between organizational 
forms, innovative performance and the institutional context within Europe. 
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 Appendix 1 Organizational Variables Used in Factor Analysis 
Variable Mean
Teamwork 1 if  your job involves doing all or part of  
your work in a team, 0 otherwise
64.2
Job rotation 1 if  your job involves rotating tasks between 
yourself  and colleagues, 0 otherwise
48.9
Quality norms 1 if  your main paid job involves meeting 
precise quality standards, 0 otherwise
74.4
Discretion in fi xing work 
methods
1 if  you are able to choose or change your 
methods of  work, 0 otherwise
61.7
Discretion in setting 
work pace
1 if  you are able to choose or change your 




1 if  on the whole your pace of  work 





1 if  on the whole your pace of  work is 
dependent on the direct control of  your 
boss, 0 otherwise
38.9
Norm- based constraints 
on work pace
1 if  on the whole your pace of  work is 
dependent on the numerical production 
targets, 0 otherwise
38.7
Automatic constraints on 
work pace
1 if  on the whole your pace of  work is 
dependent on the automatic speed of  a 





1 if  the employee’s main paid job involves 
assessing him or herself  the quality of  his 




1 if  your job involves solving unforeseen 
problems on your own, 0 otherwise
79.3
Learning new things 1 if  your job involves learning new things on 
your own, 0 otherwise
71.4
Task Complexity 1 if  your job involves complex tasks, 0 
otherwise
56.7
Task monotony 1 if  your job involves monotonous tasks, 0 
otherwise
42.4
Task repetitiveness 1 if  your work involves short repetitive tasks 
of  less than one minute, 0 otherwise
24.9
216
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE216
 Appendix 2 Graphical Representation of  Factor Analysis – 15 
Organizational Variables 
 The fi gure above presents graphically the fi rst two axes or factors of  the mul-
tiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The fi rst factor or axis, accounting for 
18% of  the inertia or chi- squared statistic, distinguishes between Taylorist and 
‘post- Taylorist’ organizational forms. Thus on one side of  the axis we fi nd the 
variables measuring autonomy, learning, problem- solving and task complexity 
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 Figure A8.1  Forms of  work organization 
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the variables measuring monotony and the various factors constraining work 
pace, notably those linked to the automatic speed of  equipment or fl ow of  
products and to the use of  quantitative production norms. The second fac-
tor or axis, accounting for 15% of  the chi- squared statistic, is structured by 
two groups of  variables characteristic of  the lean production model: fi rst, the 
use of  teams and job rotation, which are associated with the importance of  
horizontal constraints on work pace, and second, those variables measuring 
the use of  quality management techniques, which are associated with what we 
have called ‘automatic’ and ‘norm- based’ constraints. The third factor, which 
accounts for 8 per cent of  the chi- squared statistic, is also structured by these 
two groups of  variables. However, it brings into relief  the distinction between, 
on the one hand, those organizational settings characterized by team work, 
job rotation and horizontal interdependence in work, and, on the other hand, 
those organizational settings where the use of  quality norms, automatic and 
quantitative norm- based constraints on work pace are important. The second 
and third axes of  the analysis demonstrate that the simple dichotomy between 
Taylorist and lean organizational methods is not suffi  cient for capturing the 
organizational variety that exists across European nations. 
 The projection of  the centre of  gravity of  the four organizational clusters 
coming out of  the hierarchical classifi cation analysis (see  Table 8.2 ) onto the 
graphic representation of  the fi rst two factors of  the MCA shows that the four 
clusters correspond to the quite diff erent working conditions. The discretion-
ary learning cluster is located to the east of  the graph, the lean cluster to the 
south, the Taylorist cluster to the west and the traditional cluster to the north. 
 Notes 
 1  We ignore here the eff ect of  organizational forms that provide fi nancial or other incen-
tives to employees to innovate. 
 2  Results for the United Kingdom were provided by the Department of  Trade and 
Industry and results for Denmark by the Danish Centre for Studies in Research and 
Research Policy. 
 3  This section draws extensively from Lorenz and Valeyre (2005). 
 4  The initial fi ndings of  the survey are presented in a European Foundation report by 
D. Merllié and P. Paoli [2001]. 
 5  Mintzberg also refers to a third bureaucratic form, the ‘divisionalized’ form. Unlike the 
other four confi gurations, he describes it as a partial structure superimposed on others 
(i.e. divisions); each of  which is driven towards the machine bureaucracy. 
 6  The term J- form is used because its archetypical practices and forms of  work organiza-
tion are best illustrated by the ‘Japanese- type’ organization discussed in the work of  
Aoki (1988) and Nonaka and Takeuchi ( 1995 ). 
 7  For the questions and coding used to construct the measures on which the statistical 
analysis is based, see Appendix 1. 
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 8  The factor analysis method used here is multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), which 
is especially suitable for the analysis of  categorical variables. Unlike principal compo-
nents analysis where the total variance is decomposed along the principal factors or 
components, in multiple correspondence analysis the total variation of  the data matrix 
is measured by the usual chi- squared statistic for row- column independence, and it is the 
chi- squared statistic that is decomposed along the principal factors. It is common to refer 
to the percentage of  the ‘inertia’ accounted for by a factor. Inertia is defi ned as the value 
of  the chi- squared statistic of  the original data matrix divided by the grand total of  the 
number of  observations. (See J. P. Benzecri ( 1973 ); Greenacre ( 1993 , 24– 31)). 
 9  For a graphical presentation of  the positions of  the centres of  gravity for the clusters on 
the fi rst two factors of  the MCA, see Appendix 2. 
 10  The percentages are weighted. 
 11  A third model, which included controls of  age, gender and a measure of  the importance 
of  further education received by the employee, gave substantially the same results. The 
only diff erences were that working in Austria becomes a signifi cant predictor of  the 
likelihood of  working under the discretionary learning forms; working in Portugal is no 
longer a signifi cant predictor of  the likelihood of  working under the lean forms, and 
working in Finland or Austria is no longer signifi cant negative predictor of  the likeli-
hood of  working under the traditional forms. 
 12  As an example, the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard fi nds a 2.5 fold diff erence 
between the best and worst EU- 15 member states on the Summary Innovation Index. 
 13  CIS- 3 did not include fi rms in several sectors covered in the Third Working Conditions 
Survey: construction (NACE 45) and several service sectors:  retail trade (NACE 52), 
automobile trade and repair (NACE 50), hotels and restaurants (NACE 55), some busi-
ness services (NACE 74.1 and NACE 74.4 to 74.8) and personal services (NACE 90 to 
93). However CIS- 3 did include wholesale trade (NACE 51). The main eff ect is that the 
CIS innovation modes data will underestimate the percentage of  fi rms with traditional 
forms of  work organization (see below, pp.). 
 14  Data are available for all EU member nations in 2000 with the exception of  Ireland. 
The original Arundel, Hollanders and Crowley classifi cation makes a further distinc-
tion between lead innovators that make continuous use of  R&D and are active on 
national or international markets and lead innovators that make only occasional use 
of  R&D and/ or are only active on local or regional markets. Since our interest is the 
relation between forms of  work organization and the capacity for creative in- house 
development of  novel products or processes regardless of  R&D expenditures or the 
scope of  markets, we have merged these two categories into a single ‘lead innovator’ 
group. For full details on the methodology for innovation modes, see Annex B of  the 
Trend Chart document ‘EXIS: An Exploratory Approach to Innovation Scoreboards’ 
available at  http:// trendchart.cordis.lu/ scoreboards/ scoreboard2004/ pdf/ EXIS.pdf ). 
 15  In order to calculate the correlations on the basis of  survey samples, which are har-
monized to the fullest extent possible, fi rms from construction (NACE 45), hotels and 
restaurants (NACE 55) and personal services (NACE 90 to 93) have been excluded from 
the Working Conditions Survey sample. 
 16  The correlations between the frequency of  discretionary learning and the frequencies 
of  lead innovators and noninnovators are signifi cant at the .05 level. 
 17  All these correlations are signifi cant at the .05 level or better with the exception of  the 
positive correlation between lean and the frequency of  adopters, which is signifi cant at 
the .10 level. 
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 18  The innovation modes are only weakly correlated with the frequency of  the traditional 
forms of  work organization (R- squared less than .10 in all cases). 
 19  Some investment in learning will nevertheless be required, both to select the new tech-
nology to adopt and to adapt employee skills and competences to its use. 
 20  The vast literature on the transfer of  Japanese management practices by Japanese mul-
tinationals to their affi  liates located in Europe and the United States and during the 
1980s and 1990s provides evidence relevant to this issue. Most of  this literature argues 
that Japanese management practices are modifi ed in the process of  transfer resulting 
in hybrid organizational forms combining elements of  work organization and HRM 
practices characteristic of  the host country. See Kenney and Florida  1993 ; Liker et al. 
 1992 ; Oliver and Wilkinson  1992 . For evidence on the limited delegation of  decision- 
making authority to shop- fl oor personnel in Japanese transplants located in the United 
Kingdom, see Lorenz ( 2000 ); Doeringer et al. ( 2003 ). 
 21  Access to CIS- 3 data was restricted, with the results for innovation mode calculated 
in- house by Eurostat and by national statistical offi  ces at our request. Both lacked the 
resources to conduct detailed analyses at a highly disaggregated sector level. Since then, 
the micro CIS- 3 data for some countries can by analysed by researchers on site at 
Eurostat, but unfortunately the micro data for most of  the original EU- 15 countries are 
still unavailable. 
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 Chapter 9 
 POSTSCRIPT: INNOVATION SYSTEM 
RESEARCH; WHERE IT CAME FROM 
AND WHERE IT MIGHT GO 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 9.1  Introduction 
 When the fi rst edition of  this book 1 was published in 1992, the concept of  
‘national innovation system’ was known only by a handful of  scholars and 
policymakers. Over a period of  15 years, there has been a rapid and wide 
diff usion of  the concept. Giving ‘Google’ the text strings ‘national innovation 
system(s)’ and ‘national system(s) of  innovation’ you end up with almost one 
million references. Going through the references, you fi nd that most of  them 
are recent and that many of  them are related to innovation policy eff orts at the 
national level while others refer to new contributions in social science. 
 Using Google Scholar (May 2007), we fi nd that more than 2,000 scien-
tifi c publications have referred to the diff erent editions of  Lundvall (1992). 
Economists, business economists, economic historians, sociologists, political 
scientists and especially economic geographers have utilized the concept to 
explain and understand phenomena related to innovation and competence 
building. 2 
 In this chapter we argue that  during the process of  diff usion there has been 
a  distortion of  the concept as compared to the original versions as developed 
by Christopher Freeman and the IKE group in Aalborg. Often policymakers 
and scholars have applied a narrow understanding of  the concept and this has 
given rise to so- called ‘innovation paradoxes’, which leave signifi cant elements 
of  innovation- based economic performance unexplained. 
 Such a bias is refl ected in studies of  innovation that focus on science- based 
innovation and on the  formal technological infrastructure and in policies aim-
ing almost exclusively at stimulating R&D eff orts in hi- tech sectors. 
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 Without a broad defi nition of  the national innovation system encompassing individual, 
organizational and interorganizational learning, it is impossible to establish the link from 
innovation to economic growth. A double focus is needed where attention is given 
not only to the science infrastructure but also to institutions/ organizations 
that support  competence building in labour markets, education and working life. 
This is especially important in the current era of  the  globalizing learning econ-
omy (Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ; Lundvall and Borras  1998 ; Archibugi and 
Lundvall  2001 ). 
 We see one major reason for this distortion in the uncomfortable coex-
istence in international organizations such as OECD and the European 
Commission of  the innovation system approach and the much more narrow 
understanding of  innovation emanating from standard economics (Eparvier 
 2005 ). Evolutionary processes of  learning where agents are transformed and 
become more diverse in terms of  what they know and what they know how to 
do are not reconcilable with the rational ‘representative agents’ that populate 
the neoclassical world (Dosi 1999). Actually, we regard the neglect of  ‘learning 
as competence building’ as the principal weakness of  standard economics and 
the narrow defi nitions of  innovation systems as refl ecting a negative spillover 
from this misdirected abstraction. 
 Both ‘Mode 2 knowledge production’ (Gibbons et  al.  1994 ) and the 
‘Triple Helix’ approach focus on science and the role of  universities in inno-
vation. When they present themselves or are applied by policymakers, not as 
analysing a subsystem within but as full- blown alternatives to the innovation 
system approach (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff   1995 ; Etzkowitz; Leydesdorff  
 2000 ), these approaches contribute to the distortion. These perspectives 
capture processes  linking science and technology to innovation; below we 
refer to this as  STI learning . The fact that science and codifi ed knowledge 
become increasingly important for more and more fi rms in diff erent indus-
tries – including the so- called low- tech ones –  does not imply that experience- based 
learning and tacit knowledge have become less important for innovation. To bring 
innovations, including science- based innovations to the market, organiza-
tional learning, industrial networks as well as employee participation and 
competence building are more important than ever. We refer to these pro-
cesses as  DUI learning . 
 Section 9.2 takes a brief  look at how the concept National System of  
Innovation (NSI) came about and developed on the general background of  
the history of  innovation research. 3  Section 9.3 confronts the theoretical foun-
dations of  the concept with standard economics;  section 9.4 defi nes analytical 
challenges.  Section 9.5 relates the concept to economic development, inequal-
ity and sustainability. The chapter ends with the concluding  section 9.6 . As 
mentioned, the literature on innovation systems has grown exponentially over 
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the last 15 years, and what follows does not aim at a full and fair survey of  the 
literature. The issues raised and the sources cited refl ect my own priorities. 
 9.2  A Concept with Roots Far Back in History 
 9.2.1  Milestones in the development of  the innovation 
system concept 
 Basic ideas behind the concept ‘national systems of  innovation’ go back to 
Friedrich List ( 1841 ). 4 His concept of  ‘national systems of  production’ took 
into account a wide set of  national institutions including those engaged in 
education and training as well as infrastructure such as networks for trans-
portation of  people and commodities (Freeman 1995a). To the best of  my 
knowledge, the fi rst written contribution that used the concept ‘national sys-
tem of  innovation’ was the unpublished paper by Christopher Freeman from 
1982 that he produced for the OECD expert group on Science, Technology 
and Competitiveness (Freeman 1982, 18). 5 Here he takes Friedrich List as one 
central point of  reference. 
 Box 9.1  Regional, Sectoral, Technological and 
Corporate Systems 
 Over the last decade several new concepts representing the systemic per-
spective on innovation have been developed. The literature on ‘regional 
systems of  innovation’ has grown rapidly since the middle of  the 1990s 
(Cooke  1996 ; Maskell and Malmberg  1997 ). Bo Carlsson with colleagues 
from Sweden developed the concept ‘technological systems’ in the begin-
ning of  the 1990s (Carlsson and Stankiewitz  1991 ). Franco Malerba with 
colleagues from Italy has developed the concept of  ‘sectoral systems of  
innovation’ (Breschi and Malerba  1997 ). Ove Granstrand has proposed the 
‘corporate innovation system’ as a perspective. Some of  the crucial ideas 
inherent in the innovation system concept such as vertical interaction and 
innovation as an interactive process are central also in the literature on 
industrial clusters by Porter and colleagues. 
 Of  these diff erent perspectives, the regional system approach is the one 
that resembles most the original versions of  the national system of  inno-
vation. It has in common with the NSI approach that it uses the fact that 
some knowledge is local and tacit to explain that innovation systems are 
localized. Also, both approaches attempt to explain economic performance 
of  geographical entities. The corporate system perspective may also have 
economic performance at focus at the level of  the single enterprise. 
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 The other perspectives aim at explaining the innovation process in rela-
tion to specifi c technologies and sectors. The analysis of  technological sys-
tems has been especially useful in analysing how new technologies emerge. 
The sectoral system approach is unique among the diff erent approaches 
in not defi ning as analytical object a vertically integrated system. The 
approach may be seen as the outcome of  a cross fertilization between 
industrial and innovation economics. 
 In the beginning of  the 1980s, the idea of  a national system of  innova-
tion was immanent in the work of  several economists studying innovation. 
Richard R. Nelson together with other US scholars had compared technol-
ogy  policy and institutions in the high- tech fi eld in the United States with 
Japan and Europe (Nelson  1984 ). Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
at Sussex University pursued several studies comparing industrial develop-
ment in Germany and the United Kingdom covering, for instance, diff er-
ences in the management of  innovation, work practices and engineering 
education. 
 The idea of  a national system of  innovation was immanent also in the 
research program pursued by the IKE group at Aalborg University. 6 In several 
working papers and publications from the fi rst half  of  the 1980s, we referred 
to ‘the innovative capability of  the national system of  production’. The hand-
ier ‘innovation system’ appears for the fi rst time in  Product Innovation and User- 
Producer Interaction (Lundvall  1985 ) but without the adjective ‘national’. Again, 
it was Christopher Freeman who brought the modern version of  the full con-
cept ‘national innovation system’ into the literature. He did so in 1987 in his 
book on innovation and innovation policy in Japan (Freeman  1987 ). 
 When Freeman collaborated with Nelson and Lundvall in the project 
on technical change and economic theory supported by the International 
Federation of  Institutes for Advanced Study (IFIAS), the outcome was a book 
(Dosi et al.  1988 ) with a section having several chapters on ‘national systems 
of  innovation’ (Freeman  1988 ; Lundvall  1988 ; Nelson  1988 ). After that fol-
lowed three major edited volumes on the subject (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 
1993; Edquist  1997 ). 7 
 The innovation system concept may be regarded as a practical tool for 
designing innovation policy, but it might also be seen as a synthesis of  analyti-
cal results produced by scholars working on understanding innovation. In this 
section, we give a brief  review of  the history of  innovation research with focus 
on how diff erent generations of  economists have contributed to the modern 
understanding of  innovation systems. 
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 9.2.2  Innovation research starting with Adam Smith 
 The idea that  innovation matters for economic development is present in the 
work of  the classical economists. Innovation plays an important role in the 
introduction to Adam Smith’s classical work on the  Wealth of  Nations . It is espe-
cially interesting to note that he identifi es and distinguishes  two diff erent modes of  
innovation (see  Box 9.2 ). 
 Box 9.2  Adam Smith on Innovation and Modes of  
Learning 
 Adam Smith ( 1776 , 8) on the DUI- mode of  learning: 
 A great part of  the machines made use of  in those manufactures in which labour is most 
subdivided, were originally the invention of  common workmen, who, being each of  them 
employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards fi nding 
out easier and readier methods of  performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to 
visit such manufactures, must frequently have been shown very pretty machines, which 
were the inventions of  such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own par-
ticular part of  the work. In the fi rst fi re engines, a boy was constantly employed to open 
and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as 
the piston either ascended or descended. One of  those boys, who loved to play with his 
companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of  the valve which opened 
this communication to another part of  the machine, the valve would open and shut without 
his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself  with his play- fellows. One of  the 
greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine, since it was fi rst invented, 
was in this manner the discovery of  a boy who wanted to save his own labour. 
 Adam Smith ( 1776 , 9) on the STI- mode of  learning: 
 All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of  those 
who had occasion to use the  machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenu-
ity of  the makers of  the machines, when to make them became the business of  a peculiar 
trade; and some by that of  those who are called philosophers, or men of  speculation, whose 
trade it is not to do anything, but to observe everything, and who, upon that account, are 
often capable of  combining together the powers of  the most distant and dissimilar objects. 
In the progress of  society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, 
the principal or sole trade and occupation of  a particular class of  citizens. Like every other 
employment, too, it is subdivided into a great number of  diff erent branches, each of  which 
aff ords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of  philosophers; and this subdivision of  
employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves 
time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done 
upon the whole, and the quantity of  science is considerably increased by it.’ 
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 The fi rst mode is experience based, and I will refer to it as the DUI- mode – 
learning by doing, using and interacting. The other mode refers to science- 
based research processes and I will refer to it as the STI- mode – science is seen 
as the fi rst step towards technology and innovation. In this chapter, we will 
argue that this distinction is fundamental when it comes to analysing modern 
innovation systems and also when it comes to designing management strategy 
as well as public policy. 8 
 9.2.3  Friedrich List on the need for an active state to build 
innovation systems 
 While Adam Smith was propagating free trade and a liberal economy, the 
German economist Friedrich List disagreed. He characterized Adam Smith’s 
theory as ‘cosmopolitan’ and argued that if  followed by other countries, it 
would just confi rm and reinforce the dominance of  the British Empire in the 
world economy (Reinert  1999 ). 
 He argued that for countries such as Germany, trying to ‘catch up’ with 
the leading economy, there was a need for government intervention. List pre-
sented a broad agenda for government in the building of  infrastructure that 
could contribute to technical advance. It is interesting to note that he referred 
to ‘mental capital’ as the most important kind of  capital. He argued that the 
wealth of  nations more than anything else refl ected ‘ the accumulation of  all dis-
coveries, inventions, improvements, perfections and exertions of  all generations which have 
lived before us ’ (Freeman 1995a, 6). 
 9.2.4  Karl Marx on technological progress 
 The historical parts of   Das Kapital give deep insights into how new technolo-
gies shape the economy and society. The basic assumption in his historical 
analysis that new productive forces may get into confl ict with ‘production rela-
tions’ is a useful guideline for how to study innovation systems. At the micro 
level this corresponds to the fact that radically new technologies cannot fl our-
ish in fi rms ‘locked in’ into old organizational forms and competence sets. At 
the aggregate level it corresponds to the need to transform societal institutions, 
competences and organizations in order to reap the benefi ts of  technological 
revolutions. 9 
 Marx is a pioneer also when it comes to emphasizing the importance both 
of  ‘science as a force of  production’ and ‘technological competition’ where 
fi rms need to engage in innovation in order to gain markets and reduce costs. 
Many of  his insights on the role of  science and technology in relation to the 
economy are very advanced for his time (Rosenberg  1976 ). 
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 9.2.5  Marshall’s contribution 
 Marshall ( 1919 ,  1920 ) is known as one of  the founding fathers of  modern 
neoclassical economics. He was also the one who introduced the concept ‘the 
representative fi rm’ – a concept that has contributed to the lack of  under-
standing of  economic development in modern neoclassical economics. But as 
documented by Metcalfe in a diff erent reading, he may be seen as contributing 
not only to evolutionary understanding of  industrial dynamics in general but 
also to the idea of  a national system of  innovation (Metcalfe 2006, 17). He 
links innovation to management competences, brings the wider institutional 
setting in terms of  diff erent types of  research laboratories into the analysis and 
recognizes that the overall system and mode of  innovation may diff er across 
national borders (19). 
 Marshall’s focus on incremental innovation – rather than on the radical 
innovations as emphasized by Schumpeter  – may be seen as an important 
inspiration for modern innovation research. As will be argued below, any 
attempt to link innovation to economic growth and development not only 
needs to capture radical and incremental innovations but also the ongoing 
processes of  imitation and learning (Arocena and Sutz  2000a ). 
 As with Adam Smith it is possible to discern two types of  mechanisms for 
the advancement of  knowledge and technology and in the case of  Marshall 
they are linked to two types of  ‘innovation systems’. One refers to industrial 
districts where the focus in on experience- based learning (DUI) and the other 
refers to the national system of  research (STI). 
 Marshall is unique in being a potential source of  inspiration both for 
mainstream and evolutionary economics. This refl ects his ambition to 
develop a theory that explains fl uctuations in supply and demand with a 
theory that explains economic development. His method to try to combine 
the short- term static analysis and the evolutionary development where inno-
vation takes place and agents become more competent is to introduce the 
distinction between short period, long period and secular period. Metcalfe 
argues that this should be seen primarily as an attempt to link order and 
change. 
 While the national innovation system approach assumes innovation to be 
a ubiquitous and ongoing process, not to be relegated to ‘the secular period’, 
it also operates with a distinction between order and change. It assumes that 
for national economies there are systemic features in terms of  economic 
structures and relationships as well as institutions that represent continuity 
and order, and that form the environment for innovation processes where 
technical knowledge and the competence of  individuals and organizations 
change. 
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 9.2.6  Joseph Schumpeter as the grandfather of  modern 
innovation theory 
 Joseph Schumpeter is generally seen as the founder of  modern innovation 
research and many scholars who work on innovation would accept to be clas-
sifi ed as neo- Schumpeterian. 10 
 In  Theory of  Economic Development (Schumpeter  1934 ), innovation is seen as 
the major mechanism behind economic dynamics. The dynamo of  the system 
is the individual entrepreneur who introduces innovations in markets and cre-
ates new enterprises. After the pioneers follow imitators and gradually the 
profi ts created by the original wave of  innovation are eroded. 
 In  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter  1942 ), the innovation 
mechanism is quite diff erent. Here the major source of  innovation is not the 
brave individual entrepreneur but the big company with experts working 
together in R&D teams searching for new technological solutions. The distinc-
tion between the two ways to present the motor of  innovation has led scholars 
to refer to  Schumpeter Mark I and  Schumpeter Mark II . 
 We can use some of  Schumpeter’s ideas to inspire our analysis of  innova-
tion systems. First, we might note the important role of  imitation. The overall 
performance of  an innovation system will refl ect not only the pioneers but also 
the capability of  followers. Second, we might revise his analytical scheme and 
regard the total population of  fi rms in a system as including both Mark I and 
Mark II fi rms. We may characterize a specifi c national system as being more 
or less dominated by one type or the other. 
 But at one very important point, Schumpeter’s ideas deviate from the basic 
insights behind the innovation system concept. Schumpeter took an extreme 
position assuming  that the demand side would simply adjust to the supply side . 11 It is 
true that he defi nes the opening of  new markets as one kind of  innovation. 
But in general, consumers and users are assumed to be ready to absorb what-
ever new innovation is brought to them by entrepreneurs or fi rms. Actually, 
it might be argued that the innovation system perspective came out of  a criti-
cism of  Schumpeter’s relative neglect of  the demand side. 
 Schmookler ( 1966 ) opened the debate with taking almost the opposite view 
of  Schumpeter. He used a host of  empirical data on inventions as well as from 
secondary sources to demonstrate that inventions and innovations tend to fl our-
ish in areas where demand is strong and growing. One important outcome of  
the ensuing debate was  a new perspective on innovation as refl ecting the interplay between 
technology push and demand pull . The critical debate of  Schmookler’s empirical 
results confi rmed this new perspective (Mowery and Rosenberg  1979 ). 
 The ‘chain- link model’, where both supply push and demand pull are anal-
ysed in relation to scientifi c knowledge, may be seen as one contribution to the 
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new perspective (Kline and Rosenberg  1986 ). The perspective on innovation 
as a process of  interaction between producers and users may be seen as intro-
ducing its micro- foundation (Lundvall  1985 ). 
 9.2.7  Christopher Freeman as the father of  modern 
innovation theory 
 Christopher Freeman played a key role in stimulating these new theoreti-
cal developments, especially in Europe. 12 In the early 1980s, his lectures to 
PhD students were on Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II and on the contro-
versy between Schumpeter and Schmookler regarding the role of  supply 
and demand in the innovation process. 13 His founding of  SPRU at Sussex 
University in 1966 was a major step towards giving innovation studies a more 
permanent institutional foundation. 
 One important reference in his lectures in the beginning of  the 1980s was 
to the  Sappho- study organized at SPRU (Rothwell 1972, 1977). This study was 
simple but original in design. The research team located a number of  innova-
tion pairs – ‘twins’ in terms of  major characteristics – where one of  the two was 
a success, while the other was a failure. The two innovations were then com-
pared in terms of  characteristics of  the ‘host’ organization. The most important 
result was that the  interaction between departments within the organization and 
interaction with external organization came out as the prerequisites for suc-
cess in innovation. Innovations that took place in fi rms where divisions operated 
without interaction with each other and in fi rms that did not interact with sup-
pliers, users and customers were less successful than the more interactive fi rms. 14 
 Freeman pioneered the vision that innovation should be understood as an 
interactive process, not as a linear one where innovation automatically comes 
out of  R&D eff orts. As mentioned above, Freeman was also the pioneer when 
it came to introducing the concept of  ‘national system of  innovation’ (Freeman 
1982/ 2004). 
 9.2.8  The fl ourishing 1980s 
 The  1980s was a period when innovation research became ‘emancipated’ and 
more ambitious also in confronting basic assumptions in standard econom-
ics. Important work took place in diff erent areas both in Europe and in the 
United States. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete made important contributions to the 
role of  innovation in relation to foreign trade (Dosi et al.  1990 ). Christopher 
Freeman and Soete analysed employment issues in relation to technical inno-
vation (Freeman and Soete  1987 ). Giovanni Dosi established his hypothesis on 
shifts in technological paradigms (Dosi  1984 ). 
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 Box 9.3  Diff erent Perspectives on National Systems 
 Scholars, comparing national systems in terms of  how they diff er in quali-
tative terms and in terms of  how they perform, have developed and made 
use of  diff erent perspectives. The analysis of  the  national competitive advantage 
by Michael Porter borrowed some ideas from the innovation system tradi-
tion – especially the importance of  domestic demand and domestic user 
for product innovation. But he also added unique ideas about the posi-
tive impact of  domestic competition on innovation in specifi c sectors of  
clusters. 
 Whitley’s analysis of   national business systems off ers important inspira-
tion for the analysis of  innovation systems (Whitley  1994 ). The basic idea 
that match and mismatch between diff erent elements of  the system aff ect 
performance and that it is possible to develop a typology of  national sys-
tems are in line with Freeman’s comparison between the Japanese and the 
Anglo- Saxon systems. But Whitley’s analysis is broader, and it introduces 
cultural and social dimensions in the analysis. 
 Similar intentions lay behind the concept of  Social Systems of  innova-
tion (Amable et al.  1997 ). Recent work on the micro- organizational basis 
for learning by Lorenz and Valeyre indicates that the systemic features dis-
tinguishing the taxonomic categories are rooted in diff erent types of  micro- 
organizational structures. 
 In the United States, the Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary economic 
approach to economic growth signalled a more ambitious agenda for inno-
vation research (Nelson and Winter  1982 ). Rosenberg and Kline presented 
the chain- linked model (Kline and Rosenberg  1986 ). Freeman and Lundvall 
developed further ideas about innovation as an interactive process and innova-
tion systems together with Richard Nelson. 
 Box 9.4  Does the Innovation System Have a Function? 
 Edquist ( 2005 ) argues that the NSI concept is vague and unclear and calls 
for making it a more rigorous, systematic and ‘theory- like’ concept. This 
is always a legitimate concern, but it is not obvious that the direction he 
recommends for the eff ort would bring us in this direction. 
 Edquist argues that the innovation system has ‘as general function’ to 
pursue innovation processes. His functionalist approach seems to emanate 
from a version of  system theory as is practiced among engineers (Rickne 
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 2000 ).  We would argue that social systems only have the functions that we assign to 
them . In a normative perspective it could be argued that the function is ‘to 
contribute to economic performance on the basis of  processes of  creation 
and diff usion of  knowledge’. This would correspond to the normative focus 
of  those who pioneered the NSI concept. 
 Edquist lists 10  activities (also referred to as ‘functions’ on p. 189) that 
should be studied in a systematic manner in terms of  their respective 
‘causes and determinants’. The list encompasses quite disparate elements 
including, for instance, forms of  knowledge creation and learning, organi-
zational forms, market demand and public policy instruments. 
 The idea of  studying separately each of  the listed activities reminds 
us somewhat of  Edward Denison’s attempt to reduce the growth residual 
through growth accounting. We can see the listing of  a number of  ‘activi-
ties’ as being potentially useful as establishing a checklist for managers and 
policymakers (Rickne  2000 ). It might also be helpful when comparing mar-
ket with nonmarket economies (Liu and White  2001 ). 
 But in terms of  theoretical understanding, it represents a step back-
wards since much of  what we already know about the innovation process 
is neglected. For instance, the distinction made between the three kinds of  
learning neglects that one of  them (innovation) comes out of  practising 
the other two (R&D and competence building) (Edquist 2005, 191– 92). It 
is therefore not obvious how studying them separately would lead to more 
rigorous theory. 
 These diff erent eff orts merged in two diff erent major projects. One was a 
major book project led by a team consisting of  Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg 
and Soete ( 1988 ). The other major project took place in the policy realm and was 
organized by the Directorate for Science Technology and Industry at OECD. 
Around 1988, Director Chabbal initiated the technology and economics pro-
gram (TEP) with Francois Chesnais as project coordinator and intellectual 
dynamo of  the project. The TEP report integrated many of  the most advanced 
ideas developed among innovation scholars in the 1980s, and it gave innovation 
policy as well as innovation studies a new kind of  legitimacy in all OECD coun-
tries (OECD 1992). The idea that innovation is an interactive process and that 
it is useful to analyse ‘national innovation systems’ was spread to policymakers. 
 While the TEP project gave legitimacy to the innovation system concept 
among policymakers, it did not result in a clean break with the linear model 
where innovation is seen as emanating more or less automatically from science. 
In international organizations, as in national governments, the strong position 
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of  expertise based on standard economics contributed to a narrow interpreta-
tion of  the national system of  innovation. Triple Helix and Mode 2 theories also 
tend to support a perspective where the DUI- mode of  innovation is neglected. 
 9.2.9  Intentions behind the original conceptualization of  
national systems of  innovation 
 As we have seen, the innovation system perspective integrates principal 
results from innovation research. For several of  the protagonists of  the con-
cept, including Freeman and myself, it was seen not only as a tool to explain 
innovation but also as constituting an alternative analytical framework and a 
challenge to standard economics when it comes to explain competitiveness, 
economic growth and development. In the next section we compare the NSI 
perspective with the basic assumptions of  standard economics. 
 Many recent contributions to innovation systems have diff erent and in a 
sense more modest ambitions ‘to explain innovation’ by linking inputs in terms 
of  investment in R&D to outputs in terms of  patents or new products. They 
may emanate from scholars connected to technical universities and business 
schools and have as principal aim to give good advice to business manag-
ers or specialized government agencies. Other contributions, emanating from 
international economic organizations analysing national growth performance 
combine the system perspective with elements of  neoclassical economics. 
Some even utilize production function techniques based on standard econom-
ics assumption, including agents acting on the basis of  rational expectations. 
In this post scriptum, I will stick to the original ambitions when discussing how 
to study national systems of  innovation. 
 9.3  National Innovation System as Analytical 
Focusing Device 
 The innovation system framework is in direct competition with standard econom-
ics when it comes to giving advice to policymakers. In this section we will try to 
present the core theoretical ideas behind the innovation system perspective and 
confront them with those of  standard economics. Our main conclusion is that 
the neglect in standard economics of  ‘learning as competence building’ is a major 
weakness that makes it less relevant for understanding innovation and dynamic 
economic performance, especially in the current era of  the learning economy. 
 9.3.1  Theoretical elements entering into the innovation 
system concept 
 As indicated in the fi rst section the national innovation system approach is 
grounded on empirical fi ndings through the 1970s and 1980s, many of  which 
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emanated from scholars connected to SPRU. Of  special importance were the 
Sappho study and the Pavitt taxonomy (Rothwell 1977; Pavitt  1984 ). The 
Sappho study demonstrated that interaction and feedbacks are crucial for the 
innovation performance of  the fi rm while the Pavitt taxonomy helped to see 
how diff erent sectors interact and play diff erent roles as producers and users 
of  innovation in the overall innovation system. 
 But, the concept also refl ects deductive reasoning explaining the stylized 
facts observed in empirical studies. For instance, on refl ection, it is obvious 
that product innovation could not thrive in an economy with ‘pure markets’ 
characterized by arm’s length and anonymous relationships between the inno-
vating producer and the potential user (Lundvall  1985 ; Lund- Vinding  2002 ; 
Christensen and Lundvall  2004 ). 
 Box 9.5  Is Innovation System a Theory? 
 Edquist has raised the question if  innovation is ‘a theory’, and his response 
has been in the negative. In a sense it is obvious that ‘innovation system’ is 
a concept rather than ‘a general theory’. It is certainly true that it does not 
specify  general laws of  cause and eff ect. But nonetheless this way of  putting 
the question may lead to misleading conclusions for how to proceed with 
research and analytical work in relation to innovation systems. 
 One problem with posing and answering the question is that it is far 
from clear what should be meant with ‘theory’ in social science. As indi-
cated in the earlier section, the innovation system perspective is built on a 
series of  coherent assumptions. It is also true that most of  these assump-
tions are rooted in systematic empirical work and that they can be tested as 
well as rejected by further empirical work. Using the perspective helps to 
see, understand and control phenomena that could not be seen, understood 
or controlled without using this (or a similar) concept. In this sense it does 
what theory is expected to do: it helps to organize and focus the analysis, it 
helps to foresee what is going to happen, it helps to explain what has hap-
pened and it helps to give basis for action. 
 The fact that diff erent scholars work with diff erent delimitations of  the 
components of  the system and with diff erent focus on elements and rela-
tionships does not make the concept less theoretical or scientifi c. In this 
chapter, I will argue in favour of  a ‘broad defi nition of  the NSI’. But this 
argument refl ects a specifi c purpose  – that is, to link innovation to eco-
nomic performance at the national level. It is equally legitimate to pursue 
the analysis with a more narrow perspective – such as the one implicit in 
the triple helix approach – if, for instance, the purpose is to analyse interna-
tional diff erences in the emergence of  science- based technologies. 
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 A more realistic and fertile approach for social science than the aim to 
develop general theory is to combine attempts to build general, valid and 
reliable knowledge about causalities with the insight that social science, by 
defi nition, always will remain historical. In such an endeavour, heuristic 
concepts and focusing devices such as national systems of  innovation may 
play a major role since they off er a broad and fl exible framework for orga-
nizing and interpreting case studies and comparative analyses (Mjøset 2001, 
2002). To develop a ‘general theory’ of  innovation systems that abstracts 
from time and space would therefore undermine the utility of  the concept 
both as an analytical tool and as a policy tool (Shin  2004 ). 
 The only solution to the paradox that product innovations are quite fre-
quent in the market economy is that most markets are not ‘pure’, rather they 
are ‘organized’ and include a mix of  trust, loyalty and power relationships. 
To establish these durable relationships, it is necessary for the parties involved 
to invest in codes and channels of  information – and to build ‘social capital’. 
When it is realized that actual markets are mixed with organizational elements, 
it opens up the possibility that the elements of  organization will diff er between 
national and regional systems. This may be seen as constituting a micro- 
foundation for the innovation systems concept, and it was presented as such 
by Nelson in Dosi et al. ( 1988 ) and in  National Innovation Systems: A Comparative 
Analysis (Nelson 1993). 15 
 Evolutionary economics constitutes a general theoretical framework for the 
analysis of  innovation systems. It is a key assumption in evolutionary econom-
ics that agents and organizational routines diff er and that  diversity is fundamen-
tal for the dynamics of  the system. Innovation creates novelty and diversity in 
the system whereas competition has a double eff ect on diversity. On the one 
hand it stimulates eff orts to innovate, and on the other hand it is a selection 
process that reduces diversity, while some routines are reproduced over time. 
In what follows, we will assume that  evolution in terms of  what people and organiza-
tions know and in terms of  how they learn is especially important for the dynamic perfor-
mance of  the national innovation system . 
 9.3.2  Knowledge and learning 
 In the introduction to  National Innovation Systems: Towards a Theory of  Innovation 
and Interactive Learning (Lundvall 1992), I  stated that ‘the most fundamental 
resource in the modern economy is knowledge and, accordingly, the most 
important process is learning.’ But at that time (1992), our use of  the con-
cepts of  knowledge and learning were not at all well developed. Over the last 
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15 years, the attempts to get a better understanding of  the knowledge- based 
economy and the learning economy have created a more satisfactory theoret-
ical foundation for the understanding of  innovation systems (see, for instance, 
Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ; OECD 2000; Foray  2004 ; Amin and Cohendet 
 2004 ). 
 The understanding has been developed using the basic distinctions between 
information and knowledge, between ‘knowing about the world’ and ‘knowing 
how to change the world’ and between knowledge that is explicit and codi-
fi ed versus knowledge that remains implicit and tacit (Johnson et al.  2002 ). 
In Lundvall and Johnson ( 1994 ), we introduced a distinction between know- 
what, know- why, know- how and know- who that has proved to be useful in 
understanding knowledge creation and learning in innovation systems. These 
distinctions are especially helpful when it comes to contrasting the theoretical 
micro- foundations of  innovation systems with those of  standard economics. 
 If  neoclassical models include learning, it is understood either as getting 
access to more information about the world (know-what) or it is treated as a 
black- box phenomenon as in growth models assuming ‘learning by doing’. 
The very fundamental fact that agents  – individuals as well as fi rms  –  are 
more or less competent (in terms of  know- how and know- why) and are  more or less 
integrated in knowledge- based networks (know- who) is abstracted from – in order 
to keep the analysis simple – and based on ‘representative fi rms’ and agents. 
 This abstraction is most problematic in an economy where the distribution of  competences 
becomes more and more uneven and the capability to learn tends to become the most impor-
tant factor behind the economic success of  people, organizations and regions (Lundvall 
and Johnson  1994 ). 
 9.3.3  The theory behind innovation systems 
 As pointed out, List was critical to the exaggerated focus on allocation as 
opposed to knowledge creation and growth.  Table  9.1 illustrates how the 
analytical framework connected to innovation systems relates to mainstream 
economic theory. The theoretical core of  standard economic theory is about 
rational agents making choices to which well defi ned (but possibly risky) alter-
native outcomes are connected, and the focus of  the analysis is on the alloca-
tion of  scarce resources. As illustrated by  Table 9.1 the emphasis is diff erent in 
the innovation system approach. 
 The analysis of  innovation systems is based on a two- dimensional shift 
of  focus towards the combination of  innovation and learning. While stan-
dard economics is preoccupied with specifying the institutional set- up that 
results in an optimal allocation of  existing resources, we are concerned with 
how diff erent institutional set- ups aff ect the creation of  new resources. While 
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standard economics analyses how agents make choices on the basis of  given 
sets of  information and competences, we are interested in how the knowl-
edge – including both information about the world and know- how of  agents – 
change in the economic process. 
 This double shift in perspective has implications for innovation policy. Just 
to take one example, a policy analysis of  patent races where ‘winner takes it 
all’ will, as far as it neglects the learning and competence building that takes 
place during the race, end up with too restrictive conclusions regarding the 
role of  government in stimulating R&D. 
 9.3.4  The NSI perspective is more complex – not less 
theoretical – than standard economics 
 What has been said obviously implies a more complex theory than standard 
neoclassical economics where it is assumed that all agents have equal access 
to technologies and are equally competent in developing and utilizing them. 
But it would be wrong to conclude that the theory behind innovation systems 
is ‘less theoretical’. 
 Basically, the theory underlying innovation system analysis is about learn-
ing processes involving skilful but imperfectly rational agents and organiza-
tions. It assumes that organizations and agents have a capability to enhance 
their competences through searching and learning, that they do so in interac-
tion with other agents and that this is refl ected in innovation processes and 
outcomes in the form of  innovations and new competences. 
 The methodological dictum within neoclassical economics that a theory 
should be both general and abstract sometimes takes Occam’s razor too far 
leading to negligence of  the concrete and historical. But the most important 
weakness of  neoclassical theory is not that it is too abstract.  It is rather that it 
makes the wrong abstractions . In a context where knowledge is the most important 
resource and learning the most important process, neoclassical theory tends 
to abstract from the very processes that make a diff erence in terms of  the eco-
nomic performance of  fi rms and for the wealth of  nations. 
 Processes of  competence building and innovation are at the focal point in 
innovation system analysis. The focus is on how enduring relationships and 
 Table 9.1  The two- dimensional shift in perspective 
Allocation Innovation
Rational choice Standard neoclassical Project management
Learning Austrian economics Innovation systems
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patterns of  dependence and interaction are established, evolve and dissolve 
as time goes by. New competences are built while old ones are destroyed. At 
each point of  time, discernable patterns of  collaboration and communication 
characterize the innovation system. But, of  course, in the long run, these pat-
terns change in a process of  creative destruction of  knowledge and relation-
ships. A crucial normative issue is how such patterns aff ect the creation of  new 
resources and to what degree they support learning among agents. 
 Box 9.6  Diff erent Meanings of  Learning 
 As any everyday concept, learning has several diff erent connotations. In the 
literature on learning organizations, it is often referred to as  adaptation : as a 
process where agents when confronted with new circumstances register and 
internalize the change and adapt their behaviour accordingly. 
 In education learning is seen as a process of   competence building . It is 
assumed that new competences can be established through education and 
training and thereafter mobilized when coping with and mastering theo-
retical and practical problems. 
 In our analysis of  innovation systems, we see learning as referring both 
to adaptation and competence building. And we emphasize that compe-
tence building takes place also on- the- job through learning by doing, learn-
ing by using and learning by interacting. 
 9.3.5  Standard economics favours narrow interpretation of  
innovation systems 
 Standard economics tends to stick to the idea that only quantitative as opposed 
to qualitative concepts can be accepted as scientifi c (Georgescu- Roegen  1971 ). 
One reason for the bias towards narrow interpretations of  innovation systems is 
that it is much easier to develop quantitative analysis of  R&D and patents than 
it is to measure organizational forms and outcomes of  organizational learning. 
 Standard economics will typically focus on potential market failure and on 
choices to be made between diff erent alternative uses of  scarce resources. In 
the context of  innovation policy, the concern will be, fi rst, if  public rates of  
return are higher that private rates and second, if  the rate of  return of  public 
money is higher in investing in R&D than it would be in other areas of  pub-
lic investment. 16 The very idea that there might be organizational forms that 
are more effi  cient than the ones already in use cannot be reconciled with the 
basic analytical framework where it is assumed that agents, including fi rms, 
are equally rational and competent. 
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 Standard economics will tend to see the market as the ‘natural’, if  not opti-
mal, framework of  human interaction and economic transactions. This leads 
to biased conclusions when considering how to organize the economy (Nelson 
2006). The concept ‘market failure’ refl ects this bias since it indicates that 
other institutional set- ups should be considered only when it is obvious that 
the market cannot do the job. 
 9.4  Challenges for Innovation System Research 
 9.4.1  Causality in a systemic context 
 A major challenge for innovation system analysis is to avoid thinking in terms 
of  mechanical models of  causality and develop theory as well as analytical 
techniques that make it possible to study how diff erent factors interact in a 
systemic context. 
 When studying national systems it is a specifi c challenge for statistical anal-
ysis that the ‘population’ (the number of  nations) is so small and heteroge-
neous. Some statistical procedures will as fi rst approximation look for causality 
patterns that are general for the whole population – for all national systems 
of  innovation. Such procedures are sometimes used in empirical analysis of  
determinants of  economic growth. We believe that other methods are more 
useful when it comes to studying national systems of  innovation. These might 
include clustering procedures dividing the population into diff erent ‘subspe-
cies’ or ‘families’ with common characteristics (level of  development, size, con-
tinental belonging, etc.), and then looking for patterns of  interdependency 
for each of  the diff erent families and fi nally relating this to multidimensional 
indicators of  economic performance. 
 It is, for instance, common to rank the United States at the top of  perfor-
mance together with the small Nordic countries. But it is also well known that 
the US system is fundamentally diff erent from the small Nordic countries in 
terms of  institutions and characteristics (population size, size of  the public 
sector, degree of  inequality, industrial structure and modes of  innovation). 
Therefore, in spite of  the fact that both categories of  countries belong to the 
same species ‘national systems of  innovation’, there is no reason to assume 
that the mechanism linking R&D eff ort to innovation and economic perfor-
mance is the same in the two countries. 
 The idea that the aim of  innovation research is to end up with general 
laws that can be applied equally in all national systems is mistaken. There are 
certain activities that can be linked to innovation and that link innovation to 
economic growth in all systems. But the mechanisms diff er across diff erent 
national systems. This is why theoretical work on national innovation systems 
cannot dispense from historical analysis. 
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 9.4.2  Understanding knowledge and learning 
 One important challenge for innovation system analysis is to deepen the 
understanding of  how diff erent kinds of  knowledge are created and used in 
the process of  innovation. Some elements of  knowledge are local and tacit, 
embodied in people and embedded in organizations. Other elements are 
global, explicit and can easily be transferred from one part of  the world to 
another. Diff erent sectors in the economy and in society make use of  diff er-
ent mixes of  local and global knowledge and in some areas, such as educa-
tion and business consulting, it is especially diffi  cult to codify the know- how 
that consultants and teachers make use of  when they give advice and teach 
(OECD 2000). 
 To understand how learning takes place within organizations as well as in 
the interaction between organizations, it is a key to understand how systems 
of  innovation work. While it is important to study national characteristics in 
terms of  organizations that pursue R&D, it is equally important to understand 
national characteristics in terms of  how fi rms interact with customers and to 
what degree diff erent fi rms give employees access to competence building in 
connection with ongoing economic activities. 
 9.4.3  The coevolution of  the division of  labour, 
interaction and cooperation 
 As pointed out by Adam Smith, a fundamental process in economic develop-
ment and economic growth is the deepening and extension of  the division of  
labour. Specialization within and between organizations makes it possible to 
exploit scale economies and also to focus on competence building so that it can 
advance more rapidly. 
 As the horizontal and vertical division of  labour evolves, it contributes to 
 diversity and diversity feeds innovation. But the growing specialization also cre-
ates new barriers for communication and interaction. This is highly relevant 
because innovation is the outcome of  combining knowledge located at diff erent 
sites (and embodied in diff erent experts) in a specialized innovation system. It 
is well documented that diff erent departments (R&D, production, sales, etc.) 
within a fi rm have diffi  culties understanding and communicating with each 
other. At the individual level, experts with diff erent specialties have diffi  culties 
interacting and understanding each other. The ease to communicate across 
such barriers in a national system with a vertical division of  labour between 
separate organizations is especially interesting because it is here that prod-
uct innovations are developed in an interaction between users and producers 
(Lundvall  2006 ). 
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 It is a major challenge to understand the coevolution of  the division of  
labour and the interaction that takes place within and between organizations. 
In some countries it is much easier to establish cooperation within and/ or 
between organizations than it is in other countries. This will be refl ected in 
the actual division of  labour, and it aff ects the kind of  learning and innovation 
that takes place in the system. 
 Box 9.7  National Patterns in Work Organization 17 
 Table 9.2 originates from a paper by Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2006 ). The four 
organizational models were constructed on the basis of  factor analysis of  
responses to surveys addressed to employees in 15 European countries. 
 Table 9.2  National diff erences in organizational models (per cent of  employees 











Netherlands 64.0 17.2 5.3 13.5
Denmark 60.0 21.9 6.8 11.3
Sweden 52.6 18.5 7.1 21.7
Finland 47.8 27.6 12.5 12.1
Austria 47.5 21.5 13.1 18.0
Centre
Germany 44.3 19.6 14.3 21.9
Luxemb. 42.8 25.4 11.9 20.0
Belgium 38.9 25.1 13.9 22.1
France 38.0 33.3 11.1 17.7
West
UK 34.8 40.6 10.9 13.7
Ireland 24.0 37.8 20.7 17.6
South
Italy 30.0 23.6 20.9 25.4
Portugal 26.1 28.1 23.0 22.8
Spain 20.1 38.8 18.5 22.5
Greece 18.7 25.6 28.0 27.7
EU- 15 39.1 28.2 13.6 19.1
 Source : Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2006 ). 
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 Table  9.1 shows that people working in diff erent national systems of  
innovation and competence building  have very diff erent access to learning by 
doing. It also shows that at lower income levels, there is bigger proportion 
of  the workforce that works in either simple or Taylorist organizations. The 
richer the country, the more workers are employed in discretionary learn-
ing contexts. But it is also important to note that countries at similar income 
levels – Germany and the United Kingdom – have quite diff erent distribu-
tions of  workers between the four forms. While the proportion of  workers 
operating in the lean production is more than 40 per cent in the United 
Kingdom, it is less than 20 per cent in Germany. The micro- foundation of  
national systems of  innovation diff ers not only because of  levels of  income 
but also because of  other systemic features. 
 9.4.4  Firms as sites for employee learning 
 Innovation indicators refl ect outputs such as number of  patents or inputs that 
are easy to measure such as R&D expenditure. When it comes to indicators 
of  knowledge there is a strong bias in favour of  knowledge that is explicit. 
Investment in scientifi c knowledge is measured by surveys on R&D and inno-
vation. The know- how built up through learning by doing, using and inter-
acting is much more diffi  cult to measure. Human capital measurements may 
register formal investment in education but what people learn at the work-
place or as consumers is not easy to capture through standard measurements. 
 The absence of  indicators makes the area less visible for policymakers, and 
this contributes to a bias in innovation policy towards promoting STI rather 
than DUI activities (see  Table 9.2 ). 
 In recent empirical work by Lorenz and Valeyre, it has been shown that there 
are dramatic diff erences between Europe’s national systems in terms of  how and 
how much an average employee learns at their workplace (Lorenz and Valeyre 
 2006 ). While in Denmark a majority of  workers are engaged in ‘discretionary 
learning’ , where they combine learning through problem solving with a certain 
autonomy in their work situation, the majority of  workers in countries such as 
Greece and Spain are engaged in Taylorist type of  work with much more lim-
ited opportunities for learning and with very little autonomy (see  Box 9.7 ). 
 In a follow- up to the analysis of  these national patterns of  workplace learn-
ing, they have been combined with innovation indicators. The analysis shows, 
fi rst, that on average countries that make intensive use of  discretionary learn-
ing are most prone to engaging in ‘endogenous innovation’ (defi ned as inno-
vations that emanate from in- house R&D eff orts and result in products new 
to the market). But, second, it shows that strong economic performance may 
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emanate from quite diff erent combinations of  innovation and learning modes. 
For instance, Denmark is not very strong in endogenous innovation but very 
strong in discretionary learning, while the opposite is true for another Nordic 
country, Finland (Arundel et al.  2006 ). 
 The national diff erences in what people do and learn at their workplace 
is a major factor structuring the national innovation system and aff ecting its 
performance; it is certainly more fundamental and diffi  cult to change than, 
for instance, R&D intensity. In countries such as Finland and Korea, R&D 
measures of  ‘performance’ refl ect the propensity to do research within one 
big corporation such as Nokia and Samsung. This contrasts with indicators 
of  competence building in working life since these refer to how competence 
building takes place in all parts of  the economy. 
 9.4.5  The weak correlation between strength of  the 
science- based and economic performance 
 Over the last century there has been a certain focus on the European paradox 
referring to the assumed fact that Europe is strong in science but weak in inno-
vation and economic growth. 18 Similar paradoxes have been argued to exist in 
countries such as the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. In an OECD report 
a  general result is that for the countries included in the study it can be shown 
that those that ‘perform well’ in terms of  STI indicators do not perform well 
in terms of  innovation (OECD 2005, 29). 19 This indicates that what is regis-
tered is not so much a paradox as it is a systematic weakness in the theoretical 
analysis and the indicators on which it is built. 
 We would argue that these apparent paradoxes emanate from a narrow 
understanding of  the innovation process. They demonstrate that heavy invest-
ment in science in the systems where organizational learning within and 
between fi rms is weakly developed and where there is a weak focus on user 
needs has only limited positive impact on innovation and economic growth. 
 This can be illustrated by data on innovation performance at the fi rm level – 
see  Table 9.3 . In a series of  recent papers based on a unique combination of  
survey and register data for Danish fi rms, we have demonstrated that fi rms 
that engage in R&D without establishing organizational forms that promote 
learning and neglect customer interaction are much less innovative than fi rms 
that are strong both in terms of  STI and DUI learning (Jensen et al.  2007 ). 20 
 Table 9.3 refers to the outcome of  an analysis of  survey and register data 
for almost 700 Danish fi rms, and it presents diff erent variables related to the 
propensity to introduce new products or services. We use sector, size and form 
of  ownership as control variables but the focus is on a variable indicating  the 
mode of  innovation in the fi rm. We distinguish between fi rms that are strong in 
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science- based learning, fi rms strong in organizational learning, fi rms that are 
strong in both respects, and we use those fi rms that are weak in both respects 
as the benchmark category. To construct this variable we pursue a cluster anal-
ysis grouping the fi rms into the four categories. 
 As indicators of  strong science- based learning, we use the R&D expen-
diture, presence of  employees with academic degrees in natural science or 
technology and collaboration with scientists in universities or other science 
organizations. As indicators of  experience- based learning, we take the use of  
certain organizational practices normally connected with learning organiza-
tions such as ‘interdisciplinary work groups’ and ‘integration of  functions’ 
together with ‘closer interaction with customers’ – to signal learning by inter-
acting and a focus on user needs. 
 We use fi rms that only make weak eff orts to support science- based and 
experience- based learning as benchmark and the odds ratio estimate indicates 
how much higher the propensity to innovate is among fi rms strong in one or 








Coeffi  cient 
estimate
STI Cluster 3.529 1.2611** 2.355 0.8564**
DUI Cluster 2.487 0.9109** 2.218 0.7967**
DUI/ STI Cluster 7.843 2.0596** 5.064 1.6222**
Business services 1.433 0.3599
Construction 0.491 – 0.7120*
Manuf. (hi– tech) 
(high tech)
1.805 0.5905*
Manuf. (low and 
med. tech) tech)
1.250 0.2229
Other services 0.747 – 0.2923
100 and more 
employees
1.757 0.5635*
50– 99 employees 0.862 – 0.1481
Danish group 0.859 – 0.1524




Pseudo R 2 0.1247 0.1247 0.1775 0.1775
 N  692  692  692  692 
 ** = signifi cant at the .01 level, * = signifi cant at the .05 level. 
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both of  the modes of  learning respectively. The results reported in  Table 9.3 
show that fi rms that combine the two modes are much more prone to innovate 
than the rest. It shows that the eff ect remains strong also after introducing 
control variables related to size and sector. 
 Box 9.8  How to Study National Systems? 
 Our interest in utilizing the innovation system perspective is not purely 
academic. We use this concept as a focusing device in order to better under-
stand how innovation aff ects economic development at the national level. 
Within this broad view, many factors contribute to innovation, and it might 
be seen as a problem that almost all aspects of  society need to be brought 
in to explain the actual pattern of  innovation. To structure the analysis, it 
is useful to distinguish between the  core of  the innovation system and  the 
wider setting . Both need to be included in the analysis since the aim is to link 
innovation to economic development. 
 Firms and the knowledge infrastructure constitute the core of  the sys-
tem. In principle, we include all fi rms in the core since every fi rm has a 
potential for developing, absorbing or using new technology. 
 The wider setting refers to institutions that contribute to competence 
building and shape human interaction in relation to innovation. These 
include, fi rst, family pattern, education system, career patterns in labour 
markets, inequality and social welfare systems. Second, they include the his-
torical record of  macroeconomic stability and the access to fi nance. Third, 
they include the fi nal demand from households and public sector organiza-
tions. Fourth, they include government and public policy directly aiming at 
stimulating innovation, including diff usion and effi  cient use. 
 This way of  setting the scene indicates a marginal role for public policy. 
What is intended is rather to see public policy mainly as intervening in rela-
tion to the core and the wider setting of  the national innovation system. 
Alternatively, we could see public policy as endogenous. To some degree, 
we take this perspective in Edquist and Lundvall ( 1993 ) where we demon-
strate how innovation policy in Sweden and Denmark tends to reproduce 
rather than renew the strengths of  the respective systems. 
 The analysis and results reported above ( Table 9.3 ) point to the need to 
develop our understanding of  how diff erent forms of  knowledge and diff erent 
modes of  innovation are combined in diff erent national innovation systems. 
The analysis also explains why narrow defi nitions of  national innovation sys-
tems that focus only on science- based innovation are of  little relevance for the 
economic performance of  fi rms and national innovation systems. This is not 
   247
POSTSCRIPT 247
least important when it comes to analysing the barriers and opportunities for 
economic development in poor countries, another challenge for innovation 
system research (Arocena and Sutz 2000b; Cassiolato et al.  2003 ). 
 9.5  National Systems of  Innovation and Economic 
Development 
 While the modern version of  the concept of  national systems of  innovation 
was developed mainly in rich countries (Freeman  1982 ; Freeman and Lundvall 
 1988 ; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Edquist  1997 ), some of  the most important 
elements actually came from the literature on development issues in the third 
world. For instance the Aalborg version (Andersen and Lundvall  1988 ) got 
some of  its inspiration concerning the interdependence between diff erent sec-
tors from Hirschman ( 1958 ) and Stewart ( 1977 ). Other encouragements came 
from Myrdal (1968). Applying the systems of  innovation approach to economic 
development brings into focus other research issues of  general interest such 
as the need to understand how innovation relates to sustainable development, 
economic welfare and the role of  government in commodifying knowledge. 
 Most chapters in Lundvall (1992) treat the innovation system as an ex- post 
rather than as an ex- ante concept. The concept refers to relatively strong and 
diversifi ed systems with well- developed institutional and infrastructural sup-
port of  innovation activities. The perspective is one where innovation pro-
cesses are evolutionary and path dependent and systems of  innovation evolve 
over time in a largely unplanned manner. The system of  innovation approach 
has not, to the same extent, been applied to system building. When applied to 
the South, the focus needs to be shifted in the direction of  system construction 
and system promotion – something that was central in List’s ideas for catch-
ing up – and to the fact that public policy is a conscious activity that needs to 
stimulate and supplement the spontaneous development of  systems of  innova-
tion (Muchie et al.  2003 ; Lundvall et al.  2006 ). 
 Box 9.9  A Method to Study National Innovation 
Systems 
 In what  follows, I sketch a method to study national systems of  innovation 
that moves from micro to macro and back again to micro. The ‘model’ 
starts from the following stylized facts: 
 1.  Firms play the most important role in the innovation system. Firms innovate 
in an interaction with other fi rms and with knowledge infrastructure. 
 2.  Firms’ mode of  innovation and learning refl ects national education 
systems, labour markets, etc. 
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 3.  Firms belonging to diff erent sectors contribute diff erently to innovation 
processes. 
 Therefore, the  fi rst step would be to analyse what takes place inside fi rms 
in terms of  innovation in the light of  organizational set- up and human 
resources while taking into account sector specialization. 
 A  second step would be to analyse the interaction among fi rms and with 
knowledge infrastructure, including both domestic and international 
linkages. 
 A  third step would be to explain national specifi cities in these respects with 
reference to national education, labour markets, fi nancial markets, welfare 
regimes and intellectual property regimes. 
 A  fourth step would be to use fi rm organization and network positioning 
as factors that explain the specialization and performance of  the innova-
tion system. 
 This method focuses the analysis on the central motor in the innovation 
system (i.e., the total population of  fi rms, their linkages to each other and to 
the knowledge infrastructure). But it also recognizes that most parts of  the 
socioeconomic system may infl uence how this motor works and not least 
how it aff ects the performance of  the economy as a whole. 
 Another weakness of  the system of  innovation approach is that it is still 
lacking in its treatment of  the power aspects of  development. The focus on 
interactive learning – a process in which agents communicate and cooperate 
in the creation and utilization of  new economically useful knowledge – may 
lead to an underestimation of  the confl icts over income and power, connected 
to the innovation process. In a global context where the access to technical 
knowledge is becoming restricted not only by weak ‘absorptive capacity’ but 
also by more and more ambitious global schemes to protect intellectual prop-
erty, this perspective gives a too rosy picture. Postcolonial and class privileges 
may block learning possibilities and existing competences may be destroyed 
for political reasons related to the global distribution of  power. 
 Furthermore, the relationships between globalization and national and 
local systems need to be further researched. It is important to know more 
about how globalization processes aff ect the possibilities to build and support 
national and local systems of  innovation in developing countries (Lastres and 
Cassiolato  2005 ). ‘Borrowing’ and adopting technologies that the technologi-
cally advanced countries control today is an important key to development. 
The combination of  reverse engineering, licensing, sending scholars abroad, 
inviting foreign fi rms and experts and engaging in international scientifi c 
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collaborations may be diffi  cult to achieve but all these elements need to be 
considered in building the national innovation systems. When building such 
systems, it is a major challenge to develop national strategies that make it pos-
sible to select technologies and institutions from abroad that support innova-
tion and competence building. 
 It is thus clear that the innovation system approach proposed here needs 
to be adapted to the situation in developing countries, if  it is to be applied to 
system building. It is also clear that what is most relevant for developing econo-
mies is a broad defi nition of  the NSI including not only low- tech industries but 
also primary sectors such as agriculture. Activities contributing to competence 
building need to be taken into account and narrow perspectives that focus only 
on the STI- mode needs to be avoided. 21 
 Box 9.10  Innovation Systems and Development 
Thinking 
 As pointed out in the text, the literature on national innovation systems 
builds on conceptual pillars rooted in the development literature. The role 
of  technology was an important part of  the postwar debate on develop-
ment. Schumpeter’s ( 1934 ) concept of  development contributed with two 
central ideas for this debate. One was the positive eff ects of  generating 
new products and new processes. The other was the disruptive character 
of  development. These two notions shaped the subsequent contributions, 
with Prebisch’s ( 1950 ), Singer’s ( 1950 ) and Myrdal’s ( 1958 ) analyses of  the 
long- term deterioration of  terms of  trade for primary products and of  the 
distribution of  gains between developed and developing countries. 
 In Latin America, a number of  development studies followed Prebisch, 
arguing about the central role played by technical change in explaining the 
evolution of  the capitalism and in determining the historical process of  
hierarchy formation of  regions and countries. Furtado ( 1964 ), for instance, 
established an express relation between economic development and tech-
nological change pointing out that the growth of  an economy was based 
on the accumulation of  knowledge and understood development within a 
systemic, historically determined, view. 
 Inspired by Schumpeter, an important and infl uential literature about 
how fi rms in the developing world acquire and develop technological 
capabilities unfolded during the 1970s and 1980s. Key concepts were the 
notions of  technological capabilities and learning. Several empirical studies 
have shown how less developed countries have managed to develop sig-
nifi cant skills, which have led to ‘effi  cient’ production, at least in the short- 
term. These studies focused mostly on the capabilities of  producers (e.g. 
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knowledge and skills required for production) (Katz  1984 ; Dahlman et al. 
 1987 ). 
 In the same period (1970s and 1980s) in Latin America, authors inspired 
by the Latin American Structuralist School (LASA) literature developed 
a number of  fi rm- level studies where the second of  Schumpeter’s ideas – 
the disruptive character of  development – was taken into account. This 
work was instrumental in showing not only successful stories of  techno-
logical upgrading but also important limitations of  the capabilities and 
learning approaches to technology and development precisely because this 
approach left behind key elements, such as the role of  institutions, of  the 
macroeconomic regime and of  power confl icts. 
 In East Asian economies, empirical investigation of  successful evolution 
of  innovation systems also helped to link the innovation systems perspec-
tive to development analyses. For example, case studies of  the textile and 
clothing and electronics industries in the Taiwan province of  China and 
the Republic of  Korea confi rmed that interfi rm linkages, including subcon-
tracting arrangements, were crucial channels of  technological learning, in 
some cases even more important than direct channels such as foreign direct 
investment (San Gee and Kuo  1998 ; Ernst et al. 1998). 
 9.5.1  Welfare and inequality in the context of  innovation 
systems 
 A promising line of  research is to link the perspective of  Amartya Sen ( 1999 ) 
on welfare and inequality to the national system perspective. Sen presents a 
capability- based approach where development is seen as an expansion of  the 
substantive freedoms that people enjoy. Substantive freedoms are defi ned as 
the capabilities people have to live the kind of  lives they have reason to value. 
These include things like being able to avoid starvation and undernourish-
ment, diseases and premature mortality. It also includes the freedoms of  being 
literate, able to participate in public life and in political processes, having the 
ability and possibility to work and to infl uence one’s work conditions, having 
entrepreneurial freedom and possibilities to take economic decisions of  diff er-
ent kinds. Enhancement of  freedoms like these is seen as both the ends and 
means of  development. 
 This way of  looking at development refers to the capabilities people have 
to act and to choose a life they value rather than to their level of  income and 
possession of  wealth. Poverty, for example, is in this perspective more a depri-
vation of  basic capabilities than just low income. Human capabilities rather 
than resource endowments are the fundamental factors of  development. 
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 Sen’s approach fi ts well into a system of  innovation approach. It is notewor-
thy however that learning and innovation capabilities generally do not seem 
to be explicitly included in this capability- based approach to development. 
Extending capabilities may be the result of  changing the setting in which the 
agent operates, but even more important in the learning economy is whether 
the setting gives access to and stimulates a renewal and upgrading of  the com-
petences of  agents. 
 The learning capability is thus one of  the most important of  the human 
capabilities, and it is conditioned by national institutions and forms of  work 
organization (see, for instance,  Box 9.7 for the case of  Europe). It does not only 
have an instrumental role in development but also, under certain conditions, 
substantive value. When learning takes place in such a way that it enhances 
the capability of  individuals and collectives to utilize and coexist with their 
environment, it contributes directly to human well- being. Furthermore, to be 
able to participate in learning and innovation at the work place may be seen as 
‘a good thing’ contributing to a feeling of  belonging and signifi cance. 
 9.5.2  On the sustainability of  innovation systems 
 National  systems of  innovation may be regarded as a tool for analysing eco-
nomic development and economic growth. It aims at explaining how systemic 
features and diff erent institutional set- ups at the national level link innovation 
and learning processes to economic growth. 
 But such a perspective may be too narrow. As pointed out by Freeman and 
Soete (1997), the ecological challenge ought to be integrated in any strategy 
for economic development and here we will argue that in the learning econ-
omy not only intellectual capital but also social capital is an important element 
in the development process. The extended perspective can be introduced as 
in diagram 3 below. 
 Table 9.4 illustrates that economic growth is faced with a double challenge 
in terms of  sustainability and that there is an immanent risk of  undermining 
not only the material basis of  material production (Segura- Bonilla  1999 ) but 
also the knowledge base. The creation of  tangible capital may be threatened 
 Table 9.4  Resources fundamental for economic growth – combining the tangible 





Tangible resources 1. Production capital 2. Natural capital
Intangible resources 3. Intellectual capital 4. Social capital
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by a neglect of  environmental sustainability. We will argue that the production 
and effi  cient use of  intellectual capital is fundamentally dependent on social 
capital (Woolcock  1998 ). A development strategy that focuses only on produc-
tion capital and intellectual capital is not sustainable. 
 This is equally true for developed as for developing economies. But in most 
developed economies there has been a long history of  institution building 
that helps to cope with sustainability (Russia is a case where there is an imbal-
ance between the level of  technical development and institutions checking 
unsustainable development). Even if  they are insuffi  cient in many respects, 
these kinds of  institutions are more developed than in the developing part 
of  the world. A  success in terms of  economic growth in a less developed 
economy may therefore create extreme tension between growth and sustain-
ability. Directing the eff orts of  the innovation system towards solving crises 
in ecological and social terms may be necessary in order to avoid real ‘limits 
to growth’. 
 Innovation may have a positive role in bolstering sustainability. Technical 
innovation, for instance, in terms of  developing substitutes to naturally scarce 
raw products, may help to overcome the fact that natural capital cannot always 
be reproduced. In a similar vein new social institutions may help to overcome 
a crisis where social capital gets fragmented. In both cases, it is important to 
note that the workings of  unhampered market forces may, in the longer term, 
erode the basis of  economic growth. 
 9.5.3  The role of  the state and the commodifi cation 
of  knowledge 
 As explained, the modern version of  the innovation system concept was devel-
oped in the mid- 1980s. It is important to note that the early versions were 
 critical both to mainstream economics and to the prevailing economic policy 
where weak competitiveness was seen as primarily refl ecting high costs and 
especially high- wage costs. 
 The wide diff usion of  the concept among policymakers took place in the 
1990s. At the beginning of  the new millennium, most OECD countries had 
adopted the concept to support the design of  innovation policy. In order to 
understand the interpretation of  the concept in policy circles, it is important 
to take into account the ideological and political climate that reigned during 
this diff usion process. 
 Basically the 1990s was a period with strong emphasis on market regula-
tion and on private property rights as ideal institutions – the breakdown of  
the centrally planned economies in Europe gave new impetus to neoliberal 
strategies developed in the 1980s. This resulted in a certain degeneration of  
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the concept. Analytical aspects of  the concept that might lead to conclusions 
that went against the logic of  markets and free trade were suppressed. 
 The original innovation system approach emphasized that knowledge and 
learning are crucial for economic performance in the current era (Lundvall 
1992). But it does not follow that all knowledge should be ‘commodifi ed’, 
and this is what seems to have become the major tendency. There is a grow-
ing trend in political circles to regard  all knowledge as a potential commod-
ity and to subordinate  all knowledge production under the logic of  international 
competitiveness. This is refl ected in a movement in favour of  expanding and 
strengthening intellectual property rights to the extreme and far beyond what 
promotes socioeconomic progress and as well in a strong drive towards colo-
nizing academic knowledge and making it subordinate to market demand. 
 To make universities more open to society is a necessary process and 
expectations that the knowledge produced at universities should contribute 
to economic welfare are legitimate. But the current drive towards the market 
is driven by the lop- sided understanding of  innovation as emanating almost 
solely from science and therefore it goes too far. 
 The long- term implications and costs of  making scholars and universities 
profi t- oriented seem to be neglected among the protagonists of  university 
reforms in the Bayh– Dole spirit. 22 Scholars who are stimulated to act strategi-
cally on their own behalf  and on the behalf  of  their institutions will certainly 
become less engaged in sharing their knowledge with others. Private compa-
nies might, in the short run, appreciate that universities become more profi t- 
oriented, but they will soon experience that the barriers around the knowledge 
accumulated will become higher and that access to the most relevant knowl-
edge will become more diffi  cult. 
 It is even more intriguing to refl ect on what awaits at the end of  the cur-
rent trajectory, at the point in time where the entrepreneurial university has 
become truly a business corporation operating in international markets. At 
that point we must expect that WTO restrains the current freedom of  national 
governments to subsidize basic research taking place within universities by 
competition laws and trade regulations. How could it be argued that private 
fi rms (universities) that compete on global markets should be subsidized by 
the national government? To establish controls that make it certain that gov-
ernment support only goes to basic research – without aff ecting services sold 
internationally – would open up for complex legal processes. If  governments 
wanted to go on subsidizing basic research, they might need to establish a new 
set of  institutions. 23 
 Finally, there is a need to think about the implications for the role of  uni-
versities of  the fact that knowledge becomes more and more fundamental for 
the economy as for society as a whole. The historical role of  universities has 
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been an institution that ‘validates’ knowledge. It has been an institution that, 
while aiming at the full truth of  matters, at least systematically tries to estab-
lish what ‘reasonably reliable knowledge’ is. This is also one reason why it has 
been an institution with a relative autonomy in relation to the state as well as 
in relation to economic interests. This function is even more important in a 
knowledge- based society. 24 
 As a kind of  countervailing power to the colonizing tendency emanating 
from market- oriented innovation policy, we see a need to develop a wider fi eld 
of  politics –  knowledge politics – that covers all aspects of  knowledge production 
and takes into account that the production of  knowledge has much wider 
scope than just contributing to economic growth. This includes, of  course, 
knowledge necessary for social and ecological sustainability but not only that. 
In rich societies, it should be possible to aff ord culture, ethics and knowledge 
for its own sake, not only knowledge that promotes innovation and economic 
growth. This implies that there might be a need for establishing a new kind of  
‘academy of  science and knowledge’ that has as one of  its dedicated tasks to 
set the limits for how far innovation policy may infl uence knowledge produc-
tion and use. 
 9.5.4  Higher education, innovation and economic development 
 In the context of  poor countries, the idea of  a relative autonomy for universities 
may appear as a luxury that cannot be aff orded. In a recent paper (Lundvall 
 2007 ), I have made an attempt to link higher education to innovation and eco-
nomic development. 
 In less developed countries as in rich countries, the most important func-
tion of  universities remains to train academic personnel and give them com-
petences so that they can be absorbed in meaningful employment where they 
solve problems that are so complex that less- skilled workers would fail. Such 
problems will appear more frequently in economies where innovation is fre-
quent (Nelson and Phelps  1965 ; Schultz  1975 ). Therefore the design of  the 
university system needs to be seen as an integrated part of  the formation of  a 
national system of  innovation. 
 The idea that universities should serve as direct sources for innovation 
through their ‘third mission’ and that this mission should involve the cre-
ation of  markets for knowledge implicit in much of  the triple helix literature 
is problematic in poor as well as in rich countries (Arocena and Sutz 2005). 
To establish a closer interaction with the rest of  society is especially impor-
tant in less developed countries where the distance between academia and 
real life is often very big. But rather than creating market- oriented universi-
ties, what is needed is educational reform including the wide introduction of  
   255
POSTSCRIPT 255
problem- based learning as a teaching method and, in general, a closer interac-
tion between theory and practise. 
 Box 9.11  The Globelics Experience 
 Globelics is a global research community combining scholars working on 
innovation studies with scholars working on development studies. It has 
been characterized as a network for ‘researchers without borders’ ( www.
globelics.org ). The Globelics annual conferences take place in  developing 
countries and the fi nance has been raised within the hosting country. 
 Besides the annual conferences, regional and national networks have been 
established in Asia, Latin America and China (see  http:// sdc- socialscience.
com/ 2016- cicalics- academy- and- workshop/ ). Each year, 40 PhD students, 
coming equally from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe, are invited 
to Globelics Academy in Lisbon where world- leading scholars in innova-
tion studies for a 10- day period give lectures and methodological advice for 
their thesis work. A similar Cicalics Academy takes place in China every 
year with a majority of  Chinese students and with international lecturers. 
(More recently initiatives in Latin America, Africa and India have resulte in 
similar activities in these regions.) 
 The purpose of  Globelics is to counterbalance the increasingly uneven 
global access to research networks. It gives scholars in less developed 
countries access to the most recent research and it opens up channels for 
publication of  their work. It also makes it possible to share experiences 
among scholars from diff erent parts of  the developing world, bypassing 
the metropoles in the North. Several major research projects with global 
scope use Globelics as host – the Catch- Up project coordinated by Richard 
Nelson, The Brics project coordinated by Jose Cassiolato and the Unidev 
project coordinated by Claes Brundenius. 
 Globelics has a scientifi c board with distinguished scholars such as 
Christopher Freeman and Richard Nelson and with leading scholars from 
the South. But basically Globelics is a self- organizing global network. It 
draws its energy mainly from the fact that scholars from the North and the 
South fi nd it highly rewarding to work together and learn from each other 
in a seriously committed but friendly atmosphere. 
 One major long- term positive eff ect is that young scholars from all parts 
of  the world, sometimes working in isolation and under diffi  cult conditions, 
get inspiration and support in their eff orts to do good research on innova-
tion. There is already a lively ‘Globelics community’ of  young scholars who 
correspond regularly on both a scientifi c and a social basis. 
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 Investment in higher education may not give substantial rates of  return in 
a technologically stagnant economy. Since the alternative to invest in higher 
education is to remain in stagnation forever, our analysis needs to focus on two 
questions. First, how to design higher education in such a way that it helps to 
break the vicious circle of  stagnation and stagnating demand for graduates? 
Second, how to design a general strategy for vitalizing national innovation 
systems that includes investment in higher education as important element? 
 9.6  Conclusions 
 In this chapter we went back to the origins of  the concept of  the national 
innovation system. We have argued that the original versions as developed by 
Christopher Freeman and the Aalborg group are more adequate tools when 
it comes to linking innovation to aggregate national economic performance 
than narrow versions that focus mainly on the science base. In the current 
era, there is a need both for strengthening the science base and for promoting 
experience- based learning. This is absolutely fundamental when it comes to 
linking the analysis of  national innovation systems to economic development. 
 This implies new directions for research on innovation systems. First, it 
is necessary to develop a better understanding and more effi  cient analytical 
techniques to study institutional ‘complementarity’ and ‘mismatch’ in innova-
tion systems. Second, there is a need to deepen the understanding of  the pro-
duction, diff usion and use of  knowledge. In this connection the focus should 
be on interactive learning processes and on how ‘social capital’ evolves as a 
basis for interaction within and across organizational boundaries. Third, there 
is a need to understand and develop indicators of  how and to what degree 
workplaces function as learning sites in diff erent national systems. Fourth, a 
promising research strategy is to link organizational learning, mobility of  peo-
ple and network formation. Networks will always involve interaction between 
people, and the specifi c careers will have an impact on with whom and how 
agents interact. 
 Universities play an important role in the innovation system, but the triple- 
helix perspective, with its neglect of  DUI- mode of  learning, may have led to 
exaggerated expectations of  what can and should be expected from them. 
Universities need to be guaranteed a minimum autonomy in order to give 
long- term contributions to knowledge creation and the idea that they should 
be completely subsumed to market forces and political control is incompatible 
with their role as guardians of  what is ‘reasonably reliable knowledge’. Their 
most important role in the national innovation system is not to be incubators 
for start- up fi rms or for patents; it remains the training of  graduates for the 
labour market. 
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 Today, as compared to the original 1992 approach, we would emphasize 
even more the importance of  human resources. While one aspect of  global-
ization is that codifi ed knowledge moves quickly across borders, the most 
localized resource remains people, their tacit knowledge, their network rela-
tionships and their accumulated organizational experiences. Therefore all 
parts of  the innovation system that contribute to competence building are 
becoming increasingly important for national performance. 
 Over the last decade, there has developed a big lively and productive 
research community primarily studying industrial dynamics in the business 
sector and often the contributing scholar are employed at business schools or 
technical universities (compare for the annual Druid ( www.druid.dk ) and the 
biannual Schumpeter conferences). There might be falling marginal returns 
to this kind of  research and seen from the point of  view of  the innovation 
system approach, there are important issues not given suffi  cient attention. Five 
themes that have been touched on in this postscript need to be further devel-
oped in future research: 
 •  Implications of  the NSI approach for economic theory, 
 •  NSI and economic development, 
 •  NSI welfare states and inequality, 
 •  Environmental sustainability of  national innovation systems, and 
 •  Innovation in the public sector. 
 Most of  these themes will require transdisciplinary eff orts combining econom-
ics with management, sociology, political science and engineering. 
 Notes 
 1  B.-Å. Lundvall (ed.). (2010), ‘Post Script: Innovation System Research – Where It Came 
From and Where It Might Go’, in  National Systems of  Innovation:  Towards a Theory of  
Innovation and Interactive Learning , 317– 49. London: Anthem. 
 2  In economic geography, the diff usion of  the innovation system perspective has, together 
with the industrial district and industrial clusters approaches, contributed to the con-
struction of  a ‘new economic geography’ that has changed the way geographical loca-
tion and agglomeration is explained (Maskell and Malmberg  1997 ; Cooke  2001 ; Clark, 
Feldman and Gertler  2000 ). 
 3  Several authors have presented overviews of  the innovation system literature and made 
attempts to classify diff erent approaches. An early contribution is McKelvey ( 1991 ). 
More recent ones are Balzat and Hanusch ( 2004 ) and Sharif  ( 2006 ). The latter’s contri-
bution builds upon a combination of  literature survey and interviews with key persons 
who were involved in coining the concept. An interesting critical contribution is  National 
Innovation System, Scientifi c Concept or Political Rhetoric (Miettinen  2002 ), which points to 
the problematic and vague character of  the concept as it is transferred back and forth 
between the academic and the public policy spheres. 
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 4  Reinert ( 2003 ) argues that many of  the ideas go further back to a succession of  scholars 
belonging to ‘the other Cannon’ starting with Antonio Serra. De Liso ( 2006 ) argues that 
Charles Babbage may be seen as another ancestor for the innovation system concept. 
 5  The paper was published for the fi rst time more than 20  years later in the journal 
 Industrial and Corporate Change (Freeman 2004). 
 6  The IKE group had the privilege to interact with Christopher Freeman in several proj-
ects in this period, and many of  our ideas were shaped in a dialogue with him (see, for 
instance, Freeman  1981 ). 
 7  For an overview of  the current status of  innovation research, see the new  Oxford 
Handbook on Innovation (Fagerberg et al.  2005 ). 
 8  Adam Smith’s major contribution was to link the evolving and increasingly more devel-
oped division of  labour to the creation of  wealth. In Lundvall ( 2006 ) I have tried to 
reformulate his theory, emphasizing interactive learning in the context of  vertical divi-
sion of  labour so that it becomes more relevant for explaining innovation- based eco-
nomic growth. 
 9  For a historical analysis of  how match and mismatch is refl ected in economic per-
formance of  national systems, see Freeman (1995b). In  Innovation, Growth and Social 
Cohesion: The Danish Model (Lundvall  2002 ), I discuss the role of  mismatches in the dis-
appointing performance following ‘the new economy’ euphoria. 
 10  In ‘The Invisible College of  Economics of  Innovation and Technological Change’ 
(Verspagen and Werker  2003 ), one can see which innovation scholars defi ne themselves 
as ‘neo- Schumpeterians’. 
 11  Another point where Schumpeter’s approach diff ers from the NSI approach is his 
neglect of  the importance of  knowledge and learning for understanding the innovation 
process. Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs are activists who bring new combinations to the 
market. How the new combinations come about is left in the dark (Witt 1993, xiv). 
 12  In the United States, Richard R.  Nelson and Nathan Rosenberg played the most 
important role in developing the theoretical, historical and empirical understanding of  
innovation. 
 13  The IKE group had the privilege to have him visiting as guest professor at Aalborg 
University for periods, and there we all became his apprentices. He was not only an 
outstanding scholar but also a uniquely generous person. 
 14  Another characteristic of  the successful innovations was that the project team leader 
in charge of  developing the innovation had certain seniority and was able to mobilize 
resources in critical phases of  the innovation process. 
 15  Today we would add to this micro- foundation the nation- specifi c characteristics of  
work organization and learning at the workplace. This will be addressed in  section 9.4 . 
 16  Within this narrow logic, the neglect of  learning eff ects from engaging in innovation 
will underestimate both the private and public rates of  return. 
 17  The data originate from a survey of  workers in 15 European countries on working 
conditions gathered by the Dublin Institute for Working and Living conditions. 
Discretionary learning refers to work situations where workers say that they learn 
a lot and that they have some freedom to organize their own work. Lean pro-
duction learning refers to work situations where workers learn but where there is 
little discretion left for the workers to organize their own activities. Taylorist orga-
nization off ers little learning and very little freedom for the worker while simple 
organization gives more autonomy in solving simple tasks that off er little learning 
opportunities. 
   259
POSTSCRIPT 259
 18  This debate has triggered strong eff orts to link universities to fi rms in Europe some-
times going as far as seeing the ideal university as ‘innovation factory’. Dosi, Llerena 
and Sylos Labini ( 2006 ) raise doubts about the basic assumption behind the paradox 
that Europe is strong in Science. 
 19  After comparing the performance of  six countries, it is stated that ‘A striking feature is 
the apparent missing link between indicators A- E and the overall performance indica-
tors in F. ‘ This suggests that priorities and biases in the STI- policy system are weakly linked to general 
economic performance and policies ’ (OECD 2005, 29). 
 20  The data in  Table 9.2 are from Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall ( 2007 ). 
 21  Several authors analysing the situation of  less developed countries have been critical 
to the use of  the concept ‘national innovation system’ and have preferred to work with 
concepts such as national technological systems (Lall and Pietrobelli  2003 ) or national 
learning systems (Mathews  2001 ;Viotti  2002 ). To some degree I see their alternative 
conceptual proposals as reactions to the use of  narrowly defi ned innovation systems 
with focus on STI learning. I strongly support the idea that understanding processes of  
experience- based learning is a key to the understanding of  the specifi cities of  national 
innovation systems (see Lorenz and Lundvall  2006 ). 
 22  The Bayh– Dole Act, implemented in the United States in the 1980s, gives stronger 
opportunities and incentives to universities to engage in patenting and protecting their 
knowledge. As documented by Mowery and Sampat ( 2004 ), the interpretation of  the 
‘success’ of  this reform in Europe has been exaggerated. 
 23  This scenario gains in realism by the fact that some major US universities would domi-
nate ‘the level playing fi eld’ and by the fact that the US government would still be able 
to pursue basic research under headings such as health, military defence and space 
technology since these can be defi ned as being of  strategic importance for its security. 
 24  In order to explain this to economists it is useful to point to the generally accepted idea 
that there is a need for relative autonomy of  central banks. To make sure that we can 
trust the value of  money, it has been accepted that its main guardian is given a certain 
degree of  autonomy. We need a similar guardian for knowledge, and it is diffi  cult to 
fi nd another institution/ organization that is better suited to be the central bank of  
knowledge than the university. 
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 Chapter 10 
 CHINA’S INNOVATION SYSTEM AND 
THE MOVE TOWARDS HARMONIOUS 
GROWTH AND ENDOGENOUS 
INNOVATION 
 Shulin  Gu and  Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 10.1  Introduction 
 Observers around the world are impressed by the rapid growth of  China’s 
economy, some with hope and others with fear. Some hope that China will 
off er the unique experience of  successful economic growth and catch- up; 
some see the rise of  China as a threat to the current world order and to the 
powers that currently dominate the world in terms of  economy, technology 
and politics. 
 While outside observers tend to focus on the success story of  unprecedented 
growth, policy documents and recent domestic debates in China have pointed 
to the need for a shift in the growth trajectory with stronger emphasis on 
‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’. In this chapter, we 
make an attempt to capture the current characteristics of  China’s production 
and innovation system; how they were shaped by history and what major chal-
lenges they raise for the future. 
 In  section 10.2 we present data on China’s postwar growth experience. 
We show how the shift in policy towards decentralization, privatization and 
openness around 1980 established an institutional setting that, together with 
other factors such as the presence of  a wide ‘Chinese Diaspora’, has resulted 
in extremely high rates of  capital accumulation especially in manufacturing. 
The section ends with pointing to some inherent contradictions in the current 
growth pattern. 
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 In  section 10.3 we take a closer look at how the policy shift in the 1980s aff ected 
the institutional framework shaping R&D activities, in particular, and learning 
and innovation, in general. The attempt to break down the barrier between 
the science and technology infrastructure, on the one hand, and the production 
sphere, on the other, was highly successful as compared to the development in the 
former Soviet Union. But the original intentions were not fully realized. Rather 
than establishing markets for science and technology, the reforms led knowledge 
producers to engage in mergers or forward vertical integration, and they became 
to a large extent involved in production activities. 
 Referring back to the analysis of  the sustainability of  the growth model 
and the unfi nished reform of  the innovation system  section 10.4 introduces 
the recent decision by China’s government to promote endogenous innovation 
and harmonious development. Applying the innovation system perspective, 
we argue that these broadly defi ned objectives can be realized only through 
a strategic adjustment towards ‘innovation driven growth and learning based 
development’ and we discuss what important policy elements such a strategic 
adjustment needs to encompass. 
 In  section 10.5 , we conclude that imperfections in the division of  labour and 
in the interaction between users and producers of  knowledge and innovation 
that was behind the reforms of  the 1980s remain central concerns. In order to 
raise the long- term effi  ciency of  the massive accumulation of  production capi-
tal, it is necessary to promote the formation of  social capital and to be more 
considerate when exploiting natural capital. 
 10.2  The Transition of  China’s Economy 
 How do we explain the extraordinary growth performance of  China? What 
are the unique features of  the production system? In this section we will see 
how the development paths of  the past defi ne the strengths and weaknesses of  
the national production systems as well as the bottlenecks and challenges that 
confront China today. It is useful to distinguish between two periods in China 
in the second half  of  the twentieth century. The crucial shift takes place in 
1978 when Deng Xiaoping took over the political leadership after Chairman 
Mao and initiated economic reform and the opening of  the economy to 
international trade. The fi rst was a period of  development under a centrally 
planned economic regime, and the second a period with market- oriented 
reforms and economic transition. To characterize economic performance of  
the two periods, we use the data summarized by Maddison (1998) depicted in 
 Table 10.1 and  Figures 10.1 and  10.2 . 
 At the time of  the revolution, the economy was still dominated by agri-
culture; in 1952 about 60 per cent of  GDP was generated by the agricultural 
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 Figure 10.1  Per capita GDP in comparison (USA=100) 
 Table 10.1  Growth of  China’s economy 1890– 1995 (at constant prices) 
1890– 1952 1952– 1978 1978– 1995 1952– 1995
Farming, Fishery 
& Forestry
0.3 2.2 5.1 3.4
Industry 1.7 9.6 8.5 9.2
Construction 1.6 7.2 11.1 8.7
Transport & 
Communications
0.9 6.0 10.0 7.6
Commerce & 
Restaurants
0.8 3.3 9.9 5.9
Other Services 
(incl. Government)
1.1 4.2 6.7 5.2
GDP 0.6 4.4 7.5 5.6
Per capita GDP 0.0 2.3 6.0 3.8
Export Volume 1.6 6.4 13.5 9.2
(primary) sector, as shown in  Figure 10.2 , Both the fi rst and the second period 
were dominated by industrialization rather than ‘postindustrialization’ that 
took place after World War II in developed and most of  the less developed 
countries. As a result, China ends up being highly ‘industrialized’ by the end 
of  the century. In 2003, the GDP structure of  China was 12.5 per cent pri-
mary, 46 per cent secondary and 41.5 per cent tertiary. The growth in manu-
facturing and the relative shrinkage of  agriculture went on also in the 1990s, 
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and the value- added share of  the service sectors remained almost unchanged 
until the second half  of  the 1990s. 
 But as we shall see below the economic structure looks quite diff erent 
when the focus is employment rather than value added. The proportion of  
the labour force working in agriculture remains as high as 50 per cent in the 
beginning of  the new millennium. The growth in manufacturing value added 
refl ects, more than anything else, a very high rate of  accumulation of  fi xed 
capital accompanied by high rates of  growth in labour productivity. 
 Behind the high- growth rates and the restructuring of  the economy in the 
second period lay extraordinary rates of  savings and capital accumulation. In 
order to understand how these could be realized in a poor country like China, 
it is necessary to look at the institutional changes that took place with the shift 
in the political climate. 
 10.2.1  Reforms and development performance in the 
1980s and 1990s 
 The policies transforming the economy from being centrally planned towards 
a market- oriented regime may be seen as following two parallel and mutually 
reinforcing lines of  action aiming at decentralization and privatization (Wu 
2003). 
 The fi rst line of  action, ‘bureaucratic decentralization’, began with increas-
ing the autonomy of  fi rms in decision- making on production planning, 
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Services Industry & construction Agriculture
 Figure 10.2  GDP structure of  China’s economy (at constant prices) 
 Source : Maddison 1998: 56, Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
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and with more autonomy to local governments in fi nancial, budgetary and 
administrative issues. Initially, decentralization was based on ad hoc nego-
tiations in individual cases. It was not until the mid- 1990s, that nationwide 
reforms formalized the relationships and introduced more transparent and 
coherent rules. This was the period when reforms of  taxation, banking sys-
tem and governance structure of  state- owned enterprises (i.e. ‘corporatiza-
tion’ of  previously state- ownerships) were initiated. This dynamic of  policy 
learning where experiences from local and regional experimentation were 
gradually diff used at the national level has been one major characteristic of  
the reform period. 
 The second line of  action loosened the restrictions fi rst for township and 
village enterprises in the early 1980s and later also for private initiatives in the 
mid- 1990s. It included the creation of  ‘Special Economic Zones’ for – Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) with various favourable regulations. In provinces like 
Zhejiang, this led to private initiatives by entrepreneurs. Here limited arable 
land, poor mineral deposits, high population density and little accumulation 
in modern industry in combination with local historical experience in com-
mercial activities led to the start- up of  private fi rms based on small family 
workshops. 
 But most importantly, it gave the local governments bigger opportunities 
to engage in initiatives promoting the local accumulation of  capital. They 
did so through establishing and expanding Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs), sometimes owned by the local governments, sometimes representing 
joint enterprises with private capital or through initiatives attracting private 
capital from local, national or international sources. 
 ‘Diaspora networks’ played an important part in re- enforcing the rapid cap-
ital accumulation from foreign investment. Throughout the 1980s, the open-
ing to FDI and international trade attracted partners mainly from the Greater 
China area – Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Singapore and overseas Chinese 
from other continents. It was not until the second half  of  the 1990s that mul-
tinational companies from North America and West Europe came into China 
on a large scale. In 2003 Hong Kong, together with Taiwan, remained the fi rst 
and primary source of  FDI, holding about half  of  the total FDI in China. The 
fact that the members of  the diaspora could communicate directly with local 
authorities reduced investor uncertainties. 
 The second line of  action, also called ‘incremental reform’, opened up new 
spaces for economic activities outside the entities inherited from the central 
planning era. As a result, the ownership structure of  industrial enterprises 
changed rapidly. As can be seen from  Figure 10.3 , by 2003, each of  the three 
types of  ownership – the state- owned, FDI- dominated and other domestic – 
were responsible for roughly one- third of  output. 
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 It is important to note that a big share of  the fi rms belonging to the cat-
egory of  ‘other domestic’ enterprises primarily refl ects rapid growth in the 
number and size of  township and village fi rms over which local governments 
have some infl uence. The township and village enterprises that played a 
major role for industrialization in many regions in China outnumber both 
the domestic- private and the state- owned fi rms; they underwent a trans-
formation from collective ownership to become privately owned since the 
mid- 1990s. 
 10.2.2  Export- led growth 
 International trade was initially pushed by favourable policies and gradually 
pulled by FDI and intra- trade within global value chains. Today China’s econ-
omy has reached a much higher level of  openness than all other large econo-
mies in the world – developed or developing ( Table 10.2 and  Figure 10.4 ). 
 Export structures have been upgraded ( Figure 10.5 ). The share of  primary 
products, such as foodstuff s, agricultural products and mineral fuels, have 
been reduced from half  of  the total in 1980 to less than 10 per cent by 2002, 
while the share of  manufactured goods increased to more than 90 per cent. In 




















FDI-dominated (FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan Incl.)
State-owned and state ownership dominated
 Figure 10.3  Ownership structure: Industry by 2003 
 Source : Based on China Statistical Yearbook  2004  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ ndsj/ 
yb2004- c/ indexch.htm 
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1978 1989 1997 2002 2003
%
 Figure 10.4  Openness to global economy 
 Source :  Based on China Statistical Yearbook  2004 ;  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ ndsj/ 
yb2004- c/ indexch.htm ,  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjdt/ zygg/ P020060109431083446682.
doc 
 Table 10.2  Openness of  China to the global economy 
1978 1989 1997 2002 2003
GDP (¥100 million) 3,624.1 16,917.8 78,973 120,333 135,823
Sum import and export 
(¥100 million)
355.0 4,156.0 26,967.2 51,378.2 70,483.5
 Source : Based on China Statistical Yearbook  2004 ;  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ ndsj/ 
yb2004- c/ indexch.htm ,  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjdt/ zygg/ P020060109431083446682.
doc. 
products, demonstrated the fastest growth rate. Additionally, light and textile 
products and apparel increased considerably as well. 
 Beyond quantitative growth, qualitative or structural change has been radi-
cal. It is useful to make a distinction between global production chains that 
are driven mainly by demand factors – buyer driven chains – and those driven 
mainly by supply factors  – producer- driven chains (Gereffi    1999 ; UNIDO 
 2002 ). In the products of  ‘buyer- driven’ chains (such as apparel, footwear and 
toys) contained in category 3 and partly in category 5 in  Figure 10.5 , China 
has become the preferred manufacturing location of  a global ‘Triangle’ rela-
tionship. The consumption sites are largely in North America and Western 
Europe, while Hong Kong and Taiwanese businesspeople play roles as rela-
tional coordinators. Many of  these goods are produced in factories owned by 
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Taiwanese or Hong Kong investors; some are produced in Chinese- owned 
fi rms but produced in subcontracting relationships. 
 In the ‘producer- driven’ industries such as computer and IT products, 
which are included in category 4 in  Figure 10.5 , exports are mainly manufac-
tured in factories owned by Western and Taiwanese investors. For 2003, it is 
reported that 61.9 per cent of  high- tech export was produced by fully foreign- 
owned fi rms and 21.4 per cent by partly foreign- owned fi rms; altogether FDI- 
related manufacturing produced more than 80 per cent of  high- tech export 
from China (China S&T Indicators 2004). This refl ects overall trends of  the 
innovation system of  China characterized by easy access to foreign technology 
while remaining weak in local and domestic clustering. We will turn to this 
point in  sections 10.3 and  10.4 . 
 10.2.3  Domestic demand and investment 
 The domestic market has also played a role for the development in the period. 
Domestic demand experienced at least two rounds of  surge and growth. The 
fi rst round appeared through the 1980s and the fi rst half  of  the 1990s, and 
it was led by household durables and necessities, as illustrated by color televi-






























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
6 Primary products
5 Chemicals
4 Light & textile products
3 Electric & machinery products
2 Miscellaneous incl. Apparel
1 Other products
 Figure 10.5  Export structure 
 Source : Reproduced based on Wu (2004)  Table 8.7 . 
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huge areas of  shortage in consumer goods industries. The combination of  
bureaucratic decentralization and incremental reforms stimulated investment 
in the supply capacity of  these industries. 
 The second round began around 1999 and was focused on real estate, pas-
senger cars, personal computers and telecommunications, as illustrated by 
microcomputers and passenger cars in  Table 10.3 and  Figure 10.6 . Cement 
and rolled steel products are intermediate products and both rounds stim-
ulated demand for them. The second period of  demand- led growth was 
strongly weighted towards large- scale activities such as construction and car 
production, which consume them in great quantities; hence one sees acceler-
ated growth in the latter years. To expand production capacity, a very high 
rate of  growth in investment was necessary. 
 The second surge of  manufacturing was more directly induced by central 
monetary and industrial policies. In order to cope with the stagnation and 




















1978 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Air conditioner 10,000 set Color television 10,000 set
Rolled steel products 100,000 ton Cement 100,000 ton
Passenger car 1000 set Microcomputer 10,000 set
 Figure 10.6  Growth in representative products 
 Source :  China Statistical Yearbook  2004 Tables  14– 20  http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ 
ndsj/ yb2004- c/ indexch.htm 
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demand, the government engaged in ‘active fi scal policies’ to increase public 
investment in highways, telecommunications and power generation stations. 
The banking system was also engaged in stimulating ‘domestic demand’ in 
consumption. It created loans for individual housing and car consumers at 
reduced interest rates. 
 10.2.4  A unique pattern of  economic growth 
 In about a quarter of  a century, China’s economy has been characterized by 
high rates of  economic growth and capital accumulation. Some of  the mecha-
nisms behind that growth pattern are unique, while some have parallels with 
the institutional set up that promoted capital accumulation in England in the 
eighteenth century (Qian  1996 ). 
 The reforms that were initiated more than 25 years ago unleashed restrained 
material needs. It was explicitly argued that getting some concentration of  
wealth among the few was a fi rst step towards making everybody better off ; this 
made the strife for material wealth ideologically legitimate. Slumbering entre-
preneurship was awoken to engage in production and trade both within and 
outside the public sector.  The most important driver behind capital investment and eco-
nomic growth was a specifi c local fusion of  political and economic interests . Local authori-
ties and local entrepreneurs were able to promote simultaneously their political 
career and their own economic interests by stimulating industrial growth in their 
region, province, town or village. Most of  the extra income created remained 
under local control and the incentives to reinvest the surplus were strong. 
 Foreign direct investment initially emanating primarily from overseas 
Chinese investors and subsequently from wider sources should be added to 
this as an important factor. Joint ventures off er good opportunities for public 
and private rewards for local policymakers. The same is true for attracting 
direct investment in purely foreign- owned enterprises to the locality. Building 
infrastructure and supplying cheap labour, energy and land has become a 
key concern for local administrators. This mixture of  political and economic 
interests constitutes a new kind of  concentration of  power at the local level not 
always balanced by local political democracy and local rule of  law, and it may 
explain why the local administration is less popular than the central govern-
ment among Chinese citizens (Saich  2004 ). 
 The dynamics of  reform has also been driven by the competition between 
localities to off er the most attractive framework conditions. This sometimes 
takes the form of  off ering cheap resources and lax regulations in relation to 
environment and workers’ safety. But there are also examples of  forward- 
looking ideas developed locally and then spread nationwide. 
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 10.2.5  Limits to growth 
 The development trajectory behind the high speed of  growth is now con-
fronted with barriers for further growth. Some of  these are external and refer 
to potential trade confl icts. Others refl ect domestic problems with social and 
ecological sustainability. There are indications of  serious weaknesses of  the 
innovation system. The call for ‘harmonious development’ may be interpreted 
as an attempt to give new direction to the recognized unsustainable growth 
patterns (see below for four dimensions of  unsustainability). 
 Remarkable global impact and trade disputes : China’s economic growth has had a 
very visible impact on the global economy. When China’s exports and imports 
grow with double- digit rates, it makes a major diff erence for the rest of  the 
world. The impact on other countries’ trade balances is such that there is an 
upper limit for how far the trade surplus can be increased without triggering 
trade quotas or other forms of  retaliation. The current trend of  massive pen-
etration into global markets may not be lasting much longer. 
 Jobless growth: In terms of  GDP structure ( Figure 10.7 and  Figure 10.8 com-
pare China with four big developing or transitional economies: Brazil, South 
Africa, India and Russia), China appears to be overwhelmingly ‘industrial-
ized’. However, China is faced with the challenge from ‘jobless growth’ in 








































 Figure 10.7  GDP structure in comparison 
 Source :  For the data on China:  Statistical Yearbook 2004 ( http:// www.stats.gov.cn/ 
tjsj/ ndsj/ yb2004- c/ indexch.htm ), for the Data on Brazil, South Africa, India and 
Russia: World Facts and Figures at  http:// worldfactsandfi gures.com 
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structure, China appears as an agricultural economy  – half  of  the labour 
remains in this sector. Only India has a bigger proportion of  the labour force 
in agriculture. Combining the two sets of  data it is obvious that China is char-
acterized by high and rapidly growing capital– labour ratio in the manufactur-
ing sector. While there was net job creation in the fi rst years of  the reform 
period, the increase of  employment slowed down in the 1980s and stagnated 
since the 1990s. 
 This displacement of  employment exacerbates ‘structural unemployment’ 
(Lewis  1955 ). ‘Jobless growth’, in addition to inequality in wealth distribu-
tion and redistribution, entails social instability and endangers sustainable 
development. 
 Widening income gaps and negative environmental externalities : Gaps between the 
urban and the rural, between regions and between the rich and poor in the 
same region are widening. Working conditions and workers’ safety have been 
largely neglected. Negative externalities also include environmental degra-
dation such as air and water pollution and exploitation and wasteful use of  
other nonrenewable resources. The current development mode entails intense 
consumption of  nonrenewable raw materials and energy sources. Especially 
when these inputs are under the control of  local groups with vested interests 
there may be a tendency to set prices too low and to be lax in terms of  safety 
regulations. 
 Slow pace in competence and competitiveness upgrading: The industrialization 










































 Figure 10.8  Employment structure in comparison 
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innovation capability in Chinese fi rms. After 20 years of  being the origin of  
manufactured goods ‘Made in China’, China’s economy has not been able 
to embark on the track of  competence upgrading. This contrasts with the 
catching- up history of  the United States and Japan where ‘Made in US’ and 
‘Made in Japan’ were preludes to the two countries, within a time span of  one 
generation, reaching the world frontier in innovativeness and competitiveness. 
China remains specialized in low value- added products with profi t margins 
trapped at a meagre 2– 5 per cent, or in some areas even lower. 1 
 Recent policy documents and the general debate have pointed to these 
problems and contradictions, and to the need for a shift in the development 
strategy with stronger emphasis on ‘harmonious development’ and ‘endog-
enous innovation’. What adjustments of  the development strategy are needed 
to realize the intentions signalled by these concepts? 
 Before we discuss this issue in  section 10.4 , it is necessary to analyse the 
reform of  the innovation system that accompanied decentralization and priva-
tization. The analysis of  the reform and its outcome points to the weaknesses 
of  the current innovation system, and it helps us to specify what reforms are 
required in order to make innovation endogenous and to make it contribute to 
harmonious development. We will argue that eff orts to stimulate endogenous 
innovation may go hand in hand with promoting harmonious development. 
 10.3  The Transformation of  China’s Innovation System 
 We now turn to the transformation of  the innovation system of  China in the 
context of  market- oriented economic reform. It is interesting to note that the 
motivation for the reform of  the R&D system initiated in 1985 was ‘highly sys-
temic’ in the sense that the focus was on reshaping the division of  labour and 
the interaction between producers and users of  knowledge and innovation. As 
we shall see, the problems that remain after the reform can also be defi ned as 
‘highly systemic’. The fundamental weakness of  the system, having a negative 
impact both on the absorption of  foreign technology and on domestic innova-
tion, has to do with an economic structure that does not support learning by 
interaction in organized markets. 
 10.3.1  The attempt to reconfi gure the user– producer 
relationships 
 China has an old civilization and  historically has made important contribu-
tions to global science and technology (such as the compass, gunpowder and 
paper). In the older history of  China, however, science and technology as 
it evolved in Western Europe was not regarded as important or as carrying 
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social status. While Confucius’s heritage gave high prestige to intellectuals, it 
was to those engaged in humanistic science and in political and administrative 
aff airs. Scientifi c and technological knowledge was seen as based on practical 
experience rather than as a modern type of  scholarship, while research and 
development (R&D) establishments started to be organized in the 1920s to 
1930s, China only began the process of  institutionalization of  modern science 
and technology nationwide in the 1950s. 
 The R&D system established in the fi rst period of  development was 
designed in accordance with the centrally planned regime. One prominent 
feature was the huge size that was a refl ection of  the Marxist idea of  science 
as a societal force of  production and also a result of  the self- reliance develop-
ment strategy in the centrally planned period (see  Table 10.4 ). 
 The second feature was the separation of  industrial R&D centres from pro-
ductive enterprises. The centrally planned regime had introduced particular 
mechanisms to link up R&D activity with production: all the R&D institutes, 
except for those belonging to the Chinese Academy of  Sciences (which was 
assigned to be the national top organization for comprehensive natural and 
engineering science), were organized under the jurisdiction of  sector- specifi c 
ministries or bureaus, independently outside enterprises. The ministries or 
bureaus took the responsibility for planning production tasks as well. They 
were hence in command of  both R&D and production (Gu 1999, 151– 76). 
 It is interesting to note that this model of  specialization according to prod-
uct category both for R&D centres and enterprises, and separation of  fi rms 
from innovative activities was common for all the former centrally planned 
economies. 2 The organizational separation between innovation and produc-
tion blocked the system from vital and intimate interactions between produc-
ers and users, which are important especially for innovation in sophisticated 
producer goods technology (von Hippel  1994 ; Kline and Rosenberg  1986 ; 
Lundvall  1988 ). 
 The institutional setting was refl ected in innovation characteristics. For 
example, the  machinery industry of  China was apt at ‘general purpose’ 
machinery and weak in technologies fulfi lling particular machining tasks 
since these could only be developed through interactive learning and close 
producer– user communications (Gu 1999, 127– 35). The low degree of   eff ec-
tiveness of  the centrally planned institutional settings was well acknowledged 
at the end of  the 1970s. This became one important motive for the launch of  
reforms. 
 The crucial event for R&D system reform came in 1985, slightly lagging the 
agricultural and industrial reforms, which were started in 1978 and 1984, respec-
tively. A 1985 decision made by the Central Committee of  the Communist Party 
of  China initiated the reforms in Science and Technology System Management. 
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The central theme for the reform was to rearrange the relationship between 
knowledge producers and users and their relationships with the government. 
In a context where demand, supply and coordination factors were changing, 
reform of  the science and technology system was seen as essential. 
 Table 10.4  China’s investment in  R&D 
Year
Percentage of  R&D 
Expenditure 
Based on National 
Income  Year 
Percentage of  R&D Expenditure 
Based on GDP
1953 0.1 1978 1.5 (1.8 of  national income)
1954 0.2 1979 1.5
1955 0.3 1980 1.5
1956 0.6 1981 1.3
1957 0.6 1982 1.3
1958 1.0 1983 1.4
1959 1.6 1984 1.4
1960 2.8 1985 1.2
1961 2.0 1986 1.3
1962 1.5 1987 1.0
1963 1.9 1988 0.8
1964 2.1 1989 0.8
1965 2.0 1990 0.8
1966 1.6 1991 0.8
1967 1.0 1992 0.7
1968 1.0 1993 0.7
1969 1.5 1994 0.7
1970 1.6 1995 0.6
1971 1.8 1996 0.6
1972 1.7 1997 0.6
1973 1.5 1998 0.7
1974 1.5 1999 0.8
1975 1.6 2000 1.0
1976 1.6 2001 1.1
1977 1.6 2002 1.2
1978 1.8 (1.5 of  GDP) 2003 1.3
 Sources : China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, various issues; 
National Statistics Bureau  1990 : 207, and  http:// www.sts.org.cn/ KJNEW/ main-
title/ MainTitle.htm. 
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 The size and complexity of  the S&T system made reform crucial for the 
success of  economic growth. By 1980, there were 4,690 research institutes 
affi  liated with administration bodies higher than the ‘county’ level (i.e., to cen-
tral, provincial and regional/ city governments, with some additional 3,000 
institutes at the county level, the lowest level of  the nation’s administration 
hierarchy with an independent budget (‘White Paper’ No. 1, 232– 35). Some 
323,000 scientists and engineers worked in these institutes. The then Prime 
Minister Mr. Zhao Ziyang interpreted the reform as the following:
 The current science and technology institution in our country has evolved over 
the years under special historical situations. The advantages embodied in this 
system manifested themselves in concerted eff orts to tackle major scientifi c and 
technological projects, which were achieved with great success. However, there 
is growing evidence to show that the system can no longer accommodate the 
situation in the four modernizations programme, which depends heavily on sci-
entifi c and technological progress. One of  the glaring drawbacks of  this system 
is the disconnection of  science and technology from production, a problem, 
which is a source of  great concern for all of  us… 
 By their very nature, there is an organic linkage between scientifi c research and 
production. For this linkage a horizontal, regular, many- leveled and many- sided 
channel should be provided. The management system as practiced until now 
has actually clogged this direct linkage, so that research institutes were only 
responsible to the leading departments above, in a vertical relationship, with no 
channels for interaction with the society as a whole or for providing consultancy 
services to production units. This is the root cause of  the inability of  our scien-
tifi c research to meet our production needs over the years… This state of  aff airs 
can hardly be altered if  we confi ne ourselves to the beaten track. The way out 
lies in a reform. (Zhao 1986) 
 10.3.2  The adaptive policy process and the recombination of  
competences 
 For reforming the S&T system, a two- pronged policy was designed. On the 
one hand, ‘technology markets’ were established to function as distributive 
institutions for R&D outputs (Decision:  Section III). On the other hand, 
excellence- based allocation mechanisms were introduced for the allocation 
of  public R&D funds (Decision: Section II). In order for R&D institutes to 
be able to respond to opportunities arising at the market place, some degree 
of  autonomy in terms of  hiring personnel, engaging in contracted projects 
and acceptance and use of  contractual fees were assigned (Decision: Section 
VII). At the same time subsidies from the government were gradually reduced 
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(Decision: Sections I and II). It was expected that by push and pull, the previ-
ously publicly funded R&D institutes would move to serve their clients via 
regular and multiple linkages. 3 
 The actual process of  S&T system reform – as the reforms of  the overall 
economic system – unfolded through trial and error and entailed continuous 
adjustment of  policies (Shulin  1999 ).  The technology market solution , central in 
the initial design, was soon recognized as being diffi  cult to realize in its origi-
nal form. The users were not capable of  absorbing transferred technology, 
and the market was too small to secure R&D institutes with enough earnings. 
Buyers and sellers experienced serious uncertainty in assessing the use value of  
technology giving rise to disputes when writing and implementing contracts. 
As a response, in 1987 reform policy began to promote the  merger of  R&D 
institutes into existing enterprises or enterprise groups. The merger process was 
also diffi  cult to realize, however. Huge gaps between the merging parties, from 
diff erences in work culture and administrative affi  liations, were hard to over-
come immediately. 
 In the next year (1988) the Torch Programme was launched to encour-
age organizations akin to  spin- off  enterprises – called  NTEs (New Technology 
Enterprises)  – from existing R&D institutes and universities. Local govern-
ments contributed to investment in infrastructure and supporting institutions 
for the New and Hi- Tech Industry Zones that became incubation bases for the 
NTE start- ups. Scientists and engineers, often with support from their parent 
institutions, went into commercial application of  their inventions and exper-
tise by means of  the creation of  NTEs. And by the early 1990s, reform policy 
included another solution to change  individual R&D institutes into production enti-
ties. This, as well, was an adaptation to an actual evolution already realized by 
many industrial R&D institutes. 
 At the end of  the 1990s, the reforms came to a form of  conclusion. In 
1999 an offi  cial decision pointed to the need to clarify the actual character 
of  the previously government- run industrial technology R&D institutes. By 
2001, 4 some 1,200 industrial technology R&D institutes had re- registered 
their business type. Of  them more than 300 were  merger cases; these institutes 
have cancelled their independent position and become a part of  an enter-
prise, and 600 plus have changed to become  profi table fi rms in themselves. A few 
have entered into a university.  Table  10.5 indicates the changed structure 
of  R&D performers. In 2000 the proportion of  R&D performed by ‘enter-
prises’ increased abruptly (see line 3,  Table 10.5 ) largely because a number 
of  previous R&D institutes became registered enterprises or part of  existing 
enterprises.  Table 10.4 also depicts the scope of   technology market and  spin- off s , 
both grew steadily over time (lines 1 and 2), illustrating the complementary 
eff ects of  various transformation means. Lines 4 and 5 and 3 show a changed 
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 Table 10.5  Selective indicators to changes in China’s NIS (all the measures at cur-
rent prices) 
1985 1990 1995 2000
 (1) Technology Market 
Contract fees (RMB Billion) 2.30 7.51 26.83 65.07
 (2) Spin– off s 
Number of  NTEs 















 (3) Domestic R&D 
expenditure (RMB Billion) 
in which Enterprises (%) 



















 (4) Import of  capital goods 
(USD Billion)
16.24 16.85 52.64 69.45 
(1999)
 (5) FDI (USD Billion) 1.96 3.49 37.52 40.72
 Sources : China Statistical Year Book on Science and Technology, various issues. 
structure in technology sources. China, not so long ago nearly closed to inter-
national exchange in technology and knowledge, has become a widely open 
innovation system, with enormous infl ows of  technology in forms of  interna-
tional capital goods and FDI. 
 Adaptive policy evolving though trial and error characterizes ‘gradual 
reforms’ in the whole process of  economic transition in China. The great 
uncertainties associated with foreseeing the impact of  major political reforms 
made adaptive policy learning necessary. Only policymaking that was respon-
sive and adaptive to the feedback information on the impact could preserve 
the feasibility for success of  any radical social innovation program (Metcalfe 
 1995 ; Gu and Lundvall  2006 ). 
 10.3.3  A review of  the transformation of  the innovation system 
 On the basis of  the discussion above,  Figure  10.9 illuminates the National 
Innovation System of  China as it looked before (part A) and after (part B) 
the transformation. It embraces (1)   innovation actors   – R&D institutes, capi-
tal goods industries that provide embodied technology for user sectors and 
domestic end- product manufacturers; (2)   infl ows of  technology   – by means of  
technology licensing (TL) sample machine procurement (SMP), procurement 
of  equipment (PE), foreign direct investment (FDI) and original equipment 
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TL: Technology Licensing
SMP: Sample Machine Procurement
PE: Procurement of Equipment
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 Figure 10.9  Transformation of  China’s NIS 
manufacturing (OEM); and (3)  interactive relationships between actors and with 
domestic and international markets. We use arrows with diff erent line bold-
ness to illustrate the intensity of  the various links. It gives a fi rst impression of  
what signifi cant changes the transformation has brought into the system. 
 The transformation was constructive in safeguarding and recombining 
technological capabilities in the context of  market reform and opening up to 
the global economy. It has supported rapid growth in the economy as a whole. 
For example, a number of  NTEs like Huawei, Datang and Lenovo grew to 
become key ICT enterprises and this led to a fundamental restructuring of  
China’s ICT industry (Shulin and Steinmueller 1996/ 2000). The achieve-
ments are especially impressive when comparing with Russia where scientifi c 
and technological capabilities were destroyed on a huge scale. It nonetheless 
leaves the system with some prominent weaknesses (see below for two major 
weaknesses). 
 Easy access to foreign technology while remaining weak in local and domestic clustering: 
First of  all, the resulting system developed weaker domestic links and interac-
tions than international links; although the mastery of  the latter links remains 
rather passive, dominated by the import of  foreign technology embodied in 
machinery and other process equipment. The  capital goods industry has not 
played a role as an innovation centre for the whole economy by providing 
appropriately advanced production means for various users; they were instead 
largely integrated into the respective global value chains. Many regions of  
China, for which the autonomy of  policy decision- making was strengthened 
during the market reform, are weak in  geographical proximity- based clustering or 
networking even when there is some fi rm agglomeration. In general  potential 
local or domestic links along and between value chains have been slow to develop and 
hard to expand. Small fi rms in traditional manufacturing sectors, agriculture 
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and rural development have received inadequate support from national and 
regional technological infrastructure, showing a  separation between the modern and 
the traditional part of  the system. 
 Missing technological infrastructure and supportive institutional development: Second, 
the transformation ignored the development of  technological infrastructure 
and supportive institutions. The remarkable aspect of  the reform is that the 
initial intention  – to establish markets for technologies for existing R&D 
institutes and existing enterprises  – was not realized. Instead other unfore-
seen adaptations ‘saved’ the reform. A general tendency was  vertical integration 
of  R&D and design with production activities  – either through merger into enter-
prises or through the establishment of  downstream production. This was true 
not only for R&D institutes for industrial technology but also for institutes 
engaged in health and agricultural R&D and even for universities. As a result, 
the reconfi guration of  the scientifi c and technological infrastructure was not 
complete during the market reforms. This has resulted in a weak capability to 
provide S&T inputs and supportive services to innovation in fi rms – a capabil-
ity that is fundamentally important for knowledge based growth (Nelson  2004 ; 
David  2003 ). 
 There were several reasons for the drive towards vertical integration. One 
reason was the peculiar pattern of  division of  labour for R&D institutes 
inherited from the centrally planned system in which they had already been 
involved in many ‘downstream’ activities. 5 Weak absorptive capacity and less 
developed social capital were other reasons for the diffi  culties in establishing 
markets for technology. 
 The phenomenon of  factories that integrated vertically within themselves 
all stages in the production process were common in all centrally planned 
economies (Granick 1967). Kornai (1980) explained this with a combination 
of  the factories’ hunger for investment and paternalistic relations with the 
planning authority. The  vertically integrated factories were left almost untouched by 
the market reforms, and this obstructed networking in the core part of  the 
economy. Vertically integrated enterprises survived, mainly in what had been 
seen as strategic sectors and especially in the machinery industry that was 
given high priority before the reform. 
 10.4  Problems, Debates and Challenges 
 By the second half  of  the 1990s, symptoms increasingly indicated that the 
development dynamics created by reforms were about to be exhausted and 
negative sides of  the growth model came more into focus. The accession 
to WTO added to the need for China to move into a new period of  eco-
nomic and NIS transition. This was the background for the 1999 Decision by 
the Communist Party and the State Council where it declared the need for 
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‘enhancing technological innovation, developing high technologies and pro-
moting commercial production of  S&T achievements’. 6 However there has 
not been much change in economic policy and in the orientation of  develop-
ment, except for ‘active fi scal policies’, which targeted material infrastructure 
construction and a considerable increase in public investment in R&D. 
 With the further accumulation of  problems, the government now has 
decided to make ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’ 
key components of  a renewal of  the development strategy. In this section we 
analyse the problems and introduce the policy debate around ‘endogenous 
innovation’. Starting from the innovation system perspective and taking into 
account the historical transition of  the system, we propose an interpretation 
of  endogenous innovation where it is understood as a move towards innova-
tion driven growth and learning based economic development. 
 10.4.1  ‘Endogenous innovation’ 7 and policy debates 
 In October 2005, the Communist Party Central Committee and China’s gov-
ernment stipulated the Guiding Vision for the 11th National Economic and 
Social Development Program (2006– 2010). It emphasizes the importance of  
adjustment of  development strategy, which should be economizing material 
inputs, upgrading economic structure and innovative capability, being friendly 
to environmental protection, balancing between urban and rural development 
and between the development in East, Middle and West regions and main-
taining job creation and social equality (CCCPC 2005). The key for realizing 
the new strategy is endogenous innovation ( zi- zhu- chuang- xin ) and continuous 
reforms to build harmoniousdevelopment. One can see that the new strategic 
vision accommodates several of  the problems discussed above. 
 Policy debates on endogenous innovation following the decision may 
be considered as a follow- up of  earlier long- lasting debates. 8 A fi rst focus 
concerns the theoretical rationale for alternative development strategies – 
whether the strategy should be based on comparative advantages or if  it 
should involve strategic industrial policy aiming at catch- up and leapfrog-
ging. Another focus of  the debates relates to the buy- or- make question of  
technology. Here one opinion insists on the necessity to increase investment 
in domestic R&D so as to develop competence in core technologies and 
technological capabilities, national brands and to build independent capa-
bilities in relation to defence, health care and other national specifi c needs. 
The opposite opinion argues in favour of  buying/ borrowing technologies 
from abroad; it claims that high R&D investment has, to date, brought 
advantages neither for the country nor for the enterprises. A third focus is 
on policies for FDI. Whether, and to what extent does FDI contribute to 
   291
CHINA’S INNOVATION SYSTEM 291
technology acquisition and upgrading? Were the policies aiming at attract-
ing FDI by opening the huge domestic market successful? Should the favour-
able treatment for FDI continue or should regulatory conditions be identical 
for domestic and FDI- related businesses? 
 The debates have thus raised several diff erent issues and have not always 
been clearly focused. The emphasis on promoting free market and trade liber-
alization in policy spheres was, to some extent, unavoidable in a period when 
China was engaged in economic and social transition away from a centrally 
planned regime. Nonetheless, the current debates may be understood as rec-
ognition that free markets alone have their limits when it comes to guide social 
and economic transition and development. 
 10.4.2  Endogenous innovation as strategic element of  
innovation- driven growth and learning- based 
economic development 
 In order to clarify the current debates, we believe it is necessary to elevate 
the central theme ‘how to embark on innovation- driven growth and learning- 
based economic development’. Otherwise many of  the debates might go 
nowhere. 
 For example, purchasing technology from overseas and the domestic devel-
opment of  technology are both important; they actually are complementary in 
most real innovation processes. To see policies that encourage domestic fi rms’ 
innovation as confl icting with policies that aim to acquire foreign technolo-
gies would be misleading. Comparative advantages are necessary reference 
points for operational planning while strategic planning needs to consider 
how existing comparative advantages can be renewed and upgraded. To pro-
mote endogenous innovation, a conventional and simplistic response would 
be to invest more in science and technology, and re- enforce the tendency that 
R&D organizations move into downstream activities. It is highly questionable 
if  such an eff ort would make any major diff erence and overcome the weak-
nesses in competence upgrading at the fi rm level and in internal clustering 
and dynamics. 
 The crucial question is how to overcome the weaknesses the Chinese econ-
omy and innovation system have encountered, and for this, it is essential to 
defi ne endogenous innovation as a strategy for innovation- driven growth and 
learning- based development. We believe that the fundamental challenge is still 
to make the innovation system as a whole to work in such a way that it contrib-
utes to economic growth and harmonious development. This is actually what 
the Chinese government’s Guiding Vision for the 11th National Economic 
and Social Development Program (2006– 2010) declares. 
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 10.4.3  Reconfi guring innovation systems in the context of  the 
globalizing learning economy 
 The idea that economic development is a process where the degree of  spe-
cialization and the division of  labour grow and become more complex, and 
the mastery of  knowledge generation and application becomes increasingly 
sophisticated, goes back to Adam Smith, and has been discussed widely 
by economic historians (e.g., Maddison  1991 ; Fei & Ranis  1997 ). Human 
learning, which takes place by doing and through science- based innovation, 
is the most important source for economic growth and involves the deep-
ening of  the division of  labour and increasing scale economies as well as 
dynamic eff ects (North  1996 ; Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ). In the current 
context of  global competition, deregulation and radical technical change 
the dynamic eff ects become increasingly important. The acceleration of  
the rate of  change implies that the speed of  learning becomes increasingly 
important for the competitiveness of  fi rms and national systems. One of  
the authors has referred to this change in context as ‘a globalizing learn-
ing economy’ (Lundvall and Borras 1998; Archibugi and Lundvall  2001 ). 
China’s experience shows that development in the context of  globalizing 
learning economy has made it very essential to facilitate a rapid learning 
pace and intensity. 
 One of  the major focuses of  the innovation system perspective (Nelson and Winter 
1982; Freeman  1987 ; Lundvall  1992 ; Nelson  1993 )  is about how an innovation 
system generalizes and diff uses knowledge through learning. Learning takes place in 
specialized R&D centres that transform local experiences and laboratory 
experiments into more general knowledge and diff use it through training 
and publications. But learning also takes place in production and consump-
tion. Producer learning results in productivity growth. Consumer learn-
ing results in change in the composition of  fi nal demand (Pasinetti  1981 ). 
Learning by using refers to how users of  complex systems or advanced pro-
cess equipment become more profi cient as they experience and solve prob-
lems (Rosenberg  1982 ). 
 However, the development of  new products and processes, especially capi-
tal goods and sophisticated devices, has to involve an interaction and informa-
tion exchange between users and producers (Lundvall  1985 ).  Interactive learning 
is pervasive in a modern economy, which is characteristic of  sophisticated 
patterns in division of  labour. More fundamentally, ‘learning- by- interacting’ 
generalizes and spreads the initially local learning consequences throughout 
the whole economy in the form of  new machinery, new components or new 
software systems embodied knowledge and tacit and human embedded com-
petences and business solutions (Lundvall  2006 ). 
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 How a system gets interactive learning to work well is crucial for innovation 
and development performance of  a national economy.  Interactive learning is car-
ried out in a hybrid structure of  governance consisting of  markets, organizations and 
networks, which we call an ‘organized market’ (Lundvall  1985 ). Perfect com-
petition with arm’s length and anonymous relationships between customers 
and sellers cannot support product innovation. Vertically integrated fi rms also 
exclude product innovation and an economic structure dominated by such 
fi rms would make an economy less rich in terms of  learning experiences and 
also more rigid and therefore quite vulnerable to market turbulence (Lundvall 
 2006 ; Richardson  2002 ). 
 Learning takes place through user producer interaction where, for 
instance, one producer of  machinery absorbs information about user expe-
riences from many diverse users. The interaction at this level may be seen 
as an important dynamo for innovation- driven economic growth. Diff erent 
from conventional thoughts, the perspective of  interactive learning points to 
the  importance of  the structure of  production and innovation system , the absence of  
a strong domestic capital goods sector would constitute a serious handicap 
for the innovation system. Similar considerations apply to  knowledge intensive 
business services . Today such services play an increasingly important role for 
economic growth. While it is necessary for production enterprises to have 
in house R&D activities in order to be able to absorb knowledge from the 
outside, having access to knowledge intensive business services is a great 
advantage. Empirical studies from diff erent countries show that fi rms that 
outsource the production of  such services experience rapid productivity 
growth (Tomlinson  2001 ). 
 Network formation is crucial for the improvement of  interactive learning by 
augmenting and mediating ‘complementary’ but not ‘similar’ innovative activ-
ities (Saxenian  1996 ; Baldwin and Clark  1997 ; Langlois  2003 ).  ‘Social capital’ 
supports networking and interactive learning across organizational borders 
(Woolcock  1998 ). Social capital may in this connection be defi ned as ‘the will-
ingness and capability of  citizens and organizations to make commitments to 
each other, collaborate with each other and trust each other in processes of  
exchange and interactive learning.’ 
 The above paragraphs illustrate the importance of  applying a systemic 
perspective when designing an innovation policy aiming at endogenous inno-
vation. From the NIS perspective the promotion of  endogenous innovation 
needs to be built on an understanding of  the two major themes:  interactive learn-
ing and  system effi  ciency . 
 The policy discussion in the following sections will draw on the ideas devel-
oped above. We see some of  the major challenges for the reform of  China’s 
innovation system as having to do with a need to reconfi gure user– producer 
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relationships and to stimulate new forms for user– producer interaction in the 
context of  innovation. 
 10.4.4  Innovation policies to overcome the limits to growth 
and foster endogenous innovation and harmonious 
development 
 At the end of   section 10.2 , we listed a number of  problems that emanate from 
China’s current trajectory of  economic growth. At the end of   section 10.3 , we 
pointed to weaknesses of  the current innovation system. In what follows we 
will, from the innovation system perspective, briefl y present some ideas for the 
next transition of  the innovation system that respond to these problems and 
weaknesses and take into account the global context. 
 Address domestic needs:  An inexorable factor for innovation is demand character-
istics; it off ers both incentives and demand information. Enterprises in China 
should not miss the rich resources of  domestic market, refl ecting heteroge-
neous regional, habitual and cultural variation in needs and both advanced 
and basic needs. A  general shift towards home markets would also reduce 
international friction in relation to trade. 
 One way to promote harmonious and sustained development is to direct 
innovation activities towards domestic social and ecological needs such as 
health services, education, transport, energy and environment. China has 
the necessary planning capacity to coordinate R&D and the development of  
industrial competence and qualifi ed demand, using a pragmatic mixture of  
market and administrative governance. 9 
 To respond to the demands emerging domestically would open ways to 
stimulate and nurture novel ideas for endogenous innovation. In the longer 
run that would eventually make it possible for China to contribute both to 
market demand in the international market and to human well- being. In 
short, addressing domestic needs is a necessary ground for ‘peaceful develop-
ment’ and harmonious development. 
 Engage in product innovation and improve engineering capability : At the level of  the 
single fi rm, product innovation addresses new needs in the market and 
therefore it may be seen as an important way to make the market grow. 
Process innovation, on the other hand, improves the effi  ciency of  the pro-
duction process. Both types of  innovations are important for the survival of  
the fi rm. But for the innovation system as a whole product innovation may 
be more effi  cient in promoting innovation driven growth and job creation. It 
enriches the division of  labour, and it opens up larger space for interactive 
learning. While product innovation creates jobs, process innovation alone 
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tends to reduce jobs (Pianta  2005 ). This distinction is especially important in 
an economy with big labour reserves and jobless growth in its most dynamic 
sector. 
 Jobless growth results partly from lack of  product innovation and partly 
from weak engineering capability. The weak engineering capability is refl ected 
in the massive import of  means of  production such as machinery and in weak 
indigenous provision. Engineering capability is the ability to implement and 
realize innovation based on innovative ideas, which in themselves are experi-
encing dramatic change and improvement (Dodgson et al. 2005). Policies that 
stimulate domestic fi rms to develop new products in the form of  new pro-
cess equipment that can be used by domestic fi rms would certainly promote 
endogenous innovation through the stimuli for interaction at the core of  the 
innovation system that it represents. 
 Product innovation takes place also in the form of  new services and increas-
ingly the knowledge intensive business services that have become strategic 
parts of  the innovation system (Tomlinson  2001 ). They interact with many 
users that can profi t from the development of  more effi  cient services that 
embody the experiences of  many diverse users. With a strategic perspective 
building a strong and dynamic sector around business services may be a nec-
essary step towards innovation- driven growth in China. The growth of  this 
sector has until recently been slow, and there is also a great potential for job 
creation in this sector. 
 Building user competences and institutions supporting SME competence.  Since user– 
producer interaction is crucial for the success of  innovation, it is not suffi  cient 
to merely promote the competence and knowledge creation of  suppliers. One 
important reason why the 1985 reform did not succeed in building markets 
for science and technology was that the potential users did not have the com-
petence to absorb advanced knowledge. This is why the dominant pattern 
was vertical integration and knowledge producers moving into production. 
To improve interactive learning, user competence is as important as the com-
petence of  the producer, and in China, this constitutes a major bottleneck for 
learning and innovation. 
 Competence refers to scientifi c capabilities as well as to the capacity to 
engage in learning by doing and organizational learning. To promote the 
building of  scientifi c capabilities, incentives for enterprises to engage in R&D 
activities may be combined with incentives to hire highly educated personnel. 
To stimulate the diff usion of  organizational learning among fi rms, a combi-
nation of  benchmarking good practices in terms of  organizational and inter- 
organizational learning may be combined with competence based selection 
and ‘job rotation’ among top managers. 
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 For small and medium- sized fi rms in traditional sectors, including agro- 
food business, specifi c institutes and self- organized initiatives with the task of  
diff using technical innovations and good organizational practice may be sup-
ported by the public sector. Such fi rms have the need for inexpensive access 
to technological services and knowledge institutions. Especially in periods of  
graduate engineer and scientist unemployment, giving such fi rms public sup-
port to hire their fi rst engineer/ graduate might be considered. 
 Develop a responsive science and engineering base .  The 1985 reform resulted in a 
structure where universities and other institutions with responsibilities for 
basic research became strongly involved in commercial activities. With the 
improvement of  the level of  competences at the level of  fi rms, universities 
and public R&D centres should redefi ne their roles and withdraw gradually 
from downstream commercial activities that are not easily combined with the 
search for excellence in science and technology. 
 Improvement of  public funds management and the development of  sci-
entifi c community- based academic evaluation would largely increase the effi  -
ciency of  knowledge production. Such a shift may actually be combined with 
a more intense communication with industry both in research and in higher 
education. 10 In the more global knowledge society, it is also important to par-
ticipate in international academic communities and to expose the academic 
research to international competition. Such changes would certainly increase 
the rate of  return from the increased investment in R&D that the Chinese 
government is beginning to implement. 
 Develop new forms of  participatory governance of  economic organizations . There are diff er-
ent forms of  governance, and the degrees to which people tolerate social gaps 
also diff er across the rich countries. Some advanced rich countries operate with 
wide social gaps while others are more egalitarian. The fi rst group includes the 
United States and the United Kingdom where ordinary people are less participa-
tory; they are expected to adapt passively to new technologies. The second group 
includes the small European welfare states where ordinary workers take active 
part in innovation as well as in sharing of  the benefi ts that innovation creates. 
 In China one way to stimulate participation in the process of  change is to 
establish cooperative ownership to fi rms. This might be especially relevant for 
densely populated agricultural regions. The International Labour Offi  ce (ILO 
 2003 ) calls for rediscovering the cooperative advantage in poverty reduction, 
warning at the same time that people have to learn lessons from negative expe-
riences in the past. One of  the lessons is to let the cooperatives grow through 
self- organization and learning; another is to support the development of  the 
qualifi cations of  leaders and participants. 
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 Improving education and stimulating the mobility of  skilled labour. The most funda-
mental and dynamic resource in the innovation system is people. Every sin-
gle person is a potential user and producer of  technology and knowledge. In 
order to enhance user competence and facilitate interaction between users 
and producers, improvement of  education and training is one of  the basic 
means. Universal secondary education in poor rural areas is a way to pre-
pare residents for participation in knowledge and skill- intensive agricultural 
and related activities or for becoming members of  new generations of  urban 
residents. 
 The education system has to be modifi ed in terms of  curricula design and 
pedagogical methods in order to promote the problem solving capacity of  stu-
dents. Increasingly, interaction will depend on experts who are both creative 
and cooperative. Elite education needs to be complemented with universal and 
life- long continuous education for the strategy of  endogenous innovation and 
harmonious development. 
 But not all competences emanate from formal education and training. 
With rapid change, the learning that takes place at work becomes more and 
more important. Stimulating the diff usion of  ‘learning organization’ practices 
among enterprises is fundamental both for stimulating endogenous innovation 
and for the ongoing upgrading of  skills of  the workforce. 
 The mobility of  people across organizational borders shapes social con-
nections and interaction. Enterprise employees and managers with a univer-
sity educational background will be the ones that have the least diffi  culties 
to establish collaboration with researchers at universities. Therefore, schemes 
that make it attractive to move back and forth between academia and the 
enterprise sector may be seen as especially important. 
 Develop networking and learning regions. Regions can be springboards for endog-
enous innovation, if  they develop and exploit specialized strengths based 
on fi rm networks that contain tacit knowledge (Cooke and Morgan  1998 ). 
The local and regional dimension has become crucial for growth in China 
through reforms leading to bureaucratic decentralization. But the develop-
ment towards learning regions has been less impressive. There is a need for a 
new incentive structure and for policy capacity building at the regional and 
local level. Reform should aim at rewarding innovative solutions that promote 
networking and save scarce resources. 
 There is also a need to give central government a stronger role in the redis-
tribution of  wealth between provinces and regions. Central government could 
also play a more important role as promoter of  regional policy and manage-
rial learning within the regions. 
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 10.4.5  Social capital and endogenous innovation 
 In sum, endogenous innovation and harmonious development require are a 
new set of  eff orts rather diff erent from those made in the 1980s and 1990s. It 
involves reforms of  the institutions that support markets and make contracts 
trustworthy, but it also involves broader social changes that support interac-
tions among economic agents. 
 Corruption and irregularities in the use of  legal systems undermine trust 
and thereby undermine a critical prerequisite for interactive learning across 
organizational borders. Innovation is, because of  its inherently uncertain 
character, especially vulnerable to lack of  trust. To foster the rule of  law and 
a competent and honest public administration is therefore an integrated ele-
ment of  any strategy for innovation and learning- based development. In the 
current context, fostering good governance, especially at the local level and at 
the enterprise level may be a key to enhancing innovation. 
 One way to illustrate the task of  promoting endogenous innovation and 
harmonious development is to present it in terms of  four types of  capital (see 
 Table 10.6) . 
 Production capital can be relatively easily produced and reproduced. The 
same is true for intellectual capital. But production capital loses much of  its use 
value when natural capital is eroded – once the land and the drinking water 
have been polluted, it is immensely expensive to clean it up. Intellectual capital 
is created through interactive learning, and it will depend strongly on social 
capital. In a society where people trust institutions and each other and are 
ready to cooperate willingly also outside the most narrow group, learning will 
fl ourish. 
 Endogenous innovation and harmonious development implies a growth 
model that gives attention not only to production capital and intellectual capi-
tal but also avoids the degradation of  natural capital as a key element in a 
strategy favouring harmonious development. Stimulating the formation of  
social capital is a key to long- term success in promoting endogenous innova-
tion. Social capital is the basis for interactive learning and therefore the lubri-
cation that makes the innovation system work smoothly. 
 Table 10.6  Resources fundamental for economic growth – combining the tangible 





Tangible resources Production capital Natural capital
Intangible resources Intellectual capital Social capital
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 10.5  Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have analysed the forces behind rapid growth in China. We 
have shown that pragmatic policies and policy learning have been central for 
its success. We have also pointed to challenges posed by the growth pattern 
and to remaining weaknesses in the innovation system. 
 These challenges and weaknesses are refl ected in the new political signals, 
giving priority to the concepts of  endogenous innovation and harmonious 
development. Building on the historical experience, we argue that the best way 
to interpret these concepts is to see them as signalling innovation- driven eco-
nomic growth and learning- based economic development. 
 The global context and the historical starting point is diff erent than it was 
in 1985, but the basic perspective for reform with focus on interaction between 
users and producers of  knowledge and technology remains pertinent when 
designing the next major transition. Strengthening domestic demand and the 
competence of  domestic users of  technology is a key to success. Enhancing the 
knowledge base of  strategic sectors producing process equipment and knowl-
edge intensive business services for the market is another important element. 
Investing in ‘social capital’  – designing institutions so that citizens become 
more ready to collaborate and learn from each other – is a way to promote 
endogenous innovation. 
 Many aspects of  both the successes and the problems that China has expe-
rienced are unforeseen in previous catch- up history and in existing theories of  
economic development. This is true for the limits of  export- led development 
strategies, the inadequacy of  manufactured exports in spreading learning eff ects, 
the extreme rate of  substitution of  capital for labour and the severe structural 
unemployment phenomenon. The response to these accumulated challenges 
sees China embark on a new development strategy characterized by endoge-
nous innovation and harmonious development, which we have interpreted as a 
strategy of  innovation- driven growth and learning- based development. 
 As China pursues harmonious development, it will become clear that it 
does not represent any economic threat to other countries. For those who hope 
China off ers a uniquely successful experience, we need to point out that the 
actual process of  adjustment unavoidably will involve uncertainties and set-
backs. We wish that innovation studies can serve an instrumental and positive 
role and certainly believe that innovation studies can learn a lot from the tran-
sition that China will undergo in future years. 
 Notes 
 1  Low profi tability of  commodities made in China is common knowledge, although 
the 2– 5 per cent is a rough estimation. For example. the TV industry, which has a 
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well- developed competitive advantage, has rather thin profi t margins because key com-
ponents for fi nal products are imported from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It is reported 
that in 2005 average net profi t of  the TV industry was as low as less than 3 per cent, 
and for some fi rms it was lower than 1 per cent, even though the industry had intro-
duced fl at panel TV sets one year ago and these were expected to improve the indus-
try’s profi tability record. (Shangwu Shoukan (Business Watch Magazine) 28 October 
2005). Ninbo City, Zhejiang province, is an important export– manufacturing base. It 
exported US$ 12 billion of  products such as clothing, cigarette lighters and air con-
ditioners in 2003. Possessing weak negotiating capacity with international buyers and 
being engaged in the low end of  value chains, the exporting fi rms had net profi ts of  
around 10 per cent with some lower than 5 per cent. (IT jingli shijie (CEO & CIO 
China) 9 November 2004). 
 2  See Granick (1967) for former Soviet Union and for more general discussion see 
Hanson and Pavitt ( 1987 ). 
 3  Note that the Decision recognized the diversity of  R&D institutes in terms of  their 
functions. It divided them into ‘technology development type’, ‘basic research type’, 
and ‘public welfare and infrastructure services type’. The reduction of  public funds 
was mainly applied to the technology development type and it was done gradually to 
be completed in a time span of  fi ve years. Consequently by 1991, the 2,000 plus, out of  
4,000 in total, technology development institutes had had their public ‘operation fees’ 
entirely or partly cut. Roughly the sum of  the reduction accounted to slightly less than 
RMB 1 billion (or USD$ 200 MM) or about one- tenth of  the overall government S&T 
budget in 1985. 
 4  See:  http:// www.sts.org.cn/ report_ 3/ documents/ 2002/ 0207.htm 
 5  Data show that in 1985, the centrally affi  liated R&D institutes engaged mainly in 
‘experiment development’ and ‘design and production engineering’. According to 
international standards, half  of  their works were not ‘R&D’ but downstream innova-
tion related activities such as ‘design and production engineering’ and ‘diff usion and 
technical services’. The locally affi  liated R&D institutes went even downward further. 
Similar phenomenon was observed in other centrally planned systems to a lesser extent. 
Distribution of Innovation Activity (1985)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Production
Diffusion and Technical Services




Central R&D Institutes Local R&D Institutes
 Source : ‘White Paper’ No. 1: 238 
 6  For the full document, refer to  http:// www.most.gov.cn/ t_ a3_ zcfgytzgg_ a.jsp 
 7  There are diff erent English translations of  the Chinese term  zi- zhu- chuang- xin; here we 
use ‘endogenous innovation’. ‘Independent innovation’ appears quite often in English 
versions of  Chinese media reports, to which we tend to disagree, as it is misleading. In 
Chinese, to put an adjective ‘ zi- zhu’ to ‘innovation’ is to emphasize that strategically 
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China has to be proactive to do something new and not passively stay with existing and 
imported technologies. Readers are better to understand the fashionable Chinese term 
 zi- zhu- chuang- xin simply as ‘innovation’. 
 8  The following is discussion based on various sources from media reports and from per-
sonal exchanges. 
 9  It is interesting to note that the market economy par excellence, the United States, has 
a much more active government policy to support science and technology than Japan 
and Europe. But the government programs appear as part of  health- and space- related 
programs, not as industrial policy. 
 10  A stronger element of  practical experience and a more problem- oriented learning 
method in the academic training of  scientists, engineers and managers would be a most 
effi  cient way to create stronger links between universities and enterprises. The same 
would be true for more systematic eff orts by universities to off er life- long learning to 
these categories. But the most important change would be coming from the increased 
hiring of  academic personnel by the enterprises. 
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 Chapter 11 
 THE ‘NEW NEW DEAL’ AS A RESPONSE 
TO THE EURO- CRISIS 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 11.1  Introduction 
 While the Eurozone was originally designed to protect member countries from 
economic instability, it has now turned into a major source of  instability for 
the world as a whole. Currently European leaders bring Europe ahead in the 
direction of  a European Federation not because it is part of  their vision, but 
because it seems to be the only way to avoid triggering a global depression. 
 When the Eurozone was established there were warning voices that a mon-
etary union without a common fi scal policy would be vulnerable to external 
shocks. The total budget of  the EU constitutes only a few percent of  the total 
GNP for member states and therefore it cannot play the same role as the 
federal budget in the United States as automatic stabilizer. This is especially 
problematic for a currency union bringing together countries at very diff erent 
levels of  economic development. There were elements in the Lisbon Strategy 
that could have reduced the gaps between Northern and Southern Europe. 
But the turn towards more neoliberal solutions that took place around 2005 
undermined its capacity to function as a scaff old for the Eurozone (Lundvall 
and Lorenz  2011 ). 
 In this chapter I show that the countries in the Eurozone now most exposed 
to fi nancial speculation are the ones that have the weakest industrial struc-
ture with the biggest proportion of  workplaces directly exposed to competi-
tion with emerging economies. On this background I will argue that, standing 
alone, neither Austrian austerity nor Keynesian policies can help establish a 
sustainable Eurozone. There is a need to design Keynesian policies coordi-
nated at the European level in such a way that they promote deep institutional 
change in education, labour market and industrial policy in Southern Europe. 
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Public expenditure needs to be allocated to stimulate the learning capacity 
where it is weakest – this is why the solution may be referred to as a ‘new new 
deal’ . It is about redistributing learning capacities. 
 11.2  Innovation and the Division of  Labour 
 The following analysis builds upon a simple theoretical model linking to each 
other ‘innovation as an interactive process’  and the dynamics of  the division 
of  labour (Lundvall  2006 ). According to Adam Smith the extension and deep-
ening of  the division of  labour is the major mechanism behind economic 
growth. On the other hand, innovation is the most important mechanism 
behind the evolving division of  labour. New products and processes give rise 
to new and more developed forms of  specialization. The more developed 
division of  labour opens up new interfaces for interactive learning that may 
stimulate further innovation. It also enhances diversity that opens up for ‘new 
combinations’ of  ‘distant elements’. Such new combinations are at the very 
core of  the innovation process. 
 But specialization may also raise barriers between professions and disci-
plines, between theorists and practical people, and, not least, it may repro-
duce social distance between workers and bosses. One way to interpret the 
results to be presented below is that a mix of  theory and practice at school and 
democracy/ participation at work reduce both barriers and social distance and 
thereby enhance the opportunities for interactive learning and for absorbing 
quickly and effi  ciently new ideas in the production system. 
 In order to intervene wisely in this process, it is important to understand 
the role of  diff erent kinds of  ‘diff erences’ for the performance of  innovation 
systems. While high degrees of  diversity in people’s experiences and in sources 
of  knowledge give a rich foundation for innovations, high degrees of  inequal-
ity hamper the interaction and communication that is crucial for successful 
innovation. A crucial policy challenge is to combine the potential of  egalitar-
ian learning systems with open intercultural dialogue and high degrees of  
diversity. 
 11.3  The Learning Economy 
 The learning economy refers to acceleration in the rate of  economic and tech-
nical change imposing a strong transformation pressure on open economies 
(Lundvall and Johnson  1994 ). Behind the acceleration of  change lie shorter 
 product life cycles and intensifi ed global competition as well as politically 
driven deregulation. At the level of  the fi rm, the acceleration of  change is 
registered as an intensifi cation of  competition. At the level of  the individual it 
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is experienced as a permanent need to renew skills and competences in order 
to remain ‘employable’. Change and learning are two sides of  the same coin. 
The high speed of  change confronts people and organizations with new prob-
lems, and to tackle the new problems requires new skills (OECD  1996 ). The 
selection by employers of  more learning- oriented employees and the market 
selection in favour of  change- oriented fi rms accelerates further innovation 
and change. 
 In an open economy the key to economic success is to constantly transform 
the economy so that the exposed activities are either upgraded or substituted 
for by new activities that make more intensive use of  competences. It is a 
major task for policy to design institutions that regulate education and labour 
markets so that they promote processes of  learning and the formation and 
diff usion of  learning organizations in the private and public sectors. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, it is not suffi  cient to promote R&D eff orts 
and the training of  scientists and engineers. 
 11.4  Modes of  Innovation and Innovation Performance 
 In the article ‘Why All This Fuss about Codifi ed and Tacit Knowledge?’ 
(Johnson et  al.  2002 ), we linked the distinction between codifi ed and tacit 
knowledge to innovation and learning. In ‘Forms of  Knowledge and Modes of  
Innovation’ (Jensen et al.  2007 ), we introduced two modes of  learning related 
to this distinction. Using a survey and register data from around 700 Danish 
fi rms, we demonstrated that fi rms that combine R&D eff orts (STI learning) 
with organizational learning and interaction with customers (DUI learning) 
are the most innovative (see  chapter 7 ). 
 In order to fi nd out how the diff erent aspects of  establishing a learning 
organization tend to be combined with the capacity to handle scientifi c and 
codifi ed knowledge, we pursued a clustering across fi rms using latent class 
analysis. The fi rst cluster is a static or low- learning cluster and encompasses 
about 40 per cent of  the fi rms. Firms belonging to the second cluster, which 
we refer to as the STI- cluster, encompasses about 10 per cent of  the fi rms. 
They have activities that indicate a strong capacity to absorb and use codi-
fi ed knowledge. The third cluster, which we refer to as the DUI- cluster, is 
characterized by an over- average development of  organizational character-
istics typical for the learning organization but without activities that indicate 
a strong capacity to absorb and use codifi ed knowledge. The fourth cluster 
includes fi rms using mixed strategies that combine the DUI- and STI- modes. 
It includes 20 per cent of  the fi rms. 
 In order to examine the eff ect of  the learning modes on the fi rms’ innova-
tive performance, we use logistic regression analysis as reported in  Table 11.1 . 
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Coeffi  cient 
estimate
STI cluster 3.529 1.2611** 2.355 0.8564**
DUI cluster 2.487 0.9109** 2.218 0.7967**
DUI/ STI cluster 7.843 2.0596** 5.064 1.6222**
Business services 1.433 0.3599







Other services 0.747 – 0.2923
100 and more 
employees
1.757 0.5635*
50– 99 employees 0.862 – 0.1481
Danish group 0.859 – 0.1524
Single fi rm 0.521 – 0.6526*
Customized product 1.378 0.3203
Pseudo R 2 0.1247 0.1247 0.1775 0.1775
 N 692 692 692 692
 Notes: ** 5 signifi cant at the 0.01 level; * 5 signifi cant at the 0.05 level. 
The dependent variable for this exercise is whether or not the fi rm has intro-
duced to the market a new product or service (P/ S innovation) over the last 
three years. The independent variables in the Model 1 specifi cation are binary 
variables indicating whether or not the fi rm belongs to a particular cluster. 
In the Model 2 specifi cation, we include control variables to account for the 
eff ects of  industry, fi rm size, ownership structure and whether the fi rm pro-
duces customized or standard products. 
 Overall, the results of  the logistic analysis show that adopting DUI- mode- 
enhancing practices and policies tends to increase fi rm innovative perfor-
mance. Further, they support the view that fi rms adopting mixed strategies 
combining the two modes tend to perform better than those relying predomi-
nantly on one mode or the other. 
 Our results strongly suggest a need for realignment of  policy objectives and 
priorities, given the tendency to develop innovation policy with a one- sided 
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focus on promoting the science base of  high- technology fi rms. Actually both, 
a strategy that promotes organizational learning in STI fi rms and one that 
promotes STI learning in DUI fi rms may have more eff ect on innovation than 
the standard solution of  promoting R&D in high- tech fi rms that are already 
experienced in pursuing it. 
 Thinking in terms of  the two modes and their evolution in the learning 
economy may also have implications for policy coordination and institution- 
building. If  the main responsibility is given to a ministry of  science, then 
the STI bias in innovation policy is reinforced. The best solution might be 
to establish a council with a secretariat at the level of  the prime minister’s 
offi  ce with the mandate to coordinate ‘innovation and competence- building’ 
nationwide. 
 11.5  How Europe’s Economies Learn 
 Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2005 ) develop an original and informative EU- wide map-
ping of  how employees work and learn in the private sector. In ‘How Europe’s 
Economies Learn:  A  Comparison of  Work Organization and Innovation 
Mode for the EU- 15’ (Arundel et al.  2007 ), international comparisons show 
that there is a positive correlation between the national share of  employees 
engaged in advanced forms of  learning at the workplace and the percentage 
of  private sector enterprises successful in the forms of  innovation requiring 
high levels of  in- house creative activity. 
 Cluster analysis is used to identify four diff erent systems of  work 
organization: 
 •  Discretionary learning (DL) 
 •  Lean 
 •  Taylorist 
 •  Traditional forms 
 Two of  these, the discretionary- learning and lean forms, are characterized by 
high levels of  learning and problem solving in work. The principal diff erence 
between the discretionary- learning and the lean clusters is the relatively high 
level of  discretion or autonomy in work exercised by employees grouped in 
the former. Task complexity is also higher in the discretionary- learning cluster 
than in the lean cluster. 
 Discretionary learning thus refers to work settings where a lot of  respon-
sibility is allocated to the employees who are expected to solve problems on 
their own. Employees operating in these modes are constantly confronted 
with ‘disequilibria’ and as they cope with these, they learn and become more 
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competent. But in this process, they also experience that some of  their earlier 
insights and skills become obsolete. 
 Lean production also involves problem solving and learning, but here the 
problems are more narrowly defi ned and the set of  possible solutions less wide 
and diverse. The work is highly constrained, and this points to a more struc-
tured or bureaucratic style of  organizational learning that corresponds rather 
closely to the characteristics of  the Japanese- inspired ‘lean production’ model. 
 The other two clusters are characterized by relatively low levels of  learn-
ing and problem solving. The Taylorist form leaves very little autonomy to 
the employee in making decisions. In the traditional cluster, there is more 
autonomy but learning and task complexity is the lowest among the four types 
of  work organization. This cluster includes employees working in small- scale 
establishments in personal services and transport where methods are for the 
most part informal and non- codifi ed. 
 Table 11.2 shows that people working in diff erent national systems of  inno-
vation and competence work and learn diff erently. Discretionary learning is 
most widely diff used in the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and to a lesser 
extent in Austria and Germany. The lean model is most in evidence in the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain. The Taylorist forms are more present 
in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, while the traditional forms are similarly 
more in evidence in these four Southern European countries. 1 
 The share of  discretionary learning is higher in Germany than in the 
United Kingdom or in France. 
 Table 11.2 indicates unequal access to learning at work across diff erent parts 
of  Europe. The three Nordic countries, together with the Netherlands, have 
few Taylorist jobs left in the economy while a majority of  employees operate 
in jobs that are demanding both in terms of  skills and in terms of  autonomy. 
 When comparing and ranking national innovation systems the focus is nor-
mally on STI indicators. For instance, the European innovation scoreboard 
does not include any indicator refl ecting organizational learning. The analy-
sis pursued here shows that diff erences in how people work and learn across 
Europe are even more dramatic than diff erences in R&D eff orts or in the 
intensity of  training of  scientifi c personnel. 
 Figure 11.1 is from a study conducted by Arundel et al. ( 2007 ). Drawing on 
the results from the Third Community Innovation Survey, it shows the posi-
tive correlation between the national share of  employees engaged in advanced 
forms of  learning at the workplace and the percentage of  private- sector enter-
prises doing more radical forms of  innovation.  Lead innovators are those enter-
prises that have demonstrated a capacity for developing new- to- the- market 
innovations, and the category includes both fi rms that perform R&D on a 
continuous basis and those that do not perform R&D at all or that only do so 
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occasionally. In the Arundel et al. study ( 2007 ), this group of  highly creative 
innovators is separated out from noninnovators as well as from less ambitious 
fi rms that innovate mainly by modifying technology developed by other fi rms 
or organizations ( modifi ers) or that introduce innovations developed entirely by 
external sources ( followers) . 
 Figure 11.1 shows that countries with wide participation in discretionary 
learning have a bigger share of  fi rms that develop their own innovations and 
innovations that are new to the market. Here it is notable that the United 
Kingdom stands out from the northern and most of  the continental nations 
both for its low level of  discretionary learning and its low percentage of  lead 
 Table 11.2  National diff erences in organizational models (percentage of  employees 











Netherlands 64.0 17.2 5.3 13.5
Denmark 60.0 21.9 6.8 11.3
Sweden 52.6 18.5 7.1 21.7
Finland 47.8 27.6 12.5 12.1
 Centre 
Austria  47.5 21.5 13.1 18.0
Germany  44.3 19.6 14.3 21.9
Luxembourg  42.8 25.4 11.9 20.0
Belgium  38.9 25.1 13.9 22.1




34.8 40.6 10.9 13.7
Ireland 24.0 37.8 20.7 17.6
 South 
Italy 30.0 23.6 20.9 25.4
Portugal 26.1 28.1 23.0 22.8
Spain 20.1 38.8 18.5 22.5
Greece 18.7 25.6 28.0 27.7
 EU- 15  39.1  28.2  13.6  19.1 
 Source: Adapted version based on Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2006 ). 
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innovators. These results are compatible with other studies showing that 
fi rms with learning- organization characteristics tend to be more innovative 
(Lundvall and Nielsen  2007 ). 
 11.6  Education and Training for Learning Organizations 
 Since discretionary learning depends upon the capacity of  employees to 
undertake complex problem- solving tasks, it can be expected that nations with 
a high frequency of  these forms will have made substantial investments in edu-
cation and training. In what follows we compare tertiary education in universi-
ties and other institutions of  higher education with the continuing vocational 
training off ered by enterprises. 
 Tertiary education develops both problem- solving skills and formal and 
transferable technical and scientifi c skills. While most of  the qualifi cations 
acquired through third- level education will be relatively general and hence 
transferable in the labour market, the qualifi cations an employee acquires 
through continuing vocational training will be more fi rm specifi c. Some of  
this training will be designed to renew employees’ technical skills and knowl-
edge in order to respond to the fi rm’s requirements in terms of  ongoing prod-
























Lead innovators (%) by  discretionary learning (%)
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 Figure 11.1  Percentage lead innovators by percentage discretionary learning 
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 Figure 11.2 shows the correlations between the frequency of  discretionary- 
learning forms and two of  the four measures of  human resources for innova-
tion used in Trendchart’s innovation benchmarking exercise: the proportion 
of  the population with third- level education and the number of  science and 
engineering graduates since 1993 as a percentage of  the population aged 
20– 29 years in 2000. 
 The results show a modest positive correlation ( R - squared = 0.26) between 
the discretionary- learning forms and the percentage of  the population with 
third- level education and no discernible correlation between the discretionary- 
learning forms and the measure of  the importance of  new science and engi-
neering graduates. 
 Figure  11.3 shows that there are fairly strong positive correlations ( R - 
squared = 0.75 and 0.52 respectively) between the frequency of  discretionary 
learning and the two measures of  fi rms’ investments in continuing vocational 
training: the percentage of  private sector fi rms off ering such training and the 
participants in continuous vocational education as a percentage of  employees 
in all enterprises. 2 The results suggest that these forms of  fi rm- specifi c training 
are key complementary resources in the development of  the fi rm’s capacity for 
knowledge exploration and innovation. The diagram also points to a North/ 
South divide within Europe. The Nordic countries are characterized by rela-
tively high levels of  vocational training and by relatively high- level use of  the 
discretionary- learning forms. This may be a factor that contributes to their 
relative success in the learning economy. 
 These results indicate that national educational systems where the empha-
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 Figure 11.2  Discretionary learning and tertiary education 
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broader forms of  vocational training may be vulnerable in the context of  
the learning economy. It is notable that Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, 
which have all made considerable strides in increasing the number of  science 
and engineering graduates but stand out for their low levels of  investment in 
continuing vocational training, rank the lowest on the discretionary- learning 
scale. The more drastic the status diff erence and distinction between theory 
and practice in education programmes, the more diffi  cult it will be to install 
participatory learning in the private sector. The strong element of  vocational 
training in the Nordic countries contributes to engaging workers more actively 
in processes of  change. 
 11.7  Skill Requirements in Firms Engaged in 
Organizational Change 
 Since one major role of  schools is to educate and provide qualifi ed labour, it is 
important to capture new tendencies in skill and competence requirements. In 
a socioeconomic context characterized by rapid change, it is especially inter-
esting to analyse in what directions organizations engaged in change specify 
change in skill requirements. In this section, we take a closer look into how 
management in a selection of  Danish fi rms refers to changes in their demand 
for skills. The focus is upon changes in the competences demanded within 
fi rms that have engaged in organizational change (Lundvall  2002 ). 
 A series of  surveys of  the Danish national innovation system (the DISKO 
surveys) showed among other results that organizational change involves a shift 
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 Table 11.3  Changes in task content for employees during the period 1993– 95 for 
fi rms that have made organizational changes (outside the parentheses) compared 
with fi rms that have not made organizational changes (in parentheses) 
More Less Unchanged No answer
(a) Independence in 
work
72.6 (37.1) 4.2 (2.7) 21.2 (56.3) 2.0 (3.8)
(b) Professional 56.4 (36.3) 7.5 (5.3) 33.3 (53.8) 2.8 (4.4)
qualifi cations
(c) Degree of  
specialization
33.9 (26.2) 20.8 (7.8) 39.3 (58.4) 6.0 (7.5)
(d) Routine character of 5.6 (8.2) 41.8 (15.5) 45.0 (67.1) 7.7 (9.1)
tasks
(e) Customer contact 51.6 (29.3) 5.1 (3.1) 37.2 (59.9) 6.1 (7.6)
(f) Contact with 
suppliers
34.9 (18.0) 7.1 (4.3) 46.4 (62.0) 11.6 (15.6)
(g) Contact with other 24.7 (14.0) 5.5 (4.3) 56.8 (68.9) 13.0 (13.7)
fi rms
(h) Cooperation with 59.1 (27.1) 5.8 (4.5) 31.8 (63.3) 3.2 (5.0)
Colleagues
(i) Cooperation with 64.9 (28.6) 5.9 (4.2) 26.1 (62.2) 3.1 (4.9)
Management
 Note: Management representatives in 4,000 Danish private fi rms, excluding agri-
culture, were asked ‘Did the fi rm introduce a non- trivial change in the organiza-
tion in the period 1993– 95?’ The response rate was close to 50 per cent. For more 
detailed information, see Lundvall ( 2002 ). 
 Source: Lundvall ( 2002 ). 
in the pattern of  answers (percentage share of  fi rms giving respectively more 
or less emphasis to each specifi c category of  tasks) between the fi rms that have 
introduced new forms of  organization and those that have not (numbers in 
parenthesis). The demand for general skills (independence in the work situation, 
cooperation with external partners especially customers and for cooperation with 
management and colleagues) has grown in both categories of  fi rms. However, 
it has grown much more strongly in those fi rms that have pursued organiza-
tional change. There are correspondingly large diff erences between the two types 
of  organizations in the rate of  occurrence of  a  reduction in routine work. This 
response pattern gives an indication of  the future direction of  skill requirements. 
 Therefore education systems should be designed in such a way that they 
promote general skills in terms of  communication, cooperation and creativity 
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(to solve nonroutine problems). This model points to teaching methods that 
are democratic and interactive rather than authoritarian and unidirectional. 
Collective creativity may be stimulated by engaging students in teamwork and 
in solving unstructured problems with the teacher as coach. 
 As illustrated by  Table 11.3 (see line d), the general tendency among the 
fi rms is that the amount of  routine work is shrinking, while the demand for 
independent, creative and cooperative workers is increasing. While this trend 
points to a need for education to contribute to creativity, many tasks still require 
a capacity to pursue routine work based upon discipline- organized knowledge 
and with a high degree of  precision in solving tasks. This is true even for the 
core of  ‘creative professions’ such as architects and artists. Therefore educa-
tion systems should not abandon traditional teaching methods and individual 
training to solve well- structured problems. On balance, however, national edu-
cation systems need to give more room for stimulating both collective and 
individual creativity in order to cope with change and build a learning society 
 11.8  The Role of  Universities in the Learning Economy 
 When it comes to linking universities to economic development, the main 
emphasis is currently on how universities may serve industry through direct 
fl ows of  information from ongoing research. To illustrate, in a recent book 
with the title  How Universities Promote Economic Growth edited by World Bank 
economists (Yusuf  and Nabeshima  2007 ), the only dimension covered is the 
formation of  university– industry links related to research. We believe that this 
narrow agenda, where the role of  higher education is neglected, refl ects a 
biased interpretation of  the sources of  innovation (as STI driven) as well as an 
underestimation of  the importance of  transmitting tacit knowledge embodied 
in people (Lundvall  2008 ). 
 On the basis of  the data presented in the last two sections above, there may 
be a need to consider how well teaching programmes prepare students for 
the transfer and practical use of  scientifi c knowledge. Innovation is a process 
requiring close interaction between individuals and organizations. Therefore, 
while skills in mathematics and language are fundamental, they need to be 
combined with social skills that make it possible to cooperate vertically in 
hierarchies as well as horizontally with experts with a diff erent educational 
background. 
 This implies that teaching at universities needs to be adjusted in order to 
prepare the students for communication and cooperation with other categories 
of  workers and experts. Traditional learning forms such as mass lectures nei-
ther prepare students to use the theory and methods in a real- life context nor 
does it replicate the kind of  learning that is required in a future professional 
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life. In professional life, most learning takes place through problem solving, 
often in a context of  collaboration with others with a diff erent background. 
 Problem- based learning and combining theoretical work with periods of  practical work are 
obvious responses to these problems. 
 The transition to a learning economy has important  implications for higher 
education. One major implication is that educational institutions need to be 
ready to support  continuous and life- long learning . Especially in fast- moving fi elds 
of  knowledge, there is a need to give regular and frequent opportunities for 
experts to renew their professional knowledge. The proliferation of  execu-
tive education programmes in business schools may be seen as indicating the 
growing insight among individuals and in management that continuously 
renewing competences is of  great importance. But so far the opportunities for 
upgrading professionals skills have been off ered mainly in relation to manage-
ment functions. Similar programmes are needed in other areas where eff ective 
demand is less strong. 
 Finally, rapid change in science and technology and the need to move 
quickly from invention to innovation present a strong argument for keeping 
a reasonably  close connection between education and research in higher education. 
Teachers who have little or obsolete knowledge about what is going on in 
current research are not helpful when it comes to giving the students useful 
insights into dynamic knowledge fi elds. 
 11.9  Linking Modes of  Learning to Measures of  
Employment and Unemployment Security 
 EU member nations display signifi cant diff erences in systems of  employment 
and unemployment protection. Systems combining high levels of  unemploy-
ment protection with relatively low levels of  employment protection may have 
an advantage in terms of  the adoption of  the forms of  work organization that 
promote learning and ‘new- to- the- market’ innovations. Organizations that 
compete on the basis of  strategies of  continuous knowledge exploration tend 
to have relatively porous organizational boundaries so as to permit the inser-
tion of  new knowledge and ideas from the outside. Job tenures tend to be short 
because careers are often structured around a series of  discrete projects rather 
than advancing within an intrafi rm hierarchy (Lam and Lundvall  2006 ). 
 While the absence of  legal restrictions on hiring and fi ring will not neces-
sarily result in the forms of  labour market mobility that contribute to a con-
tinuous evolution of  the fi rm’s knowledge base, strong systems of  employment 
protection may prove to be an obstacle. Well- developed systems of  unemploy-
ment protection, however, may contribute to the development of  fl uid labour 
markets. The security such systems provide encourages individuals to commit 
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themselves to what would otherwise be perceived as unacceptably risky forms 
of  employment and career paths, and such forms of  protection contribute 
to accumulation of  knowledge for particular sectors or regions since in their 
absence, the unemployed workers would be under greater pressure to relocate. 
 Evidence in support of  the view that systems of  fl exicurity promote the 
discretionary learning (DL) forms of  work organization is provided in 
 Figure 11.4 . Graph (a) shows that there is a fairly strong positive correlation 
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 Figure  11.4  Correlations between  discretionary learning and systems of  social 
protection 
 Note: The unemployment protection measure shown is the average net replacement 
rate of  in- work income over 60 months averaged across four family types and two 
income levels including social assistance in 1999. See OECD (2002, 40). The employ-
ment protection measure is the OECD’s overall employment protection index for the 
late 1990s. See OECD ( 2000 , ch. 2). 
 Source: Lundvall and Lorenz ( 2011 ). 
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and the frequency of   discretionary learning. Graph (b) shows a negative cor-
relation ( R - squared = 0.36) between the level of  employment protection and 
the frequency of  the DL forms. 
 Graph (c)  in  Figure 11.4 shows an index of  fl exicurity constructed from 
the measures of  employment and unemployment protection. The index is 
constructed so that a nation combining intermediate levels of  both unemploy-
ment and employment security will score higher than a nation combining a 
high level of  unemployment security with a high level of  employment security, 
or a nation combining a low level of  employment security with a low level of  
unemployment security. 3 The assumption is that the positive eff ects of  a high 
level of  unemployment protection (low level of  employment protection) can-
not compensate for the negative eff ects of  a high level of  employment protec-
tion (low level of  unemployment protection). As the literature on fl exicurity 
suggests, what is rather required is the right mix of  fl exibility and security. The 
index is positively correlated ( R - squared = 0.48) with the frequency of  the DL 
forms of  work organization. 
 In the article ‘Organisational Learning and Systems of  Labour Market 
Regulation in Europe’ (Holm et  al.  2010 ), we have taken one further step 
towards addressing this research agenda by using multilevel logistic regression 
to explore the relation between individual level outcomes and national systems 
of  labour market fl exibility and regulation. The results confi rm that the way 
work is organized is nation- specifi c and that it varies with the degree of  labour 
market mobility and with the way labour markets are regulated. Again, fl exi-
curity goes hand in hand with discretionary learning at the workplace. 
 11.10  Degree of  Inequality in Access to Organizational 
Learning in Europe 
 An egalitarian income distribution might not be the most important dimen-
sion of  social equality. If  it is combined with growing gaps in competence 
between skilled and low- skilled workers, it might result in underemployment 
of  the low skilled. The data referred to above on organizational models of  
learning in diff erent European countries makes it possible to fi nd indicators 
of  such more adequate measures of  inequality. In  Table 11.4 we present an 
indicator for the social distribution of  workplace learning opportunities. We 
distinguish between ‘workers’ and ‘managers’, and we compare their access to 
discretionary learning in diff erent national systems. 4 
 Table 11.4 shows that employees at the high end of  the professional hier-
archy have more easy access to jobs involving discretionary learning. This is 
true for all the countries listed. But it is also noteworthy that the data indi-
cate that the inequality in access to learning is quite diff erent in diff erent 
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 Table 11.4  National diff erences in organizational models (percentages of  employ-
ees by organizational class) 
Discretionary 
learning












Netherlands 64.0 81.6 51.1 37.3
Denmark 60.0 85.0 56.2 35.9
Sweden 52.6 76.4 38.2 50.3
Finland 47.8 62.0 38.5 37.9
Austria 47.5 74.1 44.6 39.9
 Centre 
Germany 44.3 65.4 36.8 43.8
Luxembourg 42.8 70.3 33.1 52.9
Belgium 38.9 65.7 30.8 53.1
France 38.0 66.5 25.4 61.9
 West 
UK 34.8 58.9 20.1 65.9
Ireland 24.0 46.7 16.4 64.9
 South 
Italy 30.0 63.7 20.8 67.3
Portugal 26.1 59.0 18.2 69.2
Spain 20.1 52.4 19.1 63.5
Greece 18.7 40.4 17.0 57.9
 Note: *The index is constructed by dividing the share of  ‘workers’ engaged in discre-
tionary learning by the share of  ‘managers’ engaged in discretionary learning and 
subtracting the resulting percentage from 100. If  the share of  workers and managers 
was the same, the index would equal 0, and if  the share of  workers was 0, the index 
would equal 100. 
 Source : Lundvall et al. ( 2008 ). 
countries. In the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, the inequality in the 
distribution of  learning opportunities is moderate while it is very substantial 
in the less- developed South. For instance, the proportion of  the management 
category engaged in discretionary learning in Portugal is almost as high as 
in Finland (62% in Finland and 59% in Portugal), but the proportion of  
workers engaged in discretionary learning is much lower in Portugal (18.2% 
versus 38.2%). 
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 The Nordic countries are egalitarian not only in terms of  income distribu-
tion but also when it comes to access to workplace learning, the distribution is 
more equal than in Southern Europe. The combination of  welfare states off er-
ing basic security, equal income distribution and low social distance is refl ected 
in high degrees of  trust and in broad participation in change. While there 
are tendencies towards polarization in the current context also in the Nordic 
countries, they still benefi t from ‘social capital’, reducing social distance and 
other barriers to communication and interaction in processes of  change and 
innovation. On the other hand we can see that the major reason for the low 
share of  discretionary- learning jobs in the South refl ects that workers  – as 
opposed to management – do not have access to such jobs. 
 So, while it might be true that higher education fosters people who con-
tribute directly to innovation, it seems to be when those people interact with 
broader segments of  the workforce in promoting or coping with change that 
the innovation system as a whole turns out to be most effi  cient. The broader 
participation in change refl ects a combination of  increased income security 
off ered by welfare state initiatives and equality in income distribution. 
 11.11  The Euro- Crisis and Europe’s Uneven Development 
 The Euro- crisis was triggered by the fi nancial crisis of  2007. But it is rooted 
in the uneven development of  the countries belonging to the Eurozone. We 
have seen how uneven development is refl ected in diff erences in how people 
work and learn at work. The diff erences between the South and the North are 
dramatic. We have also shown that the institutional characteristics of  espe-
cially labour markets and education systems are highly interdependent with 
the frequency of  the workers’ access to workplace learning. 
 The crisis and the fear of  getting the national economy into the searchlight 
of  fi nancial speculators force individual national governments to pursue bud-
get cuts and make attempts to weaken trade unions and lower taxes for busi-
ness. This is also the kind of  ‘competitive response’ that German Chancellor 
Merkel has insisted upon as solution for Europe as a whole. But while this 
kind of  policy might be legitimate for a small open economy such as Ireland 
with potential problems with the external balance, for Europe as a whole this 
‘small- country strategy’ is self- defeating. 
 Not only will it cement long- term unemployment and lead to a prolonged 
recession, budget cuts related to education, training and active labour market 
policies will also contribute to making the uneven development of  Europe 
even more serious. Deepening inequality at the national and international 
level will undermine social capital and interactive learning. The current ver-
sion of  the competitiveness/ stabilization pact will aggravate rather than solve 
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the structural crisis for the Eurozone. There is a need for a completely diff er-
ent approach that attacks directly the uneven development in Europe. The 
strategic aim of  this alternative strategy should be to enhance the learning 
capacity in Europe with emphasis upon Southern Europe. 
 11.12  Policy Recommendations 
 On the basis of  the analysis in this chapter, we recommend policy initiatives 
aiming at promoting innovation through reforming education systems, labour 
markets and working life in Southern Europe: 
 1.  Education systems should be made robust to cope with radical unforeseen 
change and prepare students for participatory life- long learning. 
 2.  Higher education should stimulate problem- based learning and combine 
traditional learning of  disciplines with their application to real problems. 
 3.  Universities should become more open to interaction with society and 
students should spend more ‘learning time’ outside their classroom. 
 4.  Education systems should establish porous borders between theoretical- 
academic programmes and more practical- professional programmes. 
 5.  Labour market policy should establish strong incentives for both employers 
and employees to upgrade skills. 
 6.  New training programmes for those with the weakest positions in the 
learning society (low- skilled workers and certain ethnic minorities) should 
be developed. 
 7.  A new social contract should be developed where employees respond 
to enhanced economic security and skill upgrading by more active 
participation in change. 
 8.  Managers and employees, as well as their organizations, should be engaged 
in the diff usion of  good practice for organizational learning. 
 9.  At the national level, the prime minister should act as de facto chair for a 
new National Council for Competence Building and Innovation. 
 Such changes would require the engagement and positive participation of  all 
segments of  society. Government should play the role of  the main driver and 
coach of  the reform process. 
 11.13  The Roads Ahead for Europe 
 The Lisbon Strategy may be seen as an attempt to establish regional 
and political convergence in Europe with the ultimate aim of  building a 
strong and cohesive union built upon the principle of  solidarity. But the 
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implementation  – with emphasis on ‘best- practice’ and benchmarking in 
specifi c policy areas – was both too technocratic and too weak in terms of  
the instruments used to implement it. Neither was the strategy successful in 
stimulating popular participation in the project. To mobilize citizens for the 
European project there is a need for a vision that goes beyond the common 
market and ‘structural reform’. 
 In a seminal paper written at the occasion of  the conference on ‘The 
European Identity in a Global Economy’ in preparation for the Lisbon 
Summit under the Portuguese presidency, Manuel Castells argued that there 
is a need of  ‘a common European identity on whose behalf  citizens around 
Europe could be ready to share problems and build common solutions’ ( 2002 , 
234). After rejecting common religion and culture, he pointed to ‘shared feel-
ings concerning the need for universal social protection of  living conditions, 
social solidarity, stable employment, workers’ rights, universal human rights, 
concern about poor people around the world, extension of  democracy to 
regional and local levels’. He proposed that if  European institutions promoted 
these values, probably the ‘project identity’ would grow (Castells  2002 ). 
 To mobilize popular support, to reconstruct the Euro- zone and to attack 
uneven development in Europe, there is a need to recognize the ‘social dimen-
sion’ and to transform it into an Economic and Social Union (ESU). There is 
also a need for a shift where the fear of  state intervention and the blind belief  
in markets is changed into a pragmatic perspective where governments are 
allowed to take on the tasks necessary to promote stable economic growth. 
Among the most important tasks, we would emphasize a redesign of  all insti-
tutions and sector policies so that they respond to the fact that we are in a new 
phase where knowledge is the most important resource and learning the most 
important process. 
 Notes 
 1  Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2006 ) use logit regression analysis in order to control for diff erences 
in sector, occupation and establishment size when estimating the impact of  nation on 
the likelihood of  employees being grouped in the various forms of  work organization. 
The results show statistically signifi cant ‘national eff ect’ also when controlling for the 
structural variables, thus pointing to considerable latitude in how work is organized for 
the same occupation or within the same industrial sector. 
 2  It is also worth observing that there are fairly strong positive correlations between 
the frequency of  leading innovators and the two measures of  vocational training,  R - 
squared = 0.47 and 0.45 respectively. 
 3  The index is constructed by reversing the scoring on the employment protection 
index such that high values correspond to low levels of  protection and multiplying this 
reversed score by the unemployment index. The resulting fl exicurity index has then 
been rescaled so that the maximum score is 100. 
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 4  The class of  managers includes not only top and middle management but also profes-
sionals and technicians (ISCO major groups 1, 2 and 3). The worker category includes 
clerks, service and sales workers as well as craft, plant and machine operators and 
unskilled occupations (ISCO major groups 4 through 9). 
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 Chapter 12 
 GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE IN AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES FOR THE LEARNING 
ECONOMY 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall and  Rasmus  Lema 
 12.1  Introduction 1 
 Recent press reports suggest that Africa may now be at a turning point in terms 
of  economic growth and development. These reports point out that, although 
starting from a low base, Africa is now the world’s fastest growing continent. 
However, naive optimism on this ground should be avoided (Karuri- Sebina 
et al.  2012 ). The recent growth has been concentrated in particular countries 
and sectors and the transformation of  growth into sustainable social and eco-
nomic progress will not happen automatically. 
 There is thus a discrepancy between the reporting of  record growth rates 
for African economies in media and the reality of  how people’s living condi-
tions have evolved over the last decade in the African high growth economies. 
The widely shared understanding among development scholars that regis-
tered economic growth and development must be seen as two distinct, even if  
related, processes has become more evident than ever. In this chapter, we will 
argue that in order to transform the economic upswing as measured by gross 
domestic product, fast- growing African countries need structural and institu-
tional change across the economic, social and political spheres that bring them 
closer to what we will refer to as ‘learning economies’. 
 The widening of  the gap between reality on the ground and perceptions 
based on growth rates refl ects partly that the increasing global demand for 
natural resources – especially for commodities such as oil and minerals – has 
led to advantageous change in terms of  trade, to increased export volumes 
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and raised the rates of  GNP growth while the impact on domestic employ-
ment has often been limited and sometimes negative. The expansion of  the 
commodity sector does not automatically create large- scale employment 
directly and so far it has rarely resulted in a substantial increase in job cre-
ation in upstream and downstream manufacturing and in knowledge- based 
services. 
 It has even been argued that the structural change that occurred in low- 
income economies with high rates of  growth had a negative impact on the 
potential for future aggregate economic growth (McMillan and Rodrik  2011 ). 
They have pointed to the fact that the share of  low productive workplaces, 
many of  them in informal sector activities or in subsistence agriculture, has 
grown in the midst of  the period of  rapid growth. This has gone hand in hand 
with deindustrialization – the share of  the labour force in manufacturing has 
fallen from an already low level. 
 We will take this as a starting point for an analysis of  opportunities and 
policy options for African countries. What kind of  policies and institutions 
are necessary in order to transform the current increase in rents from com-
modities exports into industrial investment and upgrading of  agriculture and 
agro- industrial development? 
 This question is raised in the context of  competing theories about eco-
nomic development. We contrast the recommendations of  neoclassical 
economists with those that can be derived from the classical development 
economics that includes scholars as Dobb, Hirschman and Sen. The theo-
retical perspective that we propose on this basis takes into account that we 
have entered a phase – the learning economy – where it is useful to take as 
a starting point that ‘learning’ is at the core of  any process of  development. 
Development is a process where individuals and organizations learn to do 
new things and learn to do them in new ways in conjunction with structural 
transformation. At the core of  the process of  development is competence 
building. In the chapter, we analyse development and learning at the micro- , 
macro- and meso- level. 
 On the basis of  empirical patterns and theoretical considerations, we will 
discuss policy options in relation to the African reality. This is not easy. First, 
there are major diff erences between African countries  – there is not one 
strategy that fi ts all. Second, in many African countries the most fundamen-
tal barriers for development are sociopolitical rather than techno- economic. 
Here political transformations must go hand in hand with socioeconomic and 
technological transformations. Finally, as outsiders to the African scene, we 
can refer to lessons from other parts of  the world and sketch dilemmas and 
alternative options, but the relevance of  these lessons needs to be assessed on 
a case- by- case basis, and the specifi c strategies need to be built on the basis of  
local experience. 
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 12.2  Recent Developments in Africa’s Economies 
 12.2.1  Growth and structural change 
 In a recent contribution, Valensisi and Davis ( 2011 ) analyse recent patterns of  
growth and structural change in the least developed economies, including most 
of  the Sub- Saharan African (SSA) countries. They refer to the rapid growth 
between 2000 and 2009  – on average GNP has grown with 7 per cent per 
annum. They show that even average GDP per capita increased with as much as 
5.5 per cent (growth was unevenly distributed so median growth for this group of  
countries was 2.2%). The authors make an eff ort to go behind this observed pat-
tern of  growth in order to understand the underlying structural change process. 
 They fi nd that the impressive growth record was based on rapid growth 
in the exports of  hard commodities and on a capital infl ow through foreign 
direct investment (FDI), overseas development aids (ODA) and remittances 
from expatriates that allowed for a strong growth in consumer demand for 
services and for imported consumer goods. Agriculture grew only slowly, and 
in most of  the least developed economies, there was deindustrialization (in 
two- thirds of  the least developed economies the share of  manufacturing was 
reduced from its already modest level). 
 The growth process and the increased demand for natural resource– based 
commodities did not lead to any increase in the investment ratio – on average 
the rate of  investment remained close to 20 per cent. Most of  the extra income 
was absorbed by middle- class consumption, and in many of  the countries 
import grew more than exports (in 38 out of  49 countries). One problem with 
this pattern of  growth is that it does not create suffi  cient number of  decent 
jobs for the many young people in Africa. Another problem is that it estab-
lishes a vulnerable economic structure where the whole economy is dependent 
on single hard commodity export products. 
 12.2.2  Insuffi  cient job creation and poverty reduction 
 The UN  2013 Economic report on Africa recognizes the problems with the 
current lopsided growth pattern – it is presented under the heading ‘Making 
the Most of  Africa’s Commodities:  Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and 
Economic Transformation’. It points out that the employment problem 
remains unsolved in most African countries.
 Strong growth across the continent has not been translated into the broad- based 
economic and social development needed to lift millions of  Africans out of  pov-
erty and reduce the wide inequalities seen in most countries. This is because 
Africa’s recent growth, driven by primary commodities, has low employment 
intensity – that is, the ability to generate jobs.’ (UN 2010) 
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 Thus the continent continues to suff er from high unemployment, particularly 
for youth and female populations, with too few opportunities to absorb new 
labour market entrants…More than 70 per cent of  Africans earn their living 
from vulnerable employment as economies continue to depend heavily on pro-
duction and export of  primary commodities. Investments remain concentrated 
in capital- intensive extractive industries, with few forward and backward link-
ages with the rest of  the economy. (UN 2010, 30) 
 The report also points out that the impact of  growth on poverty reduction has 
been modest:
 Recent data show some slight improvement in poverty reduction, even though 
the region will not be able to achieve the related MDGs. The proportion of  
people living in extreme poverty (below $1.25 a day) in Africa (excluding North 
Africa) has been projected to reach 35.8 per cent in 2015 against the previous 
forecasts of  38 per cent (UN, 2011). This slight, albeit slow, improvement is partly 
attributable to high and sustained economic growth since 2000. (UN 2010, 35) 
 The general picture is that the increase in global demand for natural resource– 
based commodities  – especially hard commodities such as minerals  – has 
driven growth in Africa. Combined with an infl ow of  fi nancial resources this 
has stimulated private consumption of  domestic services and imported manu-
factured goods. The employment impact and the impact in terms of  poverty 
reduction have been very limited. A third problem is that the kind of  struc-
tural change that has taken place with deindustrialization, growth in urban 
informal employment and stagnating productivity in agriculture may under-
mine the prospects of  future economic development. 
 12.2.3  Growth- reducing structural change 
 McMillan and Rodrik ( 2011 ) pursue a simple exercise where they break down 
the observed aggregate growth in labour productivity into two components 
for the period 1990– 2005. One component refl ects productivity growth within 
sectors, and the second component is the eff ect that comes from moving labour 
from sectors with low productivity to sectors with high levels. According to the 
authors, most African countries have been characterized by a trend- wise move 
of  labour from high to low productivity sectors (including urban informal sec-
tors). This is what the authors refer to as growth- reducing structural change. 
 This observation goes against what should be expected since productivity gaps 
between sectors are extremely large in the least developed countries. Therefore, 
we should assume that economic development takes the form of  workers moving 
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from low to high productivity sectors. But actually, the opposite takes place in 
most of  the observed countries. Exceptions are Ghana and Ethiopia where 
structural change gave a positive contribution to economic growth. According 
to McMillan and Rodrik, to change the dominant negative direction, there is 
a need to direct investment to manufacturing and especially to expand manu-
facturing activities with more value added to the products. According to the 
authors, fl exible labour markets should help. Below we will propose more ambi-
tious policies related to building learning economies as response. 
 12.2.4  National technological capabilities in Africa 
 Mayor et al. ( 2012 ) have made an attempt to map the distribution of  techno-
logical capabilities in Africa. The analysis covers 30 African countries for the 
years 2010– 11, the data used emanate from World Economic Forum, and they 
come either from statistical sources or from an executive survey. Technological 
capabilities are presented in three dimensions: (a) The available base (internet 
use, educated labour and research and development (R&D)), (b) government 
and business technological eff ort (technological infrastructure, enterprise per-
formance and policies related to innovation) and (c) results (patents and the 
intellectual property rights regime). 
 The analysis leads the authors to defi ne four clusters of  countries where 
South Africa stands alone as a lead country followed by Morocco, Tunisia and 
Egypt. The countries with the weakest technological capacities are Algeria, 
Libya, Mauretania and Zimbabwe. It should be taken into account that most of  
the data originates from surveys with business leaders and so there might be a 
bias in favour of  regimes that do not intervene with regulating business activities. 
 Nonetheless, the analysis illustrates that Africa is heterogeneous and that 
diff erent countries face diff erent challenges when it comes to developing and 
making use of  technological capabilities. It is also worth noting that almost all 
of  the lead countries have experienced political turmoil recently. We are going 
to turn back to this later since it indicates that investments in upgrading the 
skills of  the young generation that are not followed by economic opportunities 
may lead to discontent and unrest. 
 12.3  What Is Development? 
 12.3.1  A neoclassical theory of  development 
 If  we start from neoclassical economics and deduce how less developed coun-
tries may catch- up, the focus of  policy intervention would be on institutional 
design aiming at well- defi ned private property rights, including intellectual 
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property rights. It would certainly recommend ubiquitous introduction of  the 
market mechanism, propagate private ownership and recommend keeping 
the public sector as small as possible. It would advise against protectionism 
and hampering with international trade and capital fl ows. The role of  govern-
ment should be limited to securing a stable macroeconomic context and to 
guarantee private property, including intellectual property. 
 In cases of   obvious market failure, government may be allowed to intervene. 
For instance, scientifi c information may be seen as a public good and therefore 
require state production or subsidy. But generally governments should stay out 
of  the economic process and leave it to the market to give signals to actors. 
Specifi cally, there would be a strong emphasis on the advantages of  free trade. 
Through the free working of  comparative advantages resources would be used 
in the most effi  cient way. Since all countries have equal access to information, 
including technology, we would expect a general tendency towards conver-
gence in productivity and living standards. This ‘neoclassical theory of  devel-
opment’ lies behind what has been called Washington consensus. 
 The recent history demonstrates that most of  the countries that have built 
their strategy on the assumptions of  neoclassical theory have failed to develop 
and that most of  those that have prospered, especially those in Asia, have 
deviated from these ideas. Going further back in history, it is obvious that the 
rich countries did not become rich by following the neoclassical prescriptions. 
They protected their industries, and they showed little respect for intellectual 
property rights. Actually it was almost a rule that countries emulated technolo-
gies developed in other countries, often with such success that they became 
technology leaders. But the theory and the prescriptions remain very much 
alive since they are strongly supported by powerful global interest groups and 
institutions rooted in the developed countries. 2 
 The report by Stiglitz et  al. ( 2013 ) on industrial policy in Africa off ers a 
modifi ed version of  the neoclassical development theory that use the frequency 
of  market failure and not least the importance of  knowledge and learning as 
arguments for a more selective and interventionist industrial policy. Actually it 
argues that neoclassical economics has accepted that industrial policy is now 
not only acceptable but also commendable. It may be noted that the authors 
say nothing about infant industries and trade and that there is a tendency to rec-
ommend moderate interventions with full respect for ‘comparative advantage’. 
 12.3.2  Development economics 
 In the late 1940s there was a growing interest to try to explain and remedy 
economic underdevelopment. One of  the fi rst important contributions that 
triggered the debate was by Rosenstein Rodan (1943). The basic question 
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was: How could the poor countries catch- up with rich countries? The debate 
was quite polarized. Some of  the literature came from Marxists who saw 
global inequality as rooted in an imperialist system and assumed that the only 
way for poor countries to grow rich was a transformation towards a socialist 
and centrally planned economy. Others belonging to the liberal camp took the 
opposite view and saw underdevelopment as refl ecting that markets were not 
free and that capitalist institutions were not suffi  ciently well established. 
 A group of  scholars with mixed ideological background – Arthur Lewis, 
Paul Rosenstein Rodan, Hans Singer, Maurice Dobb, Amartya Sen, Albert 
Hirschman and others – came with more complex prescriptions for how poor 
countries could grow rich. They proposed that fi ve elements were  absolutely 
essential for development: 
 1.  A high rate of  savings and investments. 
 2.  A fi rst stage of  import substitution increasingly to be combined with 
expansion of  export. 
 3.  Absorbing technological knowledge from abroad. 
 4.  Focus on expanding the manufacturing sector. 
 5.  An active role of  the state in guiding the direction of  development. 
 It is interesting to note that in the countries that were the most successful and 
competitive entrants in the world economy (Japan, Korea and China), all the 
fi ve elements were present. But it is also true that in other parts of  the world 
the attempts to combine import substitution with learning from abroad were 
much less successful in developing self- propelling industrial growth – at least 
in the long term. The less successful examples were often countries in Latin 
America and Africa with higher degrees of  inequality and with political sys-
tems that invested less in building the domestic knowledge base necessary to 
learn from abroad. 
 So one cannot say the theory was ever proven to be wrong. Rather the 
experience indicated that while the fi ve conditions listed might be necessary, 
they were not suffi  cient. In the meantime international organizations, such as 
the World Bank, IMF and OECD dominated by the United States, set condi-
tions for loans and assistance that made realizing the conditions very diffi  cult 
to those  developing countries that became (made themselves) dependent on 
loans and grants. 
 12.3.3  Aggregate growth and structural change 
 Macroeconomists sometimes assume that economic growth takes place as 
in a corn economy with only one sector. They do so in order to keep things 
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simple and make advanced mathematical modelling possible. This perspec-
tive misses out the very fundamental fact that growth and structural change 
are two sides of  the same coin (Pasinetti 1981). Aggregate growth will refl ect 
the uneven growth rates in diff erent sectors in the economy – and in national 
accounts the growth of  the whole is actually a weighted sum of  the growth 
of  its parts. 
 In this context Kutsnetz ( 1966 ) makes a very elementary but often neglected 
point. He shows that high rates of  aggregate growth typically require that the 
big sectors grow rapidly. Even if  a new sector grows very rapidly, its contribu-
tion to aggregate growth will, to begin with, be modest. Therefore accelerat-
ing growth in the currently dominating sectors – such as agriculture or the 
urban informal service sector in Africa – is an obvious way to raise income 
per capita in the short to medium term. A typical pattern of  growth for the 
rich countries has been to raise productivity in agriculture, while workers have 
moved from agriculture to manufacturing. In Africa raising the productivity 
in the informal sector and to create demand for labour outside the informal 
sector is a major challenge. 
 This is important since the informal sector remains a signifi cant and even 
expanding economic force in sub- Saharan Africa. The sector is estimated to 
account for more than 65 per cent of  nonfarm employment in sub- Saharan 
Africa (Adams et al. 2013). In Tanzania the informal sector is estimated to 
account for more than 55 per cent of  employment in urban areas and over 
the 2001– 2006 period the number of  workers in the informal sector increased 
at an annual rate of  9 per cent as compared to 4 per cent for the economy 
as a whole (Kahyarara and Rutasitara 2009). It is obvious that a successful 
industrialization strategy would reduce the relative weight of  the  informal sec-
tor in the long term. Given its current weight in the sub- Saharan economies 
measures to upgrade workers’ skills and the technologies used in the informal 
sector would give substantial contributions to growth and welfare. The same 
is of  course true for agriculture, which is the other major sector in terms of  
employment in most of  the least developed economies. 
 Nevertheless, it is equally true that in the long term, the emergence and 
growth of  new sectors is crucial for the wealth of  the nation. The ideal new 
sectors would be characterized by rapid technological learning, increasing 
returns to scale and increasing world demand. Moreover, it must, to some 
degree, build on already existing domestic competences in the labour force 
and in enterprises. It may be a problem to foster such new sectors when the 
traditional big sectors have strong representation in the political system (e.g., 
soy producers in Argentina and the oil industry in the Northern Africa). 
Finding ways to align interests of  dominating sectors with the formation of  
new sectors may be necessary to overcome such barriers. 3 
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 One of  the most fundamental questions now debated among innovation 
scholars is what role the natural resource– based sectors and especially those 
producing hard commodities, such as minerals, oil and gas, can play in a pro-
cess of  industrial transformation. Is it correct that such sectors off er less poten-
tial for technological learning and for building upstream and downstream 
couplings as well as lateral transfer of  knowledge to other sectors, or does this 
version of  the ‘resource curse’ view just represent leftovers from the classical 
development economists? Do new perspectives on how local fi rms can link up 
to global value chains make these views obsolete? Another relevant question is 
if  it is possible to create suffi  cient volume of  new jobs for the young generation 
without industrialization. We will return to these questions in the last sections 
of  the chapter. 
 12.3.4  Learning, innovation and development 
 Stiglitz ( 2011 ) proposes that there is a need to engage in ‘rethinking develop-
ment economics’. It is remarkable that he builds his argument around the 
concept of  ‘the learning society’  – a concept that has been central among 
innovation scholars for many years. Dalum et al. (1992) presented ideas for 
innovation policy in the learning society in the context of  the analysis of  
national systems of  innovation (Lundvall  1992 ). Two years later, Lundvall and 
Johnson ( 1994 ) further developed this concept under the heading ‘the learning 
economy’. As pointed out in Lundvall et al. ( 2009 ), several scholars (such as 
Viotti  2002 ) have proposed to refer to national learning systems in  developing 
countries rather than to present them as national innovation systems. In this 
section, we will present a perspective on development that is rooted in our 
interpretation of  the concept of  ‘the learning economy’. 
 An ambitious defi nition of  development must refer not only to registered 
economic growth and structural change but should also take into account the 
welfare of  individuals and to how resources and capacities are distributed 
among individuals, regions and classes. It also needs to take into account long- 
term generational perspectives. Such a defi nition would take into account 
both material conditions and mental and spiritual conditions – including posi-
tive and negative experiences – from being members of  traditional and new 
communities. It would need to refl ect experiences from diff erent roles in life 
such as the roles of  consumer, family member, citizen and worker. Short- term 
gains should be weighed against long- term costs and foregone opportunities – 
such as environmental degradation and depletion of  nonreproducible natural 
resources. 
 Here we are going to be more modest and bring in two dimensions that 
tend to be neglected in the traditional view on development and economic 
336
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE336
growth. The fi rst refers to  the quality of  working life , while the second refers to 
the crucial role of  the uneven capacity to learn and the  uneven access to learning . 
The most primitive versions of  welfare economics assume that increasing the 
bundle of  consumption goods is basically what constitutes increased welfare. 
This is why national income per capita is the most frequently used indicator. 
The perspective is implicit in the argument in favour of  free trade combined 
with ‘fl exible’ work arrangements. 
 For instance, while the positive impact of  globalization on consumption 
opportunities is taken into account, possible negative consequences on job 
security and working conditions are neglected. This traditional perspective is 
especially problematic when it comes to assessing the economic development 
in Africa where increasing consumption opportunities for the middle class 
seem to go hand in hand with more vulnerable employment and less quality 
in working life for the majority of  workers. 
 In order to understand the importance of  learning, it is useful to start from 
Amartya Sen’s defi nition of  welfare as ‘freedoms’ and capabilities to realize 
what you regard as valuable. This is, in general, a valuable approach because 
it takes into account that the aspirations of  people may be diff erent in diff erent 
countries and regions. We would nonetheless, in this context, like to emphasize 
‘access to learning’ as perhaps the most fundamental freedom – especially in 
a society characterized by rapid change in people’s private and professional 
lives. The two concepts – learning and development – are crucially intercon-
nected both at the individual level and at other levels of  the economy (learning 
organizations, learning regions and the learning economy at the aggregate 
level). 
 There are two reasons for why we should focus on learning. First, a cru-
cial prerequisite for any kind of  economic transformation is a speed- up of  
learning as competence building both among individuals and within organi-
zations. Structural change is a process where people are confronted with new 
tasks. Second, we would argue that learning is not only of  instrumental value, 
enhancing the productivity of  the individual worker, it is also of  substantive 
value for individuals. This is obvious for the child’s development into adult-
hood. To block the child’s process of  learning to communicate and act in the 
society would be cruel. For most adults, a life without any learning would 
constitute monotony. 
 This perspective neither rules out that the speed of  learning imposed by 
circumstances may become disturbingly high and create stress and suff erings, 
especially when the individuals have no capabilities to understand and manage 
the processes involved, nor does it mean that all forms of  learning represent 
progress. And learning new things implies that old knowledge becomes obso-
lete. Learning as well as development will  always involve creative  destruction . 
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As new patterns take form; old ones tend to be destroyed. Often the old pat-
terns are seen as positive by some of  those living in the society. In worst cases, 
destruction takes place without much creation. While some form of  creative 
destruction is necessary to lift African people out of  poverty, the involvement 
of  ordinary citizens in the management of  change would make the processes 
of  change and learning less painful. 
 Stiglitz ( 2011 ) argues that there is another kind of  link from a learning 
economy perspective to inclusive development. His argument is the correct 
observation that the learning society will be most successful when learning 
is broad based and knowledge is widely spread in the economy. In a series of  
papers on the learning economy, we have presented a somewhat diff erent per-
spective where we have shown that if  left to itself, the learning economy tends 
to become increasingly polarized (Lundvall 1996, 2002). Only with strong and 
systematic government intervention aiming at strengthening the capacity of  
weak learners and off ering them better access to learning is it possible to build 
strong learning societies. 
 12.4  Transformation Pressure, Learning Capacity and 
Redistribution 
 In a context of  global competition, national economies as well as fi rms are 
exposed to a more or less intense ‘transformation pressure’. For instance, the 
strong competition from China has put a very intense transformation pres-
sure on manufacturing fi rms in Africa. The transformation pressure at the 
level of  the manufacturing fi rm can be reduced in diff erent ways. Workers 
may be forced to accept lower wages, the currency may be devaluated or the 
government may introduce trade barriers to protect the domestic fi rms in 
order to promote import substitution. Another alternative is that the fi rms are 
left to themselves to cope with the intensifi cation of  the transformation pres-
sure. They might do so by downscaling or bankruptcy. Alternatively, they may 
respond by engaging in organizational and technological learning resulting 
in a stronger competitiveness based on higher productivity and incremental 
product and process innovations. 
 When the transformation pressure is growing, it speeds up structural change 
in the national innovation system. Low- productivity activities will be closed 
down. With a suffi  cient population of  fi rms with a capacity to innovate and 
adapt, the resources that are freed up from the fi rms failing will be absorbed 
by these new or growing high- productivity activities. However, with a weak 
learning capacity at the level of  fi rms the result will be a further increase in 
underemployment in informal activities and unemployment. How the cost 
and benefi ts of  the transformation are distributed aff ect how willing people 
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will be to contribute actively to the process of  transformation within the fi rms. 
The response at the national level will refl ect the strength of  the national inno-
vation and competence building system. 
 12.4.1  Why we need to broaden the innovation system concept 
 One major diff erence between neoclassical economics and evolutionary eco-
nomics is that in the evolutionary perspective history and institutions matter. 
The national system of  innovation (NSI) concept signals that the economic 
structure and the current institutional set- up, both with historical roots, need 
to be analysed and understood in order to set policy priorities. However, it 
is obvious that diff erent authors mean diff erent things when referring to a 
national system of  innovation. Some major diff erences have to do with the 
focus of  the analysis and with how broad the defi nition is in relation to institu-
tions and markets. 
 Authors from the United States with a background in studying science and 
technology policy tend to focus the analysis on ‘the innovation system in the 
narrow sense’. They tend to regard the NSI concept as a follow- up and broad-
ening of  earlier analyses of  national science systems and national technology 
policies (see, for instance, the defi nition given in Mowery and Oxley 1995, 80). 
The focus is on the systemic relationships between the R&D eff orts in fi rms, 
science and technology (S&T) organizations, including universities, and public 
policy. 
 Freeman (1987) developed a broader concept that took into account 
national specifi cities in how fi rms organize innovative activities; he empha-
sized, for example, how Japanese fi rms increasingly used ‘the factory as lab-
oratory’. Researchers in Aalborg (Lundvall  1985 ; Andersen and Lundvall 
1988) also developed a concept of  innovation systems where there are other 
major sources of  innovation than science. Innovation is seen as refl ecting 
interactive learning taking place in connection with ongoing activities in pro-
duction and sales. Therefore the analysis takes its starting point in the process 
of  production and the process of  product development assuming, for instance, 
that the interaction with users is fundamental for product innovation. 4 
 None of  these approaches, however, gave suffi  cient attention to the broader 
set of  institutions shaping competence building in the economy, such as labour 
markets, the education and training system and their relation to systems of  
corporate governance, nor did they consider the broader connections between 
these institutional subsystems and national political cultures and welfare 
regimes. In order to capture this wider set of  interactions in a dynamic per-
spective, we introduce an evolutionary framework for analysing how econo-
mies learn under the pressure of  globalization. 
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 12.4.2  Mediating transformation pressure 
 The starting premise is that a range of  factors have resulted in an acceleration 
of  economic change. These factors include economic globalization, policies 
and demands of  international institutions such as deregulation of  fi nance, 
population growth and technological change, etc. In many African countries, 
the boom in commodities exports adds to these factors. When the  transformation 
pressure becomes more intense it means that fi rms will have to engage in change 
in terms of  organization, technology and capabilities if  they want to survive 
and grow. At the level of  the labour market, this process will be refl ected in 
dynamics where workers will gain, lose or change jobs while learning new (and 
forgetting old) skills and competences. 
 A crucial characteristic of  a national system is how it responds to an 
increase in transformative pressure. The  capability to innovate and to adapt will 
refl ect systemic features having to do with how easy it is to establish interactive 
learning within and across the organizational borders (social capital) and with 
the preparedness to take risks (entrepreneurship). Organizational capabilities 
and the competence structure of  the workforce play an important role. Social 
cohesion may be an important factor behind social capital while it might get 
in the way of  entrepreneurship. 
 The mechanism for  redistribution of  costs and benefi ts emanating from change dif-
fers between national systems. 5  Figure 12.1 is adapted from the framework 
developed in Archibugi and Lundvall (2001) to link transformation pressure 
to the capacity to innovate and to the distribution of  costs and benefi ts of  
change. 
 The fi gure refl ects the view that capabilities to innovate and to adapt refl ect 
systematic diff erences in national institutional arrangements at the levels of  
the science and technology system, labour markets, education and training 
and fi nance. These institutional subsystems will impact on how knowledge is 
developed and used within organizations, and these organizational diff erences 
in turn will have a bearing on innovation pace (fast or slow) and innovation 
style (incremental or radical). 
 But national diff erences in innovation systems need to be seen in an even 
broader perspective and take into account feedbacks from the distribution of  
costs and benefi ts to the capacity to innovate and to adapt. An uneven dis-
tribution may create a negative attitude to change among those who mainly 
register the costs and if  there are high degrees of  insecurity among individuals 
they will tend to oppose change. 
 A second kind of  feedback mechanism goes from the ability to innovate to 
transformation pressure. Increasing the ability to innovate involves stimula-
tion of  entrepreneurship and the building of  more fl exible organizations. This 
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implies a selection of  people and institutions that are more change oriented 
and this further increases transformation pressure. 
 12.4.3  Development strategies responding to transformation 
pressures 
 The simple model presented above can be used to distinguish between dif-
ferent developmental strategies. Washington consensus based on neoclassical 
assumptions recommends that governments leave it to the market to deter-
mine the transformation pressure and to install a capacity to adapt through 
fl exible labour markets. Redistribution of  costs and benefi ts of  change should 
be kept at a minimum in order not to get prices and incentives wrong. 
 The development economists (Singer, Dobb and Sen) saw a need for less 
developed economies to regulate the transformation pressure shielding new 
Transformative pressure
Capacity to innovate and to 
adapt to change











 Figure 12.1  A model linking  transformation pressure to the capacity to change and 
to the distribution of  the costs and benefi ts of  change 
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industries from the full impact of  international competition. It is interesting 
to note that they as well as the fathers of  the concept of  ‘infant industry argu-
ment’ (Hamilton and List) saw strengthening of  the knowledge base of  the 
economy as another necessary prerequisite for economic development. 
 Friedrich List thus insisted that ‘mental capital’ was more important for 
development than physical or fi nancial capital. The emphasis on intangible 
capital, knowledge and technology has become even more clear in recent 
theories of  economic development pointing to ‘capabilities’ and innovation 
systems as crucial for economic development. In the next section we will go 
deeper into how knowledge and learning links to economic development. 
 As we remarked above, the Asian countries were more successful using 
the protective strategy than countries in Latin America and Africa where the 
result was stagnation rather than economic growth. One explanation is that 
there was too little emphasis on building innovation capacity that the protec-
tion from competition from abroad was not compensated by other mecha-
nisms, such as stimulation of  domestic competition and promotion of  export 
orientation, stimulating competitiveness and that income and access to land 
were more unequally distributed in Africa and Latin America. 
 12.4.4  Macro conditions for development 
 The general macroeconomic situation will aff ect the capacity of  fi rms to 
engage in investment and innovation. This is one of  the points where there 
is agreement among those belonging to the Washington consensus camp and 
those in favour of  selective industrial policies promoting innovation. But there 
are diff erences in terms of  focus. Washington consensus recommendations 
only propose fi nancial discipline and stable prices. This perspective neglects 
that innovation is, to some degree, demand driven and that engaging in entre-
preneurial activities is much less risky in a situation when aggregate demand 
is growing. Also the neoliberals propose to leave it to the market to regulate 
fi nance, something that results both in more instability and in very limited 
access to loans especially for small and medium enterprises. 
 12.4.5  Investment and fi nance 
 One of  the most fundamental weaknesses of  national innovation systems 
in Africa is the fi nancial system. In most of  the least developed countries 
access to capital for supporting ordinary trade, for investments in production 
capacity and especially for new innovative ventures is very limited. Banks do 
not have the routines and skills to deal with more risky projects and neither 
have government authorities. Therefore, the creation of  new public– private 
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institutions fi lling the function of  development banks is crucial. This would 
require building new competences and here South- South learning could play 
an important role. Among the sources of  fi nance to be channelled into the 
new institutions could be export levies on nonrenewable hard commodities. 
 12.4.6  Educated labour 
 It is obvious that education is an important prerequisite for economic develop-
ment. This can be seen from the historical record of  developed economies and 
from the recent growth of  Asian countries. Basic education off ering literacy 
and basic mathematical skills may be seen as fundamental human rights since 
such skills are necessary for full participation in society. Secondary and tertiary 
levels are of  course important for economic and social development. 
 A major problem is that the demand for candidates with higher education is 
very limited in the least developed countries. This leads to an exodus of  highly 
educated people to the rich countries and in this way the scarce resources 
invested in universities end up with being used in the developed countries. 
The 2012 UNCTAD report on the least developed countries has a theme 
‘the issues of  brain drain and brain gain’ and another on how remittances 
from emigrants may be mobilized for development. The report shows that 
from 1990– 2000 the outfl ow of  highly trained people from the least developed 
countries has increased and that it keeps growing in the new millennium. For 
 many African countries, the brain drain rate (the brain drain rate is the emi-
grants’ share of  the corresponding age and educational group in the home 
country) is over 40 per cent. This is for instance true for Uganda, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia. 
 While the report discusses possible advantages of  having a diaspora of  
trained people abroad, there is little doubt that the outfl ow of  skilled peo-
ple from the poorest to the richest countries (the United States remains the 
main destination) is unfair and undermines development eff orts in the home 
countries. 
 The main reason for the exodus of  skilled people is lack of  job opportuni-
ties and substantial diff erence in earning between home country and the host 
country. In a paper on higher education, innovation and economic develop-
ment (Lundvall 2008), we showed that the lack of  demand refl ects absence of  
innovation and therefore investments in higher education need to be coordi-
nated with support to framework conditions and policies that stimulate inno-
vation. The higher the rate of  innovation, the higher is the rate of  return on 
investments in higher education. 
 It is also a serious problem that the education system replicates elements 
from the former colonial powers. Universities train people with a strong 
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emphasis on social science and humanities while there is a tendency to neglect 
the training of  vocational skills and engineering. Emphasis is on narrowly 
defi ned scientifi c disciplines and higher education institutions often operate as 
academies with very limited elements of  practical training. Introducing prob-
lem based learning and elements of  practice in theoretical studies may reduce 
the problem of  creating jobs for the candidates. 
 12.5  Public Policy and Institutional Design 
 As pointed out in the  introduction, there are strict limits for what external 
experts can off er when it comes to designing and implementing public policy 
schemes and new institutions that support economic development. In what 
follows we refer to what seems to work in other contexts and what we see as 
general principles for promoting development. 
 12.5.1  Nondiscrimination as development strategy 
 Taking the learning economy perspective on economic development makes it 
clear that the inclusive formation of  people’s skills and their interaction is cru-
cial. In many of  the least developed economies, including those in Africa, there is 
discrimination to ethnic minorities and to women in terms of  access to resources 
and citizen rights. A focus on reducing discrimination when it comes to learning, 
not only in terms of  access to formal education – but also processes of  learning 
in production and policy processes – expands the access to human resources and 
creativity. In many societies the inclusion of  women and ethnic minorities can 
off er new potential and more commitment to economic processes. 
 A specifi c problem in Africa is the age structure with a very big share of  
young people. Developing new institutions that give young people a ‘voice’ in 
development issues may be a way to avoid that the youth get alienated and 
engage in destructive activities individually or collectively. This may be a dif-
fi cult challenge in countries where there is a tradition to listen most to the old 
and experienced. 
 Such changes may be crucial also for attracting the diaspora intellectuals 
who often fi nd patriarchy and authoritarianism repelling. 
 12.5.2  Industrial and trade policy 
 In a recent document from UNCTAD it is referred to some general principles 
for economic development:
 In recent years, UNCTAD has repeatedly argued that progressive transforma-
tion in economic structure is a prerequisite for LDCs to achieve accelerated and 
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sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The policies and strategies 
needed to attain structural transformation will involve, inter alia, 
 (a)  The development of  a new industrial policy based on a strategic approach 
that refl ects the specifi c needs and conditions of  LDCs; 
 (b)  A catalytic developmental State to compensate for the incipient and weak 
private sector in LDCs; 
 (c)  Measures to encourage private investment in productive activities and 
public investment in basic infrastructure, including the development of  
skills and support institutions; 
 (d)  The promotion of  domestic technological learning and innovation and 
improvements in productivity in both agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors (UNCTAD 2013). 
 Our analysis above supports those principles but they are somewhat general to 
be implemented as such and they need to take into account the specifi cities of  
African countries’ specifi c recent development. The UN economic report for 
Africa 2013 moves in that direction by demonstrating the limits of  the current 
development patterns where natural resource rents are not transformed into 
investment in manufacturing and agriculture. 
 The UN report points to the formation of  ‘industrial clusters’ around  com-
modity production on the basis of  private– public partnerships as the central 
strategy. The advantage with such an incremental strategy is that it builds 
on what is already there and aims at raising productivity in existing activi-
ties. However, there might be a need for more bold industrial policy strategies 
that take the wider perspective of  the national innovation system and aim 
at fostering new manufacturing industries with high- learning potential. Here 
productivity of  the whole economy could be increased by moving resources 
from low- to high- productivity sectors. 
 12.5.3  Industrial policies as learning processes 
 It is useful to see public policy as a learning process. There is no reason to 
assume that the policy makers get things right from the very beginning. For 
instance, we found that the original intentions of  the Chinese reforms aiming 
at creating ‘markets for knowledge’ did not succeed (see  chapter 10 in this 
book). The enterprises were not ready to procure knowledge from universities 
and other knowledge institutions. Instead, knowledge suppliers had to move 
ahead and establish their own enterprises in order to bring knowledge into 
use. This unintended process turned out to be an important step for China in 
its catch- up process, and it was accepted as such by policymakers. 
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 When policymakers in African countries take new initiatives in industrial 
policy, they should be aware of  the fact that it is a learning process. This 
involves systematically evaluating outcomes and not least registering unex-
pected outcomes – both positive and negative – and making sure that the next 
wave of  initiatives takes these experiences into account. 
 Stiglitz et al. ( 2013 ) discuss the argument that industrial policy should be 
avoided in Africa because there is too little administrative capacity to pur-
sue industrial policy in Africa. They turn down the argument. But there is 
little doubt that there is much for African policymakers to learn from success-
ful catching- up economies. Programs with expert exchange between African 
countries and some Asian countries could be one way to speed up policy 
learning. 
 12.5.4  Environmental policy as industrial policy 
 As the global climate change regime moves ahead towards 2020, there will be 
increasing investments related to climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
poor countries. Substantial opportunities for funding of   low- carbon innova-
tions will arise particularly in Africa. Ensuring that the most adequate tech-
nologies are selected and that they are diff used and used in such a way that 
the outcome is better living conditions for the population is a major challenge. 
 At the same times environmental policy is an important form of  industrial 
policy with potential for job creation. Making it more costly to use carbon- 
based technologies and giving support to low- carbon solutions will change not 
only the structure of  power production but also the wider industry structure. 
Introducing low- carbon solutions in agriculture and in the informal sector, for 
instance, through new systems for recycling and repair activities can off er both 
investment and job opportunities. 
 12.5.5  The BRICS connection and below-the-radar innovation 
 The most recent developments in Africa with growing dependence on pro-
duction of  commodities and a tendency towards deindustrialization refl ects 
the growing role of  China and other major economies. It is a major task for 
governments in Africa to exploit the potential for a positive interaction with 
BRICS countries. This potential refl ects that emerging economies are in a 
particularly strong position to advance relevant and aff ordable technologies 
because conditions in BRICS are more similar to those in the poor countries. 
 However, even the most ‘adequate’ technologies developed abroad will need 
to go through a process of  transformation in order to become both effi  cient 
and inclusive in the specifi c context of   African countries. The fact that the 
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solutions may be adequate has little to do with the source of  the technology 
but depends on the contextualization and adaptation of  the technology into 
the local context (Arocena and Sutz  2000 ). Building absorptive capacity in 
the informal sector and in agriculture requires new types of  policy initiatives. 
 12.5.6  The global regime for knowledge protection and sharing 
 Above we could see how very scarce resources used for higher education went 
into investments in people who then moved to rich countries that could benefi t 
from the investments. The lack of  protection of  these resources can be argued 
in terms of  the need for individual freedom to move from one country to 
another. The argument is weakened when it turns out that the rich countries’ 
respect for this freedom is highly selective. Ordinary poor people with less edu-
cation are eff ectively blocked at frontiers of  the rich countries. 
 The lack of  protection of  human capital stands in strong contrast to the 
global rules regarding intellectual property rights. The WTO agreements on 
TRIPS set very strict limits for the use of  knowledge developed abroad, and 
they have been even further restricted by bilateral agreements between the 
United States and the least developed countries (Sampath and Roff e  2012 ). 
The WTO agreements also include references to the duty of  developed coun-
tries to engage in ‘technology transfer’ to the least developed economies, but 
those references are vague without monitoring and sanctions. 
 There is little doubt that the global regime for knowledge sharing and pro-
tection is biased in favour of  the rich countries. To renegotiate this regime 
would require a coordinated eff ort of  African countries, perhaps with a role 
of  the African Union. 
 12.5.7  The natural resource curse and the need to promote 
manufacturing in Africa – some refl ections on the 
implications for public policy 
 The data and conclusions presented under the heading ‘the resource curse’ 
in Sachs and Warner ( 1995 ) have triggered a substantial amount of  analyti-
cal work as well as heated debate among economists and political scientists. 
Recently the topic has attracted the attention of  scholars linking innovation 
and innovation policy to development (see for instance Katz 2006; Perez 2010; 
Iizuka and Katz 2011; Andersen 2012). 
 Some early contributions to the resource curse debate by economic his-
torians such as Gavin Wright and Paul David demonstrated that knowledge 
creation and learning in direct connection with the exploitation of  mineral 
resources have been crucial for US economic growth. Others such as De 
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Ferranti et al. ( 2002 ) have argued that the most important explanation of  the 
diff erent paths of  development, where Nordic countries succeeded to develop 
strong and diversifi ed economies starting from a situation of  natural resource 
specialization, while Latin American countries failed to do so, had to do with 
a weak knowledge base and with an institutional set- up that did not support 
processes of  learning. 
 On this basis innovation scholars have argued against a specifi c version of  
natural resource curse based on the assumptions that: 
 1.  The learning potential and the knowledge content is limited in natural 
resource– based sectors. 
 2.  Natural resource– based sectors tend to develop as enclaves with limited 
capacity to drive the creation of  upstream and downstream manufacturing. 
 It is in line with the argument in this chapter that the key diff erence between 
successful and less successful growth policies lies in the nature of  the learning 
process that promotes the economic potential of  access to natural resources 
(Wright  2001 ). A crucial issue is how natural resource– related activities make 
use of  and master new technologies and knowledge to improve production 
processes (De Ferranti et al.  2002 ). A key question is how Africa can exploit the 
‘window of  opportunity’ opened up by increased global demand for natural 
resources and transform it into a knowledge base that would allow for sus-
tained and inclusive growth. 
 We share the scepticism to the generalized resource curse hypothesis and 
see the building of  clusters around natural resources as one useful step towards 
economic development in Africa. Nevertheless, we see a need to develop fur-
ther the policy implications of  the criticism. We are not convinced that the 
natural resource base should be  the only starting point for industrialization in 
Africa. The fact that most African countries import big proportions of  their 
consumption goods from abroad indicates a potential for import substitu-
tion. Second, we see the broad- based growth of  manufacturing as crucial for 
making Africa’s economies less vulnerable and for creating jobs for the young 
generation. This is the case even if  there is a great potential for learning and 
upgrading in natural resource– based sectors. 
 In relation to building clusters around natural resources – both mining and 
agriculture – we see a crucial need for building relevant capacity in  engineering 
and design . Without local competence in these areas, there is no possibility to 
link up with global value chains with unique and high- value- added products. 
But the same is true for any attempt to build industrial capacity. One impor-
tant reason why the attempts to realize import substitution in Latin America 
and Africa did not succeed is that technical training and engineering have 
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been given too little attention as compared to general education in science, 
social sciences and humanities. 
 Notes 
 1  This paper was drafted to form the basis for a presentation at the AfricaLics Academy 
held in Algiers in October 2013. It also draws on a concept note prepared by the 
authors for the Globelics Seminar on Innovation and Economic Development, Dar- es- 
Salaam, March 2012. 
 2  An important factor is that, daily, thousands of  young economics students are exposed 
to programs teaching this message. Many of  those working in ministries of  fi nance in 
African countries have been trained to believe in it. 
 3  The fact that the landed aristocracy in England became involved in trade and industry 
was a major factor that made the Industrial Revolution possible. 
 4  To a certain degree, these diff erences in focus refl ect the national origin of  the analysts. 
In small countries such as Denmark, as in the developing countries – a major concern 
of  Freeman – it is obvious that the competence base most critical for innovation in the 
economy as a whole is not scientifi c knowledge. Incremental innovation, ‘absorptive 
capacity’ and economic performance will typically refl ect the skills and motivation of  
employees as well as inter- and intra- organizational relationships and characteristics. 
Science- based sectors may be rapidly growing, but their shares of  total employment 
and exports remain relatively small. 
 5  In the Anglo- Saxon countries the basic idea is that individuals should carry as much as 
possible of  both benefi ts and costs. In the Nordic countries universal tax fi nanced wel-
fare systems redistribute in favour of  individuals who lose their job or become handi-
capped. The more conservative systems in place in Continental European countries 
tend to redistribute through employment- tied public insurance systems. In Southern 
Europe, where systems of  social protection are relatively weak, the family can still play 
an important role as redistributing mechanism. In Japan the big corporations redistrib-
ute resources to older workers who would otherwise be victims of  change by off ering 
them life- long employment. 
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 Chapter 13 
 NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
AND GLOBALIZATION 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 13.1  Introduction 
 Today the term national innovation system appears in several diff erent 
domains within social science and engineering, and it is widely used in policy 
circles all over the world. The concept refl ects an assumption that the pat-
tern of  innovation diff ers across countries and that such diff erences can be 
explained by systemic features. The components of  the innovation system are 
diff erent, and they are linked diff erently to each other and such diff erences in 
economic structure and institutional set up are refl ected in the rate and direc-
tion of  innovation. 
 We will take as starting point ideas presented in the very fi rst contribu-
tions that made use of  the innovation system concept,  Freeman ( 1982 ) and 
Lundvall ( 1985 ). There is some overlap between them but the perspectives are 
quite diff erent. Freeman’s analysis refers to macro- phenomena and to inter-
national trade and development, while Lundvall ( 1985 ) refers to the micro 
level where innovation is seen as shaped by user– producer relationships. We 
will argue that they are complementary and that they can be used to span and 
dissect important themes in the more recent literature on innovation systems 
and global value chains. 
 The concept national innovation system may be seen as a new combination 
of  two diff erent perspectives, one developed within the IKE group at Aalborg 
University and one developed at Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at 
Sussex University. The concept came out of  bringing together an under-
standing of  innovation as rooted in the production system (Aalborg) and an 
understanding of  innovation as rooted in the science and technology system 
(Sussex). 
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 The Aalborg approach was inspired by the concept ‘national production 
systems’ as it was used by French Marxist structuralists such as Palloix ( 1969 ) 
and de Bernis (1968). Esben Sloth Andersen (1992) criticized and developed 
these ideas by introducing an evolutionary perspective with focus on innova-
tion with the aim to overcome the limitations of  what he saw as a too static 
framework. Another important inspiration for the Aalborg group’s work on 
innovation systems came from Björn Johnson ( 1992 ) who linked innovation 
and learning to the socioeconomic characteristics of  national institutions. 
Lundvall ( 1985 ) took inspiration from early works by Andersen and Johnson 
while studying user– producer interfaces as refl ecting economic structure as 
well as institutional characteristics. 
 Scholars at SPRU were involved in a series of  empirical projects that 
brought forward the interaction that took place in connection with innovation 
processes in industrial enterprises (Rothwell 1972, 1977). One of  Freeman’s 
favourite themes in lectures in the early 1980s was about how innovation stud-
ies could overcome the apparent contradiction between supply- and demand- 
driven innovation through understanding innovation as an interactive process. 
While the Aalborg research program on innovation, knowledge and economic 
dynamics (the IKE- group) started from the production system and developed 
its understanding of  innovation and learning on this basis, the SPRU pio-
neered the mapping, comparing and analysis of  national science and tech-
nology systems – a concept used by OECD already in the beginning of  the 
1980s. This is refl ected in Freeman ( 1982 ) where the focus is on the role of  
 Technological Infrastructure . 
 It is important to note that the two fi rst contributions that made use of  the 
concept (Freeman  1982 and Lundvall  1985 ) aimed at understanding national 
economic performance in terms of  competitiveness and economic growth and 
that the analysis was critical both to mainstream economics and dominant 
economic policy prescriptions. They were critical to development strategies 
based on ‘pure markets’ and night watcher states and to the discourses that 
presented lower wages as the best cure for weak competitiveness. Both of  these 
contributions were placed in the tradition of  political economy and the power 
dimension was taken explicitly into account. Freeman ( 1982 ) referred to the 
diff erences between the rich and the poor countries in terms of  their capacity 
to set the global rules of  the game and pointed to the important role of  state 
intervention to close technological gaps, while Lundvall ( 1985 ) analysed how 
gaps in competence and economic resources between users and producers led 
to ‘unsatisfactory innovations’ when either the user or the producer took a 
dominant position. 
 In the ensuing diff usion and use of  the innovation system concept these 
critical dimensions were almost lost, and they were defi nitely marginalized. 
   353
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND GLOBALIZATION 353
Scholars at business schools and technological universities as well as econo-
mists in international organizations such as OECD and the World Bank used 
the concept in a technocratic way and neglected the power dimension. 
 13.2  Technological Infrastructure and International 
Competitiveness 
 Around 1980 the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry 
(DSTI) established a group of  experts to analyse ‘Science, technology and 
competiveness’ with Sir Ingram as chairperson and Francois Chesnais as sec-
retary. After a series of  meetings, the group fi nalized a report in 1983 that 
introduced the concept of  ‘structural competitiveness’. The report demon-
strated that short- term variations in wage costs and currency rates had only 
limited eff ects on long- term diff erences that refl ected the ‘absolute advantage’ 
of  certain countries. The report concluded that the investments in knowledge 
infrastructure and in human capital were crucial for the long- term economic 
performance of  the national economy. The report’s conclusions were contro-
versial for OECD, and it was never published (offi  cially due to limited printing 
capacity – sic!); some of  the main results were presented in an article in STI 
review several years later (Chesnais  1987 ). 
 The group invited a number of  external experts to write papers that 
gave insights into the link between science, technology and competitive-
ness. Christopher Freeman contributed with a paper on ‘Technological 
Infrastructure and International Competitiveness’ (Freeman  1982 / 2004). In 
this paper, he made what might be the very fi rst reference to ‘the national 
innovation system’ (Freeman  1982 , 550), and he outlined arguments for why 
national systems of  innovation and especially technological infrastructure 
matter for the competitiveness of  nations. 
 The paper is introduced by an important distinction between two diff er-
ent perspectives on international trade: one, prominent in standard econom-
ics where the focus is on comparative advantage and trade specialization, 
and a second where the focus is on absolute advantage and competitiveness. 
The aim of  the paper is to address issues related to the second perspective. 
The paper refers to the Leontief  paradox (1951) and to the attempts to dis-
solve the paradox by analysing the role that technology plays for the patterns 
of  trade specialization (Posner  1961 ; Hufbauer  1966 ; Gruber et  al.  1967 ). 
Freeman then moves on to a discussion of  the literature on the role of  ‘non- 
price factors’ in trade citing works by respectively Kravis and Lipsey ( 1971 ) 
and Posner and Steer ( 1979 ), indicating that factors related to quality and 
reliability are more important than price for users’ selection of  means of  pro-
duction. He also refers to ‘the Kaldor paradox’ (1978), showing a ‘perverse’ 
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relationship between national cost levels and export shares for the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 As Freeman points out (with the exception of  Kaldor’s paper) the empirical 
results that he quotes operate at the sector level showing that in most sectors, 
technology (as refl ected in R&D intensity and patenting) is an important factor 
when it comes to explaining international specialization. They only indirectly 
address the question why countries remain in a dominating position for a lon-
ger period when it comes to trade and economic growth through innovation. 
 In order to respond to this question, he uses economic history as a method 
and shows how technological and economic world leadership has shifted from 
the Great Britain to Germany, and he gives a detailed analysis of  how Japan 
on the basis of  investment in knowledge and innovation is successfully engaged 
in catching- up with the United States and with the lead European countries. 
 One original and interesting element in Freeman’s paper is his reading of  
Friedrich List (Freeman  1982 , 552– 57). He recognizes the well- known fact 
that List challenges the free- trade ideology of  Adam Smith and that List 
argues in favour of  protecting infant industries. But he also shows that List’s 
most severe criticism of  Adam Smith is that Smith neglects the importance 
of  ‘mental capital’ and the quality of  the labour force: ‘His free trade theory 
takes into account present values, but nowhere the powers that produce them’ 
(List  1845 , 208). 
 According to List, it is only when you take into account the learning pro-
cesses in the production sphere that you can understand why, under specifi c 
circumstances, the principle of  freedom of  trade may need to be subordinated 
to the need to foster competences in the production sphere. A related argu-
ment for protecting domestic markets is that it will attract foreign tangible and 
intangible capital contributing to the formation of  mental capital. In both 
cases List’s focus is on the dynamics of  innovation and competence building:
 The present state of  nations is the result of  the accumulation of  all discov-
eries, inventions, improvements, perfections and extertions of  all generations 
which have lived before us; they form the mental capital of  the present human 
race, and every separate nation is productive only in the proportion in which it 
has known how to appropriate these attainments of  former generations, and to 
increase them by its own acquirements. (List 1841, 183) 
 Freeman concludes the paper by arguing that the international monetary sys-
tems need to recognize that there are no mechanisms that automatically will 
overcome major trade disequilibria since those will refl ect structural factors 
diffi  cult to change in the short run. In the absence of  a new international 
economic order where surplus countries accept to transfer technologies and 
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support the building of  strong innovation systems in the defi cit countries, the 
outcome at the global level will be defl ationary. 
 At the national level, he points to the need for public investments in edu-
cation and research and in technological infrastructure. He ends the paper 
by arguing that these traditional priorities need to be combined with a new 
emphasis on understanding what kind of  ‘coupling’ mechanisms – linking to 
each other education systems, scientifi c institutions, engineering, business and 
marketing – characterize the countries that have been successful in catching 
up. 1 
 In this context he makes a reference to the research program of  the IKE 
group at Aalborg University:
 The research at Aalborg on the inter- dependencies between various groups 
of  fi rms in promoting technical progress in certain key sectors of  the Danish 
economy is also highly relevant here. (Andersen et al.  1981 ; Freeman  1982 , 550) 
 This reference points indirectly to the second early contribution to the devel-
opment of  the national innovation system (NIS) concept (Lundvall  1985 ). 
 13.3  Product Innovation and User– Producer Interaction 
 In the period 1980– 84, the Aalborg group hosted a major project on the 
impact of  the use of  micro- electronics on international competitiveness – the 
MIKE project. At the time there were many parallel national projects going 
on using various methods to capture the impact on productivity, employment 
and balance of  payment. Some of  those used macroeconomic models and 
input– output tables, while others studied specifi c sectors and the impact at the 
level of  the fi rm. The MIKE project defi ned the units of  analysis as ‘indus-
trial complexes’ and analysed four ‘industrial complexes’ that constituted 
important components of  the Danish economy (Agro- , Offi  ce automation- , 
Environmental- and Textile- Industrial complexes). 
 The project gave special attention to the interface between users and pro-
ducers of  means of  production that embodied information technology and 
studied how the specifi c characteristics of  the user– producer relationships 
shaped the technologies that were developed and used. The project demon-
strated several cases of  producer dominance and pointed to the importance 
for national economic performance of  giving users, including workers and 
consumers, stronger competences to cope with the new technologies. 
 Lundvall ( 1985 ) was inspired by the results obtained in the MIKE proj-
ect. It addressed two sets of  issues: one related to economic theory and the 
other related to the understanding of  the innovation process. It presented 
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innovation as an interactive process where the feedback from users’ experi-
ence was seen as crucial for the success of  innovation, and on this basis it 
demonstrated that an economy characterized either by ‘pure markets’ or ‘pure 
hierarchies’ would experience little (product) innovation. On this basis, it was 
argued that markets where new products are introduced are ‘organized’ mar-
kets or semi- hierarchies. The analysis pointed to the limits of  neoclassical eco-
nomics but also to the limits of  transaction cost economics as presented in the 
book  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Williamson  1975 ). 
 Second, with reference to the MIKE project’s analysis of  industrial com-
plexes, it gave several examples of  ‘unsatisfactory innovation’ refl ecting a com-
bination of  uneven market power and uneven distribution of  competences 
between the producer and the user. It also broadened the use of  the concept 
of  user– producer interaction to include universities as producers and indus-
trial enterprises as users showing why this interaction would always be dishar-
monious since the user and the producer operated with diff erent modes of  
learning. In this context appeared what might be the fi rst printed reference to 
‘innovation system’ (Lundvall  1985 , 36). 
 There is some overlap between these two fi rst contributions to the under-
standing of  innovation systems. As mentioned above, while analysing the role 
of  international specialization and competitiveness,  Freeman points to the 
importance of  ‘coupling’ from invention to innovation and from the original 
innovation (creation) to diff usion and use as well as to the complex process of  
‘matching scientifi c and technological opportunities with the needs of  poten-
tial users of  innovation’. The analysis in Lundvall ( 1985 ) is built on studying 
‘Danish’ industrial complexes, but three of  the four cases refer to the industrial 
complexes that are quite dependent on imports when it comes to the tech-
nologies used (this is especially the case for textile machinery). The paper also 
introduces ideas similar to what can be found in recent literature on global 
value chains: 
 The world economic system might be regarded as a complex network of  user- 
producer relationships connecting units dispersed in economic and geographical 
space … International specialization might be regarded as refl ecting competi-
tion between verticals or production rather than competition between national 
industries. (Lundvall  1985 , 34) 
 Some years later (in Lundvall  1988 ), the patterns of  user– producer relation-
ships were presented as a micro- foundation for the concept ‘national innova-
tion systems’. It was argued that the interaction with domestic users is facilitated 
by short distance in terms of  Geography, Culture and Language. This general 
argument was supported by empirical analysis of  trade specialization showing 
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that there is a correlation between the specialization in a specifi c commodity 
group on the one hand and the specialization of  machinery to be used in the 
same sector on the other. Home markets were important for those developing 
new production technologies (Fagerberg  1988 ). 
 Lundvall (1992a) may be seen as an attempt to combine and further develop 
the two perspectives presented in respectively Freeman ( 1982 ) and Lundvall 
( 1985 ). In the fi rst part of  the book, the focus is on the role of  economic insti-
tutions and structure in national innovation systems. The second part analyses 
diff erent domains within the innovation system (work organization, cluster for-
mation, fi nance, public sector and STI institutions). The third part is explicitly 
on the openness of  national systems and refers to trade, integration and FDI. 
 Chapter 3 in the book used the user– producer perspective to explain why 
national systems remain quite resistant to the trend towards globalization 
(Lundvall 1992b). It is argued that domestic interaction benefi ts from a shared 
language and from nation specifi c economic institutions since it reduces trans-
action costs and raises the returns from interactive learning. In the introduction 
to the book, it is emphasized that all national systems are becoming increas-
ingly open. However, this is not seen as a reason to cease further development 
and use of  the NSI concept. It is argued that globalization makes it even more 
necessary to understand the historical role as well as the ongoing transforma-
tion of  national innovation systems. 
 13.4  Each of  the Origins Gives Rise to New Streams of  
Analysis 
 Each of  the two pioneer contributions has stimulated specifi c research eff orts 
related to innovation systems. The literature on catching- up may be seen as a 
logical follow- up to Freeman’s reference to List and to his macro- perspective 
on economic development. While Freeman ( 1982 ) points to the diffi  culties 
of  establishing quantitative empirical analysis given the lack of  data for less 
developed countries, much of  the work on catching up has been empirical 
and aimed at testing his hypotheses. More specifi cally, this literature has tested 
the relative importance of  ‘openness’ vs. factors related to the strength of  the 
national innovation system. In the next section we summarize the main results 
from this literature. 
 The literature on cluster formation and regional innovation systems devel-
oped by economic geographers may be seen as a follow- up to the analysis 
of  user– producer interaction in  Product Innovation and User- Producer Interaction 
(Lundvall  1985 ). To begin with, this literature gave major emphasis to the 
importance of  local interaction. Later on it developed the analysis and pointed 
to complementarity between global (pipelines) and local (buzz) interaction. 
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This evolution of  ideas about interaction in space was interconnected with 
an analysis of  distinct kinds of  knowledge and diff erent forms of  learning. 
Below we will focus on how this literature has developed its view of  the role of  
distance in connection with the interaction that characterizes the innovation 
process. 
 13.5  What Are the Prerequisites for Catching- Up? 
 Fagerberg’s contributions on competitiveness and catching up may be seen as 
following a trajectory that was outlined in Freeman’s paper from 1982. While 
Freeman with reference to lack of  data, especially for the least developed coun-
tries, used qualitative and historical arguments to indicate the importance of  
technology for national economic development, Fagerberg, starting with his 
PhD thesis (1988b), has engaged in a life- long eff ort to analyse quantitative 
data in order to sort out what are the main factors that contribute to economic 
growth and international competitiveness in countries at diff erent levels of  
development (Fagerberg  1993 ,  1994 ,  2010 ,  2011 ). 
 His works show that technological capabilities (the national innovation 
system) and factors having to do with ‘governance’ are crucial for economic 
development, while factors cherished within Washington consensus such as 
‘openness’ (to trade and FDI) and the prevalence of  Western political institu-
tions do not favour economic development – especially not in the least devel-
oped countries. In ‘The Changing Global Economic Landscape: The Factors 
That Matter’, where Fagerberg ( 2010 ) summarizes much of  his work on why 
growth rates diff er, he demonstrates that a broader defi nition of  ‘openness’ is 
signifi cant for economic development. Openness to ideas, to entrepreneurial 
eff ort and to people (including tolerance to minorities), is positively correlated 
with national economic performance. 
 These conclusions are in line with the main results presented in ‘The 
Role of  Foreign Technology and Indigenous Innovation in the Emerging 
Economies:  Technological Change and Catching- Up’ (Fu, Pietrobelli and 
Soete  2011 ). Their analysis aims at understanding the role of  national and 
international sources of  knowledge and innovation. It is built on an extensive 
literature review on the impact of  FDI, and it refers to a diff erent type of  data 
than the empirics used by Fagerberg (their evidence is from case studies of  
global value chains in emerging economies), and they fi nd that:
 The evidence suggests that, despite the potential off ered by globalization and 
a liberal trade regime, the benefi ts of  international technology diff usion can 
only be delivered by parallel indigenous innovation eff orts and the presence 
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of  modern institutional and governance structures and a conducive innovation 
system. (Fu et al.  2011 , 1210) 
 They conclude that ‘w ithout indigenous innovation the income gap between 
rich and poor countries will never be closed’. 
 These results support Freeman’s  1982 analysis where he, with reference 
to Friedrich List, argues that building national technological infrastructure 
and a strong national knowledge base should be a major focus for develop-
ment strategies. Fagerberg’s analysis adds to that perspective the importance 
of  governance (rule of  law, intellectual property rights, corruption) as well 
as openness to ideas. Neither Fagerberg’s nor the analysis of  value chains in 
emerging economies indicate that the least developed countries would benefi t 
from engaging in ‘free trade’ and from more free access for foreign capital 
without simultaneously building technological capabilities and ‘upgrading’ 
national governance. 
 13.6  Interactive Learning in Regional Systems of  Innovation 
 While much of  Jan Fagerberg’s work may be seen as following the trajectory 
outlined by Freeman ( 1982 ), economic geographers used some of  Lundvall’s 
( 1985 ) core ideas in a similar way to develop further the analysis of  why cer-
tain activities tend to be located together in a specifi c region. The analysis 
of  processes of  innovation and not least the diff usion of  innovation was, of  
course, not new for this interdisciplinary discipline. Torsten Hägerstrand’s 
seminal contributions on time and space models were linked to an analysis 
of  innovation diff usion in space including refl ections on the importance of  
face- to- face interaction. His dissertation ( 1953 ) represented a major milestone. 
 In the entrance to the 1990s, Krugman and colleagues (Krugman  1991 ; 
Krugman and Venables  1995 ) presented quantitative growth models that sig-
nalled ‘the new economic geography’. Their models took aboard most of  the 
main assumptions characterizing neoclassical economics but loosened up for 
some – most importantly they allowed for increasing returns to scale, oligopo-
listic competition and costs of  transport. This invasion of  a rather narrow 
economics perspective – where it was assumed that regional agglomerations 
could be explained by rational behaviour of  fully informed agents – left many 
economic geographers uncomfortable. Neither did it match well with the 
classical approach of  Hägerstrand who, while using quantitative modelling, 
always emphasized the human and cultural dimensions of  geography and pre-
ferred to work within an evolutionary perspective where uncertainty is seen as 
fundamental for outcomes. 
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 In this climate, many economic geographers and experts on regional 
development saw the new perspectives emerging within innovation studies 
developed by heterodox economists as a more relevant inspiration for their 
research. The concept of  interactive learning was used in Cooke and Morgan 
(1990) to explain economic agglomeration in Europe. The combination of  the 
specifi c focus on user– producer interaction (Lundvall  1985 ), the more general 
concepts of  innovation systems (Lundvall  1988 ) and ‘the learning economy’ 
(Lundvall and Johnson 1993) inspired concepts such as ‘the learning region’ 
and the ‘regional innovation systems’. Nordic scholars such as Maskell and 
Malmberg ( 1997 ) and Asheim ( 1996 ) took some of  these concepts as the basis 
for developing theoretical and empirical works in new directions. 
 Further developments by Aalborg economists of  the understanding of  dif-
ferent types of  knowledge and modes of  innovation (Lundvall and Johnson 
1994; Jensen et  al.  2007 ) also infl uenced this literature. A  major argument 
for why proximity between users and producers was critical to innovation 
was that important components of  knowledge are tacit (for in depth analysis, 
see Gertler  2007 ; Asheim and Coenen  2005 ). But it was also recognized that 
knowledge may be more or less codifi ed in diff erent sectors and in diff erent 
technologies and that this fact was important for understanding diff erences 
across industries in their degrees of  localization and internationalization. 
 One of  the most important contributions was the paper by Michael Storper 
( 1995 ) who made use of  ideas from Lundvall ( 1985 ) to introduce ‘untraded 
interdependencies’ as a key concept aimed at giving regional economics a new 
theoretical foundation. Here he argued that vertical linkages such as those 
between producers and professional users were only one example of  ‘untraded 
interdependencies’; others were related to the employment contracts and were 
refl ected in informal labour market institutions at the regional level. Such rela-
tionships could be more or less hierarchical and be more or less built on trust. 
While most other scholars in economic geography draw rather practical impli-
cations from the analysis, using it primarily to argue that proximity is impor-
tant and using it to explain the formation of  clusters, Storper brought forward 
and further developed the underlying theoretical ideas. He summarizes his 
conclusions in three points: 
 1.  Technological change is path dependent. 
 2.  It is path dependent because it involves interdependencies between choices 
made over time – choices are sequenced in time, not simultaneous, and 
often irreversible. 
 3.  These choices have a spatial dimension which is closely tied to their 
temporal uncertainty and interdependence. Some interorganizational 
dependencies within the division of  labour, that is input– output or network 
   361
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND GLOBALIZATION 361
relations, involve some degree of  territorialization. But in all cases where 
organizations cluster together in territorial space in order to travel along 
a technological trajectory, they have interdependencies that are untraded, 
including labour market relationships, and ‘conventions’, or common 
languages and rules for developing, communicating and interpreting 
knowledge (though direct input– output relations may also play a role here). 
 Storper ( 1995 ) was not unaware that globalization was an ongoing process but 
he argued that those who saw it as a hegemonic trend that met with little resis-
tance had given too much attention to techno- economic input– output rela-
tions and too little to untraded interdependencies, including those not related 
to user– producer interactions. He used the concept of  localized ‘economic 
conventions’ related to the knowledge system and to labour markets as signify-
ing such interdependencies. 
 The work by Edward Lorenz with colleagues on national diff erences in the 
organization of  work may be seen as a follow- up of  these ideas. Such diff er-
ences constitute an important but neglected dimension of  Europe’s national 
innovation systems and learning economies. In Lorenz and Valeyre ( 2006 ), it is 
demonstrated that work is organized quite diff erently in diff erent national sys-
tems within Europe and that workers have very diff erent access to jobs off ering 
access to learning. In ‘How Europe’s Economies Learn: A Comparison of  Work 
Organization and Innovation Mode for the EU- 15’ (Arundel et al.  2007 ), it is 
demonstrated that there is signifi cant correlation between national performance 
in terms of  innovation and the predominant forms of  work organization. These 
diff erences typically refl ect both diff erences in formal institutions surrounding 
the labour markets and ‘conventions’ strongly rooted in national systems. 
 The fi rst wave of  research on regional clustering taking Lundvall ( 1985 , 
 1988 ) as inspiration emphasized the forces that lead to agglomeration and 
often it was assumed that agglomeration could be explained by the charac-
ter of  knowledge exchange in connection with local input– output or user– 
producer relationships. At the level of  national innovation systems, it was also 
assumed that user– producer relationship could explain the relative stability in 
international specialization. Empirical work did not always support this per-
spective and increasingly it was found that: 
 1.  The vertical couplings between fi rms within regional cluster were not 
always highly developed. Increasingly, the vertical division of  labour in 
product chains was further developed and diff erent steps were distributed 
at diff erent locations, sometimes at locations across the globe. 
 2.  While the interaction with domestic customers and suppliers was more 
frequent when developing new products, the less frequent interaction 
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with distant customers and suppliers outside the national system played 
an important role especially in connection with path- breaking and more 
radical innovations. Firms and clusters that combined ‘local buzz’ with 
‘global pipelines’ were more viable and performed better than those 
depending only on local interaction. 
 These observations emphasized the need to combine a national perspective 
with a wider view, a need reinforced by the globalization of  fi nancial markets, 
by economic integration in Europe and by the increasing number of  fi rms 
that behave as if  they were footloose. In the introduction to the  Handbook in 
Economic Geography (Clark et al.  2000 ), these are the main arguments for why 
a national perspective is insuffi  cient. Nevertheless, the conclusion is still that 
the national systems matter. It is actually said that ‘As representatives of  politi-
cal agency they may be more important than ever.’ Where the authors see a 
weakening of  the role of  national systems is especially in the tendency towards 
decoupling between private economic interest and enterprise and the home 
nation. 
 13.7  The Global Value Chain Approach 
 It is interesting to note that in the  Handbook on Economic Geography (Clark et al. 
 2000 ), there is only one reference to ‘global commodity chains’ in spite of  
the fact that the introduction argues that global and subnational economic 
processes should be given more attention. This refl ects that the community of  
scholars who developed the global value chain approach had their belonging 
to development studies – a subdiscipline clearly separated from regional stud-
ies and from the community of  scholars working on issues related to economic 
geography in the North. 
 The main research question in recent global value chain research is: How 
does the character of  the global production chain contribute to or hinder 
the upgrading of  activities in fi rms located in less developed economies? The 
complementary question is how the character of  the chain aff ects the distribu-
tion of  value produced along the chain. This leads to the third question: Does 
the integration of  local fi rms into global chains contribute to economic devel-
opment in developing countries? 
 One early major contribution to this fi eld of  research was the edited book 
by Gereffi   and Korzeniewicz ( 1994 ). The book brought together contributions 
by scholars with diff erent backgrounds. Some of  the contributions were case 
studies while others were historical or theoretical. The main theoretical refer-
ences were to respectively Immanuel Wallerstein’s contribution on ‘the world 
system and global commodity chains’ ( 1974 ) and to Michael Porter’s work 
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on ‘competition and innovation’ ( 1990 . The most important analytical step 
taken was Gereffi  ’s distinction between producer- driven and user- driven value 
chains. This constituted the beginning of  a discourse on ‘governance’ that 
later became dominated by references to transaction cost analysis. 
 Another important reference is to Humphrey and Schmitz ( 2002 ). Those 
two scholars have affi  liation with IDS at Sussex University. During the 1990s, 
their focus was on how the new understanding of  industrial districts and 
cluster formation developed in Europe could inspire strategies for industrial 
development in  developing countries (Humphrey 1995; Schmitz  1995 ,  1999 ; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 1996). Schmitz introduced the concept ‘collective 
effi  ciency’ as characterizing successful clusters, a concept close to untraded 
interdependencies and shared economic conventions. 
 Humphrey and Schmitz ( 2002 ) is an important paper since it marks a 
bridging between the global value chain literature and the cluster literature as 
it emanated from The Institute for Development Studies at Sussex University. 
It is also important since it, on a few pages, introduces some fundamental con-
cepts that have shaped the value chain discourse onwards. First it makes the 
distinction between four forms of  industrial upgrading: 
 1.  New process 
 2.  New product 
 3.  New function 
 4.  New sector 
 As compared to the innovation literature, the third form of  upgrading is of  spe-
cial interest since it goes beyond technical innovation. It may be seen as a form 
of  innovation resulting in a ‘new organization’. In the context of  the global 
value chain literature, it has a more specifi c connotation, and it is assumed 
to be of  great strategic importance. The value chain is seen as encompass-
ing diff erent functions spanning from exploitation of  natural resources and 
manufacturing to R&D and marketing. It is assumed that fi rms that control 
the R&D and marketing functions can extract more value than those fi rms 
that are engaged exclusively in natural resource extraction or manufactur-
ing. Even when fi rms succeed in developing new products and more effi  cient 
processes, they might gain little in terms of  value if  they remain a producer 
without access to R&D or without a strong position in the end- user markets. 
For the demand- driven chains, the most important factor is the control of  end- 
user markets, including establishing a strong brand. For the producer- driven 
chains, the most important form for functional upgrading is related to the 
building of  R&D capacity. Multinational fi rms that control these functions are 
assumed to be able to dominate and ‘organize’ the whole value chain. 
364
THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE364
 The second conceptual contribution relates to diff erent degrees of  domi-
nance, and it refers to the governance of  networks. The analysis takes Oliver 
Williamson’s transaction cost theory ( 1975 ) as its starting point. It is argued 
that four types of  relationships can be distinguished in the value chain: 
 1.  Arm’s length market relations 
 2.  Networks 
 3.  Quasi- hierarchies 
 4.  Hierarchy 
 The dominating form will depend on a series of  factors. Quasi- hierarchies 
may refl ect a combination of  monopoly position of  the buyer, need for speedy 
response among suppliers, limited capacity of  suppliers and complexity in the 
product. It is argued that in a dynamic perspective, the entrance of  local fi rms 
into quasi- hierarchies may support upgrading at least in terms of  products 
and processes. 
 The paper points to the importance of  understanding the role of  global 
linkages for fi rm level upgrading. But it also specifi es that in order to be suc-
cessful, integration needs to be combined with investing in knowledge within 
the fi rm and that the more demanding forms of  upgrading require a strong 
innovation system and active innovation policies. 
 A further step towards developing the understanding of  governance of  
global chains was based on the work by Sturgeon on modular production net-
works. Sturgeon ( 2002 ) argues that the modularization of  information technol-
ogy production chains should be seen in the light of  transaction cost theory. By 
standardizing and codifying interfaces between those producing components 
and the major computer fi rms, it has been possible to reap scale economies in 
production without imposing inhibitive transaction costs. It is argued that this 
is ‘a new American model of  industrial production’ that can be applied in other 
sectors and set new global standards for the organization of  value chains. 
 Gereffi   et al. ( 2005 ) take these ideas into account and propose fi ve diff erent 
modes of  governance: 
 a)  Hierarchy 
 b)  Captive 
 c)  Relational 
 d)  Modular 
 e)  Market 
 It is assumed that the further down we get on this list, the less signifi cant is 
the element of  dominance. As compared to the categories used by Humphrey 
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and Schmitz ( 2002 ), captive corresponds to semi- hierarchical, while the net-
work category has been divided into two types of  networks – relational and 
modular. 
 Three diff erent characteristics are used to explain why a transaction inter-
face takes on a specifi c form: 
 1.  The complexity of  information and knowledge transfer 
 2.  The extent to which the information can be codifi ed 
 3.  The capabilities of  suppliers 
 What is new as compared to Humphrey and Schmitz ( 2002 ) is that complex-
ity now is explicitly related to information and knowledge and especially the 
emphasis is on the codifi ability of  the information. This is a theme that Aalborg 
economists have addressed in a number of  papers where the emphasis has 
been on the limited codifi ability of  crucial elements of  knowledge – especially 
codifi ability is limited for what they refer to as ‘know- how’ and ‘know- who’ 
(Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Johnson et al. 2008). 
 13.8  Relating the Global Value Chain Approach to the 
Original NSI Contributions 
 The global value chain literature may be seen as combining elements from 
the two original NSI contributions referred to above. It makes an attempt to 
address the fundamental question raised by Freeman in connection with his 
interpretation of  Friedrich List: Under what circumstances does participation 
in trade and openness to FDI have positive impact on the knowledge base of  
the economy? 
 There is also much overlap between the global value chain literature and 
Lundvall ( 1985 ). Lundvall ( 1985 ) does propose that most markets are orga-
nized and that they are infi ltrated by hierarchical relationships  – uneven 
access to resources and competences are seen as resulting in ‘unsatisfactory 
innovation’ especially when technologies are systemic. Other important over-
laps are the references to Oliver Williamson’s ‘transaction cost analysis’ and 
the idea that the character of  knowledge as more or less codifi ed – or tech-
nologies as more or less modularized – matters for the predominant form of  
governance. 
 Therefore, combining the innovation system perspective and the value 
chain perspective may be a way to reestablish the critical intentions in the 
original contributions by Freeman and Lundvall. As mentioned, much of  the 
more recent literature and policy prescriptions have become technocratic and 
marginalized issues related to social phenomena such as power and trust. 
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 But there are of  course important diff erences as well. While the analysis 
of  Freeman aimed at pursuing analysis at the aggregate level, something that 
was followed up in Fagerberg’s work, most of  the empirical work in the global 
value chain community is located at the level of  the fi rm, the cluster or the 
value chain as a whole. 
 As Adrian Wood ( 2001 ) has pointed out, there is a need to establish an ana-
lytical link from upgrading at the level of  the single fi rm to the development of  
a whole economy. Without such a link, there is no way that one can conclude 
that upgrading of  a single fi rm or one single cluster of  fi rms will contribute 
to economic development at the country level. This ‘fallacy of  composition’ 
may actually be the weakest point in the global value chain analysis. What 
might be good for the single fi rm might not be good for a cluster, a region or 
a national economy. 
 When it comes to the micro- foundation for innovation systems and value 
chains, there are also important diff erences. Lundvall ( 1985 ) and especially 
the  economic geographers who made use of  and further developed his ideas 
have insisted on the in depth analysis of  why specifi c activities become located 
together. Here the focus has been on the character of  knowledge and learn-
ing processes as well as on localized ‘institutions’ and ‘economic conventions’. 
 The global value chain literature tends to give less emphasis to analysing 
cultural, economic and political geography. This refl ects that globalization is 
seen predominantly as bringing institutional convergence between national 
economies. This contrasts with the innovation system perspective where glo-
balization is seen as a process that might make specifi c national patterns more 
disparate leading to divergence not only in terms of  economic structure but 
also in terms of  institutions. 
 The value chain analysts tend instead to give more weight to relative costs. 
Their starting point is empirical observations of  increasingly global com-
modity chains, and to some degree, they seem to take for given that national 
governments have to respect the principles of  comparative advantage. It is 
paradoxical that value chain analysis developed mainly by sociologists has 
ended up with a somewhat uncritical use of  relative cost and  transaction cost 
theory. 
 13.9  On the Importance of  Building a Strong National 
Innovation System 
 Another issue where the two streams of  thought diverge in terms of  empha-
sis relates to the relative importance of  domestic technological capacity and 
outcomes of  participation in global value chains. The paper by Giuliani et al. 
( 2005 ) is interesting since it makes an attempt to present a picture of  local 
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versus global interaction in Latin America on the basis of  no less than 40 case 
studies. Their conclusions are that you fi nd elements of  ‘collective effi  ciency’ 
in most clusters while the form it takes depends on sector as well as regional 
and national context. They also confi rm that in order to explain how integra-
tion in global value chains aff ects upgrading in the fi rm, you need to take into 
account the characteristics of  regional and national systems of  innovation and 
especially the fi rms’ own eff orts to engage in capacity building. 
 This corresponds to what is found in ‘Learning and Catching up in 
Diff erent Sectoral Systems:  Evidence from Six Industries’ (Malerba and 
Nelson  2011 ). Studying ‘catching- up’ in six sectoral innovation systems, they 
fi nd that industries diff er in terms of  how they link up with international fi rms. 
In some successful cases of  catching- up (automobiles in Korea), the access to 
foreign technology was crucial while in other cases (software, semiconductors 
and agro- food), multinationals operated as customer lead fi rms in global value 
chains. But again, in order to explain success and failure in catching- up – a 
phenomenon that could be referred to as ‘sectoral upgrading’ – they fi nd that 
it is necessary to link the analysis of  sector performance to the characteristics 
of  national innovation system. 
 But the analysis of  a wider set of  cluster developments or of  sectoral systems 
does not solve the ‘fallacy of  composition’- problem. Even if  it can be shown 
that most clusters can benefi t from fi rms’ integration in global value chains 
and that specifi c sectors in a national system are characterized by catching- up, 
it does not follow that this will contribute to economic and social upgrading at 
the national level. This is not to degrade the importance of  case studies and 
sector studies, but it is a strong argument for combining diff erent methods 
including analysis at the macro level in order to make it possible to establish 
links from micro and meso levels to what happens at the national level. 
 13.10  Conclusion 
 The two fi rst papers that  made use of  the concept ‘innovation system’ 
(Freeman  1982 and Lundvall  1985 ) had in common a critical perspective on 
economic theory and on economic policy. They introduced the concept in 
two diff erent contexts. Freeman analysed the importance of  building a strong 
technological infrastructure at the national level, while Lundvall analysed the 
interaction taking place at the level of  the market between users and produc-
ers of  new products. 
 Freeman ( 1982 ) has inspired Fagerberg’s work on catching- up at the level 
of  national systems. Fagerberg has developed methods to analyse in quanti-
tative terms what Freeman derived as hypotheses on the basis of  historical 
material. Lundvall ( 1985 ) inspired economic geographers such as Morgan, 
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Cooke, Gertler, Maskell and Asheim who developed further the analysis of  
forms of  knowledge in the context of  geographic space. Michael Storper 
enriched the analysis by linking ‘nation specifi c conventions’ to ‘untraded 
interdependencies’. 
 The global value chain literature is overlapping with the two original con-
tributions to the innovation system analysis. It shares Freeman’s assumption 
that capacity building (upgrading) is crucial for economic development and his 
concern that not all participation in international trade will contribute to that. 
It shares with Lundvall ( 1985 ) the assumption that most markets are organized 
(taking the form of  networks) with patterns of  dominance, and it also links the 
degree of  codifi cation to transaction cost analysis. 
 There is, however, a tension between the two perspectives, and this ten-
sion can be linked to the issue of  convergence versus divergence among 
national systems of  innovation. Transnational value chains would be easier 
to establish if  national systems become less disparate in terms of  institu-
tional set- up and mode of  innovation. On the other hand, international 
diversity in terms of  specialization in production, knowledge and in terms 
of  income/ cost levels can be seen as a underlying driver of  the formation of  
global value chains. 
 In order to understand the dynamics of  convergence and divergence, the 
most important step might be to analyse in some detail the evolution of  codes 
of  communication used in more or less local or global forms of  interaction. 
There is little doubt that the multinational enterprises that play the most active 
part in shaping value chains also engage in developing codes that can over-
come gaps in culture and competences. An interesting question is how this 
aff ects competence building worldwide. Codifi cation of  tacit knowledge is 
not costless. Literature on the codifi cation of  expert systems shows that what 
comes out of  the codifi cation process is less rich in terms of  complexity and 
nuance than the original expert knowledge. 
 The global value chain approach and the national innovation system 
approach diff er also when it comes to the focus and the level of  analysis. While 
the focus of  the system of  innovation approach has been on the role of  gov-
ernments in building national infrastructure and on the role of  domestic link-
ages, the focus of  global value chain analysis has been on trade policies and 
transnational linkages. Freeman’s insistence (see Sharif   2006 ) that innovation 
system analysis should give more weight to understanding macro- phenomena 
rather than just doing case and sectoral studies has not been taken up on a big 
scale among those working on innovation systems. 2 
 Among those who have done it most systematically, we fi nd Fagerberg, Dosi 
and Verspagen. 
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 To link the transformation of  economic structures to the process of  eco-
nomic growth and development is a major methodological challenge and it is 
of  major importance for the design of  trade, industry and technology policy. 
In classical development economics, the growth of  manufacturing activities 
(assumed to be characterized by increasing returns to scale and steep learning 
curves) was seen as a crucial prerequisite for high rates of  aggregate growth. 
This was presented as motivation for trade and industry policy aiming at 
import substitution. An interesting and promising recent approach is to link 
national economic performance not to specifi c sectors but to the characteris-
tics of  the technology predominant in the domestic high growth sectors (Lee 
 2013 ). 
 An open and critical discussion between the national innovation system 
proponents and the global value chain scholars will prove fruitful when it 
comes to building an agenda for development research and when it comes 
to developing strategies for development. This assumption takes inspiration 
from the fact that the few countries that have been successful in catching- up 
(Korea, Taiwan, Japan and China) have followed strategies where they gave 
attention both to building strong national innovation systems and to joining 
global value chains. 
 Current ideological campaigns in Latin America and in Africa by experts 
close to the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund  – sometimes supported by OECD) present joining global 
value chain as a  suffi  cient road to development and  as a substitute for sector spe-
cifi c industrial and trade policy. This ideological drive undermines the cred-
ibility of  the analytical literature on global value chains. There is no indication 
that Africa can enter a sustained development trajectory without strong gov-
ernment intervention just relying on the interaction with foreign multinational 
enterprises. 
 One ambitious goal for the research agenda could be to follow up on 
Freeman’s interpretation of  Friedrich List and develop a distinction between 
patterns of  participation in the global economy that strengthen the national 
knowledge base (enhance mental capital) and patterns that undermine it. It 
could also address the more specifi c question: Under what circumstances will 
the participation in global value chains contribute to learning and upgrading 
at the level of  the fi rm, at the level of  a sector and to economic and social 
development at the national level? Such an analysis would be helpful in defi n-
ing strategies for ‘managing the openness of  national systems of  innovation’. 
The idea propagated by neoliberal economists that every single entrance of  a 
domestic fi rm into a global value chain is promoting national economic devel-
opment is of  course naive. 
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 Notes 
 1  The ideas of  structural competitiveness and the importance of  national innovation 
systems for international competitiveness became more widely accepted in the 1990s 
and in the fi rst year of  the third millennium – at least in public discourse. The Euro- 
construction, the Euro- crisis and the EU response to it, with a competitiveness pact that 
puts all the burden of  adjustment on lowering wages and living standards in the south 
of  Europe, is tragic evidence that those in charge of  European economic policy have no 
understanding of  the real dynamics of  competitiveness (Lundvall and Lorenz  2012 ). 
 2  As Freeman puts it in an interview, ‘most of  the people working on Innovation Systems 
prefer to work at the micro level and they are a bit frightened still of  the strength of  the 
neoclassical paradigm at the macroeconomic level, and I think that’s where they have to 
work. You have to have an attack on the central core of  macroeconomic theory. It is hap-
pening but not happening enough, not strongly enough argued.’ (Sharif   2006 745– 66) 
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 Chapter 14 
 THE LEARNING ECONOMY AND 
THE ECONOMICS OF HOPE 
 Bengt- Åke  Lundvall 
 This chapter addresses global issues regarded through the focusing device of  
‘the learning economy’. The form is brief  and essayistic. The chapter begins 
with refl ections on the basic concepts and their roots. With reference to the 
three chapters on Europe, China and Africa ( chapter  10 ,  11 and  12 ), it is 
shown that while problems and opportunities are context specifi c, they often 
originate from developments in another region. On this basis, the essay points 
to the need for new forms of  global governance that can promote learning 
worldwide. It ends with some ideas for a research agenda. 
 14.1  The Economics of  Hope 
 The economics of  hope alludes to a book with this title bringing together arti-
cles written by Christopher Freeman ( 1992 ). The essays cover topics related to 
science policy, innovation and competitiveness linking science and technology 
to broader social and environmental issues. They are critical to the dominant 
paradigm in economics and to public policy, but they combine criticism with 
constructive ideas about where to go. Freeman was critical of  how modern 
capitalism produced inequality and exploited natural resources. He was, how-
ever, equally critical of  dystopian perspectives where current negative trends 
were projected into the future and ending in catastrophic scenarios. 
 The perspective presented in this book is somewhat diff erent. Freeman’s 
starting point was science and science policy, and his most important refer-
ence was to the Marxist physicist J. D. Bernal who established analytical links 
between science and society. Both Freeman and Bernal built their conditional 
optimism on the assumption that science and technology has a lot to off er in 
terms of  solutions to the world’s problems, if  the institutional setting allowed it 
to serve society. In this book the starting point is the learning economy, where 
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human interaction and learning at diff erent levels spanning from the orga-
nizations, the regions and the nations shape what is happening in the world. 
Freeman’s conditional optimism was based on the potential that science- based 
learning could off er, while this book broadens the perspective and gives more 
attention to the potential of  experience- based learning. 
 14.2  The Learning Economy 
 The learning economy concept has three dimensions – it is normative as well 
as descriptive and analytical. First, the concept describes characteristics of  the 
current economy where the capacity and the opportunity to learn are crucial 
for economic performance. Second, it is analytical making use of  distinctions 
between diff erent forms of  knowledge and diff erent modes of  learning. Third, 
it is based on the normative assumption that learning contributes to human 
well- being and emancipation. 
 The concept is based on an understanding of  all human beings as having 
the capacity to learn. Learning does not only refer to expanding cognition and 
developing skills, but the values and ideas that people adopt will refl ect their 
experiences. The motivations that drive people will refl ect experiences as well 
as the expectations from others. There is no fi xed human nature. This per-
spective comes close to George Herbert Mead’s theory of  social interaction 
and Dewey’s pragmatist understanding of  learning. 
 This perspective gives ground for conditional optimism since it opens up 
for major and generalized change in human behaviour. The fact that the level 
of  trust shows great variation across societies illustrates that context matters. 
The eff ective imposition of  the smoking ban in most countries in the world 
has led to unexpected changes in attitudes to smoking, and this illustrates that 
even when major economic interests with great lobbying resources are against 
it, state regulations that aff ect human behaviour can be implemented. 
 14.3  Experience- Based Learning Is Not Always Progressive 
 Learning can result in criminal skills and bad habits. Enterprises may learn to 
become more profi cient in producing and marketing products that are dan-
gerous and unhealthy. Learning has a positive connotation in common with 
concepts such as knowledge, technical change and innovation. However, while 
more knowledge and more innovation is a prerequisite  for ‘progress’, it is not 
 equal to ‘progress’. It is therefore a collective task both to promote learning and 
to give direction to processes of  learning. 
 Learning will from time to time result in situations of  ‘lock- in’ where indi-
viduals, organizations and the whole economy get stuck because of  what has 
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been learnt. Organizations and whole industries may establish capabilities 
that become obsolete – the mechanical industry had great problems with mas-
tering information technology. The population in a region may have learnt 
activities no longer in demand – one major reason for the success of  the IT 
industry in the Silicon Valley was the absence of  heavy industry experience 
in the region. 
 Experience- based learning will, if  standing alone, mainly promote incre-
mental change along the existing trajectories. Such gradual processes result 
in gains in wealth, and they are necessary when it comes to absorbing radical 
innovations and transforming them into valuable outcomes. However from 
time to time, the old technological trajectory may be depleted and a new one is 
needed; especially when facing situations of  underdevelopment and major cri-
ses, there is a need for opening up new trajectories. In such situations, external 
interventions giving new direction both to STI- and DUI- modes of  learning 
are necessary. The most powerful institution that can intervene in the econ-
omy is, of  course, the state. 
 Governments have limited capacity to intervene, and it should not be used 
to fi ne- tune processes of  learning. First it should be used to establish frame-
work conditions that support the capacity to adapt and innovate in society. This 
involves the design and implementation of  research, education, labour market, 
energy, environment and innovation policy. It also involves policies that aim at 
redistributing the costs and benefi ts of  change (see  fi gure 12.1 in  chapter 12 ). 
 The second major task is, from time to time, to open up new techno- 
economic trajectories. The state has an important role as a collective entre-
preneur. Historically, the state has played a key role in initiating the Industrial 
Revolution in England as well as in fostering the information technology revo-
lution in the United States. Today, governments face the important task of  
opening up a green techno- economic trajectory. 
 14.4  Europe as a Learning Economy 
 The concept ‘the learning economy’ was inspired by research on innovation 
and industrial dynamics in Denmark. Empirical studies demonstrated that 
private fi rms that engaged in interactive learning with customers and work-
ers performed better than those that did not. When comparing economies in 
Europe, a similar pattern was discerned at the national level. The countries 
in Europe with wide participation in ‘discretionary learning’ turned out to be 
more engaged in radical innovations than the rest ( chapter 8 ). Together these 
observations give ground for optimism. If  democratizing the economy – giv-
ing consumers and workers voice and reducing inequality  – contributes to 
strong national economic performance, the future looks bright. 
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 The Lisbon Strategy from 2000 was infl uenced by such an optimistic view. 
But the strategy had, from the very beginning, two competing sources of  
inspiration. One refl ected the idea of  an egalitarian knowledge- based devel-
opment. It was refl ected in the objective set for 2010  ‘to make Europe the 
most competitive knowledge- based region in the world with more and better 
jobs and with social cohesion’. The other source was mainstream economics, 
as practiced by OECD economists, and it was refl ected in the call for more 
fl exible labour markets, principally meaning that wages should adjust more 
quickly to changes in the demand for labour. 
 Already halfway through the planning period (around 2005), the strategy 
became mainly oriented towards increasing fl exibility and the objectives set 
for investment in knowledge and promoting learning were never given high 
priority. This refl ected that the ideas of  the knowledge- based and learning 
economy were never taken seriously among those who were in charge of  eco-
nomic policy. In the wake of  the fi nancial crisis, the coordination of  economic 
policy was given up, and it was agreed that each member country should 
increase its own competiveness by reducing costs and by austerity policies (see 
 chapter 11 and the next section) 
 14.5  Europe’s Austerity Response to the Financial Crisis 
 International competitiveness is an ideologically loaded concept. In the domi-
nant discourse, it is assumed that fi rms compete on the basis of  low prices 
and, therefore, low costs are seen as the most important source of  competi-
tiveness. Since wages constitute the major element in costs, a direct link is 
established between the national wage rate and competitiveness. Increasingly, 
the debate brought in the costs of  fi nancing the public sector as another factor 
that undermines ‘competitiveness’ through its direct or indirect impact on the 
national cost level. It followed that raising wages and expanding the public 
sector became seen as undermining competitiveness while austerity was seen 
as the right way to enhance it. 
 In  chapter 13 , we refer to the controversial analytical work at OECD in 
the early 1980s on the link between science and technology, on the one hand, 
and competitiveness, on the other. One major conclusion from this work was 
that while costs matter in the short term, other factors are decisive for long- 
term competitiveness, or for what the group referred to as ‘structural com-
petitiveness’. Among those factors, the strength of  the knowledge base of  the 
economy and the strength of  its ‘national system of  innovation’ were found to 
be of  crucial importance ( chapter 13 ). 
 This more nuanced understanding of  what constitutes competitiveness 
became (with some delay) more widely accepted within OECD, and in the 
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beginning of  the 1990s, it was combined with a new understanding of  the 
economy as being ‘knowledge based’. As mentioned, this new perspective was 
part of  the background for the Lisbon Strategy. But the 2007 fi nancial crisis 
changed the discourse, and the original link between austerity and competi-
tiveness was reestablished. 
 In the wake of  fi nancial speculations against the weak members of  the 
Eurozone, a radical shift in policy perspective took place. A ‘competitiveness 
pact’ was established where each single country on its own should assure that 
their economic policy and economic fundamentals were acceptable to fi nance 
capital or to ‘the market’. This turn of  events had far- reaching consequences 
for Europe and for the rest of  the world. One consequence was that the eff orts 
to build a strong national knowledge base were given even lower priority. 
Among the victims of  austerity policy were investments in research, education 
and training. 
 The character of  Europe’s competitiveness strategy is important for the 
world economy as a whole. When all the European countries focus on low-
ering costs and reducing the volume of  public expenditure, it contributes 
to weak eff ective demand and to economic stagnation at the world level. 
The neglect of  investment in knowledge and learning undermines innova-
tion and growth from the supply side. The focus on austerity weakens trade 
unions and reduces the capacity of  governments to redistribute income to 
the poor. The fi nal outcome is economic stagnation combined with growing 
inequality. 
 The challenge for Europe is to reinvent the original intentions behind the 
European Union so that they fi t into the context of  the globalizing learning 
economy. This requires a new kind of  internal solidarity with priority given to 
investments in knowledge in the weak countries and breaking the current ten-
dency towards increasing inequality. It also requires a change of  the competi-
tiveness discourse and practice so that Europe carries its fair share of  world 
investment in knowledge. This will require strong political leadership and a 
readiness to go against the interests of  global fi nance. 
 14.6  China’s Growth and Investment in Knowledge 
 When the Lisbon strategy was developed around 2000, the US economy was 
used as benchmark for Europe and there were few references to the economic 
development in China in the background documents. Today, it is generally 
recognized that China’s high rate of  growth, together with high growth rates 
in other BRICS countries, has had an enormous impact on the rest of  the 
world. Less attention has been given to the exceptionally high rate of  invest-
ment in knowledge in China. Since 2000, China is the single country in the 
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world that has given full attention to the role of  knowledge and innovation, 
and as a result, the global knowledge landscape has changed. 
 When aggregate economic growth of  GNP reached more than 10 per cent 
per annum in China, the investment in knowledge was growing at double 
that rate. Research and development (R&D) expenditure, the annual number 
of  PhD graduates and the number of  scientifi c publications were all grow-
ing with around 20 per cent per annum. While the R&D intensity remained 
unchanged during the period 2000– 2015 at around 1.5 per cent in a stagnat-
ing Europe, it grew from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent in the rapidly growing 
Chinese economy. 
 This massive investment in knowledge has not been accompanied by a cor-
responding eff ort to build a learning economy, however. Most Chinese fi rms 
operate with hierarchical forms of  organization, and there is little room for 
creative contributions from employees. This becomes a growing problem in 
a society where there is explosive growth in the number of  highly educated 
young scholars. The problem is refl ected in the reluctance of  overseas Chinese 
to come back and work in China and in a tendency among young people to 
prefer to work for foreign companies off ering more room for organizational 
learning. 
 It is a major challenge for China’s leaders and enterprises to realize the 
potential of  combining this major eff ort to promote STI- mode of  learning 
with a stronger emphasis on the DUI- mode. When workers, consumers and 
citizens take on more participatory roles in the economy, it would become 
the fi rst real test of  the potential off ered by the learning economy hypothesis 
( chapter 10 ). 
 14.7  Growth and Structural Change in Africa 
 China’s high growth rates have had major impacts on all major regions in 
the world. China became a host for foreign direct investments from Europe 
and the United States, and outsourcing led to structural change with loss of  
jobs in manufacturing in the OECD area. The increased demand for natural 
resource– based commodities from China contributed to high- growth rates in 
Latin America and Africa. 
 However so far, the high- growth rates in Africa have not spread and ben-
efi ted the majority of  the population. The African countries have become 
increasingly specialized in natural resource– based hard commodities such as 
oil and other minerals, and as a result, their economies have become even 
more vulnerable to shifts in global demand. Deindustrialization and growth 
in the share of  the informal sector characterize structural change since the 
beginning of  the millennium. The present form of  economic growth cannot 
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overcome Africa’s problems of  poverty, hunger, massive youth unemployment 
and food import dependence ( chapter 12 ). 
 Joining global value chains and learning from foreign companies is not suf-
fi cient to open up a diff erent trajectory leading towards industrialization and 
job creation ( chapter 13 ). There is a need for strong and selective intervention 
in terms of  industry and trade policy, to give strong priority to build techno-
logical infrastructure and to establish STI learning in relation to some selected 
sectors including the sectors that produce food and energy. Such top- down 
eff orts would need to be supported by local initiative and mobilization. 
 The challenge for Africa is that domestic governments are weak and rentier 
interests strong, while international partners tend to benefi t from the lop- sided 
growth. Some believe that the African Union could play a role in shaping a 
common strategy. Since it is crucial to fi nance new activities, there would be 
a need for a stronger role of  the African Development Bank. Others look at 
China’s growing presence and assume that the rising costs in manufacturing in 
China combined with Chinese entrepreneurship could off er new opportuni-
ties for Africa. 
 While this chapter is being written, there has been a massive increase in 
the number of  refugees coming to Europe from war zones in Syria, Iraq 
and Afghanistan – among them are also an increasing number of  young 
African illegal emigrants hoping to get away from poverty and unemploy-
ment. The fi rst reaction has been the attempts to build Fort Europe to stop 
illegal immigrants from entering. Given the global communication infra-
structure and the proximity between Africa and Europe, it is doubtful if  
these eff orts can succeed. It is possible that failure and self- interest would 
trigger European collaboration with African countries aiming at job cre-
ation in Africa. 
 14.8  Europe, China and Africa – Diff erent but 
Interconnected Challenges 
 The development of  the austerity strategy with weak investments in knowl-
edge and learning in Europe has a negative impact on world economic growth, 
while China’s high rates of  growth and strong investment in knowledge have 
had the opposite eff ect. The increased demand for natural resources has led 
to strong but lop- sided economic growth in Africa. The lop- sided character of  
growth is one factor explaining the growing number of  emigrants now coming 
into Europe. 
 It is obvious that the world economy is strongly interconnected and that 
political choices made in one part of  the world have major impact on liv-
ing conditions in other parts. This stands in contrast to the fact that the 
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organization of  political processes predominantly is organized within the sin-
gle nation state. This interdependence becomes most dramatic, tangible and 
visible in periods of  worldwide crises. 
 The fi nancial crisis had as prerequisite the deregulation of  fi nancial mar-
kets led by the United States and the United Kingdom and supported by 
multilateral organizations such as IMF. Governments let fi nancial specula-
tion become a main driver of  the economy and allowed fi nancial bubbles 
to emerge. Enterprises changed their attention and activities as it became 
increasingly worthwhile to engage in fi nancial transactions as compared to 
engaging in innovation and investing in production capacity. The process of  
innovation and growth in the real sector was undermined and the result was 
fi nancial instability and major crises. The deregulation strategies of  the coun-
tries that host the world leading fi nancial centres (the United States and the 
United Kingdom) pursued policies that imposed enormous social and eco-
nomic costs on the rest of  the world. 
 The environmental crisis and  global warming aff ect many parts of  the 
world, but the most strongly aff ected are poor people living in tropical regions 
in Africa. The polluters are located in other parts of  the world. The movement 
of  heavy industry from Europe and the United States to locations in Asia is 
refl ected in the changing patterns of  CO 
2
 emissions. In this area, the need 
for international agreements has been generally recognized, but the readi-
ness to engage in binding agreements is limited and even binding agreements 
go without sanctions for those signing them. One major argument slowing 
down progress is that commitments would undermine the competitiveness of  
domestic fi rms. 
 The ongoing refugee crisis may be seen as refl ecting demographic crises 
in diff erent parts of  the world. In parts of  Europe and Japan, the nativity is 
so low that population stagnates, and as a result there is an aging population. 
In Africa and parts of  Asia, the population keeps growing at high rates, and 
as a result, the proportion of  young people is high. Limited job opportunities 
in these parts of  the world give strong incentives to the young to move from 
the South to the North. In the North, the major interest is to receive and inte-
grate well- educated immigrants who give positive economic contributions to 
the national economy. 
 In what follows, these three worldwide crises will be confronted with the 
learning economy concept. They have in common that they are based on 
systemic weaknesses resulting in unsustainable paths of  development. They 
also have in common that there is a need for new types of  coordination at the 
global level. Finally, they have in common that a solution will require that the 
entrepreneurial state gives a new direction to knowledge creation and learn-
ing. Market forces will, if  left alone, only aggravate the problems. 
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 14.9  Financialization, Innovation and Learning 
 Through deregulations of  fi nance, the world economy has become dominated 
by a process of  fi nancialization. This is refl ected in an increasing role of  fi nan-
cial motives, fi nancial markets, fi nancial actors and fi nancial institutions in 
the operation of  the domestic and international economies. This new global 
regime is supported by the fi nancial– industrial complex combining the inter-
ests of  fi nancial institutions, public regulators and experts. 
 The concept of  an industrial complex alludes to the military– industrial 
complex, that is, to a strong social and political constellation. Within the com-
plex, experts move between functions in organizations serving as regulators, 
suppliers and customers. Participants in the complex share the understanding 
of  what technological trajectory to follow, and they stand together in defend-
ing the autonomy of  the complex. 
 The current position of  the fi nancial– industrial complex represents a major 
threat to the learning economy. Rather than fulfi lling the role of  channelling 
capital to innovation and productive investments, it serves its own interests. 
The swarms of  ‘fi nancial innovations’ that went ahead of  the global fi nancial 
crisis are perhaps the most striking examples of  how innovations can have 
destructive consequences. Those fi nancial innovations made it possible for an 
increasing share of  transactions to take place inside the complex while taxing 
the rest of  the economy. 
 In spite of  the discrediting eff ect of  the crisis, the fi nancial– industrial com-
plex has actually strengthened its position with regard to national governments. 
Financial institutions give grades to national policy strategies. Good grades are 
given to austerity while the kind of  reforms and public investments that enhance 
the long- term capacity to innovate and learn are neglected or regarded and 
treated as negative. Grading involves sanctions where bad grades result in high 
capital costs or even a complete closing of  the access to international loans. 
 In the wake of  the most recent fi nancial crisis, regulations to repair some 
of  the most obvious fl aws in the global and national fi nancial systems were 
implemented at the international and national level. But the regulations have 
not changed the basic dynamics of  the system. Expansionary monetary policy 
has resulted in assets price infl ation making the rich richer, but zero interest 
rates have not led to new investments and economic growth. New asset price 
raises take place in a context of  economic stagnation. As a result, new bubbles 
threaten to burst and give rise to the next fi nancial crisis. 
 One way to reform the fi nancial system and move its focus from speculation 
towards innovation would be to introduce national and regional development 
banks with public ownership and a clear mandate to build the foundation of  
knowledge- based growth. It would require strong political leadership ready 
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to confront the fi nancial– industrial complex as it operates at the national and 
global level. Critical research on the functioning of  fi nance and the formation 
of  independent expertise would be helpful in this process. Today, most ‘experts 
on fi nance’ are insiders and support the strong position of  the fi nancial– 
industrial complex. 
 To avoid major depressions as triggered by fi nancialization, there is a need 
for global cooperation on a new foundation where the focus is on knowledge- 
based development rather than on monetary discipline. The current institu-
tional setting where the IMF and the World Bank tend to support rather than 
control the fi nancial– industrial complex needs to be changed. 
 In this context, the recent collaboration of  major development banks from 
BRICS countries (Brasil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) resulting in an 
alternative World Development Bank is of  major interest. Global cooperation 
could result in a Tobin tax on speculation with incomes allocated to strengthen-
ing the knowledge base and innovation systems in the least developed countries. 
 Policy learning will be required and in this case the resistance to change 
is strong, well- organized and supported by the current economic philosophy. 
Historical experience shows, nonetheless, that when the survival of  the system 
is threatened, necessary reforms will be implemented. Perhaps the suffi  cient 
willingness to learn will require yet another major world economic crisis. 
 14.10  Coordinated Eff orts to Establish a Green Trajectory 
 This section relates economic growth to sustainable development from an 
innovation and learning economy perspective, taking into account that so 
far innovations have driven economies towards more intensive and extensive 
use of  both renewable and nonrenewable natural resources. Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to envisage any successful strategy for environmental survival that 
does not make full use of  knowledge and innovation. Therefore the struggle is 
not for or against advancing knowledge and stimulating innovation but rather 
a struggle about giving new directions for innovation and learning. 
 In order to reduce the environmental impact in terms of  natural resources, 
low entropy energy and ecosystems resilience, the focus evidently has to 
be on the creation and utilization of  knowledge. Final demand should be, 
increasingly, addressed towards goods and services with low environmental 
impact and technological and organizational knowledge should systematically 
be developed towards this goal. Progress in any of  the following dimensions 
would move the economy in the right direction: 
 a)  New processes (production, transport and logistics) requiring less resource 
input per unit of  production. 
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 b)  Substituting nonrenewable with renewable resources 
 c)  New products which are more long lasting and more recyclable 
 d)  A change in the sectorial composition of  the economy towards less resource 
intensive production activities 
 e)  A change in the location of  economic activities that reduce resource use 
for transport 
 f)  New forms of  agglomerations and new principles for housing that reduce 
resource use 
 A signifi cant amount of  current innovation eff orts undermine sustainability. 
One example is product innovations for consumers that are designated and 
designed exclusively to stimulate consumers’ appetite for new models. Another 
example is process innovations that lead to more resource use per unit of  value 
produced. Therefore it is necessary to redefi ne innovation policy from ‘general 
innovation support’ towards ‘directed innovation support’. 
 Guidance may take the form of  a combination of  taxes, subsidies, pub-
lic production, public procurement, standard settings and prohibitions. One 
important criterion for selecting and designing policy tools must be how they 
aff ect innovation and learning. There is, for instance, a scholarly literature on 
how the design of  standards may respectively promote or slow down innova-
tions. Measures should be designed not so that they freeze procedures. They 
should give freedom in choice of  method as long as the outcome is that specifi c 
green objectives are reached. 
 One argument against guidance is that the measures taken are costly and 
that given the uncertainty regarding the future, we should postpone the intro-
duction of  such measures, while we in the meantime create more knowledge 
through R&D eff orts. This is the current position of  Bjørn Lomborg – the 
sceptical environmentalist. It reveals a fundamental lack of  understanding 
of  the innovation process. One well- established conclusion from innovation 
research is that eff ective new solutions can only be developed in a process 
where the outcomes of  research eff orts are continuously applied. The feed-
back from users to producers is of  crucial importance for developing useful 
technologies. 
 Nation states dominate political governance. They have the most powerful 
tools when it comes to intervention. In some cases, nation states have real-
ized the potential of  building green competitiveness strategies. This has taken 
place with windmills in Denmark, electrical cars in California and wind and 
solar power in China. In the case of  China, the scale of  government inter-
vention in promoting renewable energy has been raised as a problem in the 
WTO. One factor reducing national eff orts in the West is resistance to selec-
tive government intervention and market dogmatism. 
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 A green innovation strategy would require a speed up of  innovation and 
of  restructuring of  the economy. This has implications for fi nance of  innova-
tion and investment. To channel fi nance into new green industries, there will 
be a need to establish ‘green development banks’ where governments play 
an important role of  determining the direction of  investment. Not when it 
comes to picking specifi c projects but when it comes to promoting specifi c new 
industries that need to be promoted in order to build a green production and 
innovation system. 
 This restructuring will of  course be refl ected in shifts in the demand for 
labour. There will be sectors where specifi c jobs disappear while new jobs in 
other sectors are created and many existing jobs will require new skills and 
new perspectives on how to do things. Very ambitious combinations of  educa-
tion, life- long learning and labour market policies will be required in order 
to transform green innovations into wide production and use. Not least will 
there be a need for new kinds of  education and for retraining of  engineers, 
designers, skilled workers and managers. Institutions that support the learning 
economy will be crucial for the transformation. 
 Initiatives at the national level cannot stand alone. Therefore, in parallel 
with national eff orts, there is a need to design global cooperation. So far much 
of  the attention in connection with global cooperation has been on reach-
ing agreements on targets for reduction of  the amount of  CO 
2
 produced. 
Changing the perspective and giving more attention to how to promote inno-
vation in green technologies would help getting out of  the current stalemates. 
The establishment of  international problem based ‘mega- science’ and mega- 
technology projects, where scholars and enterprises collaborate and share 
knowledge relevant for solving ecological problems (water, desertifi cation, 
renewable technologies), would be one way to make national agreements in 
this area more realistic. Global engineering universities with a strong profi le in 
terms of  sustainability technologies could be another type of  new institutions 
that could move things in the right direction. 
 If  these diff erent initiatives were taken, a new kind of  innovation system 
would emerge. It would be a system where the diff erent components con-
verged towards new objectives and gradually accepted new norms for what 
is acceptable in terms of  environmental conditions. The attention would be 
much more turned towards how innovations impact the environment. The 
performance indicators used to measure progress would be diff erent and con-
sumers would have found new ways to satisfy their need for stimulation and 
newness. 
 It is an open question if  the capitalist process of  production and accumula-
tion can become environmentally sustainable. It is, of  course, important not 
to ‘confuse the limits of  one particular development paradigm, with the limits 
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to growth of  the system in general’ (Freeman  1992 ). It is clear, however, that 
the scale of  the problem requires radical changes not only in technologies 
but also in values, institutions, policies and consumption patterns to develop 
what Christopher Freeman ( 1992 ) two decades ago termed a ‘green techno- 
economic paradigm’. 
 There are no technical barriers to moving the innovation system in this 
direction. However, the political and institutional barriers are huge. Vested 
interests, nationalism, fi nancialization, pro- market dogma and political short 
termism constitute barriers for change. Nevertheless, new ways of  tackling 
the ecological crisis will have to be developed as problems become more 
serious. 
 14.11  Demographic Crises and Migration in the Context of  
the Globalizing Learning Economy 
 The rate of  world population growth is unevenly distributed between coun-
tries and continents. When combined with worldwide communication and 
with big and growing gaps in living standards, it results in growing fl ows of  
migration between continents. In this section, the focus is on the impact of  
migration on innovation systems and the learning economy. 
 The integration of  foreign workers coming from a radically diff erent cul-
ture represents a challenge for the OECD and especially for countries with 
the most developed learning economies. It is not surprising that Denmark and 
Netherlands combine the highest degrees of  workers’ participation in organi-
zational learning with weak performance in terms of  integrating immigrants 
with a diff erent ethnical background in the labour market. These two coun-
tries are culturally homogenous, and it has allowed organizational learning to 
take place on the basis of  tacitness and implicit rules. 
 This style of  learning excludes those who do not understand the informal 
rules, and for integration to take place, more explicit rules and more hierar-
chical forms of  management tend to be implemented. This is reinforced by 
the impact of  immigration on the industrial structure. More ample access to 
low- skilled workers with modest wage demands makes it possible to prolong 
the life of  sectors and workplaces characterized by Taylorist or simple work 
organization. 
 In order to safeguard some of  the basic qualities of  the learning economy, 
major investments in training immigrants both outside and inside the enter-
prise sector are crucial. Such training must combine upgrading of  skills with 
elements of  cultural integration. This is important not only to avoid ethnic 
confl icts and the formation of  ghettos but also in order to avoid a regression 
towards hierarchical forms of  work organization and low- quality jobs with 
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limited room for discretionary learning. Such investments require a partner-
ship between the state, the workers’ organizations and the private sector. 
 Other migration fl ows, driven less by poverty and war, are important in 
shaping the global knowledge landscape. The migration of  experts and sci-
entists is an important vehicle for transferring both explicit and tacit knowl-
edge across continents. Scientists of  Chinese and Indian origin constitute a 
big share of  all natural scientists at US universities. Others work in high- tech 
companies. This refl ects that the interest among US- born students has been 
directed more towards other fi elds of  knowledge than science and technology. 
Chinese and Indian scholars have been attracted to the United States and to 
Europe by academic freedom and more attractive material conditions. 
 Recently this outfl ow of  scholars from China and India has begun to be 
combined with a fl ow back to the countries of  origin. The successful indus-
trial transformations in the North- east Asia (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
China) have all benefi ted from the absorption of  returnees who have brought 
both specifi c scientifi c and technological capabilities and insights in how to 
organize fi nance, marketing and research back from experience- based learn-
ing abroad. Additionally, the returnees have been instrumental in building 
network relationships between their new home base and the enterprises and 
institutions abroad. The original brain drain has, to some degree, turned into 
brain circulation. 
 This benefi cial eff ect cannot be seen in Africa. The rather small pro-
portion of  well- trained professionals, scientist and engineers in Africa are 
attracted to OECD countries off ering better working and living conditions. 
In some African countries, around half  of  all doctors and nurses work in 
Europe while there is acute shortage of  health personnel in the country of  
origin. So far, there are few signs of  a fl ow back from the rich countries. 
While there are ample problems in Africa that require high- level expertise, 
the eff ective demand for this kind of  knowledge is weak. Lundvall ( 2008 ) 
argues that the low level of  eff ective demand for knowledge in less developed 
countries refl ects lack of  innovation, and that expanding higher education 
without a major drive for innovation and structural change tends to result in 
further brain drain. 
 The above brief  notes on how migration between Europe, the United 
States, China and Africa relates to the learning economy serve to illustrate 
the interdependence between continents when it comes to building a strong 
knowledge base. There is much attention in WTO trade agreements to intel-
lectual property rights that protect the interests of  major multinational fi rms 
that have a technological lead. Much less attention is given to protect the inter-
ests of  African countries that use scarce resources to educate professionals who 
end up working in Europe or the United States. 
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 The combination of  high rates of  population growth and high rates of  pov-
erty in Africa will lead to a future mass emigration to Europe that will prove 
to be impossible to absorb with or without building Fort Europe. Today many 
European countries are reducing their development aid in order to fi nance the 
infl ow of  refugees and immigrants. This will aggravate future problems. What 
is required is a new global regime where African countries are supported in 
their eff ort to create new activities and jobs. At the core of  this regime should 
be compensation for brain drain and new and more generous rules for inter-
national knowledge sharing. 
 14.12  Learning in Geographical Space – towards a New 
Research Agenda 
 This section presents the contours of  a research agenda that may be seen as a 
follow- up to the analysis and issues raised in this book. There is one overarch-
ing question that needs to be given more satisfactory answer than those given 
by current research:   How do diff erent forms of  globalization and diff erent forms of  
opening up of  national innovation systems aff ect the creation, diff usion and use of  knowledge 
at the local, national and global level? When this question has been answered, there 
are several follow- up questions to be answered:  What are the implications for public 
policy at the national (or regional) level in diff erent parts of  the world? What are the implica-
tions for the rules of  the game at the global level? 
 One of  the most fundamental assumptions driving economic policy is that 
expanding international trade contributes to economic growth and welfare. 
When countries specialize, they become more productive, and consumers 
become better off . In  chapter  12 on Africa, we showed how a whole con-
tinent as a result of  trade specialization had ended with a lop- sided struc-
ture with limited potential for learning and job creation. In  chapter 13 , we 
raised doubts about the benefi cial eff ects of  joining global value chains in the 
absence of  local capacities and a strong national innovation system. A funda-
mental research question is:  What are the dynamic eff ects of  reducing trade barriers on 
the knowledge base and learning capability? 
 New trade agreements are propagated with the argument that they raise 
the level of  income. When they get implemented, it turns out that the prom-
ises made were exaggerated. More important is that the gains take the form of  
one discrete raise. Research should ask the question:  What is the impact of  specifi c 
trade agreements on the dynamic performance of  the national innovation system? 
 Referring back to the three crises discussed, here we should also ask:  How 
do new trade agreements and existing rules for international economic interaction contribute 
to respectively fi nancial stability, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction? The 
costs of  ‘free trade’ in these three dimensions need to be taken as seriously as 
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the benefi ts. The fact that it is possible for the United States to make com-
plaints via WTO when China subsidizes green technologies illustrates that 
there are such costs. Another example is that the WTO regime makes it pos-
sible to sanction poor countries with much less political strength that engage 
in active industrial and trade policy. 
 The starting point for the research presented in this book was the analy-
sis of  the interaction between users and producers that takes place in processes 
of  product innovation. This analysis inspired research on national systems of  
innovation. One reason for studying  national systems is that some forms of  
knowledge as well as some modes of  interactive learning are localized. A fun-
damental research question is:   What happens to knowledge exchange and interac-
tive learning between users and producers involved in innovative activities when the distance 
between them goes from local and national to global? The answer will show how degrees 
of  codifi cation, modularization and standardization of  knowledge will change 
as we move from local to global interaction. 
 In  chapter  2 it was shown that hierarchical user– producer relationships 
tend to lead to ‘unsatisfactory innovations’. When we go to interaction at 
the global level, we would expect that in most instances, users or producers 
located in less developed countries are much weaker in terms competence or 
economic resources. A relevant research question is:  How does the big knowledge 
gap between global partners aff ect the direction of  innovation? 
 The national innovation system concept has been challenged by economic 
geographers and trade economists who point to the increasing importance of  
respectively local and global interaction. In this book, it is assumed that eco-
nomic development requires a developmental state that supports innovation 
and learning – sometimes in the form of  major interventions to establish new 
trajectories in terms of  technology and industrial development. Nevertheless, 
it is also recognized that states in weak economies are themselves weak. This 
raises several research questions:   What is the role of  the state at diff erent levels of  
development when it comes to regulating and managing the openness of  the economy and 
when it comes to building national institutions that make it possible to benefi t from increased 
openness? 
 Globalization is a process that has been stimulated by technological change 
and pushed by politics. Information and communication technologies and 
deregulation of  fi nance are important factors. Sometimes, the fact that mil-
lions (most of  them Chinese!) have been lifted out of  poverty is ascribed to the 
globalization process and to the growth in international trade. However, the 
performance of  the world economy in terms of  productivity and growth is not 
impressive. This raises the fi nal and most diffi  cult research question:  How does 
the current form of  globalization, where local tacit knowledge is transformed into global stan-
dardized knowledge, contribute to the world’s production, diff usion and use of  knowledge? 
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 14.13  Conclusions 
 There are diff erent interpretations of  world development and diff erent inter-
pretations of  where current trends are leading. Global warming, fi nancial 
instability and demographic challenges are three major global challenges 
which have in common, fi rst, that market forces alone cannot be expected to 
lead to acceptable and sustainable outcomes and, second, that nation state 
governance alone is insuffi  cient. In an era with strong neoliberal pro- market 
ideology in international organizations and growing nationalism, it is tempt-
ing to end up with a pessimist view of  the world. 
 However, such pessimism is myopic and underestimates the potential of  
humankind to overcome what may look like a hopeless struggle to break disas-
trous trends. Through history, there have been major crises with great human 
costs. Some of  those refl ected natural disasters, others an incapacity to man-
age major epidemics, periods of  climate change and major wars that were ini-
tiated by imperialistic hunger for power and resources. Nonetheless, there has 
been progress in important dimensions. Today more people than ever before 
in history can live a longer life with more peace and security, with suffi  cient 
nutrition and with capacity to read and follow what is going on in the world 
through diff erent media. 
 There is little doubt that capitalist development has contributed to the raise 
in productivity and to the increased diversity of  the world economy, which 
are prerequisites for the raise in living standards and in their turn constitute 
the basis for better health, nutrition and education. Competition is a major 
factor driving innovation. The profi t motive and the search for enrichment 
is one reason why individuals work hard and entrepreneurs constantly look 
for new opportunities. Markets are useful institutions that reduce the need for 
administrative decisions. This is important since the capacity to make knowl-
edgeable and wise decisions is limited – sometimes it is absent because of  the 
self- interest among decision- makers. 
 Therefore neoliberal economists, who hail the market and raise doubts 
about the size and role of  the public sector, have got some of  the historical 
evidence on their side. But they tend to abstract from the other set of  prereq-
uisites for the raise in productivity and increased diversity. State regulation 
of  working conditions and the formation of  trade unions played an impor-
tant role in making capitalist growth socially sustainable. The most success-
ful countries had a strong state that promoted general education before the 
beginning of, or at very early stages of  the industrialization process. Since 
the beginning of  the millennium, China drives world economic growth 
and leads investments in knowledge on the basis of  a mix of  planning and 
markets. 
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 While the West struggles against religious fundamentalism resulting in ter-
ror, it has failed to recognize that it has developed an  economic fundamentalism 
that stands in the way of  making full use of  the potential off ered by science, 
technology and experience- based learning. This book presents an alternative 
perspective that we refer to as ‘the  Economics of  Hope’. The starting point 
is that knowledge is seen as the most important resource in the economy and 
learning as the most important process. This gives hope because knowledge 
has unique characteristics in terms of  scarcity. Learning is a cumulative pro-
cess, and the more you use knowledge, the more it grows. Knowledge can 
be shared with others without making it less useful, and one excellent way to 
learn more is through sharing knowledge with others. Young university profes-
sors experience this when they prepare and execute their fi rst courses. When 
our societies draw the full implications from such a perspective, many prob-
lems can be solved and well- being can be enhanced. 
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